Karl Barth's interpreters often characterize him as a ‘christocentric’ theologian. This term, however, is subject to a variety of interpretations, ranging from the totalitarian and isolationist critiques of the ‘christomonist’ objection to the indeterminate and decentred approaches offered by various postmodern readings. The disparity between these two approaches suggests a level of ambiguity in the term that hinders its usefulness unless carefully qualified. Indeed, ‘centric’ terminology itself remains rather ambiguous until the substantive formal and material considerations that lie behind any given form of centricity are addressed. This article proposes to alleviate the ambiguity that has thus clouded the use of ‘christocentric’ as a description of Barth's theology by offering five formal and material qualifications; Barth's christocentricity must be understood in terms of (1) a veiling and unveiling of knowledge in Christ, (2) a methodological orientation, (3) a particular christology, (4) a trinitarian focus and (5) an affirmation of creaturely reality. Using these criteria, the article also argues that both the christomonistic and postmodern interpretations break down at certain points because they fail to appreciate fully these qualifications and thus the particular nature of Barth's christocentrism.

Contrary to periodic challenges from a viewpoint of historical scepticism or relativism, Jerome's late fourth-century description of Simon Peter may be said to represent a critical and consensual account of the Apostle's demise in Rome as this was reflected in early Christian memory of the first two centuries, both in the East and in the West. Three centuries earlier, the much-debated passage in 1 Clement 5 represents (for all its ambiguities) an integral strand of such living memory – citing the founding apostles' death for their faith according to local Roman tradition while discreetly airbrushing the specific circumstances of their demise. It is significant, finally, that local memory of Peter's martyrdom remained confined to Rome and was never subject to competing claims elsewhere.

Apophaticism has become quite fashionable, for political as well as philosophical reasons: political, because apophaticism opens up space between God and oppressive God-talk; and philosophical, because apophaticism provides theological warrant for embracing our Kantian limits. A correlate fashion has been to broaden our sense of who belongs to the ‘apophatic tradition’ – and Thomas Aquinas has been one of the favourite candidates for such reconsideration. Contrary to this trend, I argue that apophaticism is not a ‘rule’ for Thomas – far from it. Apophaticism is, ironically, one of the steps in Thomas's strategy to assemble the conceptual resources necessary for making positive statements about God. That strategy, in brief, consists of five moves: first, Thomas provisionally defines ‘God’ as the sufficient cause of certain effects ascribed to God; second, using the via negativa to rule out whatever is incompatible with a ‘God’ so specified, he argues that God-in-Godself can be identified with ‘God’; third, Thomas identifies ‘being’ as the common term between God and creatures (which is licit because, Thomas claims, being is not a genus); fourth, he argues that all beings tend toward their perfection, and that God is this perfection; and fifth, he concludes that this tendency-toward-God funds the making of meaningful, positive statements about God-in-Godself.

While several commentators have pointed out the supralapsarian nature of Schleiermacher's christology, this article is the first thorough examination of the nature of Schleiermacher's supralapsarian arguments. I show that Schleiermacher's supralapsarianism is directly based on his doctrine of absolute dependence and divine causality. However, the ontology implied by the latter doctrine is in the end inconsistent with Schleiermacher's christology, and Schleiermacher's system does not seem to have the resources to be saved from this inconsistency.

In recent years feminists and others have taken issue with traditional understandings of the atonement. Part of their criticism has been the assertion that to glorify Christ's suffering entails glorifying all suffering, a connection that potentially leads to abusive behaviour. Suffering, they claim, is not redemptive – ever. In this article I argue that, based on the biblical text, at least one instance of suffering, the suffering of Christ, is redemptive. In addition, I argue that redemptive suffering is unique to Christ. Human suffering is not redemptive and should not be spoken of in those terms.

It is widely known that early on in his teaching career Karl Barth advanced a concept of the ‘orders of creation’, but that he retracted that concept in his later work in reaction to the tragic use that had been made of it by the National Socialist movement in Germany. However, two aspects of this movement remain relatively unexplored: first, the underlying material continuity between Barth's early ethics and his later ethics that this movement occludes; and second, the significant methodological shift in Barth's theology which this movement attests. This article explores both these aspects of Barth's theological development through his treatment of the ‘orders of creation’.

This article presents a theological engagement with the Christ of the Gospel of John. Christology has two basic responsibilities. First, all Christology is required to demonstrate that it is rooted in scriptural reading. Second, consistent attentiveness needs to be paid to the dynamic relationship between Christ's person and work. The nature of these two responsibilities is elucidated by exploring some recent christological contributions. The remainder of the essay engages with the encounter at the centre of the Fourth Gospel: that in the Word made flesh the eternal love between the Father and the Son is unfolded into the time of this world. Jesus' life and ministry is the decisive meeting of time and eternity. Counsel is then offered for how John's Gospel may faithfully be read in line with this subject matter. Important objections to ‘Logos’ Christologies, and Johannine Christology in particular, are introduced. This article then proceeds to argue for the realistic meeting of all that is human and all that is divine in the person of Jesus who lives a life of loving obedience to the Father. Throughout, this article maintains a conversation with the Fourth Gospel, the ontological implications of this text, and those voices from within Christian tradition that can help us in the reading of John.

In his The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, F. LeRon Shults recommends postfoundationalism as a via media between modernist foundationalism and postmodernist antifoundationalism. He advocates postfoundationalism as an epistemological approach which avoids the pitfalls on either side and provides the best way forward for constructive theological work. In this article I attempt to assess how well Shults's proposal treats Christian theological knowing. I begin by entertaining a Barthian theological concern which might be employed as soft criteria for an assessment of any proposed theological epistemology. This concern stipulates that an epistemology in the service of Christian theology must respect a commitment to the objective reality of God who, as Word become flesh, makes himself known through the human experience of reality to his church, while recognising the fallibility of human knowing, presupposing a knowledge of God accessible through experience always only by the prevenient, self-giving action of God. I then turn to a brief analysis of the Shults–van Huyssteen case against foundationalism and nonfoundationalism, focusing particularly on the postfoundationalist critiques of foundationalism and fideism in dialogue with Barth. The article concludes with an appraisal of the postfoundationalist recommendation. I argue that Shults's approach maps well to the theological concern for critical realism and a recognition of the social embeddedness of human knowing. Postfoundationalism's underlying commitments, however, leave it closed to an external source of warrant, and as a consequence repudiate a from above view of theological knowing. I suggest instead that only a theofoundationalist epistemology avoids the pitfalls sketched by Shults in a way that maintains proper epistemic humility without entering the ghettos of fideism or scepticism.

It is frequently alleged that Martin Luther's doctrine of justification by grace through faith posits absolute human passivity vis-à-vis God and, on account of the past completion of Christ's sacrifice, disconnects Christians from the cross. This article takes issue with this view. Specifically, it disputes the claim that, through his doctrine of justification, Luther became an unwitting advocate of the conceptual juxtaposition of gift and exchange and thus also an ideologue of the shift from an organic to a contractual view of society. Instead, I argue, Luther's eucharistic theology anticipates the concerns of Radical Orthodoxy's critique of gift and sacrifice. It does so, however, in a more forceful manner, in that for Luther gift and exchange are so bound together in his doctrine of justification that the eucharist, instead of being a mere paradigm for social relationships (as Radical Orthodoxy would have it), radically restructures those relationships in the all-embracing unfolding of its participatory gratuity. An additional merit of Luther's vision lies in its systematic description of the eucharist's gift-character in terms of socially and vocationally construed delay and non-identical repetition, actively involving both God and humans – a description not afforded by Radical Orthodoxy's critique.

Three aspects of Robert Jenson's theology are investigated and then related according to their common pneumatological implications. First Jenson's neo-Barthian doctrine of revelation is considered as it leads him to an immediate or near-immediate relation of the being and act of God. This puts particular tensions on how he maintains the ontological distinction between creator and creation. Second, the same tension is found repeated in the way Jenson rejects the notion of divine timelessness. In bringing the being of God into history, and time into the being of God, he eventually calls the Father, Son and Spirit the ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ of the triune life. These tensions are heightened even further in the third section. With his characteristic concept of ‘narrative causality’ Jenson attempts a constructive recovery of Hegelian categories by suggesting the ‘End’ – as brought about by the Spirit-‘Outcome’ of God – is that ‘sublation which is itself not sublated’. The article concludes without entering the specifically Hegelian controversy, rather with more simple questions about the doctrinal integrity of Jenson's eschatology.

Poststructural emphasis on the intertextual character of texts appears to threaten the integrity of texts, opening them to a dizzying infinite variety of meanings. One might respond by trying to shore up the boundaries around texts, but it is undeniable that texts take their meaning by harmonising with other texts. How can this dilemma be resolved? Using jokes as a paradigm, the paper defends the notion that texts are ‘porous’. A text has its own integrity and specific meaning, but the boundaries between text and text are permeable. In dialogue with Kevin Vanhoozer, I argue that texts must be permeable if they are to have meaning at all. Jokes only work when the hearer has relevant information from outside the joke itself. The porosity of texts does not destroy authorial intention; the joker intends for the hearer to bring outside information to bear on the text. In these senses, every text is a joke, and a good interpreter knows the information from outside the text and has the wit to know what information is relevant. Good interpretation is always a matter of ‘getting it’.

There are several ways whereby medieval theories of vision may have contributed to the rise of practices some saw as idolatrous. A feature of much medieval art is the rise of naturalistic representation. This process was facilitated by the use of linear perspective, based ultimately on Euclid's visual cone. We are told its application led viewers to confuse a representation with its object. The theory of extramission influenced medieval piety profoundly. First, by suggesting that the eye emits a ray and ‘touches’ its object, it led worshippers to believe that seeing the Eucharistic host had a salvific effect. This may have led them to think that seeing images of saints or God had a similar effect. Second, by implying that the subject was active in the process of seeing, it underpinned Augustine's theory of vision, whereby one trained the eye to access the invisible through the visible. However, as he was aware, the untrained eye could linger on physical objects and want to possess them. Finally, there was much debate about how visual information was mediated. Some argued that it was transmitted by intermediate bodies. The parallels between their language and that used by iconophobes to describe the images they rejected are striking and merit further investigation. Others argued that the viewer had direct access to the object. This understanding, when combined with the idea that seeing equates to knowing, may have led worshippers to believe that seeing an image of God meant they might in some sense know him.

It is in Jonathan Edwards's Freedom of the Will (1754) that he reconciles impeccability and freedom of the will in the human soul of Jesus Christ, even when Jesus is in a state of trial. But how does he shape a synthesis between these two attributes without duplicity, and at the same time avoid theological and christological barbs, whether Arminian or Hobbist, Nestorian or Apollinist? For Edwards, the Son of God did not surrender impeccability when he undertook to fulfil – in human nature, and in a state of trial – intra-trinitarian promises, promises made not only by the Father to the Son, but by the Son to the Father. Edwards views the habits of the heart of Jesus Christ progressing in holiness from the moment of his incarnation. He understands the excellencies that the Son of God brought to the human nature in the incarnation in no way to have added to nor to have diminished the impeccable holy disposition of his person. A key to interpreting the holy habits of Jesus’ heart is, according to Edwards, to view the source of the impeccability of the soul of Jesus as lying in its essence, not in a cause outside his person; it lies in the very disposition of his heart.

Central to Barth's doctrine of election is the notion that Jesus Christ is the subject of election. This implies that Jesus Christ existed from all eternity. I discuss four possible interpretations of this proposition. I analyse these interpretations both in terms of their internal consistency and in terms of their consistency with Barth's overall proposal. Three of the four interpretations, defended by Emil Brunner, Cornelius Berkouwer, John Colwell and Bruce McCormack, I find wanting. With the fourth interpretation I lay my own cards on the table and argue that part of the problem lies in Barth's formulation itself. The context of Barth's saying that ‘Christ is the subject of election’ suggests that for Barth, Jesus Christ is not so much identical not with a subject, but with an act: the divine reaching out to that what is not God. This act establishes the act and object of election.

This essay explores the emphasis on habitus in contemporary approaches to theological education, particularly as developed in the recent volume Educating Clergy. Attention is given to the roots of the concept in the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu, and how it is developed in the work of Talal Asad, in order to illustrate why habitus is frequently emphasised as a helpful way to bridge the gap between theory and practice, knowledge and the good life. The analysis demonstrates a number of weaknesses in the concept, both from a practical and theological perspective. It uncovers some guiding presuppositions about the nature of ‘religion’ in Educating Clergy, which highlights the lack of homogeneity in the concept of habitus, as well as the fact that it is epistemologically ambivalent. The discussion serves to demonstrate the need for theological education to attend to the norms and sources which provide the critical leverage with which to evaluate differing habits and dispositions.

This article is a critical assessment of Pannenberg's trinitarian approach in his Systematic Theology. In particular it raises the questions of how far Pannenberg's emphasis on the Trinity affects the practice of theology and of how the theologian should understand his or her task in the light of the being and work of the triune God. It argues that there is an uneasy tension between Pannenberg's commitment to thoroughgoing trinitarianism on the one hand and his commitment to a rational theology that takes account of the modern age. This tension can be seen most clearly in Pannenberg's treatment of christology, faith and theological method. It is at these points, where modern thinking has often been so critical with traditional theology, that Pannenberg's trinitarian commitments are not deployed as consistently or penetratingly as elsewhere.

This article examines the question of Karl Barth's stance on universalism. Setting the question within the wealth of contradictory accounts of Barth on this issue, it seeks to find a way through the opposing views represented in the secondary literature. Following a brief examination of the doctrine of election which is the source of the charge of universalism, Barth's response to Berkouwer's The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth will be considered in detail. This passage helps to place Barth's own reaction to the charge of universalism in a broader framework than that of a simple denial or acceptance, and helps to highlight what Barth does and does not reject regarding universalism. It will be argued that it is the replacement of the person of Jesus Christ with a principle, rather than any limitation of the salvific work of God, that Barth rejects in rejecting apokatastasis. Barth's denial of universalism marks a dismissal of the problematic elements associated with the word, not a denial of the ultimate friendliness of Jesus Christ. The radical newness of Barth's own approach to universalism cannot be overemphasized, and marks the means by which one may pass through the impasse of differing accounts of Barth's eschatology.

In both world wars, Lutherans of German origin in Australia were used as scapegoats by the government, as that church and its people were regarded as German and therefore a safely bounded object for spite. South Australia, the heartland of Lutheranism, was especially attacked, some pastors and long-settled citizens being interned, restricted and otherwise rejected: actual worship was also affected. The traumatic effects have lasted until now in rural communities such as ‘Hope’, the subject of long-term anthropological research by the writer. These effects are not merely personal, which are grim enough, but inevitably, in deeply religious communities with limited sacred–secular split, also theological. However, given the understandable yet unacceptable unwillingness of the church to face the past, the consequences are ignored. This article argues that crises, whether natural, the result of war, or of wrong behaviour by church officers, are present in every church context through the past to the contemporary world, as is the tendency to ignore the impact in favour of maintaining the institution. The lasting theological effects on laity and clergy should be acknowledged and acted upon in training and ministry for many years after the events, whether they resulted from the behaviour of one person in a parish or an entire government or empire. This may mean accepting the implications of locality for lived theology.

I would like to begin by expressing gratitude to Edwin van Driel for creating the conditions which make possible a genuine debate on the issues raised by my essay in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth. I have, of course, long been aware of Paul Molnar's (shall we say?) rather vigorous rejection of the position I took in that essay on the question of the logical relation of election to the triunity of God in Barth's ‘mature’ theology – i.e. subsequent to publishing his revised doctrine of election in CD II/2. If I have kept silence this long, it has not been without good reason. I was unwilling to respond to Molnar for two reasons. First, in his criticisms of my views, Molnar failed to engage the one point which would have been decisive for launching a serious ‘debate’, i.e. he made no attempt to explain the meaning of Barth's thesis that Jesus Christ is the subject of election or to show how his own reading of Barth is not called into question by that thesis. He simply set it aside as (apparently) unworthy of discussion and chose instead to merely insist on his own reading. It should go without saying that no real ‘debate’ can take place when the evidence brought forth to support a new proposal is passed over in silence. Less important was the second reason.

This work critically examines the moral theology of Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II. In his writings as Wojtyla, and later as John Paul II, the theme of human dignity served as the starting point for his moral theology. This article first describes his conception of human dignity as influenced by Thomist and by phenomenological sources. The Thomist philosophy of being provided Wojtyla with an optimistic view of the epistemic and moral capacity of human persons. Wojtyla argued that because of the analogia entis, humans gain epistemic access to the normative order of God as well as the moral capacity to live in accordance with the law of God. Built upon the foundation of his Thomist assumptions, Wojtyla's phenomenological research enriched his insight into human dignity by arguing in favour of the formative nature of human action. He argued that human dignity rested also in this dynamism of personhood: the capacity not only to live in accordance with the normative order but to form oneself as virtuous by partaking in virtuous acts or to form one's community in solidarity through acts of participation and self-giving. After presenting his moral theology, this article then engages critically with his assumptions from a Protestant perspective. I argue that, while human dignity provides a powerful and beneficial starting point for ethics, his Thomist ontology of being/substance and the optimistic terms in which he interprets human dignity ultimately undermine his social programme. I propose that an ontology of relation provides a better starting point for interpreting human dignity and for appealing for acts of solidarity in the social realm.