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Soviet Labor Policy in the First Five-Year Plan: The Dneprostroi Experience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2017

Extract

Recent interpretations of the first Five-Year Plan have taken two main approaches. One has emphasized the exploitation of workers and peasants by the party elite throughout the years of the first two Five-Year Plans. In explaining the evolution of labor policies and laws that bound the workers to jobs, Robert Conquest and Solomon Schwarz emphasize the personal responsibility of Stalin, who demanded rapid expansion of industrialization and brooked no questioning of his views. To obey him and to protect their political futures, his officials used tough policies designed to produce quick, visible results. Both authors describe a linear development of ever harsher proscriptions and penalties, and they attribute greater coherence to the process and greater effectiveness to the laws than actually existed. Both see the process from the viewpoint of the capital, disregard the competing ideas among the leaders, and neglect the local level where policies had to be executed and were often changed or ignored.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies. 1983

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References

1. Robert, Conquest, Industrial Workers in the USSR (New York, 1978)Google Scholar; Solomon, Schwarz, Labor in the Soviet Union (New York, 1952)Google Scholar.

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6. John Barber is the author of numerous studies distributed by the Center for Russian and East European Studies in Birmingham.

7. “Ought we to yield to the clamours of working-men who have reached the limit of their patience but who do not understand their true interest as we do?” Karl Radek, addressing the War College, 1921. Quoted in Alexander, Barmine, One Who Survived (New York, 1945 Google Scholar), in Conquest, Industrial Workers, p. 8.

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12. Prerevolutionary planners had given priority to these goals as well. Ibid., pp. 26, 69-71.

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15. Krasnoe Zaporozhe (hereafter KZ), February 18, July 30, September 2, 1927.

16. Informatsionnyi listok Dneprostroia, no. 6 (November 1929), p. 79; Pervenets industrializatsii strany — Dneproges (Zaporozhe, 1969), p. 215. Mistakes in labor planning and the need to learn from them were discussed in the party press. See, for example, Za industrializatsii, February 2, 1930.

17. Torgovo-Promyshlennaia Gazeta, November 18, 1926. By 1930 there were 45 cranes, 10 large excavators, 56 steam locomotives, 86 automated dump cars, and hundreds of compressed air drills. Pervenets, p. 6.

18. The extra labor and construction materials were paid for through short-term loans. Ekonomicheskaia zhizri, January 24, 28, 1928. KZ, September 2, October 8, 13, 1927. Khar'kov Traktorstroi lacked machinery as Dneprostroi did. Za industrializatsii, May 14, 1930.

19. Reported by a former Dneprostroi laborer in an interview.

20. Tatiana Kirstein, “The Ural-Kuznetsk Combine; A Case-Study in Soviet Policy-Making,“ manuscript prepared for the Second World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies; John, Scott, Behind the Urals (Bloomington, Indiana, 1973), pp. 6870 Google Scholar. Magnitostroi's planned capacity was enlarged from 655,000 tons of steel annually to 1,600,000 tons in 1929 and to 2,500,000 tons in a new version in February 1930.

21. Postroika, August 24, September 21, 1929; KZ, July 10, September 16, October 3, 10, 1929.

22. Panfilova, A. M., Formirovanie rabochego klassa SSSR v gody pervoi piatiletki 1928-1932 (Moscow, 1964), pp. 24, 28, 39, 4347 Google Scholar; farms canceled old agreements and refused to make new ones. M., Romanov, Organizatsiia otkhodnichestva na novom etape (Moscow-Leningrad, 1931), pp. 10–12, 15Google Scholar.

23. A special recruitment movie helped Dneprostroi conclude 546 agreements for a total of 11,180 workers in 1931, Panfilova, , Formirovanie rabochego klassa, p. 107 Google Scholar; Khronika Dneprostroia, no. 2 (May 1930), no. 11 (January 1931).

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25. Schwartz, , Labor in the Soviet Union, pp. 54–59Google Scholar.

26. While the political climate undermined the authority of the engineers and caused them anxiety, the local party did not attack them. Already in January 1928, the Ukrainian Central Committee had warned against specialist-baiting. “Rezoliutsiia Orgburo TsK KP(b)Uk po dokladu o rabote partiinoi organizatsii Dneprostroiia,” January 25, 1928, Document 39, Pervenets, p. 54; annual party reports regularly mentioned efforts to control spets-baiting. Dneprostroi engineers were not harassed during this period and went on to direct projects in the second Five-Year Plan. They were also asked to share their experience with other projects, as they did for example at a meeting in Kichkas in October 1929. Opyt stroitel'stva gidroelektricheskikh stantsii SSSR (Moscow, 1930).

27. Za industrializatsii, June 5, 14, 25, July 5, 1930.

28. Ibid., June 25, 27, July 16, 1930.

29. Ibid., May 29, June 25, July 11, 23, 1930, for example.

30. Laws against moving were passed in the fall of 1930; the chief directive was that of the central committee on October 20. Communists and members of the Komsomol were forbidden to move without instructions.

31. Examples of incentives include: workers staying for three years received 10 percent bonuses after the first year and 5 percent for each of the next two years. Khronika Dneprostroia, no. 2 (May 1930): 20-30. Insurance coverage depended on proof of 1-2 years on the job. Dneprostroi, April 27, 1930.

32. Engineering and technical personnel, for example, were not allowed to receive extra pay when transferring from one enterprise to another. Dneprostroi, April 27,1930. Penalties for leaving the job became sufficiently severe that some workers sought to be fired for absenteeism rather than incur penalties for leaving. Za industrializatsii, June 5, 1930. Penalties included having to pay for one's education. Ibid., June 14, 1930.

33. John Barber, “Labor Discipline in Soviet Industry 1928-1941,” presentation to Twelfth AAASS Convention, 1980.

34. Gol'tsman, M. T., “Sostav stroitel'nykh rabochikh SSSR v gody pervoi piatiletki,” in Izmeneniia v chislennosti i sostave sovetskogo rabochego klassa (Moscow, 1961), pp. 124–202 Google Scholar.

35. In October 1931, 6,680 persons prepared 43 specialties; from January through April 1932, nearly 10,000 studied and 5,000 finished the study of 50 specialties in the rabfak. Oliinychenko, M. L., Lenin'ski nakreslennia v zhyttia (Kiev, 1970), p. 53 Google Scholar. The struggle for technically trained cadres was often discussed. See also Zuikov, V. N., Sozdanie tiazheloi industrii na Urale: 1926-1932 (Moscow, 1971), pp. 244–55 Google Scholar.

36. Panfilova, , Formirovanie rabochego klassa, p. 112 Google Scholar; Gol'tsman, “Sostav stroitel'nykh rabochikh SSSR,” pp. 124-202.

37. Dneprostroi, June 20, 1930.

38. KZ, July 2, 29, 1927; Dneprostroi, March 20, 1929.

39. IX Z'izdov KP(b)Uk to XVI z'izdovi VKP(b), Raport budivnykiv Dniprobudu (Khar'kov, 1930).

40. Louis Puis, “Dneprostroy.” Draft report, typewritten, unpaged.

41. Dneprostroi, , Instrukstiia dlia dumpkar'shchikov (Kichkas, 1930)Google Scholar, reminded operators to look down the track to make sure the path was unobstructed before setting a car in motion.

42. There were five literacy circles in 1927, seven in March and eighteen in October 1929. Estimates of the number of illiterates varied widely and attendance at the schools was irregular. By 1930 there were 80 different specialties taught. Oliinychenko, , Lenin'ski nakreslennia, p. 53 Google Scholar

43. Proletar Dniprobudu, February 5, 1932; Shul'man, Simona, “Dneprostroi v bor'be za kadry,” Za promyshlennye kadry, no. 1 (1932): 15–20Google Scholar.

44. Kendall, Bailes, Technology and Society under Lenin and Stalin (Princeton, 1978)Google Scholar, chap. 7.

45. 82 percent of the literate workers at Dneprostroi were studying (94.4 percent of the work force). Informatsionnyi listok, no. 10-11 (1932): 214-16; 5,000 finished 50 specialties in 1931. S., Iantarov, Dnepr rabotaet na sotsializm (Moscow, 1930), p. 30 Google Scholar. Education was important to all and the government treated it as a capital investment. Scott, , Behind the Urals, pp. 40–44, 48Google Scholar.

46. Chervone Zaporizhzhe, February 13,1930; Postroika, March 3,1930. In January an overall cost rise of 25 percent had been reported; the cost of a cubic meter of concrete had gone from 19.17 rubles to 22.42. Ibid., January 29, 1930.

47. Hugh L. Cooper, “Address before the Society of American Military Engineers’ Club, Philadelphia, February 25, 1931,” Engineers and Engineering, 48, no. 4 (April 1931): 76.

48. Bailes, Technology and Society, chap. 7 and 9.

49. Ekonomicheskaia zhizri, January 1, 1930; Za industrializatsii, July 20, 1930.

50. Za industrializatsii, April 19, July 8, 1930, for example.

51. Informatsionnyi listok, no. 6 (November 1929): 78-100; no. 8-9 (June 1930): 549-57; Puis, “Dneprostroy,” unpaged.

52. Informatsionnyi listok, no. 6 (November 1929): 78-100; no. 8-9 (June 1930): 549-57; Puis, “Dneprostroy,” unpaged.

53. Specialists, party personnel, and foreigners at Dneprostroi had special stores, cars, private housing. Interviews with former personnel. Such perquisites were widespread. Scott, , Behind the Urals, p. 42 Google Scholar; Smith, Andrew, I Was a Soviet Worker (London, 1937), pp. 37, 41, 73, 127–30Google Scholar.

54. Cohen, , Bukharin, pp. 300–301Google Scholar.

55. Ekonomicheskaia zhizn', April 29, 1927; Torgovo-Promyshlennia Gazeta, April 8, 1927; Zuikov, , Sozdanie tiazheloi industrii, p. 59 Google Scholar.

56. Postroika, May 7, 1927.

57. This point made at Dneprostroi was also developed at length by Smith, , I Was a Soviet Worker, pp. 41–42, 61-62, 86-88Google Scholar.

58. Postroika, June 3, 1928; KZ, June 2, 1928.

59. Chervone Zaporizhzhe, October 20, November 6, 1930.

60. Schwarz, , Labor in the Soviet Union, pp. 309–34Google Scholar.

61. Dneprostroi, June 14, 1929

62. Smith, , I Was a Soviet Worker, pp. 61–62, 66Google Scholar.

63. Communists sought promotion on the basis of loyalty. Ibid., p. 87; they received first choice in food and goods according to interviewees and ibid., pp. 45-47, 76-79, 84; Scott, , Behind the Urals, pp. 24–25Google Scholar.

64. Interview with a Soviet engineer.

65. Lenin called for cultural transformation in his last articles. Anatolii Lunacharskii was a strong proponent of a broadly liberal education when he was commissar of education. He was challenged by both Stalinists and Bukharin. Bailes, , Technology and Society, pp. 160–61Google Scholar.

66. KZ, May 11, June 11, July 30, November 17, 1927. Similar complaints were voiced every year in all publications._

67. Ibid., June 17, 1927.

68. Postroika, December 20, 1929.

69. In 1927, 4,500 persons attended lectures; 49 movies drew 91,403 persons. Dneprostroia, Rabochkom stroitelei, Otchet (Zaporozhe, 1927), p. 8 Google Scholar.

70. KZ, March 10, 1929. Between October 1927 and January 1928, there were 25 artistic evenings for 6,697 persons, 8 lectures and reports for 2,457 persons, and 7 evenings of questions and answers for 800. Between November 1928 and February 1929 there were 68 shows for 20,450, 28 amateur evenings with 7,200 participants, 30 movies for 9,200 viewers. There were also lectures, reports and interviews in the barracks for 86,000.

71. Ibid. Seven literary circles, six general education circles, a general education school for workers, five military circles, circles for mothers and children, cutting and sewing, radio, music, chorus, drama, and anti-religion were organized and run by the trade unions.

72. The only woman party official represented in the press was Bespalova, head of the zhenotdel. Postroika, March 8,1928. The zhenotdel recognized that part of its task was to get women to realize their own potential and work in their own behalf. KZ, June 29, 1927. Zil'bershtein, a woman engineer and party member, was able to get a job at Dneprostroi only because a government official, Krzhizhanovskii, interceded for her. Moskovskaia pravda, December 21, 1967.

73. The party denned the production information meeting as the vehicle by which the trade union “might consciously and decisively turn to the task of instructing workers and all laborers in directing the economy; creating the cultural environment conducive to labor discipline, and improving productivity; knowing that this would require sustained activity over a long period of time.“ KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s“ezdov, konferentsii iplenum TsKP (Moscow, 1954), 1:608-609; 2:219. The first such production conference had been held in Leningrad in 1923; the fourteenth s“ezd, in 1925, said it was the preferred form for drawing the masses into production work.

74. KZ, July 29, 1927, May 19, 1928; Postroika, March 9, July 23, 1929; Dneprostroi, March 29, 1929.

75. The president of the trade union council asked: “Should we shut our eyes to the fact that workers do not attend production conferences? Just recently only masters and engineering-technical personnel came, no workers and few youths and few women.” KZ, September 19, 29, 1928; Postroika, July 19, 1928.

76. One former Dneprostroevets gave the lack of choice in elections as the chief reason for his refusal to join the party. Interview. Many complained about the lack of choice and the party recognized this as a problem. KZ, September 12, 1928; Scott, , Behind the Urals, pp. 35–36Google Scholar.

77. Dneprostroi, March 22, 1929.

78. “Resoliutsiia Orgbiuro TsK KP(b)Uk po dokladu o rabote partiinoi organizatsii Dneprostroia,“ January 25, 1928, Document 39, Pervenets, p. 55; “Iz otcheta o rabote partiinoi iacheiki Dneprostroia s maia 1927 g. po 1-e ianvaria 1928 g.,” January 27, 1928, Document 40, Pervenets, p. 58.

79. G., Novikov, Marksistsko-leninskoe vospitanie na Dneprovskom stroitel'stve (Moscow, 1932), p. 12 Google Scholar.

80. In 1930, 70.4 percent of the workers belonged to the trade unions. Dneprostroi, January 4, 1930. This number fell to 60 percent, then to 56 percent. Postroika, October 17, 1931; Proletar Dniprobudu, January 25, 1931. See also Trud, January 14, 15 and February 2, 1931 concerning workers’ reluctance to join the union and hostility to joiners.

81. Grishov, V, “An interloper in the Komsomol,” Soviet Youth; Twelve Komsomol Histories. Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, no. 51 (Munich, 1960), pp. 73–89 Google Scholar. Grishov worked at Traktorstroi.

82. KZ, February 12, 13, April 11, 1929.

83. Dneprostroi, June 17, 1930.

84. Ibid., July 17,1930, October 8, 12, 1930; Postroika, July 31, 1930; Novikov, , Marksistskoleniniskoe vospitanie, pp. 21–23, 28, 39, 61-69Google Scholar.

85. A similar case can be made for the Magnitogorsk planning. See Kirstein, “The Urals- Kuznetsk Combine.” Zaleski also argues that enterprise chiefs played an important role in decision making. Zaleski, , Planning for Economic Growth, p. 302 Google Scholar; Eugene, Zaleski, Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980), p. 486 Google Scholar.

86. Beal, Fred G., Proletarian Journey (New York, 1937), pp. 288–89 Google Scholar.

87. Zaleski, , Planning for Economic Growth, p. 249 Google Scholar.

88. Although vodka was forbidden on the site, as much money was spent on vodka as on a whole city budget, according to Krasnoe Zaporozhe, the party oblast paper, of January 28, 1928; money spent on vodka could pay for seven Dneprostrois, said Postroika, the organ of the construction union, on April 7, 1929. The state cooperatives sold wine and beer