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Validation of the Spanish Version of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 October 2022

Angelo Fasce Open the ORCID record for Angelo Fasce [Opens in a new window] ,
Diego Avendaño Open the ORCID record for Diego Avendaño [Opens in a new window] ,
Neil Dagnall Open the ORCID record for Neil Dagnall [Opens in a new window] ,
Andrew Denovan Open the ORCID record for Andrew Denovan [Opens in a new window]  and
Álex Escolà-Gascón Open the ORCID record for Álex Escolà-Gascón [Opens in a new window]
Angelo Fasce*
Affiliation:
Universidade de Coimbra (Portugal)
Diego Avendaño
Affiliation:
Pécsi Tudományegyetem (Hungary)
Neil Dagnall
Affiliation:
Manchester Metropolitan University (UK)
Andrew Denovan
Affiliation:
University of Huddersfield (UK)
Álex Escolà-Gascón
Affiliation:
Universitat Ramon Llull (Spain)
*
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Angelo Fasce. Universidade de Coimbra. Faculdade de Medicina. Rua Larga, 2. 3004–504 Coimbra (Portugal). E-mail: afc@fmed.uc.pt
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Abstract

Theorists acknowledge that conspiracy beliefs represent an established psychological construct. The study of conspiracy beliefs is important because allied ideation potentially influences everyday attitudes and behaviors across a range of domains (i.e., cognitive, social, cross-cultural, and political psychology). In this article, we analyze the internal structure and construct validity of the Spanish adaptation of the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (GCBS). Correlational and confirmatory factor analyses using an international sample of 732 Spanish-speakers revealed a five-factor structure equivalent to the original instrument. Convergent validity was demonstrated using educational level, political orientation, need for uniqueness, and four social axioms (social cynicism, religiosity, reward for application, and fate control). In comparison to two English samples (N = 794 and N = 421), the adaptation demonstrated satisfactory, although restricted, levels of invariance. Accordingly, findings support the use of this translated form of the GCBS with Spanish speakers.

Keywords

Beliefsconspiracy theoriesGCBSneed for uniquenesssocial axioms
Type
Research Article
Information
The Spanish Journal of Psychology , Volume 25 , 2022 , e25
Copyright
© Universidad Complutense de Madrid and Colegio Oficial de Psicólogos de Madrid 2022

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Footnotes

Funding statement: This work was supported by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (AF, Grant Number 964728, JITSUVAX).

Conflicts of Interest: None.

Data sharing: All data and materials used in this article are publicly available in https://osf.io/whdgc/

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