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The Item Veto's Sting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2021

Adam R. Brown
Adam R. Brown*
Affiliation:
Brigham Young University, UT, USA
*
Adam R. Brown, Brigham Young University, 745 Kimball Tower, Provo, UT 84602. Email: brown@byu.edu
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Abstract

Despite lofty expectations from the item veto's proponents (and fears from its opponents), formal models have suggested that the item veto is unlikely to have much effect beyond what a full veto could render. However, I show that different findings obtain when item vetoes are appreciated more fully as a dimensionality-reducing institution. I begin by developing a package veto model in a generalized multidimensional space. I then show how introducing the item veto changes the outcome by forcing veto bargaining into what is essentially a unidimensional space. As a result, executives with an item veto or other dimensionality-reducing institution (such as a single-subject rule) can be far more powerful in legislative bargaining than executives who lack these tools, other things being equal. I use simulations to demonstrate the model's main implications.

Keywords

executive politicsgovernorslegislative politicslegislative/executive interactionveto
Type
Research Article
Information
State Politics & Policy Quarterly , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , June 2012 , pp. 183 - 203
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s) 2012

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