1. Freeman, Joseph, An American Testament: A Narrative of Rebels and Romantics (New York: Octagon Press, 1973), 107Google Scholar; Borning, Bernard, The Political and Social Thought of Charles A. Beard (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), 106Google Scholar; Nore, Ellen, Charles A. Beard: An Intellectual Biography (Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983), 72–74Google Scholar. For example, Beard, Charles A., “A Call Upon Every Citizen”, Harper's Magazine 137 (10 19, 1918):655–56Google Scholar, for an appeal to buy Liberty Bonds.

2. Beard, Charles A., “The Perils of Diplomacy”, New Republic (06 2, 1917): 136–38Google Scholar; Beard, Charles A., “German Annexations and Indemnities”, New Republic (07 14, 1917): 309–10Google Scholar. Most social democratic academics embraced a pro-war, pro-Allied position, most notably Dewey, John and Becker, Carl, although Gruber, Carol S., Mars and Minerva: World War I and the Uses of the Higher Learning (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975), 94Google Scholar, notes that Beard and Becker, despite formal declarations to the contrary, always “had considerably less faith than some of their fellow professors that the new world was already in the making”. For a similar view, see, Nore, Charles A. Beard, 73–75.

3. Ogg, Frederick and Beard, Charles A., National Governments and the World War (New York: Macmillan Co., 1919)Google Scholar, v, observe that “the late conflict… was, at bottom, a struggle between two great schemes of human government – autocracy and democracy”. In the same work (556–71), Beard explicitly accepts Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points as the explanation of America's war aims.

4. Strout, Gushing, The Pragmatic Revolt in American History: Carl Becker and Charles Beard (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), 135–38Google Scholar, argues that Beard was slow in becoming disillusioned with United States participation in World War I. This view is shared by Miller, Perry, “Charles A. Beard”, Nation 167 (09 25, 1948): 345Google Scholar, who claims that Beard did not embrace the revisionist thesis until about 1930. Likewise, see, Adler, Selig, “The War-Guilt Question and American Disillusionment”, Journal of Modern History 23 (03 1951): 1–28Google Scholar; Stourzh, George, “Charles A. Beard's Interpretations of American Foreign Policy”, World Affairs Quarterly 28 (07 1957): 111–48Google Scholar; Kennedy, Thomas C., Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy (Gainesville, Fla.: The University Presses of Florida, 1975), 28–56Google Scholar. In contrast, Borning, Political and Social Thought, 106, argues “that Beard's isolationist views were in full process of formation from the early 1920s”. Higham, John, Writing American History: Essays on Modern Scholarship (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1970), 136Google Scholar, argues that during the 1930s, Beard, “became the principal intellectual spokesman of isolationism”. Jonas, Manfred, Isolationism in America, 1935–1941 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966), 72–77Google Scholar, argues that Beard “personified, in significant ways, the academic and intellectual element in isolationism”. Finally, Cohen, Warren I., “Revisionism Between World Wars: A Study in American Diplomatic History” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1962), 144Google Scholar, is one of the few scholars to recognize that it has been a mistake to equate Beard's World War I revisionism with philosophical isolationism.

5. In a prescient essay, Pixton, John E. Jr, “The Ghost of Charles Beard”, The Christian Century (10 1, 1952): 1120–22Google Scholar, argues that, it is in Asia that American policy is most clearly failing to limit the commitment of power issues where it can be decisive.… Whether the power of the West can be decisive in Indo-China is a matter still very much in doubt. If this is even partly true, then Beard's so-called “isolationism” is relevant to our current attempts to formulate and implement workable policies serving an enlightened national interest. More notably, see, Williams, William Appleman, The Contours of American History (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1988)Google Scholar; Williams, William Appleman, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962)Google Scholar; Kennedy, , Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy; Ronald Radosh, “Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy”, Prophets on the Right (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), 17–37Google Scholar; Ronald Radosh, ”Charles A. Beard: World War II Revisionist”, in Prophets on the Right, 39–65.

6. Michalak, Stanley J. Jr, Competing Conceptions of American Foreign Policy: Worldviews in Conflict (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), 142Google Scholar.

7. For instance, Wallace, Henry A., “Beard: The Planner”, New Republic 81 (01 2, 1935): 225–27Google Scholar, observes that in 1934 it was common to hear the inner circle in Washington, D.C. complain that Beard “has gone isolationist”, although the Secretary of Agriculture under-stood that Beard's theoretical position was “decidedly bigger than such simple classification as ‘isolationist’ or ‘internationalist’”. However, in 1940, Ralph Thompson, “Books of the Times”, New York Times, May 15, 1940, 23, laments that Beard “has reached the ultimate isolationist stand” with his views on “continentalism (i.e., isolationism)”. By 1948, Mathews, John M., “Review of American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932–1940; A Study in Responsibilities, by Charles A. Beard”, American Political Science Review (12 1948): 1190Google Scholar, observes confidently that “it is well known that Professor Beard is inclined toward the so-called isolationist school of thought with reference to American foreign policy”. Only a few years later, John E. Pixton, Jr., “The Ghost of Charles Beard”, 1120, notes that Beard's works on foreign policy are “now largely ignored as mere ‘isolationism’”.

8. For example, Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy, 43, notes that Gerald P. Nye, a western progressive isolationist, asked to have one of Beard's articles reprinted in the Congressional Record, 76th Congress, 1st Session, vol. 84, pt. 11, pp. 259–60 (the article was entitled “Neutrality: Shall We have Revision?”) in support of his own position.

9. Divine, Robert A., The Illusion of Neutrality (1Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962)Google Scholar; Jonas, Isolationism in America; Cole, Wayne S., Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932–1945 (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1983)Google Scholar.

10. For example, in a headline story, the Nero York Times, November 12, 1939, 8E, charged Beard with “recommending a Policy of Isolation”. Jonas, Isolationism in America, 32, points out that “during the period before America's entry into the Second World War, the isolationists neither held to a homogeneous ideology nor were members of an organized movement”.

11. In contrast, see, Skinner, Quentin, “Motives, Intentions, and the Interpretation of Texts”, New Literary History 3 (Winter 1972): 393–408Google Scholar; Skinner, Quentin, “Meaning and Under-standing in the History of Ideas”, History and Theory 1 (1969): 3–53Google Scholar, on intentionality and the methodology of political theory.

12. Porter, Michael E., The Competitive Advantage of Nations (New York: Free Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Reich, Robert B., The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991)Google Scholar; Thurow, Lester, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among Japan, Europe, and America (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1992). CfGoogle Scholar. Business-Higher Education Forum, America's Competitive Challenge: The Need for a National Response (Washington, D.C.: Business-Higher Education Forum, 1983); Business-Higher Education Forum, Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition, An Action Agenda for American Competitiveness (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Clearinghouse on the Future, 1986).

13. Beard, Charles A., “National Politics and War”, Scribner's Magazine 97 (02 1935): 65–70Google Scholar; Beard, Charles A., “Industry's Attack on the New Deal”, Current History and Modern Culture 43 (02 1936): 399–406Google Scholar; Soule, George, “Beard and the Concept of Planning”, in Charles A. Beard: An Appraisal, ed. Beale, Howard K. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1954), 69–70Google Scholar.

14. George S. Counts, “Charles Beard, the Public Man”, in Charles A. Beard: An Appraisal, 235, observes that Beard “was convinced that if America participated in the war, even allied victory would leave his country in a worse condition after than before the war … the passing years reveal evidence supporting his prophetic vision of the nature of the postwar world”.

15. Beard quoted in Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Polity, 17.

16. Beard, Charles A., An Introduction to the English Historians (New York: Burt Franklin, 1906), 423, 623Google Scholar.

17. Beard, Charles A., American Government and Politics, 1st (New York: Macmillan, 1910), 331Google Scholar.

18. Beard, Charles A., Contemporary American History, 1877–1913 (1914; Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1971), 202Google Scholar.

19. Beard, Charles A. and Beard, Mary R., America in Mid-Passage (New York: Macmillan, 1939), 453Google Scholar. See also, Thompson, Noel, “Hobson and the Fabians: Two Roads to Socialism in the 1920s”, History of Political Economy, 26 (Summer 1994): 203–220Google Scholar.

20. Quoted in Freeman, An American Testament, 107. Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy, 7 n.19, observes correctly that “Beard was not a pacifist in a philosophical or religious sense”. More than four months before his death in 1948, for example, Kennedy notes “Beard expressed annoyance over a remark in Newsweek magazine that ‘sets me down as an old-time pacifist. I have been many things but never a pacifist’”.

21. Beard, , A Foreign Policy for America (New York: Macmillan, 1940), 73Google Scholar. Elsewhere, Beard, , The Open Door at Home (New York: Macmillan, 1934), 169Google Scholar, observes: The love of the pomp and circumstance of war, the devotion of masses to military heroes, the proneness of democracies to elect military men to office, even if merely manipulated for political and class purposes, are at least latent forces in popular psychology and must be taken into account in any scheme of policy and action, either on the right or the left.

22. Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy, 17.

23. Beard, Contemporary American History, 199. Beard argues that the earliest intellectual origins of the economic interpretation of history can be traced back to Aristotle's Politics, especially Book V, see Beard, Charles A., The Economic Basis of Politics and Related Writings (New York: Vintage Books, 1945 ed.), 27–28Google Scholar. In referring to “that ancient political device”, Beard may have been drawing on Aristotle's observation that “when danger is imminent, men are alarmed, and they therefore keep a firmer grip on their constitution. All who are concerned for the constitution should therefore foster alarms, which will put men on their guard… They must, in a word, make the remote come near”. See, The Politics of Aristotle trans. Barker, Ernest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 226Google Scholar. Aristotle's comments are proffered as a remedy to the “causes of revolution”.

24. The same dialectical theme provides the core of Beard, Charles A., The American Party Battle (New York: Workers' Education Bureau, 1928)Google Scholar.

25. Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy, 66, 59. Stourzh, “Charles A. Beard's Interpretations of American Foreign Policy”, 120, agrees that “these two volumes present the most substantial part of Beard's writings on foreign policy”.

26. Nore, Charles A. Beard, 144.

27. Cohen, “Revisionism Between World Wars”, 148.

28. Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy, 66.

29. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 155.

30. Ibid., 210.

31. Ibid. 157–58.

32. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, 4, 5.

33. Beard, Charles A., “The Economic Basis of Politics”, New Republic 32 (09 27, 1922): 128Google Scholar.

34. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 156.

35. Barrow, Clyde W., “Beyond Progressivism: Charles A. Beard's Social Democratic Theory of American Political Development”, Studies in American Political Development 8 (Fall 1994): 249–99CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

36. For instance, Higham, Writing American History, 135, observes that “Beard's The Idea of National Interest (1934) contrasted Hamiltonian with Jeffersonian traditions of foreign policy and grounded each in economic interests. The capitalist-agrarian struggle also supplied the underlying dynamics for The Rise of American Civilization (1927)”. Beard, The Open Door at Home v, 36–39, reiterates this dialectic as the foundation of his programmatic analysis.

37. Beard and Beard, The Rise of American Civilization, 1:393–432.

38. Ibid., vol. 1, argues that the War of 1812 was provoked by the United States as part of an unsuccessful effort to acquire Canada and the fur trade and to force the British to stop assisting Indians on the frontier who were obstructing the settlement of the Louisiana Territory (410–11). Beard suggests that the Florida Purchase was really a “conquest” initiated by Andrew Jackson (432), just as the Gadsden Purchase was a sidebar to the Mexican War. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 71 n.l, reiterates that: “During the dominance of the planters in the Democratic party the acquisition of land at the expense of neighbors was, of course, a feature of agrarian strategy”. Despite achieving most of its objectives, two strategic goals went unmet: the conquest of Canada during the War of 1812 and the Southern planters' dream of Caribbean conquests (especially Cuba and other islands with plantation-based economics).

39. Williams, Ihe Contours of American History, 454.

40. Wallace, Henry A., America Must Chouse (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1934)Google Scholar.

41. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 71–72. In broader terms, Beard describes the implications of a Jeffersonian foreign policy as: intra-nationalist, and anti-imperialist: it favors the annexation of contiguous unoccupied territory which can be defended without a large naval establishment and can be exploited by self-governing American farmers and planters. It opposes a large naval establishment as a danger to democracy, a menacing burden on finances, and a fomenter of international rivalries and war. In economics, it advocates free trade, tariff for revenue, or moderate tariffs, in order that surpluses of agricultural produce may be exchanged in the best market for manufactures through the medium of the lowest-cost carriers on the seas. It assails bonuses, ship subsidies, discriminations, and other bounties to manufacturers and carriers as levies on planters and farmers, imposed by government at the behest of special interests. In its view, government is primarily an agency – not too energetic – to defend the territorial heritage and keep order at home; not an agency of powerful outward thrusts to force outlets abroad for domestic surpluses. (Ibid., 70)

42. Ibid., 78.

43. Ibid., 79.

44. Harrington, Fred Harvey, “Beard's Idea of National Interest and New Interpretations”, American Perspective 4 (1950), p. 336Google Scholar.

45. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, 38.

46. Ibid., 38–39; Beard, The Idea of National Interest, 101. Beard ascribes enormous influence to Mahan's, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1890)Google Scholar and, correspondingly, he devotes a lengthy section of A Foreign Policy for America to rebutting its central thesis (40–47, 74–86).

47. Beard described the post–1897 period of American diplomacy as the intensification of an earlier Hamiltonian conception of foreign policy, but he did not consider it a radical departure from the past. Many diplomatic historians of the period claimed that the closing years of the nineteenth century marked a “new era” in American foreign policy. However, Beard insisted that dollar diplomacy “resembled in many respects the philosophy of policy expounded by leaders in the establishment of the American Republic”, see, Beard, The Idea of National Interest, 111; Noble, David W., The Progressive Mind, 1890–1917, rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980), 21Google Scholar, offers a similar interpretation.

48. Beard, Contemporary American History, 202, 224.

49. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 37–38. Cf. Ginger, Ray, The Age of Excess: The United States From 1877 to 1914 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965)Google Scholar, chaps. 8–9, who locates Progressive era politics in a phase of capitalist development dominated by the problems of distributing an industrial surplus. Also, LaFeber, Walter, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860–1898 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987)Google Scholar.

50. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 44.

51. Ibid., 39.

52. Ibid., 40.

53. Ibid., 42–43.

54. Ibid., 43. Elsewhere, Beard, , Cross Currents in Europe Today (Boston: Marshall Jones Co., 1922), 245Google Scholar, notes with respect to international financiers making loans to Third World countries that “in accordance with a custom, consecrated by time, the bondholders, whenever disturbance is threatened or a default is at hand, look eagerly to the government at Washington to support their interests diplomatically if not more vigorously”.

55. Borning, Political and Social Thought, 194.

56. Beard quoted in ibid., 194–95; Harrington, “Beard's Idea of National Interest and New Interpretations”, 337.

57. MacDonald, William, “American Interests in Foreign Affairs”, The Saturday Review of Literature 10 (02 24, 1934): 1, 505–6Google Scholar.

58. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 151, 196–97. As early as 1928, Beard wrote to William E. Dodd, a professor of history at the University of Chicago: “Can farmers and workingmen do anything in the presence of the steel helmeted giant of modern business? I have my doubts, alas!”, quoted in Glad, “Progressives and the Business Culture of the 1920s”, 86, n.39. By 1931, Beard was so disillusioned with the working class he remarked that: “My friend, John Dewey… believes that we need a new party. Some thirty years ago I believed that myself. Now I believe that we need ideas and more thinking, and then parties will take care of themselves”, in Beard, Charles A., “Address of Dr. Charles Beard”, Proceedings of a Conference of Progressives (held at Washington, D.C., 03 11–12, 1931), 70Google Scholar.

59. Ibid., 151. Beard, (169) complains: “It is also a fact that the masses may be stirred to titanic and concerted effort in war, whatever its ends alleged or real, while the same masses cannot be stirred to a similar action for some purpose of domestic and civilian economy”.

60. Ibid., 235.

61. Ibid., 36.

62. Ibid., 316.

63. Beard, The Idea of National Interest, 543, 545, praises FDR's performance at the conference, noting that “it furnished the occasion on which President Roosevelt disclosed… a new conception of national interest in foreign commerce… a conception that a high standard of national well-being is possible with a minimum reliance on foreign trade and is desirable besides”.

64. Harrington, “Beard's Idea of National Interest and New Interpretations”, 337.

65. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 316–17, complains that Roosevelt “has contributed materially to the recent acceleration of the armament race by allocating nearly three hundred million dollars from public relief funds to naval construction and sanctioned Congressional action authorizing additional construction to the amount of more than a billion dollars”.

66. Ibid., vi. Beard (vii) indicated that The Open Door at Home was “avowedly, an expression of my [Beard's] conception of national interest as a guide to future policy”.

67. Beard, The Economic Basis of Politics, 31, regarded Machiavelli and the early republicans among those who rediscovered the economic and class basis of politics.

68. Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy, 73. Beard's mixed economy socialism is explored in Barrow, Clyde W., “Building a Workers' Republic: Charles A. Beard's Critique of Liberalism in the 1930s”, Polity 30 (Fall 1997): 29–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

69. Nore, Charles A. Beard, 144.

70. Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy, 73–74. Thus, Cohen, “Revisionism Between World Wars”, 153, also notes that “Beard had high hopes for Franklin Delano Roosevelt as a man who would use the presidency to foster the national interest as Beard himself conceived it”.

71. Parrini, Carl P. and Sklar, Martin J., “New Thinking about the Market, 1896–1904: Some American Economists and the Theory of Surplus Capital”, Journal of Economic History 43 (09 1983): 559–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

72. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, 69.

73. Angell, Norman, The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power in Nations to their Economic and Social Advantage, 3d (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1912)Google Scholar. Angell was a British-born economist who grew up in the United States and became a Paris-based journalist for British and American newspapers. Angell later embraced the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, beginning with Keynes's The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1922) and was awarded the 1933 Nobel Peace Prize.

74. Angell, The Great Illusion, 49, 50–51.

75. Cf. Schumpeter, Joseph, Imperialism and Social Classes (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1951)Google Scholar; Lenin, V. I., Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1939)Google Scholar.

76. Beard, Charles A., “Forces Making for Peace”, Bulletin of the University of Georgia: Institute of Public Affairs and International Relations, 10 (11 1929): 82–84Google Scholar; “Prospects for Peace”, Harper's Magazine 158 (January 1929): 320–29.

77. Beard, Charles A., “That Promise of American Life”, New Republic (February 6, 1935): 352Google Scholar.

78. Cf. Mallan, John P., “Roosevelt, Brooks Adams, and Lea: The Warrior Critique of the Business Civilization”, American Quarterly 8 (Fall 1956): 216–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

79. Alfred Thayer Mahan quoted in Angell, The Great Illusion, 19: “It is upon their national security (assured by naval supremacy) that their economic future – their food, clothing, and housing – depends”.

80. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 38. For example, Claude Bowers, G., Beveridge and the Progressive Era (Cambridge, Mass.: Houghton-Mifflin, 1932), 66–145Google Scholar. Albert Beveridge rose to the United States Senate in 1898 with an explicit commitment to imperialism, based on the assumption that “American factories are making more than the American people can use; American soil is producing more than they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and shall be ours” (quoted in 1898, 69); Braeman, John, Albert J. Beveridge: American Nationalist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 22–25Google Scholar. Leuchtenburg, William E., “Progressivism and Imperialism: The Progressive Movement and American Foreign Policy, 1898–1916”, Mississippi Valley Historical Review 39 (12 1952): 483–502Google Scholar, documents that most Progressives “ardently supported the imperialist surge”.

81. Beard, The Idea oj National Interest, 107.

82. Ibid., 107, 167. Noble, The Progressive Mind, 21, seems to concur with Beard's interpretation.

83. Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy, 69.

84. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, 52, 54.

85. Ibid., 55. Beard's reference is to a passage from Shakespeare respecting a king's ability to divert “giddy minds” with “foreign quarrels”. Beard, Charles A., Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels (New York: Macmillan, 1939)Google Scholar, where Beard develops this thesis at greater length.

86. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, 72. Ibid., 71–72, emphasizes that: historical records do not support the proposition that American capitalists as a class or in large groups originated the idea of imperial expansion as a solution of the problem presented by cyclical disturbances or prolonged domestic depressions.… The principal weight of “Wall Street” was against the war on Spain in 1898. American bankers did not originate the movement to force American capital on China under the administration of President Taft; it is truer to say that they were “dragooned” into it by the politicians. The detailed history of the process by which the imperialist idea attained popularity in wide circles of business enterprise has not been written; but enough is known to warrant the assertion that, on the whole, great capitalists were at first skittish about the brave, new world which imperialists were proposing to create and were followers rather than leaders in the revolution of foreign policy.

87. Beard, The Idea of National Interest, 107, 167.

88. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, 46.

89. Kennedy, Charles A. Heard and American Foreign Policy, 67. Similarly, Cohen, “Revisionism Between World Wars”, 145, observes that “Beard poked around in quest of evidence with which to demonstrate that international trade did not pay”.

90. Angell, The Great Illusion, vii.

91. Ibid., vii–viii, 62.

92. Ibid., 61.

93. Ibid., 51, 66.

94. Cohen, Cf. Benjamin, The Question of Imperialism (New York: Basic Books, 1973)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

95. Angell, The Great Illusion, 31–32.

96. Ibid., 60.

97. Ibid., 32. Ibid., 55, illustrates his point by speculating that the German general, while trying to sack the Bank of England, would find that his own balance in the Bank of Berlin would have vanished into thin air and the value of even the best of his investments dwindled as though by a miracle; and that for the sake of loot, amounting to a few sovereigns apiece among his soldiery, he would have sacrificed the greater part of his own personal fortune. Angell jokes that a major difference between the German Hun and Attila the Hun is that Attila “did not have to worry about a bank rate and such like complications”.

98. Ibid., 32. Cf. Lindblom, Charles E., “The Market as Prison”, Journal of Politics 44 (05 1982): 324–32Google Scholar, concerning the market's automatic recoil mechanism; Claus Offe, “The Theory of the Capitalist State and the Problem of Policy Formation”, in Stress and Contradiction in Modern Capitalism, ed. Lindberg, Leon (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1975), 125–44,Google Scholar on “the dependency principle”; Block, Fred, “The Ruling Class Does Not Rule: Notes on the Marxist Theory of the State”, Socialist Revolution 7 (05–06 1977): 6–28Google Scholar, on business confidence as “the major structural mechanism” for disciplining policy in capitalist states.

99. Charles A. Beard, Cross Currents in Europe Today, 85.

100. Beard, “Prospects for Peace”, 320. For this reason, even though Beard supported the Allies in World War I, as early as 1917, he opposed calls for indemnities and reparations, see, Beard, “German Annexations and Indemnities”.

101. Angell, The Great Illusion, 143.

102. Ibid., 35,107.

103. Ibid., 139.

104. Ibid., 83, 84.

105. Beard, Cross Currents in Europe Today, 85–86.

106. Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy, 67.

107. Cordell Hull quoted in Williams, The Contours of American History, 414.

108. Nore, Charles A. Beard, 144.

109. Nor has that number changed substantially to this very day. See Krugman, Paul, “Competitiveness: Does it Matter?”, Fortune 129 (03 7, 1994): 109–15Google Scholar, finds that in 1992 exports were 10.6 percent of U.S. GDP, while imports were 11.1 percent. Also, Krugman, Paul, Peddling Prosperity: Economic Sense in the Age of Diminished Expectations (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994)Google Scholar; Gosselin, Peter G., “Krugman: Foreign Competition Isn't to Blame for US Ills”, The Boston Globe, 03 29, 1994, 41, 49Google Scholar.

110. Beard, The Idea of National Interest, 534. Krugman, Cf. Paul, “Europe Jobless, America Penniless?”, Foreign Affairs 95 (Summer 1994): 19–34Google Scholar, echoes Beard's theme with almost identical language: ”Even today, U.S. exports are only 10 percent of the [gross national product] in the economy. That is, the United States is still almost 90 percent an economy that produces goods and services for its own use”.

111. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 48.

112. Ibid., 224. Beard attributed this theory to Marxian economists who hypothesized that surpluses were due to the fact that, under capitalism, the owners of industries made such high profits and paid such low wages that the mass of the people at home could not buy the commodities they produced; hence the domestic market could not expand rapidly enough to absorb the increasing output of goods and furnish ever larger opportunities for capital investment in the plants, machinery, and other producers' goods, (see, Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, 69–70)

113. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 72, 49.

114. Ibid., 48–49, 226.

115. Beard and Beard, America in Mid-Passage, 453.

116. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 225.

117. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America,70.

118. Beard, Charles A., “A Five-Year Plan for America”, Forum 86 (07 1931): 9–10.Google Scholar This essay was republished under the same title in Beard, Charles A., ed., America Faces the Future (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1932), 117–40Google Scholar.

119. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, 9.

120. Beard, The Idea of National Interest, 545. Beard goes on to describe continentalism as a form of “non-imperialistic nationalism” (ibid., 546).

121. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 269.

122. Ibid., 217.

123. Ibid., 218–19.

124. Ibid., 213.

125. Ibid., 232, 287.

126. Beard, “A Five-Year Plan for America”, 10.

127. Beard, The Open Door at Horn, 287–88.

128. Ibid., 288.

129. Ibid., 289.

130. Ibid., 214–15.

131. Ibid., 221.

132. Ibid., 223–24. Cf. Ruhl, Alfred, ZurFrage der internationalen Arbeitstilung (Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1932)Google Scholar.

133. Lerner, Max, “Civilization and the Devils,” New Republic 119 (11 1, 1948): 21–24Google Scholar; Beard, The Open Door at Home, 214.

134. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 290.

135. Beard, “A Five-Year Plan for America,” 10.

136. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 261.

137. Beard, Charles A. quoted in The New York Times, 02 28, 1932, 114Google Scholar.

138. Beard and Beard, America in Mid-Passage, 452–53.

139. Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy, 92.

140. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 213; Stourzh, “Charles A. Beard's Interpretations of American Foreign Policy,” 119. Beard, Giddy Minds and Foreign Quarrels, 95, suggests that, “beyond this hemisphere, the United States should leave disputes over territory, over the ambitions of warriors, over the intrigues of hierarchies, over forms of government, over passing myths known as ideologies – all to the nations and peoples immediately and directly affected.” The only “sincere undertakings” of a diplomatic nature in which the United States should participate were those problems directly affecting North and South America.

141. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, 151.

142. Cf. March, James C. and Olsen, Johan P., Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press,' 1989)Google Scholar.

143. Beard, The Open Door at Home, p. 297.

144. Ibid., 298.

145. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, 18 (emphasis added).

146. Ibid., 152.

147. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 303.

148. Beard, A Foreign Policy for America, 19.

149. Beard, The Open Door at Home, 286.

150. Cohen, “Revisionism Between World Wars,” 157.

151. Nore, Charles A. Beard, 182.

152. Williams, The Contours of American History, 451, 454—55.

153. Ibid., 461, finds that as Roosevelt clarified his intentions to expand foreign trade, the United Steel Workers of America resolved that foreign policy should not be “formulated or made dependent upon the protection of the vested or property interests in foreign countries of the large corporations in this country.” In the same year (1937), the CIO drew attention to the “still unsolved grave economic, social, and industrial maladjustments” in the United States. Likewise, John L. Lewis in 1940 continued to prefer a hemispheric trade zone that would link the United States and Latin America, rather than pursuing concerns in Europe or Asia.

154. Beard, The Idea of National Interest, 548.

155. Beard, The Economic Basis of Politics and Related Writings, 85.

156. Beard, , “National Politics and War,” Scribner's Magazine 97 (02 1935): 65–70Google Scholar.

157. Ibid., 65. Beard and Beard, Rise of American Civilization, 1:545 ff., describes the Jacksonian era as “a triumphant farmer-labor party.”

158. Beard, “National Politics and War,” 66.

159. Ibid., 67.

160. Ibid., 69. Cf. Bensel, Richard, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1877 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

161. Hofstadter, Richard, The Progressive Historians: Turner, Beard, and Parrington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), 328Google Scholar (emphasis added).

162. Ibid., 324.

163. Beard, “National Politics and War,” 69.

164. Ibid., 69–70.

165. Ibid., 70.

166. Soule, “Beard and the Concept of Planning,” in Beale, ed., Charles A. Beard, 69–70.

167. Beard, quoted in Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians, 324.

168. Beard, “National Politics and War,” 70.

169. Ibid., 70.

170. Strout, The Pragmatic Revolt in American History, 144. Cf. Beard, Charles A., “Going Ahead With Roosevelt,” Events 1 (01 1937): 12Google Scholar; Beard, Charles A., “Roosevelt's Place in History,” Events 3 (02 1938): 86Google Scholar.

171. Stourzh, “Charles A. Beard's Interpretations of American Foreign Policy”, 140 n.75.

172. Kennedy, Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy, 74.

173. Stourzh, “Charles A. Beard's Interpretations of American Foreign Policy”, 139, 143. George R. Leighton, “Beard and Foreign Policy”, in Beale, ed., Charles A. Beard, traces the escalation of Beard's attacks on Roosevelt.

174. Strout, The Pragmatic Revolt, 153, 155. Likewise, Lerner, “Charles Beard: Civilization and the Devils”.

175. Strout, The Pragmatic Revolt, 135.

176. Nevins, Allan, “Two Views of America's Part: Mr. Bucll Argues Our Responsibility – Professor Beard Upholds Isolation”, The New York Times Book Review (05 26, 1940), sect. 6, 1, 20Google Scholar.

177. Levin, Peter R., “Charles A. Beard: Wayward Liberal”, Tomorrow 8 (03 1949): 36–40Google Scholar.

178. Quoted in Note, Charles A. Beard, 222.

179. For example, Browder, Earl and Beard, Charles A., “Collective Security – A Debate”, New Republic 93 (02 2, 1938): 356–59,Google Scholar for a debate with Earl Browder, General Secretary of the Communist Party, U.S.A. Also see, Jonas, Isolationism in America, 39–41.

180. Cochran, Thomas C., “Review of The Open Door at Home by Charles A. Beard”, The Modern Monthly 8 (02 1935): 759–60Google Scholar. Similarly, Genovese, Eugene D., In Red and Black: Marxian Explorations in Southern and Afro-American History (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), 315–56Google Scholar, passim; Frankel, Harry, “Three Conceptions of Jacksonianism”, in America's Revolutionary Heritage: Marxist Essays, ed. Novack, George (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1976), 170–80Google Scholar; George Novack, “Historians and the Belated Rise of American Imperialism”, in America's Revolutionary Heritage, 287–307; Aptheker, Herbert, Early Years of the American Republic (New York: International Publishers, 1976), 45–89Google Scholar.

181. Varney, Harold Lord, “The Man Who Lived Twice”, American Mercury 85 (08 1957): 148–50Google Scholar.

182. Beard, Charles A., “Crisis in the Pacific: I – War With Japan?”, Events 8 (11 1940), 323Google Scholar.

183. For background, see, Halperin, Morton, The Lawless Stale (New York: Penguin, 1976)Google Scholar.

184. Counts, George S., “Charles Beard, The Public Man”, in Charles A. Beard: An Appraisal, ed. Beale, Howard K. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1954), 235Google Scholar. “Review of President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941, by Charles A. Beard”, Time 51 (April 12, 1948),12, observes that “historians will probably find it no great job to riddle the argument of Dr. Beard's book. It will not be so easy to ignore his emphatic conclusion”.

185. Beard, The Economic Basis of Politics and Related Writings, 90–93. Gross, Cf. Bertram, Friendly Fascism (New York: M. Evans Publishers, 1980)Google Scholar.

186. Nore, Charles A. Beard, 222.

187. Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians, 324.

188. Nore, Charles A. Beard, 179.

189. Cf. Melman, Seymour, The Permanent War Economy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974)Google Scholar.

190. Krugman, “Does Competitiveness Matter?”, 109.