1 Lohr, C. H., “Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries,” Traditio 23–30 (1967–74); idem, Commentateurs d'Aristote au moyen-âge latin. Bibliographie de la littérature secondaire récente, Vestigia, 2 (Fribourg, 1988); Brams, J., “The Latin Aristotle and the Medieval Latin Commentaries,” Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 39 (1997): 9–22. Research for this article was carried out at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS) at Wassenaar, where I completed the transcription of Nicole Oresme's commentary on the Physics. The final redaction benefited from discussion with the members of the Center for Medieval and Renaissance Natural Philosophy at Nijmegen University. I should like to thank Martin Davies for his help in correcting the English of this article.Google Scholar

2 I shall analyse those by Buridan, John, Oresme, Nicole, de Wesalia, Johannes, and Marsilius of Inghen. Buridan, John (see also n. 60): a) De prima lectura, III, 9, “Utrum habitus et species et actus intellectualis sint idem cum intellectu vel res distincta ab intellectu,” in Patar, B., Le Traité de l'âme de Jean de Buridan [De prima lectura]: Édition, étude critique et doctrinale , Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie – Éditions du Préambule (Louvain, Longueuil, Quebec, 1991) (hereafter Patar, Buridan), 449–55; b) Georgius Lokert's Paris, 1516 edition, III, 8, “Utrum species intelligibiles differant ab actu intelligendi,” in Patar, , Buridan, 688–91; c) De tertia lectura III, 11, “Utrum actus vel habitus intellectualis sit idem quod anima intellectiva vel res sibi addita” (my analysis is chiefly concerned with this lectura), partial edition by A. Maier from MSS Vat. lat. 2164, Vat. lat. 11575, and Reg. lat. 1959, in Maier, , Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik. Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik, Storia e Letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi, 69 (Rome, 1958), 167, 331–38. A complete edition in Zupko, J. A., “John Buridan's Philosophy of Mind: An Edition and Translation of Book III of his Questions on Aristotle's ‘De anima’ (Third Redaction) with Commentary and Critical Interpretative Essays” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1989), 1: 114–29; for the commentary on q. III, 11, see 2: 576–93. Before consulting Zupko's edition I had transcribed the text from the MSS of the Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale in Florence (BNCF, MSS Conv. Sopp. D.1.1362, fols VIr^b–VIIv^a and Conv. Sopp. C.4.263, fols 58r^a–59v^a). These represent in reality three manuscripts, since the last quire of MS Conv. Sopp. A.5.1365, a known Buridan manuscript, was bound in the eighteenth century with Conv. Sopp. D. 1. 1362. So far as I know, it has not been pointed out that Quaestio III, 11 of this quire is now found in the last manuscript (the modern numeration is in roman numbers to indicate the different origins of the two parts of the MS). The explicit is as follows: fol. XIVr^a “Expliciunt questiones super librum De anima edite et compilate Parysius per venerabilem doctorem magistrum Johannem Byridam de Acthrabato.” References are to the Florentine MSS and to Zupko's edition. See Lohr, , MLAC, Traditio 26 (1970): 173–74; Michael, B., Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des späten Mittelalters (Berlin, 1985) 2: 684–729; Zupko, J., “What is the Science of the Soul? A Case Study in the Evolution of Late Medieval Natural Philosophy,” Synthese 110 (1997): 297–334, especially 313–18 (and the bibliography). I am grateful to Gabriella Pomaro, who is studying the SS. Annunziata MSS in the Conventi Soppressi collection of Florence, BNC, for her kind advice. Oresme, Nicole, Quaestiones super De anima III, 9, “Utrum actus et habitus sint accidentia distincta ab ipsa anima vel ab ipso intellectu,” in Patar, B., Nicolai Oresme Expositio et quaestiones in Aristotelis “De anima”: Études doctrinales en collaboration avec Claude Gagnon, Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie — Éditions Peeters (Louvain-La-Neuve, Louvain, Paris, 1995) (hereafter Patar, Oresme), 375–83; see also Marshall, P., “Nicholas Oresme's ‘Questiones super libros Aristotelis De anima’: A Critical Edition with Introduction and Commentary” (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1980) (hereafter Marshall), 608–22. de Wesalia, Johannes, Quaestiones super De anima, III, 13, “Utrum omnis actus intelligendi differat ab anima nostra,” Darmstadt, Hessische Landes- und Hochschulbibl., MS 2197, fols 158r–192v; see Oresme, Nicole, Quaestiones super De generatione et corruptione , ed. Caroti, S., der Wissenschaften, Bayerische Akademie, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt, 20 (Munich, 1996), 35–46. Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones in Aristotelis libros De anima, III, 7, “Utrum actus et habitus intellectuales ipsius intellectus sint anima intellectiva vel res superaddite,” Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, MS lat. 5437, fols 405v^a–406v^b . See Pluta, O., “Die Diskussion der Unsterblichkeitsfrage bei Marsilius von Inghen,” in Marsilius von Inghen Werk und Wirkung: Akten des zweiten internationalen Marsilius-von-Inghen Kongresses , Wielgus, S., ed. (Lublin, 1993), 119–64. I am very grateful to Olaf Pluta for his help on Marsilius's commentary.Google Scholar

3 Tachau, K. H., Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham: Optics, Epistemology and the Foundation of Semantics 1250–1345 , Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 22 (Leiden and New York, 1988); Spruit, L., “Species intelligibilis”: From Perception to Knowledge, 1, Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History, 48 (Leiden, New York, and Cologne, 1994). Lokert's edition of Buridan's commentary on De anima (n. 2 above) touches on this topic, as does questio III, 10 of Oresme's commentary (“Utrum in intellectu distinguantur species intelligibilis, actus intelligendi et habitus”), Patar, Oresme, 384–91, Marshall, 622–35. For Buridan in particular, see Spruyt, J., “Buridan on the Existence of Intelligible Species,” Medioevo 20 (1994): 179–203, especially 191–92 and nn. 15–19, where some passages concerning the subject of this paper are quoted.Google Scholar

4 Thijssen, J. M. M. H., Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris 1200–1400 (Philadelphia, 1998); Bianchi, L., Censure et liberté intellectuelle à l'Université de Paris (xiii^e–xiv^e siècles) (Paris, 1999).Google Scholar

5 For 1277 see Denifle, H. and Chatelain, E., Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis , 1 (Paris, 1889), 543; for 1347: “sub pena, quod ab omni honore privabuntur facultatis”; the milder punishment can be explained by the fact that the positions condemned were reckoned to be less dangerous: “quorum articulorum reputantur aliqui erronei, aliqui suspecti, aliqui male sonantes in fide,” Denifle, and Chatelain, , Chartularium, 2 (Paris, 1891), 613; Denifle and Châtelain correct Du Boulay's statement (Bulaeus, C. E., Historia Universitatis Parisiensis [Paris, 1668; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1966], 298–300) that the bishop of Paris was involved in the condemnation: “perperam Bulaeus … asserit errores a ‘Fulcone episcopo Paris.’ et magistris in theologia suspectos habitos esse, nam Fulco non erat theologus, sed juris utriusque doctor …, et non sicut Guillelmus et Stephanus sec. XIII de erroribus theologicis curabat.” No mention of the bishop in the section of John of Mirecourt's articuli in the list published with Henry of Gorchum's commentary on the Sentences (Reutlingen, ca. 1480; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1967).Google Scholar

6 Maier, , Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik , 331–38. See also Michael, , Johannes Buridan, 2: 707–12, and particularly 707, nn. 12 and 13, where Maier, and Reina, M. E. are quoted as first pointing out the possibility of echoes of John of Mirecourt's condemnation in Buridan's De anima commentary (secundum ultimam lecturam).Google Scholar

7 Zupko, , Buridan's Philosophy of Mind , 1: xxii–xxiii.Google Scholar

8 Thijssen, Hans suggested the first hypothesis to me. Both hypotheses rest upon the assumption that the questio was written after 1347, as Maier, Michael, and Zupko believe. This assumption is sufficiently supported by internal evidence, since the topic discussed here clearly refers to one of the solutions found in Mirecourt's Sentences commentary and condemned in 1347. If the questio had preceded the condemnation of 1347, then we would be led to the impossible conclusion that a Master of the Faculty of Arts would have been the instigator of the condemnation of a theologian, his superior academically, and, even more unthinkably, would have specified how he should have been punished.Google Scholar

9 See, for example, the fourteenth questio in the third book of Jean de Jandun's De anima commentary “Utrum species intelligibilis differt realiter ab intellectione” (I have used the 1473 Venice edition): “de isto dixerunt aliqui quod species intelligibilis non differt realiter ab intellectione, sed solum secundum modum,” fol. 62v^a. The problem at issue here is also the separability of entities in order to make God's intervention possible; see Courtenay, W. J., Capacity and Volition: A History of the Distinction of Absolute and Ordained Power, Quodlibet, Ricerche e strumenti di filosofia medievale, 8 (Bergamo, 1990), 191–92, and chap. 7, “Potentia absoluta and the New Parisian Articles,” 173–88, 95–96 for Tempier's Syllabus.Google Scholar

10 Sylla, E. has stressed the importance of the notion of modus rei in Roger Swineshead's De motibus naturalibus, quoting also Oresme's use of the same notion in his De configurationibus qualitatum : see Sylla, E. D., “Mathematical Physics and Imagination in the Work of the Oxford Calculators: Roger Swineshead's ‘On Natural Motions,’” in Grant, E. and Murdoch, J. E., eds., Mathematics and Its Applications to Natural Philosophy in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of Marshall Clagett (Cambridge, 1987), 75–76. On modi rerum in Oresme see also Caroti, S., “La position de Nicole Oresme sur la nature du mouvement (‘Quaestiones super Physicam’ 3, 1–8): problèmes gnoséologiques, ontologiques et sémantiques,” Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 61 (1994): 335–42; Celeyrette, J.–Mazet, E., “La hiérarchie des degrés d'être chez Nicole Oresme,” in Arabic Science and Philosophy 8 (1998), 45–65. Jack Zupko noted that the polemical target of Buridan's q. III, 11 of his De anima commentary was precisely the modi rerum: see Zupko, Buridan's Philosophy of Mind, 2: 578.Google Scholar

11 “Nor was the thesis — that no quality is a thing (res) really distinct from substances — entirely overlooked by fourteenth-century philosophers. The author of an anonymous Physics commentary in the second half of the fourteenth century opines that ‘it is indeed possible that neither heat nor cold are things distinct from their subjects’ and that ‘when fire heats water, it produces nothing but makes something to be otherwise (aliter se habere),’” McCord Adams, M., William Ockham, The Medieval Institute, University of Notre Dame: Publications in Medieval Studies, 26 (Notre Dame, Ind., 1987), 1: 278.Google Scholar

12 Maier, , Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik , 330; the anonymous commentary on the Physics is found in Vatican City, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, MS Vat. lat. 3019; in Verschollene Aristoteleskommentare des 14. Jahrhunderts, published by Maier for the first time in the Mélanges A. Mansion and later in Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts, 1, Storia e Letteratura. Raccolta di studi e testi, 97 (Rome, 1964), 255, Maier rejects the ascription of this commentary in the colophon to John Buridan (ibid.).Google Scholar

13 But one can also find in Oresme the expression conditio substantie, e.g., in questio 15 of the fourth book of his commentary on the Physics ; see Kirschner, S., Nicolaus Oresmes Kommentar zur Physik des Aristoteles: Kommentar mit Edition der Quaestionen zu Buch 3 und 4 der aristotelischen Physik sowie von vier Quaestionen zu Buch 5 , Sudhoffs Archiv, Beihefte, 39 (Stuttgart, 1997), 363, 47 (hereafter Kirschner).Google Scholar

14 “And John Mirecour allows as rationally defensible the view that acts of thought, sensation, and volition are not things (res) really distinct from the thinking, sensing, or willing substance. The general thesis was condemned by the bishop of Paris in 1347, no doubt in part because it seemed to contradict the doctrine of transubstantiation,” Adams, McCord, William Ockham , 278.Google Scholar

15 De Rijk, L. M., “On Buridan's View of Accidental Being,” in John Buridan: A Master of Arts: Some Aspects of His Philosophy: Acts of the Second Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy “Medium Aevum” on the Occasion of Its 15th Anniversary: Leiden and Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), 20–21 June, 1991 , ed. Bos, E. P. and Krop, H. A., Artistarium, Supplementa 8 (Nijmegen, 1993), 41–51, esp. 43, n. 8.Google Scholar

16 To the objection according to which the identification of motion and a dispositio addita could imply motion without a mobile (“Item, sequitur quod Deus posset separare et separatim conservare motum sine mobili et loco, immo ipsis annichilatis, quod videtur inconveniens, quia tunc esset motus et nichil moveretur,” Buridanus, Johannes, Questiones super Physicam [Paris, 1501; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1964, fol. 50r^a]), Buridan has recourse to the potentia Dei absoluta: “Ad secundam dico quod non plus reputarem inconveniens quod esset motus et nichil moveretur vel mutaretur, quam quod esset albedo et nichil esset album. Neutrum est possibile naturaliter et utrumque est possibile supernaturaliter,” fol. 51r^a .Google Scholar

17 Aristotle, , De generatione et corruptione , I, 2, 315b, 6–15.Google Scholar

18 Buridanus, Johannes, Questiones super De anima , III, 11, Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, MS Conv. Sopp. D.1.1362, fol. VIIr^a; see also MS Conv. Sopp. C.4.263, fol. 59r^a ; Zupko, , Buridan's Philosophy of Mind, 1: 121.Google Scholar

19 Patar, B., Oresme , 381, 49–51; cf. Marshall, , 619, 176–78.Google Scholar

20 de Wesalia, Johannes (n. 2 above), fol. 186r^a .Google Scholar

21 Marsilius of Inghen (n. 2 above), fol. 406r^b .Google Scholar

22 “Istis premissis, sit conclusio responsalis ad questionem: actus et habitus ipsius intellectus humani sunt res distincte realiter contra ipsum intellectum. Ista conclusio probatur per talem articulum Parisius condempnatum, ut dictum est in quarto notabili. Secundo, probatur, quia ista opinio de qua dictum est potest inducere errorem in fide, igitur non est tenenda. Consequentia tenet; antecedens patet, quia, sicut dicunt quod actus intellectus est intellectus, ita dicerent quod albedo esset paries albus … sequitur quod ita bene dicerem <in> sacramento <quod> manet substantia panis, quod est hereticum,” Marsilius of Inghen, fol. 406r^b .+sacramento++manet+substantia+panis,+quod+est+hereticum,”+Marsilius+of+Inghen,+fol.+406rb+.>Google Scholar

23 “Secundo, conclusioni predicte adhereo, quia opinio opposita potest esse principium alterius magne heresis. Nam eodem modo possent dicere de aliis (C, illis D) accidentibus et de subiectis eorum, sicut de habitibus intellectualibus (C, et intellectionibus D) et (C, de D) intellectu, scilicet quod aqua calida esset <idem> (MS: ipsa) quod caliditas et frigida idem quod frigiditas aliter et aliter se habens. Et hoc est iam contra ea que tenemus de sacramento altaris, ubi accidentia manent sine substantia. Ergo substantia panis, que erat alba, magna et (C, om. D) figurata, non erat albedo, magnitudo et (C, om. D) figura, que manent in sacramento, quia hec manent, et (C, om. D) substantia panis non manet. Unde hic est bonus Syllogismus: hec substantia panis non manebit, et hec albedo manebit, ergo hec albedo non est substantia panis,” Florence, BNC, MS Conv. Sopp. D.1.1362, fol. VIIr^a (C, 59r^a); Zupko, Buridan's Philosophy of Mind, 1: 121. No reference to transubstantiation is to be found in either Johannes de Wesalia's or Oresme's commentaries.Google Scholar

24 I am very grateful to William J. Courtenay and Hans Thijssen for their advice on this point. On John of Mirecourt see Courtenay, W. J., “John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on whether God Can Undo the Past,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 39 (1972): 224–56 and 40 (1973): 147–74; idem, “John of Mirecourt's Condemnation: Its Original Form,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 53 (1986): 190–91; Van Neste, R., “The Epistemology of John of Mirecourt: A Reinterpretation,” Citeaux: Commentarii Cistercienses 27 (1976): 5–28; Genest, J.-F. and Vignaux, P., “La bibliothèque anglaise de Jean de Mirecourt: ‘subtilitas’ ou plagiat?,” in Pluta, O., ed., Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert: In Memoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879–1947), Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie, 10 (Amsterdam, 1988), 275–301; Courtenay, W. J., “Erfurt CA 2 127 and the Censured Articles of Mirecourt and Autrecourt,” in Speer, A., ed., Bibliotheca Amploniana: Ihre Bedeutung im Spannungsfeld von Aristotelismus, Nominalismus und Humanismus, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 23 (Berlin and New York, 1995), 341–52; idem, “The Preservation and Dissemination of Academic Condemnations at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages,” in Bazán, B. C., Andújar, E., and Sbrocchi, L. G., eds., Les philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Âge: Actes du IXe Congrès international de Philosophie Médiévale: Ottawa du 17 au 22 aoÛt 1992: Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (New York, Ottawa, and Toronto 1995), 3: 1659–67.Google Scholar

25 Patar, B., in his edition of Nicole Oresme's Quaestiones super de anima seems not to perceive the difference between a pre- and post-1347 redaction of the commentary, when he proposes two equally possible alternatives for the condemnations referred to in the questio; Patar, Oresme, 381, note on line 50. As far as Marsilius's commentary is concerned, it is possible that the conflation is derivative and inspired by Buridan's arguments; in view of the similarities with Buridan's commentary, at least as far as the present topic is concerned, I shall quote Marsilius's commentary together with Buridan's.Google Scholar

26 Buridanus, Johannes, Quaestiones super Physicam (Paris, 1509; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1964), III, 7, fol. 50v^a (“unde si Deus omnia corpora annichilaret preter istum lapidem, iste lapis non amplius esset in loco, et tamen in isto casu posito adhuc esset possibile quod Deus moveret simul circulariter totum mundum. Hoc probo per quendam articulum Parisius condempnatum, in quo dicitur quod Deus non possit movere simul totum mundum motu recto, error”). Hissette, R., Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277, Philosophes Médiévaux, 22 (Louvain and Paris, 1977), 118–20, art. 66: “Quod Deus non possit movere celum motu recto. Et ratio est quia tunc relinqueret vacuum.” See Caroti, S., “Oresme on Motion (Questiones super Physicam III, 2–7),” Vivarium 31 (1993): 8–9 and especially J. Biard, “Le statut du mouvement dans la philosophie naturelle buridanienne,” in Caroti, S. and Souffrin, P., eds., La nouvelle physique du xiv^e siècle, Biblioteca di Nuncius. Studi e testi, 24 (Florence, 1997), 141–59; Sarnowsky, J., “God's Absolute Power, Thought Experiments, and the Conception of Nature in the ‘New Physics’ of xivth Century Paris,” in Caroti, and Souffrin, , 179–201, especially, 190–91.Google Scholar

27 Patar, , Oresme, 381. Hissette, , Enquête, 224; Piché, D., “Commentaire sur quelques articles d'une nouvelle édition de l'acte de censure de 1277,” Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales 65 (1998): 338–39 (the text proposed is “intellectus fit ipsa intellecta formaliter”).Google Scholar

28 “Quod scientia intelligentiae non differt a substantia eius, ubi enim non est diversitas intellecti ab intelligente, nec diversitas intellectorum,” Hissette, 95–97.Google Scholar

29 “Sed ista opinio reprobata est per articulum Parisiensem et refutata tamquam heretica quantum est de anima humana sive eius scientia,” Patar, , Buridan , 689. Olaf Pluta pointed out to me that Lokert's reference to a condemned article fits art. 47 rather than 144.Google Scholar

30 “Hec autem dicta sunt valde obscura et periculosa: sic enim asinus fuit lapis, et fuit semper, et numquam homo vel equus fuit genitus, licet materia facta fuit homo vel equus. Hec sunt satis reprobata per Aristotelem et alios et nullo modo vellem eis assentire,” fol. VIIr^a–b (C, 59r^a–b); Zupko, , Buridan's Philosophy of Mind , 1: 122; see also 2: 581–82. In Marsilius's commentary: “Tertio, est notandum quod ista oppinio non est nova, sed antiquissima; immo est oppinio Parmenidis et Mellissi, qui dixerunt quod omnia essent una substantia, sic quod non essent aliqua accidentia, sed solum substantia esset. Unde credebant quod ex homine fieret asinus et e converso, vel ex igne aqua vel e converso, solum per alium modum <se> habendi substantiarum,” Marsilius of Inghen, fol. 406r^b. This notabile precedes the one with the quotation of the articulus . habendi substantiarum,” Marsilius of Inghen, fol. 406rb. This notabile precedes the one with the quotation of the articulus .' href=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=“Hec+autem+dicta+sunt+valde+obscura+et+periculosa:+sic+enim+asinus+fuit+lapis,+et+fuit+semper,+et+numquam+homo+vel+equus+fuit+genitus,+licet+materia+facta+fuit+homo+vel+equus.+Hec+sunt+satis+reprobata+per+Aristotelem+et+alios+et+nullo+modo+vellem+eis+assentire,”+fol.+VIIra–b+(C,+59ra–b);+Zupko,+,+Buridan's+Philosophy+of+Mind+,+1:+122;+see+also+2:+581–82.+In+Marsilius's+commentary:+“Tertio,+est+notandum+quod+ista+oppinio+non+est+nova,+sed+antiquissima;+immo+est+oppinio+Parmenidis+et+Mellissi,+qui+dixerunt+quod+omnia+essent+una+substantia,+sic+quod+non+essent+aliqua+accidentia,+sed+solum+substantia+esset.+Unde+credebant+quod+ex+homine+fieret+asinus+et+e+converso,+vel+ex+igne+aqua+vel+e+converso,+solum+per+alium+modum++habendi+substantiarum,”+Marsilius+of+Inghen,+fol.+406rb.+This+notabile+precedes+the+one+with+the+quotation+of+the+articulus+.>Google Scholar

31 See n. 30; see also Marsilius of Inghen's commentary on De generatione et corruptione: “Secundo, nota quod erat una opinio antiqua, scilicet ante tempus Aristotelis, et videtur esse Parmenidis, quod elementa solum differunt secundum suas qualitates et non secundum substantiam. Unde dicebat ipse quod eadem substantia quando est calida et sicca et maxime levis dicitur ignis; quando autem est humida et calida et minus levis, vocatur aer,” Marsilius of Inghen, Questiones super libros de generatione et corruptione (Venice, 1505; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1970), fol. 112v^b .Google Scholar

32 This problem is also discussed in the commentaries on De generatione et corruptione of Buridan, Oresme, Albert of Saxony, and Marsilius of Inghen: see Oresme, , Quaestiones super de generatione et corruptione , 89–96, and also 85–88, where Oresme introduces an opinio valde famosa refuting generation and corruption.Google Scholar

33 “Oppiniones antiquorum revertuntur (D revertantur) multotiens tamquam nove et gaudent multi resumere eas, quia (D quod) propter (D per) oblivionem earum videntur nova et mirabilia dicere, et ita a iuvenibus libenter audiuntur (D auditur), quia naturaliter nova et mirabilia delectant sensum, ut patet primo Rethorice,“ fol. VIv^b (C, 58v^a); Zupko, , Buridan's Philosophy of Mind , 1: 118.Google Scholar

34 Fol. VIv^b (C, 58v^a); Zupko, 1: 118.Google Scholar

35 “Et rationes formaliores (difficiliores C) quas ad hoc adducunt sunt ille quas a principio questionis posuimus,” fol. VIv^b (C, 58v^a); Zupko, 1: 118.Google Scholar

36 Fol. VIv^b (C, 58v^b); Zupko, 1: 118.Google Scholar

37 Fol. VIv^a (C, 58r^b); Zupko, 1: 115.Google Scholar

38 See n. 26. Contrary to what I maintained in my article “La position de Nicole Oresme” (n. 10 above), 338, about the semantic problems raised by the proposition “hominem bibere vinum,” I now believe that Oresme's position is to be found in the second solution registered by Buridan rather than the third. Oresme clearly and constantly distinguishes between “aliquid sic se habens” and “aliquid sic se habere”; the denotation of the first being a res, while the second refers to a modus rei. Google Scholar

39 Fol. VIv^b (C, 58v^b); Zupko, , Buridan's Philosophy of Mind , 1: 117–18. In Marsilius's commentary: “Secundo, notandum quod <si> (MS: sicut) ista opinio defenderetur, sic etiam defenderetur quod nihil est in mundo nisi substantia, et quod accidentia essent substantie aliter et aliter se habentes, sic quod accidentia essent solum quidam modi <se> habendi substantiarum, qui non sunt distincti a substantia; ut si de calido fit frigidum, dicunt quod non est acquisitum aliquid novum, sed quod solum substantia aliter se habuit quam prius. Ex isto notabili sequitur quod, si probabitur quod accidentia sunt vera entia positiva distincta a substantia, sic etiam probabitur quod actus et habitus distinguuntur ab anima, ex eo quod est similis ratio de eis” (fol. 406r^a–b). (MS: sicut) ista opinio defenderetur, sic etiam defenderetur quod nihil est in mundo nisi substantia, et quod accidentia essent substantie aliter et aliter se habentes, sic quod accidentia essent solum quidam modi habendi substantiarum, qui non sunt distincti a substantia; ut si de calido fit frigidum, dicunt quod non est acquisitum aliquid novum, sed quod solum substantia aliter se habuit quam prius. Ex isto notabili sequitur quod, si probabitur quod accidentia sunt vera entia positiva distincta a substantia, sic etiam probabitur quod actus et habitus distinguuntur ab anima, ex eo quod est similis ratio de eis” (fol. 406ra–b).' href=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Fol.+VIvb+(C,+58vb);+Zupko,+,+Buridan's+Philosophy+of+Mind+,+1:+117–18.+In+Marsilius's+commentary:+“Secundo,+notandum+quod++(MS:+sicut)+ista+opinio+defenderetur,+sic+etiam+defenderetur+quod+nihil+est+in+mundo+nisi+substantia,+et+quod+accidentia+essent+substantie+aliter+et+aliter+se+habentes,+sic+quod+accidentia+essent+solum+quidam+modi++habendi+substantiarum,+qui+non+sunt+distincti+a+substantia;+ut+si+de+calido+fit+frigidum,+dicunt+quod+non+est+acquisitum+aliquid+novum,+sed+quod+solum+substantia+aliter+se+habuit+quam+prius.+Ex+isto+notabili+sequitur+quod,+si+probabitur+quod+accidentia+sunt+vera+entia+positiva+distincta+a+substantia,+sic+etiam+probabitur+quod+actus+et+habitus+distinguuntur+ab+anima,+ex+eo+quod+est+similis+ratio+de+eis”+(fol.+406ra–b).>Google Scholar

40 Who according to him uphold this position only for the sake of discussion (“non quia credunt eam esse veram, sed quia eos est difficile redarguere demonstrative”). This same view can be found in Marsilius's commentary: “Quantum ad secundum, est sciendum quod isti qui fundant se super istam opinionem, faciunt propter hoc, quia difficile est probare contrarium, et ergo novitate gaudiunt … placet eis ista opinio, et ideo, licet ei non assentiant, tamen tenent illam opinionem, quia rationes pro alia parte non sunt <eque> (MS: neque) fortes” (fol. 406r^a). (MS: neque) fortes” (fol. 406ra).' href=https://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Who+according+to+him+uphold+this+position+only+for+the+sake+of+discussion+(“non+quia+credunt+eam+esse+veram,+sed+quia+eos+est+difficile+redarguere+demonstrative”).+This+same+view+can+be+found+in+Marsilius's+commentary:+“Quantum+ad+secundum,+est+sciendum+quod+isti+qui+fundant+se+super+istam+opinionem,+faciunt+propter+hoc,+quia+difficile+est+probare+contrarium,+et+ergo+novitate+gaudiunt+…+placet+eis+ista+opinio,+et+ideo,+licet+ei+non+assentiant,+tamen+tenent+illam+opinionem,+quia+rationes+pro+alia+parte+non+sunt++(MS:+neque)+fortes”+(fol.+406ra).>Google Scholar

41 See nn. 23 and 30.Google Scholar

42 “Item, sequitur quod idem esset actus considerandi per intellectum et habitus intellectualis (D om.), quod est falsum, quia ex actibus fiunt habitus, et nihil generatur ex se ipso, et cessat actus non cessante habitu, et intellectus est causa et principium tam habitus quam actus. Et infinita talia possunt (D om.) ad hoc adduci,” fol. VIv^b (C, 58v^a); Zupko, , Buridan's Philosophy of Mind , 1: 117. In Marsilius's commentary: “Quantum ad primum, est sciendum quod oppinio quorundam fuit, qui dixerunt quod omnis actus et omnis habitus intellectualis est ipse intellectus aliter et aliter se habens … Sic dicunt de intellectu, quod actus ratione cuius intelligunt est intellectus aliter et aliter se habens. Et ulterius dicunt quod, antequam intelligat, intellectus non vocatur intellectio, sed quando intelligit, sicut antequam ego sedeo, ego non dicor sedens” (fol. 406r^a).Google Scholar

43 Fol. VIIr^a (C, 58v^b–59r^a); Zupko, , Buridan's Philosophy of Mind , 1: 120.Google Scholar

44 “Item, ‘aliter et aliter se habere’ significat idem quod alio et alio modo se habere. Si ergo intellectus noster sit nunc una oppinio et eras erit oppinio contraria et alio et alio modo se habens et iste modus ex quo ponuntur alii, si modi sunt plures, et aliquando <contrari> abinvicem, et intellectus non est nec erit alius, sed semper idem, necesse est esse intellectum alium ab illis modis et ab utroque illorum. Et tunc omnes difficultates que erant de alietate vel ydemptitate illarum opinionum et maiores revertuntur de illis modis; ideo melius esset statim stare in alietate (D admissione) illarum oppinionum. Verum est enim quod intellectus, quando sit contrarie oppinans alio et alio modo se habet (D habens), et illi modi sunt ille oppiniones; sic etiam Sortes prius albus et post niger, alio et alio modo se habet, et illi modi sunt albedo et nigredo. Accidentia enim sunt modi et dispositiones substantiarum secundum quorum variationem (D varietatem) substantia subito aliter et aliter se habet (D habere). Et omnino (et omnino om. D) aliter et aliter se habere requirit continuam alietatem, et oportet quod illa detur in proposito, et non potest bene dari nisi illorum habituum ad invicem vel ad intellectum” (fol. VIIIr^b [C, 59r^b]); Zupko, , Buridan's Philosophy of Mind , 1: 123.Google Scholar

45 “Sed tu obiceres: quare ergo argueretur de figura, quod sit distincta a magnitudine, cuius oppositum ego teneo. Ad istam dubitationem respondendum est per ea que dixi supra secundum Physicorum (et D) in tertia questione” (fol. VIIIr^b [C, 59r^b]); Zupko, , Buridan's Philosophy of Mind , 1: 123. See Buridani, Johannis, Questiones super octo Physicorum libros Aristotelis (Paris, 1509; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1964), fols 30v^a–31r^b (“Utrum figura est res distincta a figurato”); on this topic see Caroti, S., “Modi rerum” e “res artificiales” nel commento alla Physica di Nicole Oresme, forthcoming. The questio of the De anima commentary ends with another reference, this time to the same commentary: “Et vide quod dixi de hoc in secundo in questione decimasexta in dubitationibus quarta et quinta principalibus” (fol. VIIv^b [C, 59v^a]); this quotation is found in the reply to the fifth and last opening pro-argument.Google Scholar

46 “Secunda conclusio est quod nulla figura est distincta a primo figurato; vel sic: nulla figura est distincta a magnitudine figurata. Ista conclusio sic declaratur: magnitudo cubica remanens eadem potest fieri sperica et e converso, ut magnitudo huius cere. Et sic illa magnitudo manens eadem se habet aliter et aliter prius et posterius, tali modo quod de subiecto supponente pro ipsa verificatur idem predicatum prius affirmative et posterius negative; prius enim est cubica et posterius non est cubica” (fol. 30v^a). Buridan replies here to the possible objection, raised in a more general way also in the De anima commentary, according to which the difference between the different figure cannot be explained on the basis of the extension (magnitudo): “Et ex hoc prima facie videtur quod cubicitas et spericitas sint diverse dispositiones abinvicem et a magnitudine, propter quarum diversitatem illa magnitudo se habet aliter et aliter, ergo omnes credentes quod figura sit res distincta a magnitudine figurata habent dicere quod si magnitudo cubica fiat sperica, quedam res prius inherens illi magnitudini corrumpitur, scilicet cubicitas, et quedam alia res generatur postea inherens magnitudini, scilicet spericitas. Ideo si potest probari quod non corrumpitur sic aliqua res nec generatur, alia debebit concedi, quod figura non sit res distincta a magnitudine figurata … Probo ergo quod non sic corrumpitur una res et generatur alia. Et arguitur sic: magnitudo sic potest aliter et aliter figurari per solam approximationem aliquarum suarum partium ad invicem et elongationem aliarum ab invicem, sed per solam huiusmodi approximationem vel remotionem non generatur aliqua res nova que ante non esset, nec corrumpitur aliqua que ante esset, ergo etc. Maior manifesta est satis, ita quod sufficit michi declaratio exemplaris, quod si terra sit sperica et imaginentur tres diametri intersecantes se ad angulos rectos, que vocentur longitudo, latitudo, profunditas sue a, b, c. Et fiat compressio terre secundum a et secundum b, ita quod extremitates ipsius a approximentur ad invicem et similiter extremitates ipsius b; tunc enim extremitates ipsius c elongabuntur ab invicem, et per hoc sine alia mutatione corpus illud quod ante erat spericum, fiet oblongum et non amplius spericum. Et sic patet maior. Minor etiam probatur primo, ad hoc quod due magnitudines extra invicem existentes sint ad invicem propinque vel immediate et tangentes nichil requiritur alicui illarum inherens, sed solum quod sit alia magnitudo inter eas, per quam distent ab invicem. Unde quanto erit inter eas magnitudo maior secundum lineam longissimam de una ad aliam, tanto magis distabunt; et quanto minor tanto <minus> (ed.: magis) distabunt. Item, predicta minor rationis principalis probatur, quia per solum motum localem magnitudinum non oportet aliquid generari, quod ante non esset, nec aliquid corrumpi, quod ante esset, saltern quod sit nature permanentis. Hoc supposito ad presens et declaratur quando queretur de motu, an sit res distincta a mobili et loco” (fol. 30v^a–b). In the Physics commentary Buridan appeals also to a theological argument: “Item conclusio principalis probatur per hoc quod communiter ex fide dicitur quod omnes res alias ab invicem et non communicantes in aliqua parte, eadem Deus potest separare et separatim conservare. Sed non apparet quod Deus posset facere magnitudinem terminatam non figuratam nec figuratam sine extensione vel magnitudine, ergo hoc videtur manifeste implicare contradictionem, ergo etc.” (fol. 30v^b).+(ed.:+magis)+distabunt.+Item,+predicta+minor+rationis+principalis+probatur,+quia+per+solum+motum+localem+magnitudinum+non+oportet+aliquid+generari,+quod+ante+non+esset,+nec+aliquid+corrumpi,+quod+ante+esset,+saltern+quod+sit+nature+permanentis.+Hoc+supposito+ad+presens+et+declaratur+quando+queretur+de+motu,+an+sit+res+distincta+a+mobili+et+loco”+(fol.+30va–b).+In+the+Physics+commentary+Buridan+appeals+also+to+a+theological+argument:+“Item+conclusio+principalis+probatur+per+hoc+quod+communiter+ex+fide+dicitur+quod+omnes+res+alias+ab+invicem+et+non+communicantes+in+aliqua+parte,+eadem+Deus+potest+separare+et+separatim+conservare.+Sed+non+apparet+quod+Deus+posset+facere+magnitudinem+terminatam+non+figuratam+nec+figuratam+sine+extensione+vel+magnitudine,+ergo+hoc+videtur+manifeste+implicare+contradictionem,+ergo+etc.”+(fol.+30vb).>Google Scholar

47 Fol. VIIr^b (C, 59r^b–59v^a); Zupko, , Buridan's Philosophy of Mind , 1: 123–24. In the Physics commentary, in the reply to the first objection, Buridan maintains that for some alterations, which can be explained only through local motion, there is no need to assume a res addita: “Igitur ad primam rationem dicitur quod ibi requiritur mutatio a qua provenit talis diversa locutio; sed illa mutatio non est nisi motus localis partium illius magnitudinis, qui quidem motus localis non requirit terminos permanentes et inherentes mobili, sicut alias dicetur, et tamen per illum motum localem fit hoc illi propinquum, cum ante esset remotum, vel e converso. Et dictum est prius quod ad esse hoc illi propinquum vel distans nihil requiritur novum inherens huic vel illi” (fol. 31r^a). The three different sorts of change are introduced in the Physics commentary on a linguistic level: “Notandum est cum diligentia quod aliqua res manens eadem tripliciter potest se habere aliter et aliter, <ita> quod de ipsa, id est de termino supponente pro ipsa, verificentur predicata contradictoria prius et posterius, vel etiam quod de illo termino vere affirmetur et negetur idem predicatum prius et posterius. Primus modus est si illud predicatum sit connotativum alicuius extrinseci. Tunc enim propter existentiam vel non existentiam aut propter aliam mutationem illius extrinseci possibile est illud contingere, ut homo est pater, si est eius filius, et illo non existente non est pater; et homo est dives si sunt divitie sibi applicate, et est pauper si pereant vel alteri applicentur; et corpus a est propinquum corpori b si non sit aliud corpus intermedium vel vacuum, et est remotum vel remotius si est intermedium corpus minus aut maius. Et propter aliud sic aliter se habere non requiritur aliqua eius mutatio aut suarum partium. Secundus modus est si illud predicatum connotat situm partium illius rei ad invicem. Et tunc ad sic se habere aliter et aliter requiritur motus localis illarum partium vel alicuius earum, et nichil plus, preter ea que ante erant. Ideo cessante motu, qui non est permanens, nichil aliud est posterius quod non esset prius, et nichil etiam erat prius quod non sit posterius. Et sic est de sedere et stare, de esse rectum aut curvum, spericum aut cubicum, et sic de aliis figuris. Tertius modus est si illud predicatum nec connotat aliquid extrinsecum nec connotat habitudinem partium illius rei ad invicem. Et tunc nulla causa apparet mihi naturalis, nisi quia illi rei est aliqua res addita generata vel corrupta. Sic enim est homo albus et non albus, vel albus et niger prius et posterius et sic potest sciri et argui distinctio formarum et accidentium a substantiis suis” (fol. 31r^a–b). On this topic see McCord Adams, M., “Things versus ‘Hows,’ or Ockham on Predication and Ontology,” in Bogen, J. and McGuire, J. E., eds., How Things Are: Studies in Predication and the History of Philosophy and Science (Dordrecht, Boston, and London, 1985), 175–88.Google Scholar

48 The theological argument quoted in n. 46 is followed by some counterarguments: “Verum est tamen quod aliqui quibusdam sophisticationibus voluerunt probare oppositum dicte conclusionis. Primo, quia necesse est, si aliquid habet se aliter et aliter prius et posterius, sicut esset magnitudo que prius esset cubica et posterius sperica, quod ibi sit mutatio requirens diversos terminos, cum subiectum ponatur idem manere. Sed in huiusmodi mutatione non sunt termini diversi nisi ille figure, ergo iste sunt ab invicem diverse a magnitudine que manet eadem” (fol. 31r^a).Google Scholar

49 In the first pro-argument the identity theory seems to be confused with a neoplatonic view: “Antecedens declaratur per auctorem De causis: intelligentie sunt plene formis, ubi intendit quod non intelligunt per species acquisitas, sed per suas essentias. Similiter patet per Commentatorem in isto tertio: in separatis a materia idem est intellectum et intellectio. Et confirmatur: non est necesse ponere aliquem actum intelligendi distinctum ab anima, et omnia apparentia possunt salvari ponendo animam seipsam cognoscere, ergo non debent poni tales actus. Consequentia patet; antecedens declaratur, quia, sicut ponitur quod prima causa seipsa et sui essentia intelligit quamlibet rem, et quod est intellectio cuiuslibet rei, ita etiam potest poni de anima nostra” (fol. 185v^b).Google Scholar

50 Which is evidently otiose once the identity theory has been conceded. After the reference to the articulus Parisiensis, Johannes introduces some philosophical arguments: “Similiter est contra Aristotelem et Commentatorem. Dicit Aristoteles in littera quod anima est locus specierum. Similiter comparat intellectum tabule rase…. Similiter patet de sensibus, quia sensus est susceptivus specierum…. Similiter in isto tertio <dicit> quod lapis non est in anima, sed species lapidis, ubi innuit quod species sive actus si<t> aliquid distinctum ab anima” (fol. 186r^a).+quod+lapis+non+est+in+anima,+sed+species+lapidis,+ubi+innuit+quod+species+sive+actus+si+aliquid+distinctum+ab+anima”+(fol.+186ra).>Google Scholar

51 “Similiter hoc patet ex intentione Aristotelis in toto processu istius tertii, ubi determinat de operationibus ipsius intellectus et probatur ratione <quod> intellectus se habet aliter nunc quam aliquando se habuit, ergo per aliquid sibi acquisitum de novo. Consequentia patet, quia de eodem contradictoria verificari non possunt <nisi> (MS nec) aliquo istorum modorum. Antecedens declaratur: verum est dicere quod anima nunc intelligit, et aliquando fuit verum dicere quod non <intelligebat> (MS intelligeret). Tunc vel ista verificantur per motum localem, et hoc non, quia anima quiescente in corpore potest intelligere postquam intellexit. Nec etiam per successionem temporis, quia tempus, cum sit extrinsecum, nihil operatur ad intellectionem anime. Ergo per aliquid acquisitum, et ille est actus intelligendi. Similiter non esset secundo modo, quare intellectus aliquando esset magis habilis uno tempore quam alio ad prompte vel faciliter operandum. Similiter est contra fidem, quia propter actus malos anima dampnatur, et propter bonos salvatur” (fol.186r^a).+intellectus+se+habet+aliter+nunc+quam+aliquando+se+habuit,+ergo+per+aliquid+sibi+acquisitum+de+novo.+Consequentia+patet,+quia+de+eodem+contradictoria+verificari+non+possunt++(MS+nec)+aliquo+istorum+modorum.+Antecedens+declaratur:+verum+est+dicere+quod+anima+nunc+intelligit,+et+aliquando+fuit+verum+dicere+quod+non++(MS+intelligeret).+Tunc+vel+ista+verificantur+per+motum+localem,+et+hoc+non,+quia+anima+quiescente+in+corpore+potest+intelligere+postquam+intellexit.+Nec+etiam+per+successionem+temporis,+quia+tempus,+cum+sit+extrinsecum,+nihil+operatur+ad+intellectionem+anime.+Ergo+per+aliquid+acquisitum,+et+ille+est+actus+intelligendi.+Similiter+non+esset+secundo+modo,+quare+intellectus+aliquando+esset+magis+habilis+uno+tempore+quam+alio+ad+prompte+vel+faciliter+operandum.+Similiter+est+contra+fidem,+quia+propter+actus+malos+anima+dampnatur,+et+propter+bonos+salvatur”+(fol.186ra).>Google Scholar

52 “Secundo, omne quod se habet nunc aliter quam prius per sui mutationem, aliqualiter est mutatum, ut notum est; sed intellectus est huiusmodi, quia per experientiam patet quod quandoque intelligit unum et quandoque non; et intellectus est actus immanens ita quod est in semetipso; ergo mutatur aliqua mutatione non motu locali propter hoc, nec aliter nisi alteratione. Sed omni alteratione aliqua qualitas acquiritur vel deperditur, quia est motus ad qualitatem. Ergo in intellectu acquiritur aut deperditur aliqua qualitas; et omnis talis quae acquiritur per alterationem est accidens additum” (Patar, , Oresme , 380, 29–37, and cf. Marshall, 617–18, 153–63). Oresme introduces two arguments against the identity theory, which are based respectively on the action of the phantasm and of the will, whose effects are the res addita different from intellect; see 380–81, 38–48. The reference to the condemnation is the final con-argument.Google Scholar

53 “Primo, fuit antiqua opinio ante Aristotelem quod universaliter nullum accidens erat res distincta a substantia, sed erat illa substantia se habens aliter et aliter; et per idem dicebant quod formae substantiales erant accidentia, et per consequens non erant distinctae a materia. Et ita concludebant quod materia erat tota entitas et tota substantia” (Patar, , Oresme , 378, 83–88, and cf. Marshall, , 614, 98–104).Google Scholar

54 “Secundo fuit alia opinio specialiter de anima intellectiva quod, quamvis in aliis sint accidentia distincta, tamen non in ipsa. Et haec fuit opinio platonicorum et Macrobii. Unde dicit sic: motus animae est essentia animae; et iterum post aliquas rationes concludit: motus animae est sua essentia…. Et etiam quod in re idem est scientia et error respectu diversorum obiectorum et sunt nomina diversimode connotantia, et ita de aliis; et illa res quae est scientia non dependet ab obiecto, sed ab obiecto est aliqualiter quod vocatur scientia” (Patar, , Oresme , 379–80, 94–4; cf. Marshall, 615–16, 111–24).Google Scholar

55 According to the third one the distinction is to be found in the sense experience (“Tertio fuit opinio quod actus et habitus sunt accidentia distincta ab intellectu; tamen non sunt in ipso intellectu, sed magis in sensu, ita quod intellectus non variatur in se intelligendo, sed solum est mutatio in sensibus” [Patar, , Oresme , 379, 6–9; cf. Marshall, , 616, 126–30]). The last one, which is for Oresme the true solution, passing over the distinctions of the former, emphasizes the dangerous implications of the identity theory (“Et ideo quarto sequitur Veritas, et est conclusio affirmativa, quod talia sunt accidentia distincta. Quod arguitur sic. Primo, quia nisi ita esset, sequeretur quod ita posset dici de quolibet accidente quod non distingueretur ab obiecto. Consequens est contra philosophiam Aristotelis et contra veritatem. Et probatur consequentia, quia non videtur ratio nec aliqua differentia magis de istis accidentibus quam de aliis; et omnimode sicut rationes quae probant hic distinctionem solverentur per connotationes vel quoquo modo, ita nec plus nec minus diceretur de quibuscumque accidentibus aliis, sicut quod albedo fuit quando non fuit albedo, virtus fuit quando fuit vitium et sic de aliis” [Patar, , Oresme, 380, 18–28; cf. Marshall, , 617, 140–52]). Oresme's position on this topic in his De anima commentary is different from that defended in the Physics commentary, probably because this commentary was written after the condemnation of 1347, or at least revised after that date.Google Scholar

56 Stegmüller, F., “Die zwei Apologien des Johannes Mirecourt,” Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 5 (1933): 64–65. The author declares that he has not defended this position: “Et eius oppositum est verum, et quod probabilius multo est, quod cogitatio distinguatur ab anima, quam eius oppositum. Rationes ad hoc enim sunt multo meliores quam ad oppositum, et hoc etiam tenetur communius a doctoribus, et dicta sanctorum sunt ad hoc magis expressa. Et propter hoc teneo hoc et non oppositum. Et dico quod protervus esset et male faceret, qui oppositum temerarie sustineret” (ibid., 65).Google Scholar

57 Ibid., 65. John remarks: “Ad istam dico sicut ad praecedentem, hoc addito, quod firmius adhaereo et certius distinctioni substantiae et accidentis, quam distinctioni cogitationis ab anima, tum propter fidem, tum etiam quia rationes ad hoc sunt potentiores, et multi putant quod ad hoc habeant demonstrationes saltem a posteriori. Ymmo nescio si rationes quas ad hoc habemus, demonstrationes dici possunt” (ibid., 65–66).Google Scholar

58 “Vicesima sexta: Quod probabiliter potest sustineri, cogitationem vel volitionem non esse rem distinctam ab anima, immo quod est ipsamet anima; et sic sustinens non cogeretur negare aliquam propositionem per se notam, nec aliquam auctoritatem admittendam” (ibid., 200); “Vigesima septima: Quod est probabile in lumine naturali, non esse accidentia, sed omnem rem esse substantiam, et quod nisi esset fides, hoc esset ponendum vel probabiliter posset poni” (ibid., 201). A more accurate discussion of the relationship between intellect and intellections is to be found in the forty-fifth proposition, where John of Mirecourt records three solutions: a) intellections are qualities different from intellect; b) they are relations (and could therefore be reduced from an ontological point of view either to res agens or to res acta); c) they are neither relations nor res. I think that the third position, which John of Mirecourt seems to prefer, is very near to the modi rerum theory: “Alia est via, quae poneret intellectionem esse qualitatem absolutam, et poneret cum hoc, quod quandocumque anima intelligit, est in anima quaedam actio de genere actionis, tamen illa actio non est illa qualitas nec est anima nec est aliqua res, et diceret etiam quod nulla actio creaturae est aliqua res absoluta nec res agens, immo quod nihil est, et istam viam de actione quatenus est actio, quod ipsa non sit aliqua res, si esset assueta libentius dixissem, quam dixissem quod esset res acta vel res agens. Ad neutram tamen istarum opinionum me determinavi, sed multis dictis in illa questione dixi: eligat studens quam voluerit” (ibid., 68).Google Scholar

59 Denifle, H. and Chatelain, E., Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis , 2: 611.Google Scholar

60 Michael, , Johannes Buridan , 2: 703–20; Patar, , Buridan, 67^∗–98^∗ ; Kaluza, Z., “Bulletin d'histoire des doctrines médiévales,” Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 79 (1995): 137–39.Google Scholar

61 Patar, , Buridan , 688–91.Google Scholar

62 Patar, , Buridan , 689, 38–40.Google Scholar

63 “Et non solum dixerunt illud quod dictum est de ipso intellectu, immo negaverunt omne accidens mundi superadditum substantiae, et salvabant diversitates quae apparent nobis in substantiis per diversimode se habere” (ibid., 689).Google Scholar

64 The first is a per simile argument, which is also found in the commentaries of Oresme and Johannes de Wesalia (God and intelligences do not use species to know). “Secundo, intellectio est repraesentatio rei intellectae et species intelligibilis est repraesentatio rei intelligibilis et similitudo ipsius; modo non apparet quare tot ponantur repraesentationes, si unica possit sufficere, nam frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora; et unica possit sufficere, scilicet species intelligibilis, quae est similitudo rei intelligendae, quia sufficit habere similitudinem rei ad hoc quod fiat intellectio” (ibid., 688).Google Scholar

65 “Opinio antiquorum fuit de ista quaestione non solum quod species intelligibilis esset idem cum actibus intelligendi, immo actus intelligendi sunt idem cum ipsa anima et cum hoc habitus intellectuales. Et probant: frustra fit per plura quod bene potest fieri per pauciora; sed omnia possunt salvari ponendo solummodo animam; igitur frustra ponerentur actus et species” (ibid., 688).Google Scholar

66 “Minor probatur, quia, sicut baculus propter aliter et aliter se habere aliquando dicitur rectus, aliquando curvus, non propter hoc quod aliquid ipsi addatur vel auferatur, ita intellectus seipso nihil addendo ipsi per aliter et aliter se habere potest dici aliquando ignorans et aliquando sciens” (ibid., 689).Google Scholar

67 There is at best a scant reference here to such a distinction: “Nec valet ratio quam adduxerunt de figuris, scilicet de baculo curvato et recto, quia duobus contingit modis aliter et aliter denominari. Uno modo propter aliquam rationem intrinsecam inhaerentem alicui rei, sicut aqua aliquando dicitur frigida propter frigiditatem inhaerentem ei, et aliquando dicitur calida. Alio modo illae res aliter denominantur propter aliqua extrinseca, sicut propter motum Socratis aliquando dicor illi dexter et aliquando sinister. Istis duobus modis positis, contingit rem diversimode se habere; et non esset possibile rebus extrinsecis et intrinsecis quibuscumque eodem modo se habentibus quod res aliter et aliter denominaretur” (ibid., 689).Google Scholar

68 He seems thereby to exclude the role of the extrinsic properties, which evidently cannot explain change: “Modo per istum modum salvandi diversitates denominationum non posset salvari quod intellectus nunc denominatur sciens et postea ignorans, nunc intelligens et postea non intelligens, quia propter res extrinsecas aliter et aliter se habere non oportet quod semper intellectus aliter et aliter debeat denominari saltern istis denominationibus, quia, si illae res sint praesentes, adhuc intelligit, et si sint absentes, adhuc intelligit, immo si sint corruptae. Et sic apparet quod propter res diversimode se habere, omni alio circumscripto, intellectus non deberet dici intelligens et non intelligens. Igitur necessarium est, si intellectus debeat aliter et aliter denominari, quod hoc sit per aliquas res sibi inhaerentes, si debeat dici intelligens et non intelligens” (ibid., 690). In the opening remarks of his solution, Buridan insists more correctly on the inadequacy of basing the different states of intellect on something that is no different from intellect itself, an argument we also find in quaestio 11 of the de ultima lectura commentary.Google Scholar

69 “Alia autem est opinio specialiter de anima intellectiva dicens: quamvis in aliis, puta in substantiis corporalibus, bene ponantur aliqua accidentia distincta a substantia, tamen habitus et actus intellectus, quae vocamus accidentia ipsius intellectus, non sunt distincta ab intellectu. Et ista erat opinio Platonicorum et Macrobii” (ibid., 452); “Secundo, fuit alia opinio specialiter de anima intellectiva quod, quamvis in aliis sint accidentia distincta, tamen non in ipsa. Et haec fuit opinio Platonicorum et Macrobii” (Patar, , Oresme , 379). It is worth noticing that this position appeals to connotation in order to explain change: “Et si aliqui vellent tenere istam opinionem, ipsi faciliter solverent rationes contra eam. Bene enim concederent quod anima intellectiva est iam quidquid unquam ipsa erit, sed tamen non est talis qualis aliquando erit. Et ad consimiles rationes et ad illas prius factas ipsi responderent per connotationes; unde dicerent quod scientia fuit quando non fuit scientia, et consimilia. Unde, sicut solemus concedere: cubicum erit quando non erit cubicum, sic consimili modo isti concederent qui vellent sustinere istam opinionem: scientia erit quando non erit scientia. Posito enim quod intellectus iam aliquid sciret et postea desineret scire illud, tunc modo concederet istam: scientia erit, quia intellectus, qui est scientia, erit, tamen, quando erit non sciens, ipse non erit scientia” (Patar, , Buridan, 452); this argument also rests on a different suppositio. Google Scholar

70 There is a clear reference here to a revival of this doctrine: “Modo istam opinionem quidam post tempora Aristotelis resumpserunt, et hodierno tempore adhuc quidam tenent quod nullum accidens sit res distincta a substantia: unde ponunt quod albedo non sit res distincta a re alba, similiter ponunt quod forma substantialis non sit nisi materia taliter formata” (ibid., 452).Google Scholar

71 “Unde notandum est quod quandoque aliqua res habet se aliter et aliter in ordine ad aliquod extrinsecum, sicut columna quae modo est Socrati dextera, postea est ei sinistra. Et quando aliqua res sic se habet extrinsece et ad mutationem alicuius extrinseci aliter quam prius se habuit, tunc non oportet quod propter illud aliter et aliter se habere in illa re sit aliqua res quae prius in ea non erat. Similiter aliquando eadem res propter aliam situationem suarum partium habet se aliter quam prius se habuit, et sicut eadem res modo est sphaerica et postea quadrata; et propter tale aliter et aliter se habere iterum non oportet ponere aliquid de novo acquiri in illa re. Aliquando autem eadem res aliter se habet intrinsece quam prius se habuit absque mutatione alicuius extrinseci et absque situatione partium alia et alia; et propter illud aliter et aliter se habere oportet ponere aliquam rem novam illi rei additam vel ab eo remotam: aliter enim non posset probari quod forma substantialis esset res distincta a materia, nec posset probari quod albedo esset res distincta a substantia. Per istud notabile potest sciri qui termini de praedicamentis accidentium significent res distinctas a substantia, et qui non. Illi enim termini qui possunt de novo verificari de aliquo pronomine demonstrante substantiam propter solam mutationem alicuius extrinseci vel mutationem partium aliam et aliam secundum situm, non significant res distinctas a substantia, sicut sunt isti termini ‘dexterum,’ ‘sinistrum,’ etc., et multi plures. Illi autem qui non possunt de novo verificari de aliquo propter solam mutationem alicuius extrinseci et propter solam situationem partium aliam et aliam, significant res distinctas a substantia, sicut sunt termini de prima et de tertia specie qualitatis: illi enim non possunt de novo, affirmative vel negative, verificari de aliquo propter solam situationem partium illius aliam et aliam, et propter solam mutationem alicuius extrinseci” (ibid., 453–54).Google Scholar

72 This remark is by no means to be taken as an argument for the attribution to Buridan of the De anima commentary published by Patar as de prima lectura. Google Scholar