1 See Rivière, J., ‘Une première “Somme” du pouvoir pontifical: le pape chez Augustin d'Ancone,’ Revue des sciences religieuses 18 (1938) 158, 180.Google Scholar

2 See, for example, Wilks, M. J., The Problem of Sovereignty in the later Middle Ages (Gambridge 1963). Wilks maintains that in the true hierocratic conception of society ‘the existence of lay rulers depends solely upon his [the pope's] absolute pleasure, and nobody else is entitled to have any say in the matter’ (285). 'There can be no suggestion that they have any degree of autonomous existence or that they have in themselves a right to exist at all (69). ‘The pope creates kings and emperors as he wishes and only because he wishes. He has, for Augustinus Triumphus, an intrinsic right to do as he pleases in secular affairs without reference to any other authority’ (265).Google Scholar

3 According to Franciscus Toti, for example, ‘Die potestas temporalis hängt von der potestas spiritualis in ihrem esse ab, wie ab totali causa, ist ihr also untertan,’ Tractatus contra Bavarum , ed. Scholz, R., U(nbekannte) K(irchenpolitische) S(treitschriften aus der Zeit Ludwigs des Bayern, 1327-54) (Rome 1911-14) II 76–88 at 78. For a different reason, Kölmel's treatment of Opicinus de Canistris and his very similar treatment of Franciscus Toti, in Begimen christianum: Weg und Ergebnisse des Gewaltenverhältnisses und des Gewaltenverständnisses (8. bis 14. Jahrhundert) (Berlin 1970) 444-445 and 442-443 respectively. Opicinus maintains that although the pope distributes temporal authority to the various temporal rulers, normally he does not exercise temporal jurisdiction himself. However, he can do so when the temporal ruler grants an executionis permissio to him. This granting of an executionis permissio, argues Kölmel, must mean that the temporal ruler enjoys some power base independent of the papal authority: ‘erweist die Tatsache, dass der Herrscher oder Schenker eine “executionis permissio” erteilt, dass der Temporalherr die executio als eigenes, autogenes Recht besitzen muss. … “Executio” ist offenbar, auch das kann man daraus ersehen, ein eigener Rechtsbereich und mehr als nur delegierte Befugnis.’ This may very well be the case. However, Opicinus might reply that both the temporal office and its executio are derived in their entirety from the pope, although once the temporal ruler receives them, he acquires a right to them which he can concede to the pope, or presumably to someone else, if he so desires. Moreover, he might go on to say that the pope regards this right acquired by the temporal ruler as a right only from the perspective of the papal potestas ordinaria. See his De preeminentia spiritualis imperii , ed. Scholz, , UkS II 89-104 at 97: ‘utriusque gladii iurisdicionem habeat [papa] ac etiam executionem de potencia absoluta, non debet tamen per se gladium temporalem in vindictam exhimere.’ Google Scholar

4 Spiritalis, Aegidius, Libellus contra infideles, ed. Scholz, , UkS II 105-129 at 116; Conrad of Megenberg, De translatione Romani imperii , ed. Scholz, , UkS II 249-345 at 292; Guillelmus Amidani of Cremona, Reprobatio errorum , ed. Scholz, , UkS II 16-28 at 24-25; Tholemy of Lucca, Determinatio compendiosa de iurisdictione imperii, 8 and 15, ed. Krammer, M., MGH, Fontes iuris Germanici antiqui I (Hanover 1909)21, 33. Google Scholar

5 Spiritalis, Aegidius, Libellus 124; Conrad of Megenberg, De translatione 300, 302; Amidani, Guillelmus, Reprobatio errorum 21-22; Tholemy of Lucca, Determinatio compendiosa ch. 10 pp. 23-24, ch. 30 pp. 61-62. Tholemy of Lucca, for example, seems to acknowledge an independent right on the part of the electoral princes to elect the king of Germany. The person they elect does not have the right to take up his imperial prerogatives until his person and his election have been approved, and until he has received the required consecration and coronation from the hands of the pope. However, as the king of Germany he has the right to take up immediately the administration of his realm. Speaking of the emperor, he says: ‘manifestum est, per solam eius electionem, nisi aliud sequatur, nullum ius administrationis quesitum nisi forte in regno Teutonie, in quo ius electio acquiritur sive ex longa consuetudine, cui standum est, ubi contrarium non reperiatur lege sancitum, … vel forte ex ipsa ordinatione principum dicte provincie, cui se tamquam in re propria possunt subicere, quod de aliis partibuse is non convenit ordinare’ (23-24).Google Scholar

6 With the exception of Tholemy of Lucca, what we find in these publicists are simply incidental references to the manner in which a monarch is chosen, indicating that they have not entirely forgotten about the customary elective or hereditary procedures by which a people selects its monarch. Tholemy of Lucca, however, takes one further step in acknowledging the Aristotelian doctrine of the natural origins of civil society (Determinatio compendiosa ch. 17 p. 36). Kölmel suggests that Conrad of Megenberg does the same (Regimen christianum 524-525). However, the context of Conrad's comments indicates that rather than opting for an Aristotelian account of the origins of civil society, Conrad simply maintains that the universal authority of the empire is in harmony with the dictates of right reason. See De translatione 253.Google Scholar

7 Pelagius, Alvarus, De planctu ecclesiae ch. 37, 56, ed. Rocaberti, J. T., Bibliotheca Maxima Pontificia (Rome 1698) III 23–264 at 56, 152, 155; Elpidio, Alexander de S., De ecclesiastica potestate 2.8, ed. Rocaberti, Bibl. Max. II 7.1-40 at 24; Triumphus, Augustinus, Summa de ecclesiastica potestate qu. 1.1, qu. 35.1, qu. 36.4, qu. 45.1 (Augusta 1473); James of Viterbo, De regimine christiano 2.7, ed. Arquillière, H.-X., Le plus ancien traité de l'église (Paris 1926) 231;Google Scholar

8 Pelagius, Alvarus, De planctu ecclesiae ch. 52 p. 126; Elpidio, Alexander de S., De eccl. potestate 2.8 p. 24; James of Viterbo, De reg. christiano 1.1 p. 90; Triumphus, Augustinus, Summa qu. 23.3.Google Scholar

9 Hence these theorists will claim, in the words of Alvarus Pelagius, that the temporal power draws its being materialiter et inchoative from the people, perfective autem et formaliter from the spiritual power. Pelagius, Alvarus, De planctu ecclesiae ch. 56 p. 152. Cf. Elpidio, Alexander de S., De eccl potestate 2.8 p. 24; James of Viterbo, De reg. christiano 2.7 p. 232. This issue is discussed more fully in ‘Papal plenitudo potestatis and the Source of Temporal Authority in Late Medieval Papal Hierocratic Theory,’ Speculum 48 (1973) 654-674.Google Scholar

10 For further discussion of Augustinus Triumphus, see 335-338 infra .Google Scholar

11 Triumphus, Augustinus, Summa qu. 36.4., 37.5; qu. 41.2. Cf. Pelagius, Alvarus, De planctu ecclesiae ch. 13 p. 31, ch. 37 p. 52; Conrad of Megenberg, De translatione 295-296, 300; Toti, Franciscus, Tractatus contra Bavarum 82-83; Amidani, Guillelmus, Reprobatio errorum 24-25; de Canistris, Opicinus, De preeminentia 96; Tholemy of Lucca, Determinatio compendiosa ch. 30 p. 60.Google Scholar

12 Kölmel, , Regimen christianum 408. Cf. his ‘Einheit und Zweiheit der Gewalt im corpus mysticum: Zur Souveränitätslehre des Augustinus Triumphus,’ Historisches Jahrbuch 83 (1963) 137, 141-142.Google Scholar

18 Triumphus, Augustinus, Summa qu. 35.1 ad 1: ‘ius eligendi imperatorem non est concessum aliquibus in favorem ipsorum sed in favorem ecclesie et populi Christiani cuius caput est ipse papa. Unde quando sibi videretur hoc esse in favorem ecclesie et pacem Christiani populi, potest tale ius eis subtrahere sicut propter talem causam eis concessit.’ It should be noted here that I have modernized the punctuation when quoting from this and other older editions.Google Scholar

14 Wüks, , Problem of Sovereignty 432–433.Google Scholar

15 Ibid. 425.Google Scholar

16 Ibid. 424.Google Scholar

17 Ibid. 433.Google Scholar

18 Ibid. 424.Google Scholar

19 Romanus, Aegidius, De ecclesiastica potestate 2.13, ed. Scholz, R. (Weimar 1929) 126–127; Spiritalis, Aegidius, Libellus 123-124; Pelagius, Alvarus, De planctu ecclesiae ch. 37 pp. 44, 50, ch. 54 p. 136; idem, Speculum regum , ed. Scholz, , UkS II 514-529 at 522; Conrad of Megenberg, De translatione 252-253, 254; James of Viterbo, De reg. christiano 2.5, 204, 212; de Hoyo, Lambertus Guerrici, Liber de commendatione Iohannis XXII , ed. Scholz, , UkS II 154-168 at 159; de Canistris, Opicinus, De preeminentia 97.Google Scholar

20 Pelagius, Alvarus, De planctu ecclesiae ch. 43 p. 77; idem, Speculum regum 518; de Hoyo, Lambertus Guerrici, Liber de commendatione 159. Further on in the Speculum regum (522), however, Alvarus Pelagius opts for the other view, that the emperor ought to crown other kings, the kings of Spain excepted. Lambertus qualifies his thought by moving in the same direction, but in a more consistent manner. He seems to maintain that the imperial coronation validates the appointment of lesser rulers. To that extent he may feel that the emperor is the medium through which other princes are instituted in their authority: ‘cum imperialis dignitas omnium sub ecclesia temporalium dignitatum … sit principsa [sic], domina et magistra, ceterorum regum fidelium coronaciones, que propter viarum et expensarum ac absentiarum suarum a suis regnis evitanda incomoda, non possent nisi mediantibus certis regiminum suorum, ut premittitur, prelatis ecclesiasticis semper per summum pontificem comode celebrari, in imperatoris coronatione, ut membra in capite et subditi in domino repetantur’ (159).Google Scholar

21 Spiritalis, Aegidius, Libellus 106; Conrad of Megenberg, De translatione 294, 318; de Canistris, Opicinus, De preeminentia 94, 97. Aegidius Spiritalis is not all that clear on the matter: ‘Summus pontifex in toto orbe terrarum non solum in spiritualibus, sed in temporalibus obtinet iurisdictionem plenariam, licet ut suo vicario illam imperatori committat et aliis regibus et principibus, qui ab eo recipiunt immediate gladii potestatem.’ However, the ‘ eo’ would seem to refer to the emperor. Moreover, on a couple of occasions he speaks simply of the pope committing the exercise of temporal power to his vicar, the emperor (see 111 and 113). The implication of these passages seems to be that other lesser princes must receive their share of temporal authority from the emperor rather than directly from the pope himself.Google Scholar

22 According to Wilks's interpretation of Augustinus Triumphus, the emperor is ‘the medium through which papal jurisdiction passes on to all lesser lay officials, a “quasi quoddam medium inter alios reges et papam,” a sort of ecclesiastical sundog’ (424). However, the phrase which Wilks quotes here does not establish the point. See Triumphus, Augustinus, Summa qu. 45.3. Here Augustinus asks whether appeals to the pope have to be channeled through the emperor. In his view, they do not, but he encounters the following objection: ‘Preterea non licet transire de extremo ad extremum sine medio. Sed imperator est quasi quoddam medium inter alios reges et papam. Non ergo appellatio aliorum regum potest deferri ad papam nisi mediante imperatore.’ To this he replies as follows: ‘Ad tercium est dicendum quod illa ratio non habet locum in papa qui habet plenitudinem potestatis. Unde sicut ab eo possunt exire provisiones sine medio, quia si ad capitulum istius ecclesie spectat prelatum eligere, potest sine electione capituli illi ecclesie de prelato providere, sic possunt appellationes reduci in ipsum remoto omni medio.’ As corroborating evidence for his interpretation Wilks refers to qu. 44.1 ad 2: ‘imperator medium est et sequester inter sibi subditos vel populum et papam quantum ad curam temporalem.’ However, this passage does not provide the support that he needs. Indeed, it begs the question. The whole issue turns on the interpretation to be given to ‘subditos’ and ‘populum.’ Google Scholar

23 Summa qu. 42.1 ad 3.Google Scholar

24 Summa qu. 44.2. Augustinus asks whether ex precepto pape all are bound to keep the laws of the emperor, and he replies as follows: ‘lex imperialis includit multas conditiones quas non oportet ab omnibus servari, quia nec ista fuit intentio legislatoris ut lex eius secundum omnes conditiones illas ab omnibus servaretur. Includit namque lex primo omnium actuum humanorum directionem, eo quod omnis intentio legislatoris ad hoc tendit ut per legem datam actus humani dirigantur ad virtutem et ad bonum inducantur…. Secundo includit consuetudinis loco et tempore convenientis observationem. Dicit enim iurisconsultus quod que longa consuetudine comprobata sunt ac per annos plurimos observata velut tacita civium conventione non minus quam iura scripta servantur. Tercio includit superioris et inferioris ordinationi [ordinationem ?], secundum enim Augustinum, si proconsul mandat uni aliquid observandum, et in illo disponsatum [dispensatum ?] sit cum eo per imperatorem vel superiorem, non stringitur ad illud servandum dispensatione superioris facta. Quarto includit violentam coactionem, ad hoc enim facte sunt leges sicut dicit Ysidorus ut earum metu humana coherceatur audacia tutaque fit inter improbos innocentia et in ipsis improbis formidata supplicatio refrenetur nocendi facultas. Quantum ergo ad actuum humanorum directionem, et quantum ad superioris et inferioris ordinationem, omnes leges imperiales servare debent. Sed quantum ad consuetudinis observationem vel violentam coactionem, non omnes leges predictas servant, sed solum illi qui consuetudine ilia approbata stringuntur, et qui dominio potestatis alicuius regis vel principis subduntur.’ Google Scholar

26 One of these is Summa qu. 23, where he asks whether pagans are subject to the jurisdiction of the emperor. In his treatment of this issue he maintains that if the pagans or barbarians in question live in lands that are ruled by pagan princes, then necessarily they are subject to the jurisdiction of those princes, since all power is from God as St Paul points out. If they live in lands that are ruled by Christian kings, such as the kings of Spain and Aragon, who have a great many Saracens and Jews living in their territories, then necessarily the pagans are subject to the jurisdiction of these Christian princes. If, however, they live in Italy and in those territories in which the emperor rules, then they are subject to the jurisdiction of the emperor (Summa qu. 23.2; cf. qu. 23.5). This way of dealing with the problem would seem to indicate that, as far as Augustinus Triumphus is concerned, the emperor is simply one Christian prince among many.Google Scholar

This impression is reinforced further on in the same passage when Augustinus Triumphus asks why the emperor is called dominus mundi. This would have been an excellent opportunity for him to expound the de iure universal sovereignty of the imperial power. However, he limits himself to stating that the emperor can be said to rule over all the provinces simply because he rules over Italy: Italy, because of its dignity and preeminence, can be considered the domina provinciarum. The emperor can be called the dominus mundi because he is referred to as the king of the Romans, and Rome as everyone knows (or did know at that time) is considered to be the capital of the world (Summa qu. 23.2 ad 3). In qu. 35 he asks if it would be advisable to have several emperors instead of one, and of course he argues that one emperor would be preferable (Summa qu. 35.8). But rather than indicating some sympathy for the ideal of universal emperorship, this text is really inconclusive. Whether the emperorship is entrusted to one man or to a committee, the empire itself seems to be only one state among many.Google Scholar

26 Summa qu. 39.3 ad 2: ‘tempore Gonstantini Romanum imperium erat totum integrum, sed postmodum tyrannice et usurpative tarn imperium orientale quam occidentale fuit et est multipliciter divisum. Et ideo ecclesia propter pacem servandam solum circa partes Ytalie temporalium administrationem committit imperatori cum solemnitate confirmationis et coronationis.’ Google Scholar

27 Wilks, , Problem of Sovereignty 442–443.Google Scholar

28 The text may mean that the king is sovereign with regard to the internal affairs of his own realm, although despite this he still has a superior with regard to external matters. More likely it means simply that the king has no superior in temporal affairs actually living within his kingdom. However, whatever the case, the superior which Augustinus Triumphus has in mind is the pope and not the emperor. See Summa qu. 45.1. The statement which Wilks quotes is made in the context of a discussion concerning the question of whether all kings must obey the orders of the pope. Against this view it is argued as follows: ‘Preterea quis nullius preceptum tenetur servare nisi sui superioris. Sed quilibet rex in suo regno non recognoscit superiorem. Ergo nullius preceptum servare tenetur.’ To this Augustinus Triumphus replies as follows: ‘Ad secundum est dicendum quod rex non recognoscit superiorem in suo regno quoad dominium temporale, seu non habet in regno suo dominum temporalem maiorem ipso. Sed sicut nullus sane mentis potest dicere se non habere dominum supra se, ita nullus potest dicere vicarium eius qui eius auctoritate dominatur supra se dominium non habere.’ Google Scholar

29 Summa qu. 35.1. Cf. qu. 38.4. Cf. also Pelagius, Alvarus, De planctu ecclesiae ch. 43 p. 77; Conrad of Megenberg, De translatione 253, 295.Google Scholar

30 Watt, J., The Theory of Papal Monarchy in the Thirteenth Century (New York 1966) 35–37, 46-47.Google Scholar

31 Spiritalis, Aegidius, Libellus 127; Triumphus, Augustinus, Summa qu. 1.1, qu. 43.3 ad 1; Elpidio, Alexander de S., De eccl. potestate 2.8 p. 23; Pelagius, Alvarus, De planctu ecclesiae ch. 43 p. 76, ch. 56 p. 159; Conrad of Megenberg, De translation 317; de Meyronnes, François, De praelatura dominii spiritualis ad dominium temporale , ed. Baethgen, F., ‘Dante und Franz von Mayronis,’ Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters 15 (1959) 120-136 at 129; James of Viterbo, De reg. christiano 2.8 p. 256; Henry of Cremona, De potestate papae , ed. Scholz, R., Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philipps des Schönen und Bonifaz VIII (Stuttgart 1903) 459-471 at 467-468; Hermannus de Scildis, Tractatus contra haereticos 2.12, ed. Zumkeller, A. (Würzburg 1970) 94; John of Naples, Quaestiones variae Parisiis disputatae qu. 39 (Naples 1618) 339; de Hoyo, Lambertus Guerrici, Liber de commendatione 160; Tholemy of Lucca, Determinatio compendiosa ch. 26 p. 51.Google Scholar

32 See Wilks, , Problem of Sovereignty 254, 543ff. Google Scholar

33 Kölmel, , ‘Einheit und Zweiheit der Gewalt im corpus mysticum’ 132.Google Scholar

34 See his comments on Augustinus Triumphus, ibid. 121, 142. Cf. Regimen christianum 408-409. For comparable remarks with regard to Alvarus Pelagius see his ‘Paupertas und potestas: Kirche und Welt in der Sicht des Alvarus Pelagius,’ Franziskanische Studien 46 (1964) 73.Google Scholar

35 Summa qu. 36.3.Google Scholar

36 See, for example, Summa qu. 43.3. Here Augustinus considers the following objection: ‘Videtur enim quod concessionem factam pape per Constantinum sequentes imperatores revocare possint. Dicit enim Iurisconsultus quod, si princeps concedit alicui quod liceat ei edificare in loco publico, talis concessio debet intelligi ut fiat sine preiudicio alterius. Concessio ergo facta pape Silvestro et suis successoribus per Constantinum intelligenda est esse facta sine preiudicio aliorum imperatorum sequentium.’ To this Augustinus replies as follows: ‘Ad primam ergo est dicendum quod preiudicium fit successori quando subtrahitur ei quod sibi debetur, non autem quando redditur alteri quod sibi est subtractum. Constantinus autem reddit ecclesie et vicario Christi illa que ab ipso reciperat, cum dictum sit supra omnia esse Dei et per consequens pape vicarius eius quantum ad honoris venerationem et dominii recognitionem.’ Google Scholar

37 Cf. Summa qu. 43.3: ‘non alio iure temporalium administratione[m] Constantinus recepit nisi consensu populi, alias pape et principum ac universi senatus urbis Rome.’ Google Scholar

38 Summa qu. 23.3 ad 3. Here he maintains that the pope can justly deprive infidels of their dominium only in certain circumstances: ‘ecclesia persequitur infideles Christianos impugnantes vel iura ecclesiastica et iura nostra tirannica rabie occupantes et multa turbunelta contra Christianos attemptantes. In talibus enim casibus iuste papa potest ab eis dominia et iurisdictiones auferre et licitum bellum eis indicere. Sed si ipsi Sarraceni et infideles Christianos non persequantur nec aliud turbulentum contra Christianam fidem attemptare presumant, et cum Christianis velint pacifice conversari, non debent ab eis tolli illa que sine peccato possunt possidere.‘ Cf. qu. 22.7. Here he asks whether the pope ought to remove Christians from the dominium of infidels and answers in the negative, except, however, in three cases: ’Sciendum est tamen quod propter tria papa potest Christianos a dominio infidelium iuste subtrahere. Primo propter iniustam dominii adeptionem…. Puto tamen hanc sufficientem causam non esse iuste dominationis ut quod possit aliquis iuste dominari alicui invito quantumcumque suum dominium illi utile esse cognoscatur. Unde si infideles violenter acceperunt dominium supra fideles iuste papa potest fideles a dominio illorum subtrahere. Secundo propter iniustum usum et si non iuste uterentur eorum dominio precipiendo eis illicita contra mandata Dei et virtuosos mores vel insolita imponendo onera gravia et importabilia. Tercio propter indecentem statum, nam in ecclesia primitiva, quia totus mundus erat plenus gentibus infidelibus, potestas et dominium infidelium erat ad utilitatem Christianorum qui ad fidem conversi erant, aliter oportuisset eos de toto mundo exivisse si ab eorum dominio voluissent se subtraxisse…. Sed nunc quia multitudo gentium iam intravit ecclesiam non careret mala suspicione si Christiani potentes stare sub dominio fideli proprio opere procurarent sub infideli dominio permanere. Unde puto quod in presenti statu papa potest et debet hoc prohibere.’ Google Scholar

39 Summa qu. 37.6. Augustinus describes these duties as follows: ‘Dicendum quod imperialem seu regalem militiam quatuor per ordinem consequuntur, et dico imperialem vel regalem militiam iusticiam servantem et defendentem, quia remota iusticia imperia et regna non sunt nisi quedam latrocinia ut dicit Augustinus, iiii. De civitate Dei. Primum est pacis unitas…. Secundum est divini cultus reverentia et sanctitas…. Tercium est rerum temporalium ubertas…. Quartum est studii et doctrine Veritas.’ Google Scholar

40 Summa qu. 1.1, qu. 36.3, qu. 36.4. Cf. his Tractates brevis de duplici potestate praelatorum et laicorum , ed. Scholz, , Die Publizistik 486-501 at 500.Google Scholar

41 Summa qu. 38.1. Laehr gives a similar explanation of the Donation, without, however, drawing out its implications. See Laehr, G., Die Konstantinische Schenkung in der abendländischen Literatur des Mittelalters … (Berlin 1926) 147ff. Wilks offers an explanation that in substance is quite different. See Wilks, , Problem of Sovereignty 254, 543ff., and especially 545 n. 1. According to Wilks, the pope received nothing in the Donation to which he did not already have a right, for he was possessed of all the rights pertaining to the imperial authority including the rights of immediate administration. Hence Constantine acknowledged this by surrendering the empire in its entirety to the pope: ‘plenum ius totius imperii est acquisitum summis pontificibus non solum superioris dominationis, verum etiam immediatae administrationis’ (qu. 38.1). Silvester returned this authority to Constantine when he conferred the imperial crown upon him: ‘et papa hanc eandem immediatam administrationem concedit imperatori… pro defensione et pacifica gubernatione Ecclesiae’ (qu. 43.2). However, at that point Gonstantine made a further grant to the pope, handing over to him the immediate administration of the Empire in the West: ‘ Constantinus autem reddidit Ecclesiae et vicario Christi illa quae ab ipso receperat !’ (qu. 43.3). There are problems with the texts that Wilks uses to substantiate this argument, but in a sense the argument does have much to be said for it. The Donation might very well be considered a two-stage process. Constantine surrendered the empire to the pope, received it back from him in the imperial coronation, and then made a further grant to the papacy by handing over the rights to the immediate administration of the empire in the West. However, if the Donation is conceived in this manner, Constantine's initial grant was not a surrender of the ‘plenum ius totius imperii.’ At this stage Constantine was simply acknowledging the right of the pope to participate along with the people in the creation of the emperor. The passage which Wilks quotes in this context, quoted in its entirety above, refers to the second stage of the process. Moreover, its context indicates that Augustinus Triumphus was thinking about the complete rights to the entire empire in the West alone.Google Scholar

42 Summa qu. 43.1. ad 1.Google Scholar

43 summa qu. 43.1 ad 2.Google Scholar

44 Summa qu. 43.3.Google Scholar

45 Summa qu. 43.2 ad 1.Google Scholar

46 Summa qu. 43.2 and qu. 39.1 ad 1: ‘post donationem factam ecclesie a Constantino in toto imperio occidentalium regionum ecclesia habet temporalium non solum universalem iurisdictionem verum etiam universalem administrationem quam exequitur mediante imperatore quern eligit ne ipse implicet se negociis secularibus.’ Google Scholar

47 Summa qu. 40.3: ‘Est enim ipse imperator minister eius [pape] mediante quo administrat temporalia per Constantinum ecclesie concessa ad vindictam malefactorum laudem vero bonorum.’ Google Scholar

48 Summa qu. 40.1 ad 2.Google Scholar

49 Summa qu. 38.4.Google Scholar

50 For a contrasting view see Wilks, , Problem of Sovereignty 254.Google Scholar

51 Summa qu. 35.6.Google Scholar

52 Summa qu. 40.1: ‘Planum est … quod eadem sunt principia generationis rei et corruptionis eiusdem. Per illa enim eadem principia per que res generatur corrumpitur contrario modo sumpta…. Principium autem generationis imperatoris planum est quod est ipse papa quantum ad eius electionem, coronationem et confirmationem…. Ergo principium eius depositionis et corruptionis ipse papa existit.’ However, Augustinus Triumphus underlines the fact that the pope does not have the right to dispense entirely with the imperial authority. A little further on he discusses the following objection raised against the pope's power to depose emperors: ‘Preterea papa non potest tollere ordinem et regimen universi mundi a Deo institutum. Sed duo sunt quibus universus mundus regitur, pontificum auctoritas et regalis potestas, ut scribitur lxxxvi. di. c. duo sunt quippe. Ergo neutrum istorum papa potest tollere.’ To this he replies as follows: ‘Ad tercium est dicendum quod papa non tollit ordinem a Deo institutum quantum ad ista duo regimina tollendo dominationem, sed bene tollit potestatis abusionem, ut si potestate quam confert imperatori ipse abutatur, ecclesiam cuius mandatis tenetur parere invadendo et contemnendo, potest ipsam ab eo tollere et alteri conferre.’ Google Scholar

53 Summa qu. 40.1. He refers to the deposition of Otto of Brunswick by Innocent III, and the deposition of Frederick II by Innocent IV.Google Scholar

54 Summa qu. 37.5.Google Scholar

55 Summa qu. 35.5.Google Scholar

56 Summa qu. 39.2. He goes on to maintain, however, that when the pope elects the emperor himself there is no need for examination and confirmation. See qu. 41.2 ad 1 and qu. 39.2 ad 2: ‘ubi periculum ecclesie immineret ex vexatione et perturbatione tyrannorum, imperator vocatus ad papam ante eius confirmationem vel electionem posset administrare de mandato pape illa que spectarent ad sublevationem ecclesie.’ Google Scholar

57 Summa qu. 41.3 ad 3.Google Scholar

58 Summa qu. 39.1: ‘sicut in naturalibus actio presupponit virtutem et virtus presupponit substantiam, eo quod a nulla substantia creata potest egredi actio nisi mediante virtute, ut probat Commentator vii Meth., est enim hoc proprium solius Dei quod immediate agat per suam substantiam quia virtus eius substantia est, sic in moralibus ista tria se ad invicem presupponunt, electio, confirmatio et administratio, ita quod electio tenet locum substantie, confirmatio locum virtutis et administratio locum operationis. Per electionem enim imperator generatur et acquirit esse. Per confirmationem vero acquirit virtutem per quam agat. Sed per administrationem exequitur ipsum agere et ipsum operari mediante substantia et mediante virtute sibi per electionem et confirmationem acquisita. Unde sicut nulla creatura potest agere immediate sine virtute superaddita, quia tunc sua substantia esset sua virtus quod soli Deo convenit, sic imperator per solam electionem non potest administrare nisi beneficium confirmationis recipiat, quia tunc sequeretur quod sua electio esset eius confirmatio quod solum veritatem habet de summo pontifice qui superiorem non habet.’ However, for a slightly different view see qu. 39.2: ‘aliqua requiruntur ad rei quidditatem et substantiam, aliqua vero ad rei solemnitatem et evidentiam. Illa ergo que pertinent ad imperatoris quidditatem et substantiam solum est eius confirmatio et electio. Sed illa que pertinent ad eius solemnitatem et evidentiam est eius inunctio consecratio et coronatio. Unde convenienter ante eius officii executionem omnia ista circa eum explere debent.’ The difference here may perhaps be accounted for by suggesting that the term substantia is not being used univocally in both passages. In the first passage, where the contrast is between substantia and virtus, the term is being used in a fairly restricted sense. In the second passage, where the contrast is between substantia and solemnitas et evidencia, the term is being used in a broader sense, broad enough to include virtus .Google Scholar

59 Summa qu. 37.5. Cf. qu. 41.2: ‘planum est quod ad summum pontificem spectat immediate ius eligendi imperatorem conferre et ordinare imperium, quia cum sit minister eius in eeclesie defensione et temporalium administratione, potestas eligendi ipsum ab apostolica sede in ipsos electores est derivata.’ Cf. also qu. 36.4: ‘Hug[uccio] … dicit quod imperator potestatem gladii et dignitatem imperialem non recepit ab apostolico sed a principibus et populo per electionem, cuius contrarium supra determinatum est. Quicquid enim fuerit de imperatoribus preteritis modernorum tamen imperatorum electio planum est quod pertinet ad summum pontificem vel immediate per seipsum vel per electores quos ipse summus pontifex ordinavit.’ Google Scholar

60 Summa qu. 35.2.Google Scholar

61 Summa qu. 35.4: ‘ipse [papa] solus habet eonsiderare finem totius eeclesie et ad dictum finem omnes ordinare per debita remedia…. Quando ergo summus pontifex hoc videret talem finem magis valere personas alicuius regni vel regionis quam alterius, posset iuste huiusmodi transmutationem facere.’ Google Scholar

62 Summa qu. 35.3: ‘Quamvis ergo novitates sint timende, ubi tamen evidens et manifesta apparet utilitas potestati pape subesse dinoscitur mutare et innovare omne quod expedit reipublice utilitati et pacis populi Christiani unitati.’ Google Scholar

68 Summa qu. 35.3 ad 2: ‘sicut … a sede apostolica potestas eligendi imperatorem electoribus est concessa, ita a predicta sede potest eis auferri.’ Google Scholar

64 Summa qu. 35.1: ‘iusta et rationabili causa existente [papa] per seipsum possit imperatorem eligere, aut propter eligentium negligentiam et discordiam, aut propter electi bonitatem et condecentiam, vel propter populi Christiani pacis providentiam….’ etc. It should be pointed out here that, on a prima facie view at least, this power of the pope's does not seem to be very different from the power that he can exercise in any realm. Augustinus Triumphus maintains that, when the manifest guilt of the people demands it, the pope can circumvent their elective powers and create a king for them entirely on his own authority. See qu. 35.4, qu. 46.3, and qu. 60.4. This is not the place to go into this matter in detail. Suffice it to say that the power of the pope with regard to the imperial electors is much more extensive than his power to overrule temporarily and on an ad hoc basis the voice of any people in the creation of their monarch. According to Augustinus Triumphus, the pope could, if he thought it necessary, abolish the college of electors entirely.Google Scholar

65 Summa qu. 35.6.Google Scholar

66 Summa qu. 35.7: ‘consideratis gestis et condictionibus hominum quas experimentaliter nunc videmus, satis videtur magis expediens ecclesie pro pacifico statu suorum fidelium ordinare imperiale dominium per hereditariam sucessionem quam per electionem.’ He goes on to give three reasons for this view.Google Scholar

67 Elpidio, Alexander de S., De eccl. potestate 2.8 p. 23; Pelagius, Alvarus, De planctu ecclesiae ch. 56 p. 160; James of Viterbo, De reg. christiano 2.8 pp. 256-257. As James expresses it, speaking of the Donation: ‘Potest autem et aliter dici: videlicet quod ex huiusmodi concessione potest summus pontifex magis immediate se intromittere de temporalibus, quod ex eo patet, quia cum vacat imperium exercere potest immediate iurisdictionem temporalem et sic aliter exercet potestatem temporalem, ut habet earn ex iure divino, et aliter ut habet earn ex iure humano. Unde in ipso magis distinguitur temporalis potestas a spirituali, prout temporalis convenit ei ex iure humano, quia secundum quod convenit ei ex iure divino habet earn unitive in ipsa spirituali potestate contentam; ut autem convenit ei ex iure humano habet earn distinctive, ab ipsa potestate spirituali divisam atque discretam. Verumtamen etiam, prout habet earn iure humano, exercet earn per ministerium aliorum, ut spiritualibus actibus liberius valeat insistere qui sunt ei magis convenientes et pr oprii.’ Google Scholar

68 Pelagius, Alvarus, De planctu ecclesiae ch. 37 p. 50; Conrad of Megenberg, De translatione 317-318; Tholemy of Lucca, Determinatio compendiosa ch. 9 p. 25. As Alvarus expresses it: ‘Casus autem in quibus se Ecclesia de temporalibus intromittit sunt: primus, cum Imperator vel Princeps donat Ecclesiae iurisdictionem in Castro, vel Villa, vel Provincia, sicut habet Ecclesia in patrimonio beati Petri, … et in multis aliis terris. Regnum etiam Siciliae patrimonium est Ecclesiae … et totum imperium Occidentis ex donatione Constantini…. Unde vere et proprie Papa Monarcha est Occidentis; unde necesse est etiam per hanc rationem quod ab eo in Occidente imperium teneatur, et re vera dictus est Dominus et Imperator legitimus utilis.’ Google Scholar

69 De planctu ecclesiae ch. 43 p. 77. Cf. his Collirium adversus hereses novas , ed. Scholz, , UkS II 491-514 at 505: ‘Imperator enim ab ecclesia recipit plenitudinem potestatis … et a papa consequenter imperium, non a populo vel electoribus, … quia nec dicitur imperator, nisi corona recepta ab ecclesia.’ Cf. also Conrad of Megenberg, De translatione 295.Google Scholar

70 De planctu ecclesiae ch. 13 p. 31, ch. 37 p. 52. Cf. Conrad of Megenberg, De translatione 295-296, 300; Tholemy of Lucca, Determinatio compendiosa ch. 30 p. 60.Google Scholar

71 De planctu ecclesiae ch. 41 pp. 67–69. Cf. Tholemy of Lucca, Determinatio compendiosa ch. 12-13 pp. 27-31.Google Scholar

72 De planctu ecclesiae ch. 43 p. 76. Cf. Conrad of Megenberg, De translatione 320; Tholemy of Lucca, Determinatio compendiosa ch. 26 pp. 50-51 Cf. Conrad of Megenberg, De translatione 320; Tholemy of Lucca, Determinatio compendiosa ch. 26 pp. 50-51.Google Scholar

73 See n. 5 supra. Augustinus Triumphus might agree with this alleged right of the princes to elect the king of Germany. See n. 76 infra. However, he would add the proviso, which Tholemy of Lucca does not add, that this right of the princes is one that they possess only on papal indulgence.Google Scholar

74 See De translatione 283-284, 295-296, et passim . Cf. Toti, Franciscus, Tractatus contra Bavarum 83. As Conrad expresses it: ‘qui sua auctoritate habet imperium transferre et translatum conservare, habet eciam translato legem racionabilem statuere nemine de iure prohibente’ (296); and there is no doubt that the pope possessed the authority to transfer the empire: ‘probabo omnia regna christiane religionis per papam posse in alios, quam in suos iam possessores transferri. Quia cum papa iure divino transtulerit imperium, ita poterit transferre alia regna, cum precepta iuris divini omnes ligent’ (296-297; cf. 310). Augustinus Triumphus could have chosen to argue in this manner as well. Like Conrad of Megenberg he recognizes that the pope, as part of the authority committed to him by Christ, has the power to transfer kingdoms and empires from one nation to another; and he also acknowledges that the transfer of the empire from the Greeks to the Germans could be given as an example of the exercise of this papal prerogative. See Summa qu. 37.3-4. However, because of his greater commitment to a this-worldly basis for political authority, by and large Augustinus Triumphus would maintain that the pope's extraordinary privileges with regard to the creation of the emperor could have been made possible only by means of the Donation of Gonstantine.Google Scholar

75 Summa qu. 39.1 ad 2. Cf. qu. 41.2. In this latter passage he considers the following objection: ‘Preterea electio aliquorum regum et principum non examinatur per papam. Ergo nec imperatoris electio per eum debet examinari, cum dominium aliorum a dominio imperiali dependeat.’ To this he replies as follows: ‘Ad tercium est dicendum quod non est simile, quod modus eligendi et examinandi et quicquid pertinet ad iurisdictionem imperialis dominii dependet ex ordinatione ecclesie, quod non contingit de aliis.’ Google Scholar

76 Summa qu. 45.2: ‘Puto pro veritate esse dicendum quod papa vicarius Ihesu Christi vice Dei viventis in toto orbe terrarum spiritualium et temporalium habet universalem iurisdictionem. Sed ipsorum temporalium immediatam administrationem non recepit nisi in regionibus occidentalibus imperii [per] concessionem factam ecclesie a Constantino. Quare autem ecclesia non utitur temporalium administratione nisi in partibus Ytalie mediante imperatore quem elegit et non in aliis regnis que sunt in occidentali imperio hoc non est propter carentiam auctoritatis, sed propter nutriendum in suis filiis vinculum pacis et unitatis, quia ex quo imperium fuit divisum et a diversis partibus diversimode et tyrannice usurpatum ecclesia propter vitandum scandalum et scisma temporalium administrationem in regnis illis dimisit, propter cuius scandali vitationem Salvator humani generis etiam se tributarium fecit, Math. xvii.’ It should be pointed out here that Augustinus may be saying, not that the pope has renounced his exclusive rights of appointing the temporal rulers in these areas, but simply that he has decided not to exercise his prerogative. The following passage suggests that this may be the case, not only with regard to Germany, but also with regard to the entire Christian West, the Italian regions excepted. See qu. 39.3: ‘aliqui dicunt ius acquisitum esse imperatori per solam electionem administrandi in regno Alamanie propter duo. Primo ex diuturna et longa consuetudine, de qua si disputare volumus ut ex consuetudine aliorum alios improbemus, oritur interminata luctatio propter quam vitandam summe cavendum est ne tempestas contentionis serenitatem caritatis obnubilet…. Secundo ex ordinatione illius regni et consuetudine illius populi cui se tanquam in re propria possunt se sibi subiicere, quod de aliis partibus eis non convenit ordinare, et istud puto esse verum. Sed papa dissimilat et contrarium sibi non mandat, quia in talibus que ex ordinatione ecclesie pendent eo ipso quod dissimilantur et non prohibentur intelligitur esse concessa.’ He considers the following objection: ‘Constantinus totum occidentale imperium sub dominio Romani pontificis mandavit gubernari immediate. Cum ergo regnum Alamanie sub occidentali imperio existat, non poterit ibi administrate nisi per confirmationem pape.’ To this he replies as follows: ‘Ad secundum est dicendum quod tempore Constantini Romanum imperium erat totum integrum. Sed postmodum tyrannice et usurpative tarn imperium orientale quam occidentale fuit et est multipliciter divisum, et ideo ecclesia propter pacem servandam solum circa partes Ytalie temporalium administrationem committit imperatori cum solemnitate confirmationis et coronationis. In aliis autem partibus non exequitur quam habet iurisdictionem, sed prudenter dissimilat suorum fidelium principum dominationem.’ However, whether or not in the thought of Augustinus Triumphus the pope has renounced his claims in these other areas, he at least does not press them. And the result of this is that the pope enjoys his exceptional rights in the appointment of temporal rulers only with regard to the emperor and only in the Italian regions.Google Scholar