¹ Suger, , Vie de Louis VI le Gros, ed. Waquet, (Paris 1929) 6, 8, 102, 110, 122, 180, 182, 184, 204, 222, 240, 250.Google Scholar

² I say ‘in Suger's normal use of the term’ because there are cases in which he seems to imply a wider conception; he refers to the fact that even Thibaut of Champagne, then in rebellion, appeared to fight the emperor, saying that the count came ‘ex ajuracione Francie’ (Suger, , 224). Or, more strikingly, he states that Francia had never performed more gloriously than in those times when ‘viribus membrorum suorum adunatis’ she had fought off both the emperor and the English king (Suger, , op. cit. 230). Since the ‘viribus membrorum suorum’ included such persons as the duke of Burgundy and the counts of Flanders, Nevers and Champagne, we must conclude that Francia in this context is more broadly conceived.Google Scholar

³ The literature on the subject is enormous. The most recent study, which contains an excellent bibliography, is Lugge, Margret, ‘Gallia’ und ‘Francia’ im Mittelalter (Bonn 1960).Google Scholar

⁴ See, for example, Strayer, J. R., ‘Defense of the Realm and Royal Power in France,’ Studi in Onore di Gino Luzzatto (Milan 1949) 290–291 where Strayer notes, without development, that regnum in certain contexts does not seem to mean ‘realm’ or ‘kingdom.’ The problem is also touched upon, though somewhat unsatisfactorily from a strictly French point of view, in Kantorowicz, Ernst H., The King's Two Bodies (Princeton 1957) and in Gaines Post, Studies in Medieval Legal Thought: Public Law and the State 1100–1322 (Princeton 1964). Possibly more to the point are Fritz Hartung, ‘Die Krone als Symbol der Herrschaft im ausgehenden Mittelalter,’ Abh. Akad. Berlin 13 (1940) and Karpat, Josef, ‘Zur Geschichte des Begriffes Corona Regni in Frankreich und England,’ Miscellanea historico-juridica: Festschrift für Jan Kapras (Prague, 1941).Google Scholar

⁵ Suger, , op. cit. 6.Google Scholar

⁶ Suger, , ibid. 106.Google Scholar

⁷ Suger, , ibid. 122, 148.Google Scholar

⁸ Suger, , ibid. 202.Google Scholar

⁹ It should be noted, however, that Waquet, citing Luchaire, accepts a restricted definition of regnum: ‘Vraisemblablement l'argent prélevé pour lui venir en aide sur les églises qui dépendaient de la couronne (Luchaire, A., Annales, p. cxxix).’Google Scholar

¹⁰ Principally vol. I of Teulet, A., Layettes du Trésor des Chartes (Paris 1863–1909) and vols. I and XI of Dom Laurière et al., Ordonnances des Rois de France (Paris 1723–1849). (Hereafter cited as L.T.C. and Ordon. respectively.) I say ‘apparent absence’ because here, as in Suger, the contexts in which regnum is found are never precise enough to force a restricted definition. It may well be, of course, that such a definition was intended.Google Scholar

¹¹ L.T.C. II, no. 1617. The charter to the bishop of Angers, as successively confirmed by Louis, IX, Philip III, Philip IV and Philip V, is A. N., JJ 30A, no. 471 and JJ 53, no. 306. The charter to the bishop of Poitiers has been lost, but Teulet, following Dupuy's inventory, notes it in L.T.C., II, no. 1624. It should be noted, however, that he paraphrases the key clause as ‘a corona Francie separaretur.’ Since both the Le Mans and Angers documents, issued at the same time, use the expression ‘a regno’ it seems highly probable that the charter for Poitiers did also. Nevertheless, since the terms regnum and corona were used almost interchangeably in situations similar to these, at least during this period (as will be shown infra, pp. 129–130), there is a slight possibility that Dupuy is being accurate in his terminology.Google Scholar

¹² My research on this problem has covered only the period down to 1328 so I cannot claim knowledge of Valois usage.Google Scholar

¹³ Boutaric, E., Actes du Parlement de Paris (Paris 1863–1867) I, appendix, no. 537. This is the 1284 decision which reviews the arguments above. For other aspects of the case see de Boüard, A., Actes et lettres de Charles I ^er … (Paris 1926), nos. 810, 811, 814, 854, 913, 932, 1044, 1045, 1046.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Boüard, , no. 1046. On the distinction between “de regno” and “in regno” see infra, note 51.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Public Record Office, Chancery Warrant 97/3974. I am indebted to Prof. E. A. R. Brown of Brooklyn College who drew my attention to this document and provided a transcription.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Servois, G., ‘Documents inédits sur l'avènement de Philippe-le-Long,’ Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de France , deuxième partie (1864) 55; Viollet, P., ‘Comment les femmes ont été exclues de la succession à la couronne de France,’ Mémoires de l'Institut de France, 34² (1895) 139, 147–148; Lehugeur, P., Histoire de Philippe V le Long (Paris 1897) 82. Philip, V at first refused any increase, but in May created Charles a peer and granted him additional lands (A. N., JJ 53, no. 118).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Harper's Latin Dictionary , ed. Andrews, E. A. (New York 1879), article ‘Regnum.’ Google Scholar

¹⁸ Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis , ed. Favre, L. (Paris 1937–1938), VII, article ‘Regnum.’ This last definition, ‘pro Ducatu,’ is, incidentally, an explanation in simple terms why the dukes of Normandy should have referred to their duchy as a regnum (cited by Strayer, J. R. in his review of Marie Fauroux, Recueil des Actes des Ducs de Normandie, 911–1066 [Caen 1961] Speculum 38 [1962] 608). But for a more complicated and hypothetical view of the matter, see infra, pp. 142–144.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Newman, W. M., Le domaine royal sous les premiers Capétiens (987–1180) (Paris 1937), xii, 3–4; Lot, F. and Fawtier, R., Histoire des institutions françaises au moyen âge (Paris 1957–1962) 2.99–101.Google Scholar

²⁰ L.T.C., II, no. 1710; also Ordon., XI. 323–324. It might be noted that Louis's repeated reference to division, though not specifically of the regnum, nevertheless offers some support for the claims of Charles of Anjou and Edward II that the kingdom could be divided.Google Scholar

^20a L.T.C., I, no. 1354.Google Scholar

²¹ Strayer, J. R., The Administration of Normandy under Saint Louis (Cambridge, Mass. 1932), 6, 38, 62, 76, 90. Strayer speculates (62) that fiefs continued to be held ‘ad usus et consuetudines Normannie’ largely so that the king could take advantage of the strict military tenure common to the duchy.Google Scholar

²² Strayer, (Administration, 6, notes 3 and 4) cites three instances of the use of this title. To this must be added Philip III's 1275 ordinance on amortissements which lists among the ‘pares Francie’ the duke of Normandy (Ordon., I. 305, note e): this may, of course, be a notation of purely historical or antiquarian interest, but Strayer's evidence, particularly the king's reservation of the guard of Troarn to himself and his heirs, dukes of Normandy, suggests that more immediate and practical concerns were involved.Google Scholar

²³ For Louis, VII as duke of Aquitaine see L.T.C., I, nos. 72–75, 78, 92, 94, 124. The case differs from that of the thirteenth-century kings claiming to be dukes of Normandy because Aquitaine was particularly Eleanor's possession and not the king's, a fact shown by the ease with which she was able to retain it after she had left Louis's bed and board for Henry II's. Lot and Fawtier, 2. 103–104 maintain, somewhat at odds with all this evidence, that the Capetians from the beginning ruled with no other title than king.Google Scholar

²⁴ Strayer, , Administration , 32, 36–38.Google Scholar

²⁵ Ibid. 105; also 18, 32, 39, 40. Although the Exchequer was in theory the Norman court of last resort, by the latter part of the thirteenth century appeals were occasionally permitted to Parlement (e. g. Olim, II. 101–102, a case in 1277 under Philip III).Google Scholar

²⁶ Strayer, , Administration, 35–41 (especially 35 which deals with an inquest ‘super dominico domini regis’); see also Strayer, J. R., The Royal Domaine in the Bailliage of Rouen (Princeton 1936) passim. It should be noted, however, that Strayer (Administration, 77, note 4) cites a case employing the phrase ‘in forestis que sunt de domanio ducatus.’ In this instance the idea of a ducal domain seems to have been used simply to emphasize the particularly advantageous cutting rights that the dukes had customarily enjoyed.Google Scholar

^26a Stubbs, W., ed. Davis, , Select Charters, 9th edition (Oxford 1929) 395–397.Google Scholar

²⁷ On this, see my French Apanages and the Capetian Monarchy, 1224–1328 (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), chapter 4, ‘Sovereignty and Jurisdiction.’ Google Scholar

²⁸ Ordon., XI. 330; see also A.N., J 178B, no. 48 in which Philip IV in 1293 gave his brother Charles of Valois the right to protect the churches except for the cathedrals of Angers and Le Mans. This reservation demonstrates that the charters of liberties granted to the bishops in 1223 continued to be respected.Google Scholar

²⁹ L.T.C., I, no. 400.Google Scholar

³⁰ Archives historiques du Poitou , ed. Guérin, P., XI (1902), no. XIV (a confirmation of Philip IV; for confirmations by X Louis and V Philip, see nos. XLVII, XLVIII). For further grants of this nature under Philip Augustus see Ordon., XI. 251–252, 264–268 (especially clause 52, 267), 275, 294; Delisle, L., Catalogue des actes de Philippe-Auguste (Paris 1856) nos. 822, 824, 875, 1401, 1409.Google Scholar

³¹ For Louis, VIII and Louis IX: L.T.C., II, nos. 1674, 1675, 2318, 3412; Ordon., XI, pp. 325, 327, 328. For Louis VI in 1119: L.T.C., I, no. 46 in which Louis takes all the Cluniac monasteries ‘regni Francie’ into his protection and promises never to let them go ‘extra manum et coronam Francie.’ Google Scholar

³² On the meaning of corona see the works cited supra in note 4; I plan further research on the strictly French aspect of the problem.Google Scholar

³³ Of the three terms, corona was the one which in the end was to prevail in questions of safeguard. This process already seems well advanced by the early fourteenth century, as witnessed by A.N., JJ 61, nos. 119, 120, and particularly by A.N., JJ 56, no. 614 in which Philip V states that he intends to follow the practice of his predecessors who in granting land to a brother or to anyone else had always retained, he said, ‘all churches, cathedrals, fiefs, rear fiefs, men, liberties, franchises, and all other rights [of the Church and of prelates] whole to himself and to the crown of France.’ Google Scholar

³⁴ L.T.C., I, no. 181 (p. 89 col. a).Google Scholar

³⁵ A.N., J 178B, no. 48; there is an excellent discussion on the implications of garde in Lot and Fawtier, 3.243–246.Google Scholar

³⁶ de Beaumanoir, Philippe, ed. Salmon, , Coutumes da Beauvaisis (Paris 1899–1900), 2. no. 1043.Google Scholar

³⁷ Beaumanoir, 2. no. 1466.Google Scholar

³⁸ Here it might be noted that Newman, , op. cit. (n. 19, supra) xii, 3–4, 56–57, 73–74 continually insists on the difference between the royal domain and royal power, although the ambiguities of medieval usage in his period, he says, make it practically impossible to make this distinction explicit. It is possible, however, that what Newman senses to be forming dimly in the twelfth century is in fact the thirteenth-century distinction between domain and kingdom which began to be marked with the acquisition of Normandy (see infra, pp. 137–141). Lot and Fawtier, 2. 102 disagree with Newman, saying that they can find no such distinction, at least in the cases of bishoprics and abbeys. Professor Brown has pointed out to me that evidence from Mâcon tends to support Newman, particularly the 1119 charter of Louis VI (see note 31) which not only took all Cluniac monasteries ‘regni Francie’ into royal protection, but also reserved the right to assume control of all Cluniac fortresses and castles ‘propter necessitates et defensiones coronae regni Francie publice faciendas’ (also quoted in Duby, G., La société aux XII ^e et XII ^e siècles dans la région mâconnaise [Paris 1953] 533, note 2; for Duby's argument see ibid., 531–533). Since Mâcon was not, from Professor Brown's point of view, part of the royal domain — indeed, Duby, ibid., 531, quotes Peter the Venerable as saying the area was without king — she would see the king's action as part of his royal power, having no relation to his domain. I would point out, however, that Louis' right to take over Cluniac fortifications depended on his prior decision to protect and to take into safeguard all the Cluniac monasteries; as a result, he was dealing with things already under his garda specialis. Hence this example does not, to my mind, either give much support to Newman or tend to undercut the general direction of the thesis here being developed. Lastly, Duby, , ibid., 532, note 2, again quotes Peter the Venerable who this time describes Mâcon as being ‘in finibus regni Francorum, quod a Teutonicorum vel Romanorum imperio Arar fluvius a Lotaringis sumens initium Rhodannusque in mare Mediterranea habens profluxum disterminat.’ Duby cites this statement as proof that everyone in Mâcon recognized the king's superior rights, but in view of the earlier citation from Peter that the area lacked a king I tend to think that the abbot of Cluny was in this instance referring only to the popularly accepted frontiers of the kingdom as derived from the Treaty of Verdun, and not to the actual legal situation (on this distinction see Lugge, , op. cit., passim, and infra, pp. 139–143).Google Scholar

³⁹ Cited by Strayer, , Administration , 6, note 3.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Ordon. , I, 82–84.Google Scholar

⁴¹ On this see my French Apanages , pp. 94–95. Basically, proof rests on the fact that the financial records that this ordinance required still survive for some forty towns, and without exception they are situated in the domain.Google Scholar

⁴² What I have in mind here is that something rather like this did happen after mid-century and particularly after the huge southern apanage of Alphonse of Poitiers reverted to the crown in 1271. Suddenly the king was faced with the direct control of an area whose laws were completely at variance with those of the North and where his rights were equally different. At the same time, however, the Parlement of Paris was experiencing rapid development. The result was not the creation of a separate court of last resort, say at Toulouse, but rather of a separate chamber in Parlement for hearing all cases involving the written law. This was a sensible solution in the 1270s; it was not so in 1204 when Normandy was conquered. This reasoning, incidentally, is probably the explanation of why appeals in the latter half of the century were allowed to go, on occasion, from the Exchequer to Parlement (see supra, note 25).Google Scholar

⁴³ See supra, note 38.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Supra , pp. 120–121.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ A.N., J 164A, no. 13; Petit, J., Charles de Valois (Paris 1900) 318–326. Charles had or created no known mints other than these, and he had no lands outside of France where he could have built any, much as he might have wished otherwise.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Olim , I. 498–499, 572–573, 722–723; II. 1–8; L.T.C., III, no. 4411; A.N., J 350, no. 5. I am indebted to Prof. Strayer, J. R. for a transcription of this last document.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Quoted in Zeller, G., La réunion de Metz à la France (Paris 1926) 1. 29, note 1.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Petit-Dutaillis, Charles, The Feudal Monarchy in France and England (London 1936) 296–297. For examples, see Olim, I. 572–573, 651–652.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Maisonobe, A., Mémoire relatif au paréage de 1307 (Mende 1896) 521.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Ordon. , XI. 348.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Cited by Lugge, , 175. When Boniface says that Lyon was ‘in et de regno Francie,’ I take him to mean by this distinction that Lyon was not only within the popular frontiers of the kingdom geographically (‘in’), but also that this city was one of its legal dependencies (‘de’).Google Scholar

⁵² Ordon. , I. 509–510; for discussions of this annexation, see Boutaric, E., La France sous Philippe le Bel (Paris 1861) 406–408 and Zeller, G., 1. 28–29.Google Scholar

⁵³ Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Impériale (Paris 1862), XX² , pp. 135–138; Zeller, , 1. 25–29; Boutaric, , 385–386, 400; Olim, II. 346; Ordon., XI. 393–394.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Olim , II. 346.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Ordon. , XI. 435–437. One suspects that the first ‘Regni’ in this quotation has been improperly transcribed and that it should read ‘Regum.’ Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Quoted in Zeller, , 1. 31, note 3; it ought to be mentioned that I do not, however, accept Zeller's general interpretation of the situation there given.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Fawtier, Robert, ‘L'attentat d'Anagni,’ Mélanges d'histoire et d'archéologie , 60 (1948) 153–179, and particularly 170–171.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Langmuir, Gavin I., ‘“Judei Nostri” and the Beginning of Capetian Legislation,’ Traditio 16 (1960) 212.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ L.T.C. , II, no. 2083 (emphasis supplied).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ David, M., La souveraineté et les limites du pouvoir monarchique (Paris 1954) 34–35, 43–44.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Beaumanoir, II, nos. 1043, 1499, 1513, 1515. For a fuller discussion of Beaumanoir's views, see my French Apanages, 82–88, 91.Google Scholar

⁶² See supra , pp. 131–132.Google Scholar

⁶³ This is hardly the place to enter into the great ‘rex Francorum’ vs. ‘rex Francie’ debate most recently argued by Lugge, , 176–180, but it has occurred to me, as it may to the reader, that the Capetians may in fact have employed both titles: rex Francie when they were particularly concerned with the domain, and rex Francorum when the problem at issue involved the whole kingdom. If so, the same system could easily have been used to distinguish the two varieties of regna. This is, however, a difficult hypothesis to prove. One cannot simply check it out in printed Latin sources because there is no guarantee that they have been properly transcribed. The problem becomes doubly perplexing when it is realized that the king's title in manuscript is most often abbreviated to rex franc. It is then largely up to the reader whether he wishes to supply genitive singular or plural, masculine or feminine. I have checked all the microfilmed documents at my disposal, but thus far can find no conclusive evidence one way or the other. More reliable evidence might be found in royal documents in French, but they are, of course, exceedingly rare until the middle of the thirteenth century, at which point the two concepts of regnum were already beginning to merge. I have been able to find only one document that may be significant, and if so, it suggests that this distinction was not consciously used. There exists (Ordon. XI. 215) a mid-thirteenth-century French translation of Philip Augustus's charter of 1180 freeing slaves and serfs at Orleans, and in this document, clearly concerned only with a domain matter, Philip is titled ‘Roy des Franceis.’ There is, however, some question about this charter's authenticity; it is clearly somewhat defective. Nevertheless, even if it is a forgery, there would still be some strength to a case based on it against the conscious use of a France-Franks distinction, for it could be argued that a forger would have attempted to use the proper forms.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ David, , op. cit. (n. 60 supra) 21–44, 241 develops a theory analogous to this, though not specifically tied to the French monarchy. Actually, the whole idea derives initially from Heinrich Mitteis, Der Staat des hohen Mittelalters, 3rd edition (Weimar 1944) passim. It is Mitteis's contention that the empire may be seen in two ways from the twelfth century: as a territorial state (consisting of Germany, Burgundy, and Italy) over which the emperor ruled potestate imperiali, and secondly as a universal concept (embracing all of the populus Christianus) over which the emperor ruled auctoritate imperiali. This thesis is repeated and developed by Folz, R., L'idée d'empire en occident du V ^e au XIV ^e siècle (Paris 1953) 119ff., and echoed in David, 30–31. Since the imperial pattern so markedly resembles that to be found in France in the early thirteenth century, it is not unnatural to wonder whether the same conceptual explanations were employed. In this regard, it should be noted that if it can be shown that the Capetians were consistent in using potestas and auctoritas for domain and total regnum affairs respectively, then a verbal tool will have been provided for determining whether Newman is right in his belief that the twelfth-century kings were aware of a difference between their power and their domain (supra, note 38 and pp. 136–137).Google Scholar