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Indonesia’s New Partial Multialignment Strategy: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2025

I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana*
Affiliation:
Department of International Relations Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Airlangga, Indonesia
Probo Darono Yakti
Affiliation:
Department of International Relations Faculty of Social and Political Sciences Universitas Airlangga, Indonesia
*
Corresponding author: I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana; Email: wahyu.wicaksana@gmail.com and wahyu.wicaksana@fisip.unair.ac.id

Abstract

The nature of Indonesia’s foreign policy has long been understood as non-aligned. It has been associated with the basic tenet of bebas aktif (being independent and active) and the evolving international relations of the state, which demonstrated continuity in its non-side-taking position in the Cold War. However, recently, new trends in Indonesia’s regional and global conduct have emerged, including the diversification of multilateral engagements beyond ASEAN, the strengthening of various forms of strategic partnerships with major Indo-Pacific powers, and the adoption of normative hedging policies in response to sensitive international issues. What explains these developments? The conception of Indonesian foreign policy as being defined by non-alignment is no longer appropriate. This article argues that Indonesia now employs a partial multi-alignment strategy. Nevertheless, limited national power and persistent threat perceptions prevent the state from pursuing a fully multi-aligned strategy.

Type
Original Article
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Institute for East Asian Studies.

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