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Is Hypocrisy a Problem for Consequentialism?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2009

William H. Shaw
William H. Shaw
Affiliation:
San Jose State University, wshaw@email. sj su.edu
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Abstract

Eldon Soifer and Béla Szabados argue that hypocrisy poses a problem for consequentialism because the hypocrite, in pretending to live up to a norm he or she does not really accept, acts in ways that have good results. They argue, however, that consequentialists can meet this challenge and show the wrongness of hypocrisy by adopting a desirefulfilment version of their theory. This essay raises some doubts about Soifer and Szabados's proposal and argues that consequentialism has no difficulty coming to grips with hypocrisy, whether or not one favours a desire-fulfilment account of the good.

Type
Discussions
Information
Utilitas , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , November 1999 , pp. 340 - 346
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1999

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References

1 Soifer, Eldon and Szabados, Béla, ‘Hypocrisy andConsequentialism’, Utilitas, x (1998)Google Scholar.

2 Crisp, Roger and Cowton, Christopher, ‘Hypocrisy and Moral Seriousness’, American Philosophical Quarterly,xxxi (1994), 343–9Google Scholar.

3 On the last trait, see Crisp and Cowton, 347.