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Is Situationism All Bad News?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 November 2009

LUKE RUSSELL
LUKE RUSSELL*
Affiliation:
University of Sydneyluke.russell@usyd.edu.au
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Abstract

Situationist experiments such as the Milgram experiment and the Princeton Seminary experiment have prompted philosophers to warn us against succumbing to fear of embarrassment and sliding down slippery slopes. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that situationism is all bad news for moral agents. Fear of embarrassment can often motivate right actions, and slippery slopes can slide us away from wrongdoing. The reason that philosophers have seen situationism as bringing all bad news is that they have focused on the very demanding moral goals of virtuous and autonomous action, while ignoring important moral goals that are less demanding. Fear of embarrassment does undermine virtuous and autonomous action, but that very same fear can help us to act resolutely and rightly, and allows us to manipulate would-be wrongdoers into doing the right thing. This is good news.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 21 , Issue 4 , December 2009 , pp. 443 - 463
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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19 It is very unlikely that the results of the Isen and Levin mood-effect experiment or the Matthews and Cannon noise-effect experiment can be explained through fear of embarrassment. Sabini and Silver argue that they can discount such effects, because the affected behaviour – helping people to pick up papers – is not ‘a very important manifestation of a moral trait’ (Sabini and Silver, ‘Lack of Character?’, p. 540). Yet ethics is not concerned only with the very important manifestations of moral traits, but also with minor right and wrongs and the performance of comparatively trivial and supererogatory virtuous acts.

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48 Thanks to Michael Smith and John Doris for giving valuable feedback on this article.