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Solving Rule-Consequentialism's Acceptance Rate Problem

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 June 2015

TIMOTHY D. MILLER
TIMOTHY D. MILLER*
Affiliation:
Lee University, tmiller@leeuniversity.edu
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Abstract

Recent formulations of rule-consequentialism (RC) have attempted to select the ideal moral code based on realistic assumptions of imperfect acceptance. But this introduces further problems. What assumptions about acceptance would be realistic? And what criterion should we use to identify the ideal code? The solutions suggested in the recent literature – Fixed Rate RC, Variable Rate RC, Optimum Rate RC and Maximizing Expectation Rate RC – all calculate a code's value using formulas that stipulate some uniform rate(s) of acceptance. After pointing out a number of difficulties with these approaches, I introduce a formulation of RC on which non-uniform acceptance rates are calculated rather than stipulated. In addition to making more realistic assumptions about acceptance rates, Calculated Rates RC has several other advantages: it gives equal consideration to both acceptance and compliance rates and it brings RC more in line with our intuitive ways of thinking about rules and their consequences.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 28 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 41 - 53
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

1 Hooker, B., Ideal Code, Real World (Oxford, 2000), pp. 75–80Google Scholar.

2 Hooker, Ideal Code, p. 32.

3 Hooker, Ideal Code, p. 84.

4 If several codes are tied for having the highest expected value, Hooker gives preference to the code most similar to conventional morality. See Hooker, Ideal Code, pp. 114–17. For present purposes, I will ignore this complication.

5 Ridge, M., ‘Introducing Variable-Rate Rule Utilitarianism’, The Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2006), pp. 242–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 244–6. Several of the theories considered in this article are formulated as versions of rule-utilitarianism rather than rule-consequentialism. Since the differences between rule-utilitarianism and rule-consequentialism are not relevant to the issues discussed here, I will refer to all of them as versions of rule-consequentialism.

6 Ridge, ‘Variable-Rate’, p. 248.

7 Tobia, K., ‘Rule Consequentialism and the Problem of Partial Acceptance’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2013), pp. 643–52, at 645CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 For example, Hooker and Fletcher identify a specific way in which this general problem can present itself when they point out that VRRC's calculation could be ‘skewed by an anomaly’. Hooker, B. and Fletcher, G., ‘Variable versus Fixed Rate Rule Utilitarianism’, The Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), pp. 344–52, at 349CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also, Smith, H., ‘Measuring the Consequences of Rules’, Utilitas 22 (2010), pp. 413–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 416.

9 Hooker, Ideal Code, p. 84.

10 I am grateful to Max Parish for calling to my attention to the complexities involved in calculating the consequences of a code's rejection.

11 Tobia, ‘Partial Acceptance’, p. 646.

12 Smith, ‘Measuring Consequences’, p. 418. I have slightly modified Smith's wording for the sake of uniformity with the other formulations I am discussing.

13 Tobia, ‘Partial Acceptance’, pp. 647–8.

14 Tobia, ‘Partial Acceptance’, p. 649. My formulation is equivalent to Tobia's, but I have significantly modified his wording for the sake of clarity and uniformity with the other formulations I am discussing. Tobia formulates his criterion as a weighted sum, rather than a weighted average; restating MERRC in terms of a weighted average helps to clarify the respects in which it is both similar and dissimilar to VRRC.

15 Hooker and Fletcher raise a similar objection to Ridge's VRRC. See Hooker and Fletcher, ‘Variable versus Fixed’, pp. 349–50.

16 Much of Hooker's case for formulating RC in terms of less than complete acceptance is based in consideration of these sorts of complexities; see Hooker, Ideal Code, pp. 80–5.

17 Brandt, R., ‘Fairness to Indirect Optimific Theories in Ethics’, Ethics 98 (1988), pp. 341–60, at 356–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 I am grateful to Christopher Stephenson and my audience at the University of Oklahoma for comments on earlier versions of this material.