¹ While no other postcommunist privatization program was as neutral as the Czech program regarding employee ownership rights, Albania's program is a close second. The particularist benefits for enterprise employees were limited to special bidding arrangements that were poorly executed and with minimal effect. On Albanian privatization, see Artemiev, Igor and Fine, Gary, “Albania,” in Liberman, Ira et al., eds., Between State and Market: Mass Privatization in Transition Economies (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1997), 177–80.Google Scholar On Czech privatization, see Mejstrik, Michal, The Privatization Process in East-Central Europe: Evolutionary Process of Czech Privatizations (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² While estimates vary between 70 and 77 percent depending on the source, 72.5 percent was cited by the former chairman of the State Property Committee in Kokh, Alfred, The Selling of the Soviet Empire (New York: Liberty Publishing House, 1998), 146.Google Scholar

³ For an extensive discussion of Polish privatization, see Orenstein, Mitchell, Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Post-Communist Europe (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan PressCrossRefGoogle Scholar, forthcoming). On the distribution of benefits in Russian mass privatization, see Rutland, Peter, “Privatisation in Russia: One Step Forward Two Steps Back?” Europe-Asia Studies 46 (November 1994)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Appel, Hilary, “Voucher Privatization in Russia: Structural Consequences and Mass Response in the Second Period of Reform,” Europe-Asia Studies 49 (December 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Radygin, A., Reforma sobstvennosti v Rossii, Naputi iz proshlogo v budeshchee (Property reform in Russia: On the way from the past to the future) (Moscow: Respublika, 1994).Google Scholar For a comparison of fifteen mass privatization programs, see Liberman (fn. 1), 10–13, Table 2.

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⁶ The rational choice institutionalist literature, which can include much of the literature on property rights, offers what has been described as a “thin” or “simplistic” analysis of human rationality and preference formation. See the discussion of three subfields within the neoinstitutionalist literature in Hall, Peter and Taylor, Rosemary, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” Political Studies 44 (December 1996).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷ For critiques of the rational choice paradigm, see Green, Donald and Shapiro, Ian, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994)Google Scholar; Kelley, Stanley, “Rational Choice: Its Promises and Limitations,” Critical Review 9 (Winter 1995)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Steinmo, Sven, Thelen, Kathleen, and Longstreth, Frank, eds., Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cook, Karen and Levi, Margaret, eds., The Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mansbridge, Jane, ed., Beyond Self-interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).Google Scholar

⁸ See Blanchard, Oliver, ed., Post-Communist Reform: Pain and Progress (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993)Google Scholar, chap. 3; and Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (fn. 4).

⁹ For a discussion of individual strategies for coping with uncertainty in transition, see Burawoy, Michael and Verdery, Kathryn, eds., Uncertain Transition: Ethnographies of Change in the Post-Socialist World (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999)Google Scholar, esp. chap. 1.

¹⁰ While this study directs its focus primarily on the mass privatization programs, similar analysis can be conducted for other areas of property reform, such as the privatization of land and housing. In both of these areas the ideological orientations of elite and mass groups have strongly influenced the transformation of property relations. In Russia, for instance, the struggle by the center (that is, Yeltsin's officials) to privatize agricultural land has been both driven and blocked by ideologically opposed actors. Even more so than in the area of industrial privatization, the ideologically charged sparring match between the president's administration and the legislature over privatizing real property has rankled throughout the years of transition. More recently Yeltsin vetoed the Duma's Land Code prohibiting the sale of farmland (July 25, 1997); the Duma then overrode the veto (April 4, 1998). Similarly, the Duma overrode the president's veto of state regulation of agriculture on July 3, 1997. In addition, the federal Duma opposed regional Duma approval of land privatization in various oblasts, such as in Samara Oblast, Tatarstan, and Nizhny Novgorod.

¹¹ In 1990 in both Russia and the Czech Republic approximately 5 percent of the gross domestic output (GDP) constituted private sector output. In Hungary private sector output as a percentage of GDP was nearly four times greater and in Poland nearly five times greater. For World Bank/OECD figures on etatization, see Liberman, (fn. 1), 5.Google Scholar

¹² For explicit discussion of the influence of the Czech mass privatization program on the design of the Russian program, see Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (fn. 4), chap. 4.

¹³ For instance, Douglass North noted that he prefers the term “belief system” to ideology, since the latter word was not worth the trouble (Address presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 28, 1997).

¹⁴ For references see fnn. 51, 52, and 74.

¹⁵ Hamilton, Malcolm, “The Elements of the Concept of Ideology,” Political Studies 35 (March 1987), 38.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ This aspect (the moral imperative, the ought and not just the is) of ideology is developed in Geertz, Clifford, “Ideology as a Cultural System,” in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973).Google Scholar

¹⁷ Hamilton, (fn. 15), 36.Google Scholar

¹⁸ When emphasizing the manipulative aspect of ideology some Marxist scholars argue that an ideology “naturalizes” the political order by masking ideological propositions as truth claims. See Larrain, Jorge, The Concept of Ideology (London: Hutchinson, 1979)Google Scholar; and the discussion of Larrain and other neo-Marxists in Williams, Rhys, “Religion as Political Resource: Culture or Ideology?” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 35 (December 1996).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁹ The urgency to privatize in Russia stemmed from the fear that the goal of creating a capitalist economy could be thwarted if it were not accomplished quickly. Given that Yeltsin's reformers understood private ownership as the only acceptable institutional arrangement to correct for past structural economic weaknesses, the achievement of this goal and its irreversibility were paramount. In the Czech Republic there was less fear (although still some) of a return to communism or of the inability to break free from the Soviet Union entirely. However, the Czech reform team was similarly concerned that the privatization process must be achieved quickly before various groups, especially managers, “woke up” as one leading privatizer explains, “and attempted to block the process”; author interview with Dušan Tříska, Prague, February 13, 1996. The urgency of speed is reflected in the writing of Tříska and Klaus, who explain their voucher approach in the following way: “Speed … was regarded as absolutely essential and, therefore, no strategy was regarded as feasible, unless it was capable of producing fast results”; see Václav Klaus and Dušan Tříska, “Review Article of Kornai's, Janos “The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism,” Dismantling Socialism, An Interim Report: A Compendium of Texts from the Years 1992–1994 (Prague, 1994).Google Scholar The article was also published in the Hungarian journal Buksz (Winter 1994.)

²⁰ On the influence of ideas on policy through epistemic communities, see Haas, Peter, ed., International Organization: Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination (special issue) International Organization 46 (Winter 1992).Google Scholar

²¹ Given the complexity of this issue and the limited space available here, it is possible to raise only this theoretical assertion. For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Appel, Hilary, “Justice and the Reformulation of Property Rights in the Czech Republic, East European Politics and Societies 9 (Winter 1995).Google Scholar

²² In the Czech Republic the lustration law was an anticommunist screening measure that required the bureaucratic and industrial elite to resign from certain top posts for past acts of political collaboration, in particular with the communist secret police. Cepl, Vojtech, “Lustration in the CSFR,” East European Constitutional Review (Spring 1992)Google Scholar; Siklova, Jirina, “Lustration or the Czech Way of Screening,” East European Constitutional Review (Winter 1996).Google Scholar

²³ Author interview with Tříska (fn. 19).

²⁴ See Appel, Hilary and Gould, John, “Identity Politics and Economic Reform: Examining Industry-State Relations in the Czech and Slovak Republics,” Europe-Asia Studies 52 (January 2000).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁵ For proclamations by trade union leaders that parliamentary deputies were intentionally taking antiunion stands, see ČTK National News Wire, December 6, 1990. On the difficulties of finding support from the center of Parliament (including from Civic Forum) on labor issues, see ČTK National News Wire, December 4, 1990. For further details of the trade unions' position on privatization, see Práce, November 6, 1990. Difficulties on the part of labor in finding support in parliament were also trepeated in author interviews with members of the first postcommunist Federal Assembly, including Jan Kavan, Prague, February 7, 1996, and with members of the Czech Parliament, including Václav Rak, Prague, February 22, 1996.

²⁶ See provisions on preferential sale to employees in excerpts from the Scenario for Economic Reform, in “Document: Ze Scénáře Ekonomické Reformy,” Lidové noviny, September 4, 1990, 2.

²⁷ See Kotrba, Josef, “Privatization Process in the Czech Republic: Players and Winners,” in The Czech Republic and Economic Transition in Eastern Europe (San Diego, Calif: Academic Press, 1995), 164–65.Google Scholar

²⁸ Over 80 percent of former trade union leaders had been dismissed, 90 percent of the members had given up their Communist Party membership immediately after the Velvet Revolution, and, more over, the ČSKOS prohibited all formal affiliations with political parties in enterprises and workshops. See “Reinventing Trade Unions” (Manuscript, Central European University Privatization Project, Fall 1994); and Pleskot, Igor, “Czech and Slovak Trade Union Movement in the Period of Transformation to a Civil Democratic Society” (Mimeo, April 1994).Google Scholar

²⁹ Izvestiia, January 14, 1992, 1.

³⁰ On the ideological makeup of the highest political organs from a progovemment perspective, see Plutnik, Al'bert, “Atakuia pravitel'stvo, oppozitsiia boitsia uspekha reform,” Izvestiia, April 9, 1992, 1–2.Google Scholar For estimates of the percentage (87 percent) of members of the Supreme Soviet believed in 1992 to be former communists, see Finansovaia Izvestiia, November 18, 1992, 1.

³¹ On the early tensions between the legislature and the government, see Elistratov, Ivan and Chubaev, Sergei, “Pravitel'stvo vozvrashchaetsia na … nachalo sotrudhuchestvo,” Izvestiia, April 15, 1992, 1.Google Scholar

³² The government first proposed that employees receive 25 percent of the shares of their enterprise for free; however, these shares would be nonvoting. Yet as greater pressure mounted, the reform team offered a second and then a third variant from which worker collectives could choose. In the second variant employees could buy 51 percent of the voting shares for a negligible price. In the third variant managers or a small group of workers could buy 20 percent of voting shares at the nominal price, but several conditions governed the transaction. The second variant was designed to placate workers and managers and the third variant was specifically intended to satisfy managerial demands. The third variant was seldom applicable, though, due to strict eligibility requirements that were obscurely written into the legislation. In addition to these three variants, a fourth one was proposed by the Parliament but successfully thwarted by the reformers—to transfer up to 90 percent of the shares of an enterprise to the worker collective. For further detail on the three variants, see Frydman, Roman et al, The Privatization Process in Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States (London: Central European University Press, 1993), 53–58Google Scholar; and on the fourth variant, see Slider, Darrell, “Privatization in Russia's Regions,” Post-Soviet Affairs 10 (October-December 1994), 375.Google Scholar

³³ See fn. 2.

³⁴ Dmitry Vasiliev's assessment of employee privileges, reported in Financial Times., November 26, 1993, 2. See also former Russian State Property Committee chairman Alfred Kokh's depiction in Kokh (fn. 2), 51, 82.

³⁵ For an extended discussion the Russian government's intentions and the distributive consequences, see Appel (fn. 3), 1433–49.

³⁶ See Andrei Shleifer and Dmitry Vasiliev, “Management Ownership and Russian Privatization” (Paper presented at the World Bank conference on Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia, Washington, D.C., December 15, 1994), 9.

³⁷ Etzioni, , A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations: On Power, Involvement and Their Correlates (New York: Free Press, 1961), 34–22.Google Scholar See the discussion (and extension) of the three reinforcing mechanisms in Ian Lustick, “Hegemony and the Riddle of Nationalism: The Dialectics of Political Identity in the Middle East,” Working Paper 1997–01 (Christopher H. Browne Center for International Politics, University of Pennsylvania, 1997).

³⁸ Hough, Jerry and Fainsod, Merle, How the Soviet Union Is Governed (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 148–52.Google Scholar

³⁹ For a discussion of the dependence of normative compliance mechanisms on material incentives and coercion potential, see Levi, Margaret, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 68.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ For instance, North considers ideology primarily as an instrument of the state to justify programs and as a tool of the opposition when attacking existing arrangements. Ideas do not drive the formation of property rights systems, but they have played an important role in the maintenance of and challenge to existing property rights. North (fn. 5), 50–52.

⁴¹ Quoted from the text of the speech by Klaus at G-30 conference in Vienna on April 24, 1993, “The Czech Republic's Prospects …,” Telegraf, May 4, 1993, cited in “Klaus Hands Down ‘Ten Commandments’ for Reform,” FBIS-EEU 93–087, May 7, 1993, 7, 9.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Zdenka Mansfeldová, “Professional and Political Strategies in Economic Discourses” (Paper presented at the conference on Symbolic Politics and the Process of Democratization in Eastern Europe, Berlin, August 21–28, 1994).

⁴⁴ “Press Conference with Anatoly Chubais,” Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, July 30, 1992.

⁴⁵ “Speech of Anatoly Chubais to Congress of People's Deputies,” Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, April 8, 1992.

⁴⁶ Boycko was a key player in Russian property reforms, holding numerous positions in the privatization process, including director of the Russian Privatization Center and briefly chairman of the State Property Committee (also known as the minister of privatization). On the universality of the rational actor model, see Shiller, Robert, Boycko, Maxim, and Korobov, Vladimir, “Hunting for Homo Sovieticus: Situational versus Attitudinal Factors in Economic Behavior,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring 1993)Google Scholar; and idem, “Popular Attitudes toward Free Markets: The Soviet Union and the United States Compared,” American Economic Review 81 (June 1991).

⁴⁷ As Piotr Aven, an economist working with Gaidar and minister of economic relations, writes on this theme: “There are no special countries. All countries from the point of view of an economist are the same in what concerns the stabilization of their economies”; in Nezvisimaia gazeta, March 27, 1992, quoted by Shlapentokh, Vladimir, “Privatization Debates in Russia, 1989–1992,” Comparative Economic Studies 35 (Summer 1993), 19–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁸ On the reformers' self-perception as macroeconomic technocrats indifferent to popularity ratings, see “Egor Gaidar i v bezbykhodnykh situatsiiakh nado iskat vykhod,” Izvestiia, July 5, 1992, 1, 3.

⁴⁹ Yeltsin, Boris, The View from the Kremlin (London: Harper Collins, 1994), 159.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Weber, Max, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” in Runciman, W. G., ed., Weber Selections in Translation, trans. Matthews, Eric (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).Google Scholar

⁵¹ Hall, The Political Power of Economic Ideas: Keynesianism across Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991)Google Scholar; Sikkink, , Ideas and Institutions: Developtnentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991).Google Scholar

⁵² The notion of ideas “fitting” or “resonating” in a given context as an important insight from the ideas literature can be found within the works of many influential contributors in one form or another. See Hall (fn. 51); Sikkink (fn. 51); and John Ikenberry, G., “Creating Yesterday's New World Order: Keynesian ‘New Thinking’ and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement,” in Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).Google Scholar

⁵³ See Klaus's remarks when forming the Interparliamentary Group of the Democratic Right Wing, a subgroup of Civic Forum, and declaring the fundamental principles of the organization (ČTK National News Wire, October 31, 1990), when Klaus announces the principles of Civic Democratic Party (ODS) upon its formation.

⁵⁴ Similarly, in building a new, postcommunist identity, political leaders resorted to similar appeals to history, citing the Masaryk period in particular, to support the “naturalness” of democracy in the Czech lands. For further analysis, see Holy, Ladislav, The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See press release for market quote in Reuters, May 31, 1990.

⁵⁶ ČTK National News Wire, December 8, 1990. Examples of Klaus's evocation of history in public speeches abound. Note Klaus's historical references when he founded Civic Democratic Party (ODS) and announced the programmatic principles of the party. According to the Czech national news agency, Klaus explained that ODS would “follow the traditions of European Christian civilization, the humanistic and democratic traditions of the preordained-Munich republic (1918–1938) and the experience of the present Western democracies. It resolutely and entirely rejects Marxist and Leninist ideology, and all trends toward Socialization and Collectivization in the economy and politics are alien to it.” Applicants for membership in the ODS would have to state whether they had been members of the Communist Party, and applications from former members of the People's Militia and collaborators with the former secret police would be rejected; ČTK National News Wire, March 1, 1991.

⁵⁷ For a discussion of the Gramscian concept of “articulation,” see Grossberg, who defines articulation as a “continuous struggle to reposition practices within a shifting field of forces, to redefine possibilities by redefining the field of relations-the context-within which the practice is located.” Grossberg, Lawrence, We Gotta Get Out of This Place: Popular Conservatism and Modern Culture (London: Routledge, 1992), 54Google Scholar, quoted in Kurtjacobsen, John, “Much Ado about Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy,” World Politics 47 (January 1995), 308–9.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ John Hall writes: “The discovery that intellectuals can construct social identities should not be exaggerated.… [I]t is important to remember that the exercise of this type of ideological power is rare.… More important, normative cohesion is, given social complexity, almost certain to be incomplete”; Hall, “Ideas and the Social Sciences,” in Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 52), 53.

⁵⁹ On the culture-ideology distinction as representing the stasis-change dichotomy in the work of Clifford Geertz, Ann Swidler, and others, see Williams, Rhys, “Religion as a Political Resource: Culture or Ideology?” Journalfor the Scientific Study of Religion 35 (December 1996).Google Scholar

⁶⁰ For an analysis of political culture as the product of the protracted historical accumulation of practices and meanings, see Hansen, Thomas, The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 27.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Pipes writes: “Political Culture, shaped by a nation's historic experience, enters the nation's blood stream and changes as slowly and reluctantly as does language or customs”; Pipes, Richard, “The Communist System,” in Dallin, and Lapidus, , eds., The Soviet System in Crisis (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 18.Google Scholar

⁶² Almond, Gabriel and Verba, Sidney, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).Google Scholar

⁶³ Ibid., 500.

⁶⁴ Schmitter, and Karl, , “What Democracy Is and Is Not,” Journal of Democracy 2 (Summer 1991), 83–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁶⁵ See Laitin, , “Compliance Ideologies: Rethinking Political Culture,” American Political Science Review 89 (March 1995).Google Scholar

⁶⁶ On the revival of the study of political culture in the second half of the 1980s, see Inglehart, Ronald, “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” American Political Science Review 82 (December 1988).CrossRefGoogle Scholar More recently, see Wilson, Richard, Compliance Ideologies: Rethinking Political Culture (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)Google Scholar, as well as Laitin's analysis of political culture in Laitin (fn. 65), 168. Additionally, see Diamond, Larry, Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1994)Google Scholar, especially the introductory chapter. On Eastern Europe, see Tismaneanu, Vladimir, ed., Political Culture and Civil Society in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995).Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Public attitudes in East European countries toward Western Europe can be found in the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer, nos. 1–6 (Brussels: European Commission, 1990–96).

⁶⁸ On the “unwarranted assumptions about the uniformity of convictions” among members of an ideological group, see Schuil, , “What Is Ideology? Theoretical Problems and Lessons from Soviet-Type Societies,” Political Studies 40 (December 1992), 728–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Hansen (fn. 60) notes the tensions created by the “multiplicity of meanings inscribed in most ideological constructions. This tension may be expressed as the tension between the conceptual grammar of a discourse and the connotative domain within which it is articulated” (p. 25).

⁶⁹ Schuil notes (fn. 68) that it would be mistaken to “put a premium on the genuineness of an agents state beliefs” since “one's actions will be shaped by an ideology in so far as one must conform to its conventions”; one need not “believe in the ideology … one must be committed to it. The required attitude is respect, not faith.” For this reason, Schuil suggests that ideologies are better understood as a discourse rather than a belief system.

⁷⁰ In fact, this is precisely what Schuil (fn. 68) recommends, that the term “ideology” be replaced with the term “discourse” in instances where an ideas system is not actually “believed in” but constrains the policy debate nonetheless.

⁷¹ Demsetz (fn. 5); and North (fn. 5).

⁷² North (fn. 13).

⁷³ Riker and Sened (fn. 5); Riker and Weimer (fn. 5); Libecap (fn. 5); Eggertsson (fn. 5).

⁷⁴ The theorists included among the contributors to the ideas literature (e.g., Kathryn Sikkink, Peter Hall, Judith Goldstein, Robert Keohane, John Odell, G. John Ikenberry, Jeffrey Checkel) help to identify the social and structural mechanisms through which ideas as shared beliefs affect the creation and persistence of new policy projects, political paradigms, and regimes. In contrast to analytical approaches based upon cognitive psychology, the ideas of individuals are important in the ideas literature only inasmuch as they relate to a large community holding the same beliefs. See two review articles focusing on the ideas literature and related literatures: Jacobsen (fn. 57); and Yee, Albert, “The Causal Effects of Ideas on Policies,” International Organization 50 (Winter 1996).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁵ See Goldstein, Judith, “The Impact of Ideas on Trade Policy: The Origins of U.S. Agricultural and Manufacturing Policies,” International Organization 43 (Winter 1989), 32–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ikenberry, (fn. 52), 59Google Scholar; Robert Jackson, “The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change and International Relations,” in Goldstein, and Keohane, (fn. 52), 112–13.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ On the culture of bureaucracy, see Koh, Byung Chol, Japans Administrative Elite (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989)Google Scholar; on “cosmopolitanness,” see Callaghy, Thomas, “Vision and Politics in the Transformation of the Global Political Economy: Lessons from the Second and Third Worlds,” in Slater, Robert, Schultz, Barry, and Dorr, Steven, eds., Global Transformation and the Third World (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993).Google Scholar On interest-group legitimacy, see Nelson, Joan M., “The Politics of Economic Transformation: Is Third World Experience Relevant in Eastern Europe?” World Politics 45 (April 1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷⁷ On the insulation of elites, see Haggard, Stephen and Kaufman, Robert, eds., The Politics of Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992)Google Scholar, introduction. On networks between the state and economic groups, see Peter Evans, “The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy, and Structural Change,” in Haggard and Kaufman.

⁷⁸ See Kathryn Sikkink, in Goldstein and Keohane (fn. 52), chap. 6.

⁷⁹ Katzenstein, Peter, Cultural Norms and National Security (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).Google Scholar