¹ The Destour, or Liberal Constitutional, Party was founded in 1920. Its main goal, a Tunisian Constitution, is the meaning of “Destour” in Arabic. The best histories of the Tunisian nationalist movement are Garas, F., Bourguiba et la naissance d'une nation, Paris, 1956Google Scholar, and Julien, Ch.-A., L'Afrique du Nord en marche, Paris, 1953.Google Scholar

² The Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT) was created in January 1945 with Neo-Destour support, to provide a purely Tunisian alternative to the French Communist-dominated CGT. What is now called the Union Tunisienne des Industriels et Commerçants (UTIC) was created by the Neo-Destour in early 1946 to support the nationalist cause and to counter a similar Communist front organization. The Union Nationale des Agriculteurs Tunisiens (UNAT) was created only in 1956, but virtually all of its cadres came from the Union Générale des Agriculteurs Tunisiens, established at the same time as UTIC for similar reasons. The older organization was dissolved after some of its top leaders followed Salah Ben Youssef in 1955–1956 (see text below). The Union Générale des Etudiants de Tunisie (UGET) was founded clandestinely in 1953 by Neo-Destour students in France. The Neo-Destour Youth dates back to 1936. Some of the many Tunisian scout movements were heavily infiltrated by the Neo-Destour for many years; all have since independence been combined into one organization controlled by the party. The Union Nationale des Femmes Tunisiennes (UNFT) was founded with Bourguiba's personal blessing and support in 1957. These organizations may all be treated to a varying extent as ancillary organizations of the Neo-Destour. Their structures, which complement that of the party, help to maintain national cohesion, while providing democratically elected organs for political education and leadership training. Unfortunately, for lack of space they cannot be treated in this article.

³ Speech by Bourguiba delivered on October 2, 1958, at an assembly of Neo-Destour cadres. See Secretariat of State for Information, Les Congrès du Néo-Destour, Tunis, 1959, p. 93.

⁴ For a documented discussion of the problem, see my article, “The National Party: A Tentative Model,” Public Policy (Harvard Graduate School of Public Administration), X (1960), pp. 239–67.

⁵ It will be seen that structurally the Neo-Destour somewhat resembles Communist parties. But relative emphasis upon party structure and neglect of ideologies, as exemplified by Duverger's, MauricePolitical Parties (London, 1955)Google Scholar and Rézette's, RobertPartis politiques marocains (Paris, 1955)Google Scholar, can be misleading, especially with regard to national parties, whose structures remain fluid.

⁶ No detailed theoretical study of Bourguibism exists. But, for a discussion of some of Bourguiba's key ideas, see Stephane, Roger, La Tunisie de Bourguiba (Paris, 1958)Google Scholar, where the term “Bourguibism” was popularized, and Ardant, Gabriel, La Tunisie d'aujourd'hui et de demain (Paris, 1961).Google Scholar The best source is the collection of Bourguiba's weekly speeches since 1956, available at the Tunisian Secretariat of State for Information. For his speeches and writings before independence, see Bourguiba, Habib, La Tunisie et la France, Paris, 1954.Google Scholar

⁷ Political Bureau of the Neo-Destour Party, The Covenant and Internal Statutes of the Neo-Destour, passed by the Sixth Congress, Tunis, 1959 (published only in Arabic). I have rendered a free translation from the Arabic. In this article, political terms, whenever ambiguous, have been translated in light of the French terms that inspired their use. The internal statutes of the party passed at the Congress of 1955, along with the more rudimentary statutes of 1934 and 1937, are contained in the appendix of Les Congrès du Néo-Destour, op.cit.

⁸ This and the following quotations are from Bourguiba's speech of October 2, 1958, op.cit.

⁹ La Documentation Tunisienne, Tunisie 58, p. 22Google Scholar, quoted in Callard's, Keith highly informative article, “The Republic of Bourguiba,” International Journal, XVI (Winter 1960–1961), p. 34.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Neo-Destour Party, The National Congress of Sfax, Arabic edn. [Tunis, n.d.], p. 58.Google Scholar

¹¹ The unlikely figure of 600,000 was given in Tunisie 58. Today the party claims between 250,000 and 300,000 adherents, out of an adult male population of less than a million (women in the party are still rare, except in some cities). But these figures, swollen by new recruits in some of the politically underdeveloped areas of Tunisia, may mask increasing apathy in some old party strongholds.

¹² Apart from meager newspaper reports, the only solid documentary description of the party's present structure lies in its published internal statutes. These will not be individually cited in what follows.

¹³ The 1959 statutes omit the previous requirement that new members take an oath. In practice the prospective member today, at least in Tunis, needs two sponsors who are members of the party to present his name to the cell committee. The $3 annual dues are not always paid in full.

¹⁴ The elected officers choose among themselves a President, a Secretary-General, an Assistant Secretary-General, a Treasurer, an Assistant Treasurer, an Orientation officer, a Youth officer, and a Social Revival officer. The Orientation officer is responsible for party propaganda within the cell's district. The Youth officer carries out the program of the Neo-Destour Youth. The Social Revival officer watches over the interests of the general public in everything from garbage collection to the building of a new mosque.

¹⁵ But the Political Bureau does not exercise its new privilege indiscriminately. The representative of the Political Bureau who presides over the cell's general assembly may be asked to explain why a candidate was not approved.

¹⁶ A party member or official may be punished by a warning, suspension, or expulsion from the party, if proved guilty of any of the following broad charges: (1) prejudicing interests of the party and departing from its political principles; (2) action susceptible of endangering the party or supporting one of its enemies; (3) breaking the party Covenant or internal statutes, or affecting the dignity of the party; (4) public expression of hostility toward the party or toward one of its organs. In practice the Political Bureau has a potentially formidable disciplinary arsenal, but it is a deterrent rarely employed.

¹⁷ A few weeks before the general assembly, candidates submit their applications through the cell committee to the Political Bureau. Though the list of candidates is divulged only at the assembly, the cell members know in advance who is running for election, because prospective candidates are usually approved. At the assembly all members who have been in the party for at least nine months are electors, if they have paid a reasonable portion of their annual dues. They vote for as many candidates from the list as there are offices to fill. There are almost always substantially more candidates than offices. Voting patterns are irregular; cell elections are never blind plebiscites.

¹⁸ In Kairouan, after serious incidents on January 17, 1961, when a large crowd chanting religious slogans marched upon the Governor's office and residence to protest the transfer of a religious instructor. A re-enforced National Guard was needed to combat the mob, and a small number of people were actually killed. The incident revealed growing tension between the traditional aristocracy of the Kairouan medina and the governing authorities who are spearheading social revolution in the area. On February 13 and 14 the Commissioner held meetings of cell officers to explain his decision to increase the number of cells in the medina to 13, a surprisingly large number. On February 23 he held a meeting of party cadres to designate the new cell officers. See Al 'Amal (the official Neo-Destour daily newspaper), March 5, 1961, p. 3.

¹⁹ In theory, the provincial governmental and party structures are distinct hierarchies, with horizontal contacts only between the Governor and the Party Commissioner. In principle, the Governor's Delegates have no contact with the party apparatus. But as one delegate told me in the presence of cell officers whom I was interviewing, “We always work together in our different domains. I consult the cell about my problems, and the cell may consult me about its problems.” In practice, too, Delegates are often in contact with higher party officials.

²⁰ But an exception to this rule that occurred in the assembly of the venerable cell grouping the artisans and businessmen of the souks of Tunis was related to me with pride by a higher party official.

²¹ Though appointed, the Commissioner and his co-ordinating committee must effectively collaborate with the cells. In a sense they must be more representative than the Governor and his Delegates. During Ramadan in Sousse, for instance, the party officials never dared to smoke or eat in public during the daytime, because public opinion, attached to Ramadan and reflected in the cells, would not have approved. On the otber hand, Tunisian government policy since 1960 has been to discourage observance of the month-long fast, and most high government officials in Sousse had no hesitation about smoking in public.

²² The Director of the Political Bureau even pointed out at the 1959 Congress that cells could and should, in light of the party reorganization, give delegates specific mandates for National Council and Congress sessions. See Le Petit Matin (Tunis), March 5, 1959. The National Council is now theoretically composed of the members of the Political Bureau, the Commissioners, and one cell delegate for every 5,000 members. Previously the National Council had consisted of the members of the Political Bureau, one delegate from each federal executive, and an equal number of members elected by the Congress. These elections were hotly contested in 1955, where 172 candidates ran for 32 seats! See La Presse (Tunis), November 20, 1955.

²³ See Nouira, Hedi, “Le Néo-Destour,” Politique Etrangère, XIX (July 1954), pp. 317–34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁴ On November 17, 1961, the Director of the Neo-Destour announced that the National Council would meet sometime in February 1962 to discuss Tunisia's Three-Year Plan, which is designed to be an almost revolutionary innovation in Tunisia's social and economic life.

²⁵ In a somewhat unorthodox manner, the Political Bureau decided on November 17, 1961, after expelling one of its members from the party (Masmoudi), to co-opt Ahmed Ben Salah in his place. This decision had the salutary effect of making the Bureau's composition accord with political realities, for since January 1961 Ben Salah had become a virtual super-minister, second in some respects only to Bourguiba. Especially in the all-important economic field, the Political Bureau's discussions may therefore acquire more significance, and Ben Salah, too, may more effectively mobilize the party apparatus for his economic planning by being unequivocably a part of it.

²⁶ The party decided in early 1960 to create a corps of “animators” to stimulate the 150,000 unemployed unskilled workers whom the government hires at subsistence wages (including supplies of American wheat given to Tunisia) on public works projects. Unlike government foremen, the animators listen to workers' grievances, try to clear up administrative bottlenecks, and try to inculcate on the workers the idealistic notion that they are working for the good of the nation in the struggle against under-development.

²⁷ The Tunisian government's Monthly Statistics Bulletin reported in November 1960 that only 2,383 youths had been directly involved in specific Neo-Destour programs during 1959. It was perhaps these statistics that impelled Bourguiba on March 30, 1961, to devote a whole speech to the problems of youth organizations, in which he found the level of participation to be abysmal. In the summer of 1961, however, roughly 10,000 Neo-Destour youths participated as “volunteers” in the party's catastrophic campaign to force the evacuation of the French bases at Bizerte. It was said that some 3,000 were killed or wounded in the one-sided four-day battle.

²⁸ The October 7, 1961, issue of Afrique-Action, a weekly paper run by Neo-Destour sympathizers, carried an editorial about personal power. It was universally attributed to Mohamed Masmoudi, the newspaper's political patron, who though a member of the Political Bureau had just been dismissed by Bourguiba from his government job as Secretary of Information. Though speaking in general terms of the type of regime headed by leaders like Bourguiba, de Gaulle, Nasser, Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, Fidel Castro, and Houphouet Boigny, the article was interpreted by the Neo-Destour as a personal attack against Bourguiba and the Tunisian system rather than an exercise in political science. On November 17, after being attacked in the Neo-Destour press and in cadres' conferences, Masmoudi was expelled from the Political Bureau and from the party. Bourguiba explained the action of the Political Bureau to the Tunisian public on the following day. He argued that Masmoudi should have expressed his opinions frankly within party organs rather than in public. Interpreting Masmoudi's article personally, Bourguiba, the other members of the Political Bureau, and many party cadres believed that Masmoudi was guilty of breaking party discipline.

²⁹ See Le Petit Matin, March 4–5, 1959.

³⁰ One of Bourguiba's closest younger collaborators, for instance, was not re-elected to the Political Bureau in 1959.