¹ Parliamentary Debates, Australian House of Representatives, November 26, 1959, and March 29, 1960.

² The Times (London), July 18, 1961, 6.

³ See especially Parl. Debs., H. of R., October 22, 1959.

⁴ The battalion-brigade division is to be replaced by a five-battle-group (pentropic division) system. Including the purely volunteer Citizen Military Force (C.M.F.) of (it is hoped) 30,000 men, there will be two pentropic divisions, one consisting of two Australian Regular Army (A.R.A.) battle groups, plus three C.M.F. battle groups, and the other of five C.M.F. battle groups. The A.R.A. itself, therefore, provides two battle groups, a battalion in Malaya, the Pacific Islands Regiment, and certain additional and logistic support groups.

⁵ Other instances can be seen in statements on re-equipment; e.g., Parl Debs., H. of R., June 29, 1961.

⁶ Australia Treaties, 1960, Mutual Weapons Defence Programme Agreement between Australia and the United States of America, Treaties Series, No. 11.

⁷ Capital equipment means net changes in total equipment due to policy decisions (as against the simple maintenance of the stock of equipment).

⁸ Draft Estimates 1961–1962, Department of the Army, Explanatory Notes, Division 511, p. 2.

⁹ “The Strategic Basis of the Defence Programme” and “The Composition of Forces.”

¹⁰ Clear instances of the operation of this factor can be seen in the ministerial statements of 1959, 1960, and 1961, particularly on the naval program. It was quite clear at an early stage that the program really needed nuclear submarines, and it became equally clear that no one was prepared to fight for the considerable cost of getting them. Similarly, H.M.A.S. Melbourne has been retained, after many previous decisions to scrap it, partly for prestige and partly because it was much cheaper to achieve something by retaining the Melbourne and equipping it with helicopters than to scrap the Melbourne and move over to nuclear submarines. H.M.A.S. Sydney will come out of reserve as a transport, where an entirely new air transport command would have been preferable but also more expensive.

¹¹ There was originally a Statutory Council for Defence, which was a ministerial body assisted by chiefs of staff in an advisory capacity. They had one department and particular boards (including the Civil Aviation Board, Munitions Board, and so forth) that were thrown off and became departments, like the Department of Supply in 1938. In 1939, under Menzies and with Shedden as the top civilian official, the Department of Defence Coordination became the Department of Defence. Under it developed the Joint Services Organisation, the Chiefs of Staff Organisation, the War Cabinet Secretariat, and so on. This Secretariat was serving the War Cabinet, which had replaced the lapsed Council of Defence. But the War Cabinet was simply the ordinary Cabinet for a few special purposes. The 1940 Advisory War Council replaced in Australia the actual coalition that emerged in the United Kingdom. In 1942 Treasury control was strengthened with the creation of its specialized Defence Division. By 1944 Shedden was considering postwar defense organization. He visited the United Kingdom and under Chifley in 1945 began to handle the move over to a peacetime organization. After 1945 the institution of a Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (Wells, Dowling, Scherger) appeared and the Statutory Council for Defence was revised, with its decisions carrying the authority of Cabinet decisions. But in 1949 a new Prime Minister and a new strategic philosophy meant the lapsing of the Council and its replacement by the Defence Preparations Committee. With the passing of this policy, that committee in turn lapsed. Menzies' division of the whole Cabinet into two—an inner Cabinet and the rest—meant, in conjunction with these changes, that no special Cabinet Defence Committee was revived or existed.

¹² Public Accounts Committee, No. 50, 1960, Part III.

¹³ Cf. Public Service Act, S.25(2), and Naval Forces Regulations, Reg. 18.

¹⁴ This continuity is very impressive. There have been, for example, only three Secretaries of the Navy Department. The first was G. L. Macandie, who was clerk in the Queensland Navy Office in the 1890's, Senior Clerk when the Commonwealth Navy Office was established and, from July 12, 1915, when the Department was created, the first Secretary, in which capacity he continued to serve until the 1940's. (Macandie, G. L., The Genesis of the Royal Australian Navy, Melbourne 1949.)Google Scholar His successor, Nankervis, A. R., was on the Navy Board in the 1930'sGoogle Scholar as Financial and Civil Member, and served as Secretary from 1939 to 1950, when he was succeeded by the present Secretary, Hawkins, T. J., who had entered the Department himself when it was set up in 1915.Google Scholar This is an astonishing record of continuity; whether it is a proper one is another matter.

¹⁵ Report on the Production of Officers for the Australian Regular Army, April 6, 1959, 20.

¹⁶ This contrasts with the United States, where under the Officer Grade Limitation Act there is one brigadier or general to 1,835 men.

¹⁷ Military Board Instructions, No. 124.

¹⁸ Sections 21A (i) and (ii).

¹⁹ Report on Production of Officers, 31.

²⁰ Ibid., 27.

²¹ R. M. C. Annual Report, 1960, 3.

²² “Portsea,” Adjutant-General Publications, No. 28/60, 19.

²³ Report on Production of Officers, 25–26. Cf. Masland, J. W. and Radway, L. I., Soldiers and Scholars (Princeton 1957)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Huntington, S. P., The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Mass., 1957).Google Scholar

²⁴ Yet it is in the Australian situation that very large claims are made; “Duntroon,” Adjutant-General Publications, No. 27/60, 5. The officer will be “an ambassador at large … [who] must take great public responsibilities and not only in the purely military sphere.”

²⁵ Janowitz, Morris, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Ill., 1960).Google Scholar

²⁶ Report on Production of Officers, 39; “… bearing in mind that most of the higher commanders would probably come from cadets doing the R.M.C. arts course.”

²⁷ Hart, B. H. Liddell, Strategy (New York 1955), p. 334.Google Scholar

²⁸ Cf. Schaffer, B. B., “Military Affairs as a Field for Political Science in Australia,” Australian Political Studies Association News (Sydney), No. 2 (May 1961), 5.Google Scholar

²⁹ U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Policy, Interim Report and Hearings, “Organizing for National Security,” 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington 1960; Senator Jackson, Henry M., “Organizing for Survival,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 38 (April 1960), pp. 446–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar