¹ It does appear, however, that the Soviet bloc, larger and geographically more coherent, is more likely to endure in the form it has had in the past, if the post-colonial areas veer to the other bloc, than the loosely organized and in some respects directionless and self-doubting non-Communist bloc is, if these new sovereign states veer toward communism. It is to be observed, furthermore, that in periods of crisis a democracy tends to develop many non-democratic characteristics. The debatable question of the inner resiliency of the respective blocs is, however, beyond the scope of our present inquiry.

² Japan might have been an alternative model, but the collapse of the Japanese Co-Prosperity Sphere has eliminated the possibility.

³ To cite one example, the Indonesian National Planning Board in its 1954 estimates for the first Five-Year Plan envisages the following pattern of development: agriculture and social improvements—12 per cent; transport and roads—25 per cent; industry—25 per cent; irrigation—25 per cent; education and health—13 per cent (Indonesia, VII, No. 1 [August-September 1955], p. 11).

⁴ According to the New York Times, February 10, 1956, the new Indian Five-Year Plan calls for “… total capital outlay by the Government of $10,080,000,000, and $4,830,000 by private enterprise. Of die Government outlay, $4,777,500,000 will be spent on industry, minerals, transport, communications and power.

“By the end of the second plan in 1960–61, food production is expected to go up by 10,000,000 tons, or 15 per cent, cotton by 34 per cent and sugar by 29 per cent. Nearly 21,000,000 acres of new land would have been brought under cultivation.

“Output of steel is to rise from the present 1,300,000 tons to 4,300,000 tons, coal from the present 37,000,000 to 60,000,000 tons, and cement from 4,800,000 to 10,000,000 tons.”

The emphasis on industrial development becomes even more evident when one compares the financial outlay for industrial development in the first and second Five-Year Plans: first plan, $1,543–5 billions; the second, $4,783–5 billions, or a 300 per cent increase.

⁵ They pursued this line with dogged determination. For example, Khrushchev said at the Taj Mahal: “You are going through the wonderful spring of your country's national liberation and independent government. But I would like to warn you that freedom and independence can only be made lasting if you develop your industry, particularly machine building [Applause]” (Pravda, November 21, 1955). Khrushchev told the Indian Parliament: “The course of social development shows that in order to become truly independent and to ensure the welfare of its people each country must have its own developed economy, independent of foreign capital. History teaches that the colonizers' efforts to bring about the foreign enslavement of a less developed country can take the most varied forms. They try in every way to hamper the development of native industry in these countries, fearing that the establishment of its own industry, the creation of its own intelligentsia and the raising of the living standards of its people will strengthen a formerly dependent country, and help it along the path of independent development [Applause]” (Izvestia, November 22, 1955). And, again, in the same speech: “In order to create conditions for the country's full independence, it is necessary to create a firm foundation in the form of good industry, and to rely on it. In so doing, it is important to rely first of all on your own resources, especially since certain rich countries, in giving aid to others, want to place those whom they aid under their authority.” Speaking at Madras, Khrushchev said: “From personal experience we know that it is not enough to gain national independence; one must strengthen the independence gained in order to be able to defend it. [Stormy applause] The path toward strengthening the independence gained is the path of setting up one's own powerful industry and the path of steadily raising die people's welfare. [Applause] We sincerely wish the Republic of India to have its own powerful, highly developed industry and its own national economy, independent of foreign states” (Pravda, November 30, 1955).

⁶ The middle-class elements in India cannot take much comfort in the suggestion made by a taxation inquiry commission, and re-echoed by the Indian Planning Committee, that a “reasonable” ceiling on personal income would be 30 times the national average, which is 280 rupees. The ceiling would then be 8,400 rupees, or $1,764.

⁷ For a reasoned discussion of the general problem of power, see Moore, Barrington Jr, “Notes on the Process of Acquiring Power,” World Politics, VIII, No. 1 (October 1955), pp. 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ Cf. Friedman, F. G., “The Impact of Technically Advanced Civilization on Underdeveloped Areas,” Confluence, IV, No. 4 (January 1956), pp. 391–406.Google Scholar

⁹ In Egypt, President Nasser's book on the goals of the revolution, together with the constitutional draft, already comprise the embryo of such an ideology. At the same time, press restrictions assure the government a complete monopoly in the field of mass communications.

¹⁰ This distinction is developed in the writer's Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge, Mass., 1956) and in an article, “Totalitarianism and Rationality” (American Political Science Review, L, No. 3, September 1956), where the following definition of totalitarianism is offered: “Totalitarianism is a system where technologically advanced instruments of political power are wielded without restraint by centralized leadership of an elite movement, for the purpose of effecting a total social revolution, including the conditioning of man, on the basis of certain arbitrary ideological assumptions, in an atmosphere of coerced unanimity of the entire population.”

¹¹ Pravda, February 17, 1956.

¹² The Soviet leaders, while on their Asian tour, frequently emphasized their will ingness to share with Asiatic students the latest Soviet industrial know-how. The USSR indicated in February 1956 that it was prepared to grant 200 scholarships to Asian students to study Soviet techniques. Also, die USSR is now constructing a large technological institute in Rangoon, a hospital, an exhibition hall, and a sports center. In India, the Soviets have undertaken to build a steel mill with a capacity of one million tons.

¹³ See the stimulating discussion of this problem by Ulam, Adam B., “The Historical Role of Marxism and the Soviet System,” World Politics, VIII, No. I (October 1955), pp. 20–46.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ Arski, Stefan, “Wielka podroz” (“The Great Journey”), Nowe Drogi, 1 No. 79 (1956), p. 14.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 18.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 19. The ideological aspects of this were discussed recently by Tumur-Ochir, D., “O nekapitalisticheskom puti razvitiia otstalykh stran k sotsializmu” (“On the non-capitalist way of development of the backward countries toward socialism”), Voprosy filosofii, No. 1 (1956), pp. 47–63.Google Scholar Tumur-Ochir, using Soviet Mongolia as a case study, develops the thesis that the Soviet experience demonstrates a desirable non-capitalist way of development of backward countries.

¹⁹ Drogi, Nowe, op.cit., p. 23.Google Scholar

²⁰ Cf. Brohi, A. K., “Asia and the Western Man,” Confluence, IV, No. 3 (October 1955), pp. 302–12.Google Scholar

²¹ The scale of this program is suggested by the fact that India alone needs $2,520,000,000 to close the gap between the estimated cost of the development program through 1961 and the resources it will be able to raise internally (New YorK Times, February 10, 1956).

²² Brohi, , op.cit., p. 306.Google Scholar

²³ E.g., Asian countries have been unwilling to take advantage of the American offer of $100,000,000 for regional development under the Colombo Pact because they do not want to engage in regional cooperation; Indonesia is not using its $100,000,000 credit with the World Bank because it is unwilling to accept help in surveying and other technical prerequisites.

²⁴ This victory, however, is unlikely to mean that an industrial India or Burma would resemble the United States or even the United Kingdom. The most we can hope for (although present trends are to the contrary) is that, despite the probable socialization of their economies, they will succeed in retaining political freedom and the values connected with it.

²⁵ Alexander Gerschenkron makes the point that the tendency toward political radicalism in Russia consequent upon industrialization waned after the critical period passed. Cf. his thought-provoking study, “The Problem of Economic Development in Russian Intellectual History of the Nineteenth Century,” in Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought, ed. by Ernest J. Simmons, Cambridge, Mass., 1955.