¹ See, for example, Pipes, Richard, “Détente: Moscow's View,” in Pipes, , ed., Soviet Strategy in Europe (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976), 3–44Google Scholar; and Rothenberg, Morris, The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power (Washington, D.C.: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980).Google Scholar

² See, for example, Shulman, Marshall, “Toward a Western Philosophy of Coexistence,” Foreign Affairs 52 (October 1973), 35–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Albright, David, “The USSR and Africa: Soviet Policy,” Problems of Communism 27 (January-February 1978), 20–39Google Scholar; Menon, Rajan, “Military Power, Intervention, and Soviet Policy in the Third World,” in Kanet, Roger E., ed., Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980's (New York: Praeger, 1982), 263–84.Google Scholar

³ Our findings are consistent with Stephen Cohen's argument that policy debate in the U.S.S.R. is fueled by contention between the “friends and foes of change,” in Slavic Review 38 (June 1979), 187–202. Examples of Western scholarly attention to political cleavages on related issues include Dallin, Alexander, “Soviet Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics: A Framework for Analysis,” Journal of International Affairs 23 (No. 2, 1969), 250–60Google Scholar; Caldwell, Lawrence T., “Soviet Attitudes to SALT,” Adelphi Paper No. 75 (1971)Google Scholar; Payne, Samuel B. Jr, “The Soviet Debate on Strategic Arms Limitation: 1968–72,” Soviet Studies 27 (January 1975),27CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clemens, Walter Jr, The U.S.S.R. and Global Interdependence (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978).Google Scholar

⁴ The advocates of reform discussed below can be found in a broad array of Soviet institutions. Some of them are well-known foreign policy officials and as such are frequent spokesmen for Soviet viewpoints in the West. While we recognize their role as regime propagandists, we seek here to isolate the part they play in internal policy deliberations. The evidence suggests that their typically well-informed perspective on the West is conducive not only to effective propaganda abroad but also to reformist thinking at home.

⁵ Pravda, February 18, 1956, p. 6. The institute as well as its director, Yevgeniy Varga, fell into disfavor for overly optimistic prognoses of Western economic trends in the postwar period. See Jaffe, Philip, “The Varga Controversy,” Survey 18 (Summer 1972), 138–60Google Scholar, and Marantz, Paul, “Soviet Foreign Policy Factionalism under Stalin?” Soviet Union 3 (Part 1, 1976), 91–98.Google Scholar

⁶ See Inozemtsev, Nikolay, “Osobennosti sovremennogo imperializma i yego osnovnyye protivorechiya” [Features of Modern Imperialism and Its Basic Contradictions], Mirovaya Ekpnomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniye [hereafter cited as MEMO] (No. 5, 1970), 24Google Scholar, and Tomashevskiy, D., “Zakonomernaya tendentsiya obshchestvennogo razvitiya” [The Natural Tendency of Social Development] MEMO (No. 9, 1969), 92–95.Google Scholar See also Kumykin, P. N., ed., 50 Let Sovetskoy vneshney torgovli [Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Trade] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniye, 1967)Google Scholar, chap. 11, and an early book by Arbatov, Georgiy, Stroitelstvo kommunizma i mirovoy revolyutsionnyi protsess [The Construction of Communism and the World Revolutionary Process] (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 473.Google Scholar

⁷ The evolution of Soviet perceptions of Western economic strengths and the merits of international economic cooperation are more thoroughly examined in Hanson, Philip, Trade and Technology in Soviet-Western Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chap. 5; Parrott, Bruce B., “Technological Progress and Soviet Politics,” in Thomas, John R. and Kruse-Vaucienne, Ursula M., eds., Soviet Science and Technology: Domestic and Foreign Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 1977), 305–28Google Scholar; Lee, Rensselaer W. III, “Political Absorption of Western Technology: The Soviet and Chinese Cases,” Studies in Comparative Communism 15 (Spring/Summer 1982), 9–33.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸ The unusual nature of the plenum's business was apparent from its announced proceedings. Eight Politburo members and three candidate members addressed the plenum—by far the largest turnout at a party forum since Khrushchev. The Politburo acquired a new international dimension at the plenum, with the entry of Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Grechko, and KGB chief Andropov into its ranks.

⁹ Pravda, May 22, 1973, p. 1. Translations are by the present authors unless otherwise noted.

¹⁰ Pravda, June 24, 1973, p. 1.

¹¹ Kapitsa, , Pravda, May 15, 1973, p. 3Google Scholar; Kirillin, , Pravda, July 31, 1973, pp. 3–4.Google Scholar

¹² Smelyakov, , “Delovyye vstrechi. Zapiski zamestitelya ministra vneshney torgovlya” [Business Meetings: Notes of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade], Novyy Mir (No. 12, 1973), 203–39.Google Scholar

¹³ Pravda, May 16, 1973, pp. 4–5. See also Inozemtsev's, articles in Kommunist (No. 13, 1973), 89–103Google Scholar, and in Problemy Mira i Sotsializma (No. 9, 1973), 35–34. Articles supporting the new strategy by the director of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, Bogomolov, Oleg, appeared in Izvestiya on February 26, 1974, p. 4Google Scholar, and Kommunist (No. 5, 1974), 89–99. See also the two-part article in Izvestiya by Inozemtsev, Arbatov, and then-Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Vladimir Alkhimov, which launched the press campaign for the new program; it described an easing of the longstanding hostility in the United States to economic ties with the communist bloc: Izvestiya, May 5, 1973, p. 4, and May 8, p. 4.

¹⁴ See, for instance, an article by the CPSU Secretary with responsibility for bloc affairs at the time: Katushev, Konstantin, “Glavnoye napravleniye. O protsesse i obyektivnoy neobkhodimosti dalneyshego splocheniya stran sotsializma” [The Main Direction: On the Process and Objective Necessity of Further Integration of the Countries of Socialism], Problemy Mira i Sotsializma (No. 8, 1973), 3–10.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See an article by K. I. Suvorov, an official of the Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences, in Pravda, December 18, 1975, p. 2, in which he praised the decision of the 14th Party Congress in 1925 to make the U.S.S.R. an “independent economic unit” by developing indigenous industry rather than importing equipment from abroad.

¹⁶ Aleksandrov's address was reported by Moscow radio's domestic service, translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Soviet Union Daily Report (Washington, D.C.) [hereafter cited as FBIS—SOV], April 21, 1980, p. U/I. See also Aleksandrov's comments on the implications of U.S. sanctions at the annual meetings of the Academy in 1980 and 1982. Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR, No. 6, 1980, p. 8, and No. 6, 1982, p. 8.

¹⁷ Pravda, February 24, 1981, p. 5.

¹⁸ Literaturnaya Gazeta, September 29, 1982, p. 2.

¹⁹ Bogomolov, , “Ekonomicheskiye svyazi mezhdu sotsialisticheskimi i kapitalisticheskimi stranami” [Economic Relations between the Socialist and Capitalist Countries], MEMO (No. 3, 1980), 41–51Google Scholar; Trud, July 3, 1982, p. 3; Inozemtsev, , ”XXVI Syezd KPSS i nashi zadachi” [The 26th CPSU Congress and Our Tasks], MEMO (No. 3, 1981), 4–24.Google Scholar See also Gvishiani, Dzherman, Pravda, March 27, 1981, pp. 2–3.Google Scholar

²⁰ The proceedings of the conference are reported in MEMO, Nos. 6–8, 1979. A guiding philosophy on which this relatively balanced assessment of Western weaknesses and strengths could be based was articulated by Inozemtsev in a November 1979 address commemorating the 100th birth anniversary of Yevgeniy Varga. While disciples of Varga see the “weak sides” of imperialism, Inozemtsev, said, “they do not attempt to represent what they wish as what is real, they see the possibilities for development which world capitalism still possesses, and they analyze the factors that make it viable.” Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR (No. 2, 1980), 100.Google Scholar

²¹ See the editorial, “Mezhdu Khelsinki i Venoy” [Between Helsinki and Vienna], in the first issue of SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, ldeologiya [hereafter cited as SShA] (No. 1, 1970), 60–64; V. V. Larionov, “Strategicheskiye debaty” [Strategie Debates], SShA (No. 3, 1970), 20–31; and Georgiy Arbatov's review of the U.S. ABM debate in Izvestiya, April 15, 1969, p. 5. The outlines of the debate on security issues under Khrushchev are comprehensively examined in Thomas Wolfe, W., Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Developments after Khrushchev's fall are discussed in Kolkowicz, Roman and others, The Soviet Union and Arms Control (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970)Google Scholar, chaps. 1 and 2, and by Wolfe, in Dallin, Alexander and Larson, Thomas B., eds., Soviet Politics since Khrushchev (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1968), 111–27.Google Scholar For the establishment's differing perspectives on SALT later in the 1960s, see Caldwell (fn. 3) and Payne (fn. 3).

²² Bovin is a more influential spokesman than his position with Izvestiya alone would suggest. He first established reform credentials in the domestic policy realm in the 1960s, when he was associated with Kommunist and the Central Commitee's socialist countries department. At the time, Bovin's articles for Moscow dailies advocated de-Stalinization, the publication of “objective and honest” statistics about social and economic conditions in the U.S.S.R., and the establishment of a discipline of political science. See hvestiya, February 9, 1962, pp. 3–4, and Krasnaya Zvezda, February 10, 1965. Today, Bovin is a prominent spokesman on Soviet television and radio as well as in the press; he has unusual leeway to speak candidly on current events. He was elected to the Party's Central Auditing Commission at the 26th CPSU Congress.

²³ Izvestiya, July 11, 1973 (evening edition), p. 3. The article's sensitivity is suggested by its failure to appear, as would have been customary, in the morning edition of the paper that is mailed to subscribers abroad.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Pravda, July 22, 1973, pp. 4–5. See also Arbatov's attack on the Clausewitz formula in “Tupiki politiki sily” [The Blind Alley of the Policy of Force], Problemy Mira i Sotsializma (No. 2, 1974), 42. Other reform spokesmen began to downgrade the role of the military factor in the global “correlation of forces.” Georgiy Shakhnazarov, the deputy chief of the Central Committee's socialist countries department, argued in Kommunist (No. 3, 1974) that the correlation of forces was increasingly an ideological rather than a military question.

²⁶ Krasnaya Zvezda, August 14, 1973, pp. 2–3.

²⁷ Rybkin, , “Leninskaya kontseptsiya voyny i sovremennost“[The Leninist Concept of War and the Present Day], Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil (No. 20, 1973), 21–28.Google Scholar

²⁸ Krasnaya Zvezda, February 7, 1974, pp. 2–3.

²⁹ Pravda, September 9, 1964, p. 4.

³⁰ Pravda, July 22, 1974, p. 3.

³¹ For typical examples of the approach followed since 1974, see a speech by the late Mikhail Suslov maintaining that an East-West conflict would “threaten human civilization” (Pravda, May 13, 1978, p. 2), and the Warsaw Pact's “Moscow Declaration” asserting that world arsenals were now sufficient to “call into question the very survival of man on earth” (Pravda, November 24, 1978, pp. 1–2).

³² See Brezhnev's assertion in June 1966 that the U.S.S.R. would seek to “preserve the superiority” of its armed forces over those of its opponents: Pravda, June 11, 1966, p. 2.

³³ Pravda, January 19, 1977, p. 2; November 3, 1977, p. 3; May 4, 1978, p. 1.

³⁴ Rybkin, , “XXV Syezd KPSS i problema mirnogo sosushchestvovaniya sotsializma i kapitalizma” [The 25th CPSU Congress and the Problem of Peaceful Coexistence between Socialism and Capitalism], Voyenno-Istorkheskiy Zhumal (No. 1, 1977), 3–9.Google Scholar

³⁵ Rachik Faramazyan (head of a department of IMEMO), Pravda, June 5, 1979, p. 4; Shakhnazarov, Georgiy, Krasnaya Zvezda, June 14, 1979, pp. 2–3Google Scholar; Gorizontov, Boris (head of a department at the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System), Pravda, June 22, 1979, p. 4Google Scholar; Bykov, Oleg (deputy chief of IMEMO), Izvestiya, July 18, 1979, p. 5Google Scholar; Bovin, Aleksandr, hvestiya, July 1, 1979, p. 5.Google Scholar See also a longer and more revealing domestic radio version of Bovin's commentary, translated in FBIS-SOV, June 20, 1979, pp. AA/5–9.

³⁶ Pravda, June 23, 1979, p. 4 See also a detailed report on the proceedings of the organizational session of the council in MEMO (No. 7, 1979), 106–11. One Soviet scholar has indicated that the Council is directing research on defense industry conversion to civilian production; he asserts that scientists in the Soviet bloc “give growing consideration” to this problem. See Lokshin, G. M., “Rol obshchestvennosti v borbe za razoruzheniye” [The Role of Public Opinion in the Struggle for Disarmament], Rabochiy Klass i Sovremmenyy Mir (No. 5, 1979), p. 26.Google Scholar

³⁷ Ogarkov's remarks on victory are in Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopedia VII (Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1979), 564. His statements on U.S. policy are in Kommunist (No. 10, 1981), 80–91; in Vsegda v gototmosti k zashchite otechestva [Always Prepared for Defense of the Homeland] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1982), and in Izvestiya, May 9, 1982, pp. 1–2.

³⁸ For the Brezhnev and Chernenko statements, see Pravda, February 24, 1981, p. 4; April 23, 1981, p. 2; October 21, 1981, p. 1; and June 16, 1982, p. 1. Resistance to the Brezhnev no-first-use pledge was suggested in unusual remarks in its defense by Minister of Defense Ustinov; see Pravda, July 12, 1982, p. 4. See also an article in Literaturnaya Gazeta (October 27, 1982, pp. 14–15), purportedly responding to a reader's letter on the subject.

³⁹ See the CPSU “open letter” of July 14, 1963, reprinted in Griffith, William, The Sino-oviet Rift (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1964), 289–325.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ New Times, No. 22, May 1972, pp. 4–5.

⁴¹ Pravda, June 9, 1972, pp. 4–5.

⁴² Pravda, August 30, 1973, pp. 4–5.

⁴³ Izvestiya, September 11, 1973, p. 4.

⁴⁴ Pravda, March 24, 1977, p. 4.

⁴⁵ Bovin, , “Neprekhodyashcheye znacheniye Leninskikh idey” [The Permanent Significance of Lenin's Ideas], Kommunist (No. 10, 1980), 70–81.Google Scholar Earlier, Bovin had published a curious essay in Izvestiya on the occasion of Lenin's birthday which could be read as a critique of the Kremlin's international policies. Writing at the peak of East-West recriminations over the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Bovin detailed Lenin's contempt for leaders who were ideologically inflexible and unable to admit past mistakes; he concluded that Lenin's views were applicable to foreign as well as domestic policy. See Izvestiya, April 19, 1980, p. 5.

⁴⁶ See the article by Soviet foreign ministry official Petrovskiy, Vladimir, “Borba SSSR za razryadku v 70-ye gody” [The USSR's Struggle for Détente in the Seventies], in Novaya i Noveyshaya Istoriya (No. 1, 1981), 3–20Google Scholar, and the comments of Central Committee International Information Department head Leonid Zamyatin on Soviet television, March 28, 1981, translated in FBIS-SOV April 8, 1981, pp. CC/1–9.

⁴⁷ See Fedor Burlatskiy's “dialogue” with Parsons, G., “an American professor,” published in Literatumaya Gazeta, January 28, 1981, p. 14Google Scholar, and Arbatov's, Georgiy interview in Der Spiegel, March 23, 1981, pp. 128–34.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Mainichi Shimbun, April 22, 1981, p. 7.

⁴⁹ Pravda, April 28, 1981, p. 2.

⁵⁰ Pravda, July 23, 1981, pp. 4–5.

⁵¹ Pravda, November 6, 1982, p. 2.