¹ On the importance of perception in policy and force structure, see MccGwire, Michael, Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987), 4–5Google Scholar. There is a considerable literature on the methodology of using the Soviet press as a source for Soviet perceptions and foreign policy. For the seminal argument, see Zimmerman, William, Soviet Perspectives on International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969), 9–24Google Scholar. A more recent discussion is Hough, Jerry F., The Strugglefor the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1986)Google Scholar, chap. 2. Particularly intractable is the problem of whether journal articles, editorials, and speeches are to be taken as representational or instrumental communication. See Larson, Deborah Welch, “Research Note: Problems of Content Analysis in Foreign-Policy Research: Notes from the Study of the Origins of Cold War Belief Systems,” International Studies Quarterly 32 (June 1988), 241–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar. However, the severity of this dilemma depends on the purposes of the researcher, with the goal of establishing what Soviet leaders and analysts truly believe and perceive being the most difficult to determine using these data sources. Indeed, as Larson shows, research on American foreign policy perceptions with its wealth of data has not definitely solved these problems. The goal here is somewhat more modest: to determine what perceptions are expressed and whether the patterns of perceptions analyzed in military writings match patterns expressed in analyses by civilians and the leadership.

² See Rice, Condoleezza, “The Party, the Military, and Decision Authority in the Soviet Union,” World Politics 40 (October 1987), 55–81CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a discussion of the subordinate political role of the Soviet military in defense policy. On innovation in civilian analyses, see Valkenier, Elizabeth Kridl, The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind (New York: Praeger, 1983)Google Scholar, especially 147–50, and Hough (fn. 1), 6–12, 262–69.

³ Holloway, David, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984)Google Scholar, chap. 8; Rice (fn. 2), 64–71; Katz, Mark N., The Third World in Soviet Military Thought (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), 143Google Scholar. For example, we know that prior to the invasion by Soviet forces, a Soviet general undertook a reconnaissance mission to Afghanistan to assess the situation and the prospects for Soviet action, and in 1982 a high-ranking Soviet military commander traveled to Syria to investigate the condition of Syrian air defenses and make recommendations regarding Soviet resupply and reinforcements. See Spechler, Dina Rome, “The Politics of Intervention: The Soviet Union and the Crisis in Lebanon,” Studies in Comparative Communism 20 (Summer 1987), 115–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴ Katz (fn.3), 10–11, 150.

⁵ For a discussion of the role of “learning” in Soviet third-world policy, see Bresiauer, George W., “Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy,” World Politics 39 (April 1987), 429–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶ Holloway (fn. 3), chaps. 3 and 5. For a related argument on the central role of Soviet relations with the U.S. and Europe in establishing constraints and opportunities in Soviet third-world policy, see Sestanovich, Stephen, “The Third World in Soviet Foreign Policy, 1955–1985,” in Korbonski, Andrej and Fukuyama, Francis, eds., The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 7–9.Google Scholar

⁷ Breslauer, George W., “All Gorbachev's Men,” The National Interest, No. 12 (1988), 91–100Google Scholar, at 92. Breslauer also discusses “Russia first” orientations, but these are, obviously, not relevant to Soviet third-world policy.

⁸ The following discussion of elements of Soviet third-world policy will be very brief. For studies that discuss shifts and debates in Soviet third-world policy in greater detail see, for example, Zimmerman (fn. 1), Hough (fn.i), Valkenier (fn. 2), and Katz (fn. 3).

⁹ Katz (fn. 3), 19–21.

¹⁰ This was, however, a matter of considerable debate. See Hough (fn. 1), 149–56.

¹¹ “In the phenomenal model, escalation is something that happens, in which the participants are caught up. In the actor model, escalation is something that some government unilaterally does.” Smoke, Richard, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 22CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² MacFarlane, S. Neil, Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 140Google Scholar; Fukuyama, Francis, Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1986), 14–16Google Scholar. For a study of the domestic political basis of Brezhnev's foreign policy, see Gelman, Harry, The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

¹³ Katz (fn. 3), 67–68.

¹⁴ Valkenier (fn. 2), 99; Fukuyama, Francis, “Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy,” Problems of Communism 36 (September-October 1987), 1–13Google Scholar, at 3.

¹⁵ Fukuyama (fn. 12), 15–19, 25; Papp, Daniel S., Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980s (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 1985), 136.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Katz (fn. 3), 97–109. See also Golan, Galia, The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988Google Scholar) for evidence of military analyses along these lines in the early 1980s, as well as Papp (fn. 15), 118, and Fukuyama, Francis, Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1987). 37Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Smoke (fn. 11).

¹⁸ Breslauer (fn. 7), 5.

¹⁹ I have not attempted to outline the domestic political basis of new thinking as part of Gorbachev's efforts to consolidate power and the policy agenda. For studies that focus on the interrelationship of power, policy, politics, and personnel, see Snyder, Jack, “The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?” International Security 12 (Winter 1987–1988), 93–131CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Meyer, Stephen M., “The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security,” International Security 13 (Fall 1988), 124–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Breslauer (fn. 7). For a discussion of the points of difference and agreement between Gorbachev and civilian analysts, see Meyer, 134–55.

²⁰ MacFarlane, S. Neil, “The USSR and the Third World: Continuity and Change under Gorbachev,” The Harriman Institute Forum 1 (March 1988), 1–7Google Scholar, at 3; Valkenier, Elizabeth K., “Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Recent Soviet Reassessments,” World Politics 38 (April 1986), 415–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 427–29.

²¹ MacFarlane (fn. 20), 3.

²² For an accessible source of a range of new thinking, see Gromyko, Anatoly and Hellman, Martin, eds., Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking (New York: Walker and Co., 1988)Google Scholar, especially chapters by Andrei V. Kortunov, Alexander I. Nikitin, and Andrei Y. Melville.

²³ Robert Legvold, “The Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 68, No. 1 (America and the World 1988/80), 82–98, at 86; MacFarlane (fn. 20), 3.

²⁴ For analyses that are skeptical of the “newness” of new thinking, see MacFarlane (fn. 20) and Fukuyama (fn. 14).

²⁵ See two speeches by Gorbachev, the first given at the October Revolution anniversary celebration, 2 November 1987, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Soviet Union (hereafter FBIS-SOV), 3 November 1987, 38–61, at 54, and the second, printed in Pravda, 5 November 1987, in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereafter CDSP) 39, No. 45 (1987), 17Google Scholar.

²⁶ “XIX Vsesoyuznaya konferentsia K.PSS: Vneshnyaya politika i diplomatia,” Pravda, 26 July 1988, 2. A recent editorial in the Party's theoretical journal states without hedging that “Marxist humanism proceeds from the priority of common human interests and values before all other particular interests”; “Revolyutsia, perestroika, gumanizm” [Revolution, pere-stroika, humanism], Kommunist, No. 15 (1988), 5–11,Google Scholar at 5.

²⁷ Quoted in Yasmann, Viktor, “The New Thinking in Regional Conflicts: Ideology and Politics,” Radio Liberty Research, No. 493 (3 December 1987), 1–6Google Scholar, at 3.

²⁸ See, for example, Primakov, Yevgeni, “A New Philosophy of Foreign Policy,” Pravda, 10 July 1987, in CDSP 39, No. 28 (1987), 1–4Google Scholar. Primakov is the director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO).

²⁹ Primakov, , “USSR Policy on Regional Conflicts,” International Affairs (Moscow), No. 6 (1988), 3–9Google Scholar, at 4.

³⁰ Breslauer (fn. 7), 92.

³¹ “Za delo—bez raskachki,” Pravda, 6 August 1988, 2. In contrast, Vadim Medvedev, the new chairman of a party commission on ideology appointed when Ligachev was demoted, has endorsed the revised formulation on class struggle, the priority of common human interests, and the indefinite course of peaceful coexistence. “Sovremennaya kontseptsia sotsializma,” Pravda, 5 October 1988, 4.

³² Herspring, Dale R., “Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military,” Problems of Communism 36 (July-August 1987), 99–107Google Scholar; Meyer (fn. 19); Larrabee, F. Stephen, “Gorbachev and the Soviet Military,” Foreign Affairs 66 (Summer 1988), 1002–27CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³³ Snyder, Jack, “Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces,” International Security 12 (Spring 1988), 48–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 49–53. Meyer identifies “reasonable sufficiency” and “defensive defense” as the two security issues in new thinking that most directly challenge the military's traditional role in Soviet defense policy and that have been the objects of the most vigorous resistance; Meyer (fn. 19), 144–51. Another example is the military commentary on the Soviet nuclear testing moratorium that questioned the wisdom of this unilateral policy; Larrabee (fn. 32), 1013.

³⁴ Chernavin, , “Combat Readiness of Naval Forces—At the Level of Modern Requirements,” Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 20 (1986)Google Scholar in Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter JPRS-UMA), No. 1 (1987), 22–30, at 22. In contrast, see Fukuyama (fn. 16), 34–36, for a discussion of the rise and fall of Gorshkov's theses.

³⁵ Statsenko, Maj.-Gen. I., “Vtorzheniye ne sostoyalos, Karibskiy krizis: istoria i sovremen-nost” [The invasion did not take place, the Caribbean crisis: History and the present], Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 20 (1987), 82–85Google Scholar, at 83. Statsenko does not appear to worry unduly about a spiral of escalation getting out of hand. He refers to the shooting down of a U-2 spy plane at the height of the crisis as “a suitable rebuff.”

³⁶ Ibid., 84.

³⁷ See, for example, Zhurkin, Vitaly, Karaganov, Sergei, and Kortunov, Andrei, “Reasonable Sufficiency—Or, How To Break the Vicious Cycle,” New Times, No. 40 (1987), 13–15.Google Scholar

³⁸ Capt. 1st Rank Belyayev, A., “Scientific Concepts in Modern Warfare—An Important Element in the Awareness of the Soviet Fightingman,” Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 7 (1985)Google Scholar, in JPRS-UMA, No. 50 (1985), 17–22, at 19–20. Belyayev is discussing general intersystemic war, not local conflicts, so he is not necessarily arguing that the Soviet Union must confront the U.S. throughout the third world. I refer to his position in order to illustrate the sharp differences between the way some military analysts continue to view war, escalation, ind policy, and how civilian new thinkers formulate their arguments on the requirements of crisis prevention. For more on military resistance to new thinking ideas on escalation to general war and the political means of guaranteeing security, see Meyer (fn. 19), 135–41.

³⁹ Maj.-Gen. Yasyukov, M., “The Problem of War and Peace—The Most Critical Problem of Modern Times,” Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 10 (1986)Google Scholar, in JPRS-UMA, No. 2 (1987), 5–13, at 5, 8.

⁴⁰ For example, see discussion of an earlier article by Yasyukov in Katz (fn. 3), 113.

⁴¹ Col. Malinovskiy, G. V., “Imperializm SShA—glavnyy istochnik vozniknovenia lokal-nykh voin 1945–1985” [Imperialism of the U.S.A.—the principal source of the eruption of local wars, 1945–1985], Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 1 (1986), 51–58Google Scholar, at 53. He argues later that the U.S. not only causes local and regional conflicts but also seeks to prevent conflict resolution, as it did in the Persian Gulf. This directly contradicts those crisis preventers who believe that the U.S. and Soviet Union can resolve conflicts only by joint political means. For an analysis of Malinovskiy's writing before the Gorbachev era, see Fukuyama (fn. 16), 37.

⁴² Volkogonov, “Questions of Theory: War and Peace in the Nuclear Age,” Pravda, 30 August 1985, in JPRS-UMA, No. 59 (1985), 3–8, at 3–4, and “Imperatives of the Nuclear Age,” Krasnaya zvezda, 22 May 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 4 June 1987, V4-V9, at V7.

⁴³ Malinovskiy (fn. 41), 58. He also points out that analysis of local wars shows the failure of U.S. attempts in Vietnam, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Namibia. In only one of these cases, Afghanistan, was the Soviet Union directly involved in defending national liberation. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did support and supply progressive forces to varying degrees in each of those conflicts, so perhaps he is advocating a return to limited and cautious support as was the norm before the 1970s.

⁴⁴ Yaremenko, , “Grozovye tuchi nad persidskim zalivom” [Stormdouds over the Persian Gulf], Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 24 (1987), 73–77Google Scholar, at 73.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 77.

⁴⁶ Gen. Sredin, Col. G., “Sovetskiy patriotizm i proletarskiy internatsionalizm—vazhneishiye istochniki massovovo geroizma v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine” [Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism—the most important source of popular heroism in the Great Patriotic War], Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 2 (1985), 3–13Google Scholar, at 6, 11–13. This article appeared quite early in 1985, so it cannot be seen as resistance to the most recent revisionist formulations, but it contrasts with civilian analyses and leadership emphases of the period.

⁴⁷ Maj.-Gen. Khrobostov, V. P., “Vospityvat na revolyutsionnykh i boyevykh traditsiakh” [To educate in the revolutionary and fighting tradition], Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 8 (1988), 3–9Google Scholar, at 6. This soldier apparently blew himself up with a grenade when “armed bandits” (Afghan rebels) drew near in order to make it possible for others in his company to escape. He was posthumously made a Hero of the Soviet Union.

⁴⁸ Lt. Gen. Screbryannikov, V., “Lofty Mission,” Soviet Military Review (September 1987)Google Scholar, 4–6, at 5.

⁴⁹ Yasyukov (fn. 39), 13. In contrasting traditional internationalism to new thinking revisionism, I have focused on the distinction between the class-based analysis of the former and the supraclass analysis of the latter. This obscures a great deal in the historical development of notions of the appropriate role of the Soviet military in local conflicts. These issues are fulry examined by Katz (fn. 3) and Golan (fn. 16). Thus, Soviet internationalist duty was served in the 1960s by supplying weapons and military advisors, but by the late 1970s such comparative restraint would have appeared lax in meeting the Soviet duty to Angola or Ethiopia, at least in the eyes of radical activists. These are important issues for understanding Soviet policy and behavior. However, I prefer to keep the issue of appropriate means separate from the broad notion of duty because Soviet prescriptions of military means have varied with analysis of the prospects for revolutionary change and of local forces to advance Soviet interests, while the concept of proletarian internationalism has remained relatively unchanged. Thus, both radical activists and pragmatic activists have been adamant defenders of proletarian internationalism and have disagreed regarding appropriate means and targets.

⁵⁰ For example, Volkogonov points out that “for millions of people the struggle for freedom, social justice and equality takes primarily the form of the struggle for the right to life”; Volkogonov (fn. 42, 1985), 8.

⁵¹ Volkogonov (fn. 42, 1987), V6. See Adamovich's chapter in Gromyko and Hellman, eds. (fn. 22).

⁵² See Dashkevich, V., “Ostorozhno! Zaplacheno krovyu,” Krasnaya zvezda, 21 October 1988, 2Google Scholar; Lt. Col. P. Tkachenko, “Kak ty zhivyosh, moi drug i brat?” Krasnaya zvezda, 5 November 1988, 3. These articles purport to defend veterans of Afghanistan who, it is claimed, have been attacked, and their courage and devotion to duty belittled, by novels and films that focus on their pain and guilt. The vigorous defense of the conscientious exercise of military duty in Krasnaya zvezda (the newspaper of the Defense Ministry) seems to have paid off: the official line in Pravda and Izvestia largely concurs that Soviet soldiers were acting in accordance with their duty, although questions about the war itself remain. For example, the reports on the first Soviet columns to reach Termez on 6 February 1989 referred to the “soldier-internationalists,” but the article described the long, difficult passage to the Soviet border in sad and sympathetic tones and, unlike Krasnaya zvezda, did not discuss any “fulfilled duty.” See “Vyugi Salanga,” Pravda, 7 February 1989, 1, 3; “Zdravstvui, rodina!” Izvestia, 6 February 1989, 1.

⁵³ Lizichev, Gen. A. D., “Sotsialisticheskaya armia i literatura” [Socialist army and literature], Znamya (February 1988), 160–76Google Scholar, at 168, 173–74. Znamya is a literary journal, so Lizi-chev's lecture on the importance of literature to Soviet defense readiness and its proper form may be taken to be aimed at writers with whom he is unhappy. Military commentary during the last days of Soviet military presence in Afghanistan offered no surprises in this respect. Reports continued to refer to “dedicated completion of the internationalist mission by Soviet soldiers,” gratitude of the Afghan people to Soviet soldiers, etc. The commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Boris V. Gromov, has consistently referred to Soviet actions in terms of Soviet internationalism and explained the Soviet exit as a result of fulfilled Soviet duty. Upon his departure from Afghanistan on 15 February, he stated “In spite of our sacrifices and losses, we have totally fulfilled our internationalist duty.” See Lt. Col. Olynik, A., “Zdravstvui, rodina zemlya!” Krasnaya zvezda, 7 February 1989, 1Google Scholar, and “Na sklonakh Salanga,” Krasnaya zvezda, 8 February 1989, 1; Bill Keller, “Last Soviet Soldiers Leave Afghanistan After 9 Years,” New York Times, 16 February 1989, 1, 4. In contrast, at a press conference the day of the beginning of the large-scale exit, Shevardnadze made no mention of Soviet duty fulfilled. Instead he discussed the unsettled nature of the situation in Afghanistan and the need to pursue a political resolution and the “cessation of fratricidal bloodshed”; “Press-konferentsia E. A. Shevardnadze,” Pravda, 7 February 1989, 4.

⁵⁴ Maj.-Gen. Lebedev, Yuri V. and Podberezkin, Aleksei I., “Voyennye doktriny i mezhdunarodnaya bezopasnost” [Military doctrine and international security], Kommunist, No. 13 (1988), 110–19Google Scholar, at 116; Col. Strebkov, V., “Voyenny paritet vchera i segodnya,” Krasnaya zvezda, 3 January 1989, 3Google Scholar. These arguments are accompanied by strong endorsements of the “historic role of parity” and of new thinking's foundation on both parity and respect for the balance of interests.

⁵⁵ Volkogonov (fn. 42, 1985), 5.

⁵⁶ Yefimov, , “Revolyutsionny protsess i sovremennost” [Revolutionary process and the present], Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 7 (1987), 84–88Google Scholar, at 87. See Hough (fn. 1), 24, for use of the “false denial” technique in Soviet debates.

⁵⁷ Volkogonov, for example, bitterly attacks pacifists. See Volkogonov (fn. 42, 1987), V4-V6.

⁵⁸ Yefimov (fn. 56), 86.

⁵⁹ He notes that partisan war has been especially useful, praises Cuba and Nicaragua, which “found in themselves the courage to rise to the struggle with arms in hands,” and observes that the socialist countries have shown that their largest influence on the revolutionary process is their own social and economic development; ibid., 86, 88. His criticism of “Trotskyites” and exporting revolution closely parallels the argument Primakov (fn. 29) makes in defense of national liberation and revolutionary struggle along with revisionist internationalism.

⁶⁰ Another interesting possibility would be to argue that international proletarian interests are best served when Soviet interests and security are assured. This was Stalin's position, but explicit advocacy of such a reactionary internationalism is not evident to date.

⁶¹ Col. V. T. Login, review of Marksistsko-leninskoye ucheniye o voine i armii [Marxist-Leninist training on war and army], ed. D. A. Volkogonov, Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 8 (1985), in JPRS-UMA, No. 3 (1986), 69–73, at 70.

⁶² Yaremenko (fn. 44), 74.

⁶³ Ivanenko, V., “Iran: Islam i voina” [Iran: Islam and war], Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 9 (1987), 82–86Google Scholar, at 82–83, 85. The author also discusses Iranian attempts to “export” its revolution to Afghanistan, perhaps to remind us how easily religiously based local conflicts may escalate and to suggest that it is Islam, not the class enemy, that is the primary problem in the region.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 83–84. Of course, attributing failure to lack of control by professional soldiers is a self-serving argument for a military analyst to make.

⁶⁵ Vasiliy Pustov, “Conflict and Its Consequences,” Krasnaya zvezda, 21 June 1987, in FBIS-SOV, 24 June 1987, E1-E3, at E2; emphasis added.

⁶⁶ See Fukuyama (fn. 14), 2–4.

⁶⁷ Maj.-Gen. Sedov, N., “Rol natsionalno-osvoboditelnovo dvizhenia v sovremennom mire” [The role of the national liberation movement in the contemporary world], Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 3 (1988), 76–82Google Scholar, at 80.

⁶⁸ Fukuyama (fn. 16), 39.

⁶⁹ These articles focused on U.S. and Israeli operational art in the local wars they fought. To the extent there was any debate, it centered on matters such as the role of moral superiority vs. tactical and strategic skill in successful operations against imperialist forces. Examples include: Col. Babich, V. K., “Neposredstvennaia aviatsionnaya podderzhka sukhoputnykh voisk” [Direct air support of ground forces], Voenno-lstoricheskiy Zhurnal, No. 11 (1985), 53–59Google Scholar; Lt. Gen. Sokolov, V. A., “Razvitiye taktiki istrebitelei-bombardirovshchikov v lokalnykh voinakh” [Development of fighter-bomber tactics in local wars], Voenno-lstori-cheskiy Zhurnal, No. 4 (1986), 65–72Google Scholar; Col. Georgiyev, A. G., “Ispolzovaniye amerikanskimi voiskami khimicheskovo oruzhia v lokalnykh voinakh v Indokitaye (1961–1971)” [Use of chemical weapons by American troops in local wars in Indochina], Voenno-Istori-cheskiy Zhurnal, No. 1 (1987), 54–58Google Scholar; Col. Babich, V. K., “Deistvia strategicheskoi aviatsii SShA v Koreye i Vyetname” [Operations of U.S. strategic aviation in Korea and Vietnam] Voenno-Istoriches-kiy Zhurnal, No. 8 (1987), 62–67Google Scholar. See also Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhural for 1985, Nos. 2 and 9, for 1986 Nos. 3 and 5, for 1987 Nos. 5, 6, 8, and 10, and for 1988 Nos. 1, 6, and 10. See Hart, Douglas M., “Low-Intensity Conflict in Afghanistan: The Soviet View,” Survival 24 (March-April 1982), 61–68CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for an analysis of the operational lessons the Soviet military has been learning in Afghanistan.

⁷⁰ See for example, “On the Eve,” interview with Col.-Gen. V. Lobov, Moscow News, 22–29 May 1988, 4–5. See also the discussion in fn. 52 and fn. 53. While the civilian journals and press freely discuss nonclass sources of conflict and failure in Afghanistan, the military does not. For an example of the former, see Aleksandr Bovin, “Afganistan: trudnoye desyatile-tiye,” Izvestia, 23 December 1988, 5. He writes that while he originally thought intervention by Soviet troops necessary, the conflict became a civil war in which the presence of the Soviet military only exacerbated problems and made the opposition stronger. To successfully implement the “national reconciliation” policy, he notes, requires the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but the withdrawal by itself does not guarantee peace and stability.

⁷¹ Meyer (fn. 19), 129–32.