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US – Lamb: United States – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia: What Should be Required of a Safeguard Investigation?*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 September 2015

Henrik Horn  and
Petros C. Mavroidis
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The United States (US) imposed, in July 1999, a safeguard on lamb meat, in the form of tariff rate import quotas, which were to be applied for a period of three years. The measure was based on findings by the US International Trade Commission that increased imports of lamb meat were a substantial cause of threat of serious injury to the US industry producing the like product. Following complaints by New Zealand and Australia that the measure was inconsistent with Articles I, II and XIX of GATT 1994, and several provisions of the Agreement on Safeguards, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body established, in November 1999, a panel to review the consistency of the US measure with the mentioned WTO rules.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Trade Review , Volume 2 , Special Issue S1: WTO Case Law of 2001 , 2003 , pp. 72 - 114
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2003

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