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The results in this paper were motivated by the following result due to R. Solovay.
Theorem 1 (Solovay). Let M be a nonstandard model of Peano's first order axioms P and let I ⊂e M (i.e. ϕ ≠ ⊂ M and I is closed under < and successor). Then for each of the functions we can define J ⊆e I in ‹M, I› such that J is closed under that function. (∣x∣ denotes [log2(x)].)
Proof. Just notice that the cuts defined by
are successively closed under
In view of Theorem 1, the following question was raised by R. Solovay: Can we define J ⊆ I in ‹M, I› such that J is closed under exponentiation? In Theorem 2 we show that the answer is “no”. Theorem 3 is based on Theorem 2 and extends the technique to cuts which are models of subsystems of P.
To prove both theorems we shall need an estimate due to R. Parikh (see [1], especially the proof of Theorem 2.2a). For the sake of completeness, and also to introduce some notation we shall sketch Parikh's estimate in the next section. At all times we shall give the easiest estimates which still work rather than the sharpest ones.
How do we define creativity? Studies of laypersons’ beliefs tend to find that people focus on malleability, aesthetic taste, insight, and curiosity. Experts, however, propose that for something to be creative it should be both novel or original and task-appropriate or useful. Although other criteria have been proposed, none has been as thoroughly adapted. After discussing why definitions do matter, I shift to theories that categorize creativity. I cover the classic model of the four Ps (Person, Product, Process, and Press) and then highlight a newer model that incorporates a sociocultural influence, the five As (Actor, Artifact, Action, Audience, and Affordances).
It is a central claim of this book that one of the most important challenges for an anthropology of ethics is to develop the conceptual resources to enable us to think both about and with freedom; to make freedom both object and instrument of anthropological thought. This chapter begins by seeking to explain and develop the resources for doing this that we find in the later writings of Michel Foucault. This work will continue in Chapter 4. But Foucault also provides a starting point for thinking about some other general questions about the ethical dimension of human conduct, such as, ‘What constitutes an ethical subject?’, ‘Through what kind of social relations might a free subject be formed?’, ‘Can we usefully distinguish different aspects of moral life?’, ‘What place has reflective thinking in ethical life?’, and ‘What are the limits of the ethical?’.
The Foucault whose thought will be introduced in this chapter differs markedly from the figure still cited regularly under that name, in anthropology and in the other human and social sciences. The latter figure is routinely credited both by admirers and detractors with a set of views almost all of which Foucault himself explicitly repudiated. (MacIntyre's portrayal of Foucault, mentioned in Chapter 2, falls into this large category.) It must be that this much-cited ‘Foucault’, for whom power is ‘a system of domination that controls everything and leaves no room for freedom’ (1997: 293), and who subscribed to a neo-Marxist sociology and a neo-Freudian psychology, is somehow necessary to maintain certain ingrained habits of thought in the human sciences, or he would not have been so vividly imagined or profusely influential. But whatever those needs might be – we shall not be concerned here further with their diagnosis – they are not those of an anthropology of ethics. What Foucault does provide is a rethinking of the concepts of power and freedom, such that they are not each defined negatively as what the other excludes, and such that freedom emerges as a central term in the analysis of how subjects are constituted. So, far from it being the case, as Charles Taylor (1984) influentially decreed, that Foucault's thought ‘leaves no place for freedom or truth’, he in fact gives us what we might call an ethnographically usable understanding of freedom and its place in ethical life.
This paper describes Tarski’s project of rehabilitating the notion of truth, previously considered dubious by many philosophers. The project was realized by providing a formal truth definition, which does not employ any problematic concept.
We consider the monadic second-order theory of linear order. For the sake of brevity, linearly ordered sets will be called chains.
Let = ⟨A <⟩ be a chain. A formula ø(t) with one free individual variable t defines a point-set on A which contains the points of A that satisfy ø(t). As usually we identify a subset of A with its characteristic predicate and we will say that such a formula defines a predicate on A.
A formula (X) one free monadic predicate variable defines the set of predicates (or family of point-sets) on A that satisfy (X). This family is said to be definable by (X) in A. Suppose that is a subchain of = ⟨B, <⟩. With a formula (X, A) we associate the following family of point-sets (or set of predicates) {P : P ⊆ A and (P, A) holds in } on A. This family is said to be definable by in with at the background.
Note that in such a definition bound individual (respectively predicate) variables of range over B (respectively over subsets of B). Hence, it is reasonable to expect that the presence of a background chain allows one to define point sets (or families of point-sets) on A which are not definable inside .
Let ψ be a partial recursive function (of one argument) with λ-defining term F∈Λ°. This means
There are several proposals for what F⌜n⌝ should be in case ψ(n) is undefined: (1) a term without a normal form (Church); (2) an unsolvable term (Barendregt); (3) an easy term (Visser); (4) a term of order 0 (Statman).
These four possibilities will be covered by one ‘master’ result of Statman which is based on the ‘Anti Diagonal Normalization Theorem’ of Visser (1980). That ingenious theorem about precomplete numerations of Ershov is a powerful tool with applications in recursion theory, metamathematics of arithmetic and lambda calculus.
We prove that the class of trees with no branches of cardinality ≤ κ is not RPC definable in L∞κ when κ is regular. Earlier such a result was known for under the assumption κ<κ = κ. Our main result is actually proved in a stronger form which covers also L∞κ (and makes sense there) for every strong limit cardinal λ < κ of cofinality κ.
For any subset $Z \subseteq {\mathbb {Q}}$, consider the set $S_Z$ of subfields $L\subseteq {\overline {\mathbb {Q}}}$ which contain a co-infinite subset $C \subseteq L$ that is universally definable in L such that $C \cap {\mathbb {Q}}=Z$. Placing a natural topology on the set ${\operatorname {Sub}({\overline {\mathbb {Q}}})}$ of subfields of ${\overline {\mathbb {Q}}}$, we show that if Z is not thin in ${\mathbb {Q}}$, then $S_Z$ is meager in ${\operatorname {Sub}({\overline {\mathbb {Q}}})}$. Here, thin and meager both mean “small”, in terms of arithmetic geometry and topology, respectively. For example, this implies that only a meager set of fields L have the property that the ring of algebraic integers $\mathcal {O}_L$ is universally definable in L. The main tools are Hilbert’s Irreducibility Theorem and a new normal form theorem for existential definitions. The normal form theorem, which may be of independent interest, says roughly that every $\exists $-definable subset of an algebraic extension of ${\mathbb Q}$ is a finite union of single points and projections of hypersurfaces defined by absolutely irreducible polynomials.
We begin by proving that any Presburger-definable image of one or more sets of powers has zero natural density. Then, by adapting the proof of a dichotomy result on o-minimal structures by Friedman and Miller, we produce a similar dichotomy for expansions of Presburger arithmetic on the integers. Combining these two results, we obtain that the expansion of the ordered group of integers by any number of sets of powers does not define multiplication.
By
Chi Tat Chong, National University of Singapore,
Lei Qian, National University of Singapore,
Yue Yang, National University of Singapore
Edited by
Samuel R. Buss, University of California, San Diego,Petr Hájek, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague,Pavel Pudlák, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prague
Although it functioned for a matter of several years, the brick wall put up in 1940 by the Nazis efficiently enclosed the quintessential Jewish Warsaw. In this way, the ‘undefined’ Jewish town within the city's metropolitan area for the first and last time in its history was given clear physical boundaries, and in spite of the obvious differences in circumstance it could be said that Warsaw was physically divided some two decades before Berlin. Referring to Warsaw's pre-war Jewish community as a ghetto is likely further to strengthen popular misconceptions of the real state of affairs; misconceptions fuelled by the extreme situation created during the brief but cataclysmic Nazi occupation.
The existence of one particular district where more than 90 per cent of the population was Jewish in faith and culture cannot be denied; it was also this district which the Nazis all but erased from the face of the earth during and after the tragic Jewish Uprising of April-May 1943. But Muranów represented just one, if a major, aspect of Jewish Warsaw. The Ghetto Wall until July 1942 also embraced a very significant part of the neighbouring Western (Zachodnia) district, where Grzybowski Square and Krochmalna Street, as familiar to I.B. Singer readers as Muranów's Nalewki Street, were situated. The Main Synagogue stood not in Muranów or the Zachodnia, but in the commercial centre, its location as much as its architecture emphasising its importance to the Europeanised Haskala community ratherthan the unacculturated majority.Jews lived to a larger or smaller degree in every part of Warsaw; an especially numerous and long-established community could be found in the Right Bank district of Praga.
The aim of this article is to offer some insight into the origins and nature of Jewish settlement in pre-war Warsaw. The years 1862-1900 have been taken as a period when both Warsaw as a modern metropolis and its exceptionally large Jewish community of varying social make-up took shape. After considering the progression and restrictions of Warsaw's urban development within the Russian Empire we have traced the history of Warsaw's Jewry from its medieval origins, to establish a general background to the rapid and intense changes during the second half of the 19th century.
In this article we explain two different operational interpretations
of functional programs by
two different logics. The programs are simply typed λ-terms
with pairs, projections, if-then-else
and least fixed point recursion. A logic for call-by-value evaluation and
a
logic for call-by-name evaluation are obtained as as extensions
of a system which we call the basic logic of
partial terms (BPT). This logic is suitable to prove properties
of programs that are valid under
both strict and non-strict evaluation. We use methods from denotational
semantics to show
that the two extensions of BPT are adequate for call-by-value and call-by-name
evaluation.
Neither the programs nor the logics contain the constant ‘undefined’.
This article examines the categorical problem that persons of ‘mixed-race’ background presented to British administrations in eastern, central and southern Africa during the late 1920s and 1930s. Tracing a discussion regarding the terms ‘native’ and ‘non-native’ from an obscure court case in Nyasaland (contemporary Malawi) in 1929, to the Colonial Office in London, to colonial governments in eastern, central and southern Africa, this article demonstrates a lack of consensus on how the term ‘native’ was to be defined, despite its ubiquitous use. This complication arrived at a particularly crucial period when indirect rule was being implemented throughout the continent. Debate centered largely around the issue of racial descent versus culture as the determining factor. The ultimate failure of British officials to arrive at a clear definition of the term ‘native’, one of the most fundamental terms in the colonial lexicon, is consequently suggestive of both the potential weaknesses of colonial state formation and the abstraction of colonial policy vis-à-vis local empirical conditions. Furthermore, this case study compels a rethinking of contemporary categories of analysis and their historical origins.