Hostname: page-component-754f97d4cd-89jg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-07-21T04:26:26.465Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The view from Manywhere: normative economics with context-dependent preferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 December 2023

Guilhem Lecouteux Open the ORCID record for Guilhem Lecouteux [Opens in a new window]  and
Ivan Mitrouchev Open the ORCID record for Ivan Mitrouchev [Opens in a new window]
Guilhem Lecouteux*
Affiliation:
Université Côte d’Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France
Ivan Mitrouchev
Affiliation:
IESEG School of Management, Univ. Lille, CNRS, UMR 9221 – LEM – Lille Economie Management, F-59000 Lille, France
*
Corresponding author: Guilhem Lecouteux; Email: guilhem.lecouteux@univ-cotedazur.fr
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

We propose a methodology for normative evaluation when preferences are context-dependent. We offer a precise definition of context-dependence and formulate a normative criterion of self-determination, according to which one situation is better than another if individuals are aware of more potential contexts of a choice problem. We provide two interpretations of our normative approach: an extension of Sugden’s opportunity criterion and an application of Sen’s positional views in his theory of justice. Our proposition is consistent with Muldoon’s and Gaus’ approaches of public reason in social contract theory, which account for the diversity of perspectives in non-ideal worlds.

Keywords

Framingmultiple selvesnormative judgementsecond-person standpointwelfareB41D63D90I31

Information

Type
Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 40 , Issue 2 , July 2024 , pp. 374 - 396
Check for updates
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Bacharach, M. 2006. Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.10.1515/9780691186313CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baujard, A. and Gilardone, M. 2017. Sen is not a capability theorist. Journal of Economic Methodology 24, 1–19.10.1080/1350178X.2016.1257821CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Baujard, A. and Gilardone, M. 2019. “Positional views” as the cornerstone of Sen’s idea of justice. GATE Working Paper.Google Scholar
Benjamin, D.J., Fontana, M.A. and Kimball, M.S. 2020. Reconsidering risk aversion. Working Paper 28007. http://www.nber.org/papers/w28007.10.3386/w28007CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernheim, B.D. 2016. The good, the bad, and the ugly: a unified approach to behavioral welfare economics. Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis 7, 12–68.10.1017/bca.2016.5CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernheim, B.D. and Rangel, A. 2007. Toward choice-theoretic foundations for behavioral welfare economics. American Economic Review 97, 464–470.10.1257/aer.97.2.464CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bernheim, B.D. and Rangel, A. 2009. Beyond revealed preference: choice-theoretic foundations for behavioral welfare economics. Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, 51–104.10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.51CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Buchanan, J.M. 1999. Natural and artifactual man. In The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan, Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty, 246–259. Liberty Fund.Google Scholar
Camerer, C., Issacharoff, S., Loewenstein, G., O’Donoghue, T. and Rabin, M. 2003. Regulation for conservatives: behavioral economics and the case for “asymmetric paternalism”. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 151, 1211–1254.10.2307/3312889CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Christman, J. 2009. The Politics of Persons: Individual Autonomy and Socio-Historical Selves. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/CBO9780511635571CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Darwall, S. 2006. The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect and Accountability. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Davis, J.B. 2011. Individuals and Identity in Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Dold, M.F. 2018. Back to Buchanan? Explorations of welfare and subjectivism in behavioral economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 25, 160–178.10.1080/1350178X.2017.1421770CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dold, M.F. and Schubert, C. 2018. Toward a behavioral foundation of normative economics. Review of Behavioral Economics 5, 221–241.10.1561/105.00000097CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dold, M., van Emmerick, E. and Fabian, M. 2020. Taking psychology seriously? A self-determination theory perspective on Robert Sugden’s opportunity criterion. Unpublished Manuscript.Google Scholar
Ferreira, J.V. 2023. Which choices merit deference? A comparison of three behavioural proxies of subjective welfare. Economics & Philosophy 39, 124–151.10.1017/S0266267121000365CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gaus, G. 2016. The Tyranny of the Ideal: Justice in a Diverse Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Gigerenzer, G. 2015. Risk Savvy: How to Make Good Decisions. London: Penguin Books.Google Scholar
Gigerenzer, G. and Todd, P.M. 1999. Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Gold, N. 2018. Putting willpower into decision theory: the person as a team over time and intra-personal team reasoning. In Self-Control, Decision Theory, and Rationality: New Essays, 218–239. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.10.1017/9781108329170.011CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gold, N. 2022. Guard against temptation: intrapersonal team reasoning and the role of intentions in exercising willpower. Noûs 56, 554–569.10.1111/nous.12369CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grüne-Yanoff, T. and Hertwig, R. 2016. Nudge versus boost: how coherent are policy and theory? Minds and Machines 26, 149–183.10.1007/s11023-015-9367-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guala, F. and Mittone, L. 2015. A political justification of nudging. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6, 385–395.10.1007/s13164-015-0241-8CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harrison, G.W. 2019. The behavioral welfare economics of insurance. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 44, 137–175.10.1057/s10713-019-00042-yCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harrison, G.W. and Ross, D. 2018. Varieties of paternalism and the heterogeneity of utility structures. Journal of Economic Methodology 25, 42–67.10.1080/1350178X.2017.1380896CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hong, L. and Page, S.E. 2001. Problem solving by heterogeneous agents. Journal of Economic Theory 97, 123–163.10.1006/jeth.2000.2709CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Infante, G., Lecouteux, G. and Sugden, R. 2016. Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 23(1), 1–25.10.1080/1350178X.2015.1070527CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Jullien, D. 2016. All frames created equal are not identical: on the structure of Kahneman and Tversky’s framing effects. Œconomia. History, Methodology, Philosophy 6, 265–291.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D., Wakker, P.P. and Sarin, R. 1997. Back to Bentham? Explorations of experienced utility. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 375–406.10.1162/003355397555235CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Karpus, J. and Radzvilas, M. 2018. Team reasoning and a measure of mutual advantage in games. Economics & Philosophy 34(1), 1–30.10.1017/S0266267117000153CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lecouteux, G. 2015. In search of lost nudges. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6, 397–408.10.1007/s13164-015-0265-0CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lecouteux, G. 2021. Welfare economics in large worlds: welfare and public policies in an uncertain environment. In Elgar Modern Guide to the Philosophy of Economics, eds H. Kincaid and D. Ross. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.Google Scholar
Lecouteux, G. 2022. Reconciling normative and behavioural economics: the problem that cannot be solved. In The Positive and Normative in Economic Thought, 148–166. London: Routledge.10.4324/9781003247289-10CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mitrouchev, I. and Buonomo, V. 2023. Identity, ethics and behavioural welfare economics. Economics & Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267123000123.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Muldoon, R. 2016. Social Contract Theory for a Diverse World: Beyond Tolerance. London: Routledge.10.4324/9781315545882CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nagel, T. 1986. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Nielsen, K. and Rehbeck, J. 2022. When choices are mistakes. American Economic Review 112, 2237–2268.10.1257/aer.20201550CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nozick, R. 1981. Philosophical Explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Rawls, J. 1999. A Theory of Justice (Revised edn). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.10.4159/9780674042582CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ryan, R.M. and Deci, E.L. 2000. Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motivation, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist 55(1), 68–78.10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.68CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Schelling, T. 1980. The intimate contest for self-command. The Public Interest 60, 94–118.Google Scholar
Schubert, C. 2015. Opportunity and preference learning. Economics & Philosophy 31, 275–295.10.1017/S0266267115000139CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sen, A. 1985. Commodities and Capabilities. Amsterdam: North Holland.Google Scholar
Sen, A. 1992. Inequality Reexamined. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sen, A. 1993. Positional objectivity. Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, 126–145.Google Scholar
Sen, A. 2001. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sen, A. 2006. Reason, freedom and well-being. Utilitas 18(1), 80–96.10.1017/S0953820805001846CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sen, A. 2009. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Sugden, R. 2004. The opportunity criterion: consumer sovereignty without the assumption of coherent preferences. American Economic Review 94, 1014–1033.10.1257/0002828042002714CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sugden, R. 2006. What we desire, what we have reason to desire, whatever we might desire: Mill and Sen on the value of opportunity. Utilitas 18(1), 33–51.10.1017/S0953820805001810CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sugden, R. 2013. The behavioural economist and the social planner: to whom should behavioural welfare economics be addressed? Inquiry 56, 519–538.10.1080/0020174X.2013.806139CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sugden, R. 2018. The Community of Advantage: A Behavioural Economist’s Defence of the Market. Oxford: Oxford University Press.10.1093/oso/9780198825142.001.0001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sugden, R. 2021. Hume’s experimental psychology and the idea of erroneous preferences. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 183, 836–848.10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.017CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. 2003. Libertarian paternalism. American Economic Review 93, 175–179.10.1257/000282803321947001CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thaler, R.H. and Sunstein, C.R. 2009. Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness (Revised and expanded edn). London: Penguin Books.Google Scholar
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1981. The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 211, 453–458.10.1126/science.7455683CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. 1986. Rational choice and the framing of decisions. Journal of Business 59, S251–S278.10.1086/296365CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tversky, A. and Simonson, I. 1993. Context-dependent preferences. Management Science 39, 1179–1189.10.1287/mnsc.39.10.1179CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wallace, L.R. 2019. The View from Somewhere: Undoing the Myth of Journalistic Objectivity. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wilson, M. 2007. The view from somewhere. Educational Leadership 65(4), 76–80.Google Scholar