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Index

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 July 2022

Artūrs Logins
Affiliation:
Universität Zürich

Summary

Type
Chapter
Information
Normative Reasons
Between Reasoning and Explanation
, pp. 238 - 242
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BYCreative Common License - NCCreative Common License - ND
This content is Open Access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 https://creativecommons.org/cclicenses/

Index

‘ought’, central sense of, 85
‘reason’
countable noun, 9
mass noun, 9
‘a reason to’, 9
‘Why?’ questions, general, 166
‘Why F?’ questions, 5
‘Why F?’ questions, normative, 168169
abilities, general versus specific, 79
affective attitudes, 126
aim of belief, 119
Alvarez, 9, 11, 40, 47
American pragmatism, historical, 193
Anscombe, 1314
anti-Humean movement, 17
Anti-Luminosity argument, 26, 81
arguing, speech act of, 167
Army case, 174
Arpaly and Schroeder, 12
Asarnow, 40, 42, 51, 62
background conditions, 89
Bader, 67
Benmakhlouf, 13
Berker, 192, 206, 220
Boghossian, 120
BoJack, 163, 169
bribes, 217
Broome, 85, 87, 8990, 9495, 144, 147
Brown, 67, 69
Brunero, 30, 93, 96, 99, 131, 144, 150151
buck-passing account of value, 32
cabbage case, 102
cancelability test, of implicatures, 69
cancelling considerations, 86
ceteris paribus, good reasoning, 61
Chappell, 42
chocolate cream pizza case, 67
cogency, 61
cognitive homelessness, 25
constitution of rightness, 104
constraint of holism, 128
Contextualism, 109
contrastivism about reasons, 186
correctness for belief, 120
Crisp, 32
criticisability, 81
D’Arms and Jacobson, 32
Dancy, 6566, 89, 128
Davidson, 13, 16
Deductive Nomological model of explanation, 109
defeasible patterns of reasoning, 60
deliberative ought, 102
delusional subject, 77
Deonna and Teroni, 132, 134
deontic fact, 86
despicable demon case, 33
deterrent actions, 77
Dietz, 16
disposition to be moved, 57
dogmatism, 192
Drucker, 134
Dutant and Littlejohn, 162
Echeverri, 133134
enabling conditions, explanation of, 89
enabling conditions, the problem of, 65
Engel, 9, 28, 32, 120, 193
entailing evidence, 90
Epley, 134
equivocal evidence, 200
Erotetic logic, 166
Erotetic view of reasons
as Dualism about reasons, 170
full statement of, 170
in favour of, 177
introduction of, 5
succinct statement of, 168
Evidence view of reasons
arguments in favour of, 140
the most general form of, 137
objections to, 144
evidentialism, 88, 127, 192
evidentialism–pragmatism debate, 194
explaining, speech act of, 167
explaining versus arguing, 168
explanation by causes and explanation by reasons, 1316
Explanation view of reasons
arguments in favour of, 89, 104, 107
Axiological version, explanation-plus-value-based variant of, 107
Axiological version, value promotion variant of, 123
Axiological version of, 106
Deontic version of, 85
the most general form of, 84
objections to, 93, 105, 116, 129
Right-maker version of, 103
explanations versus arguments, general, 167
Faraci, 131, 134
Fassio, 119
Finlay, 107109, 111, 115, 118, 121122
fit-making considerations, 128
fittingness, 41
fittingness first, 42
Fletcher, 144, 151
Fogal, 66, 70, 100
Fogal and Sylvan, 21
Foley, 193
formal object of emotions, 132
Frege, 13
fruitfulness of theorising with reasons, 30
functions of evidence, 155
Gibbons, 51
Goldie, 134
Goldman, 193
goodness, 107
Gordon, 134, 175
gradable adjectives, 133
Greenspan, 134
Gregory, 41
Grice, 40, 45, 68
Harman, 40, 45
Hawthorne and Magidor, 10, 19, 22, 68, 99100, 144, 147
Hempel, 113, 167
hermit who knows case, 147
Heuer, 81
Hieronymi, 5, 34, 40, 46, 49, 165, 168
Hijacked flight case, 175
Horty, 61, 67, 86, 100
Hughes, 81
humanities, 13
Humeanism about reasons, 28, 76
ice-cream case, 77
ideal adviser view of reasons, 50
ideal and well-informed self, 58
implicature, 68
inclinations to believe, 59
Internalism about reasons, 77
internalism/externalism about epistemic justification, 26
internalist accessibilism, 26
internalist mentalism, 26
irrelevant truths, 167
James, 199
Kavka’s toxin case, 77
Kearns and Star, 70, 96, 9899, 101102, 137141
Kelly, 77, 155, 193, 197, 211
Kennedy, 134
Kennedy and McNally, 133
Kenny, 45
Kiesewetter, 50, 78
Kiesewetter and Gertken, 32, 36
Lasonen-Aarnio, 81
Lassiter, 134
Leary, 193, 213
Let’s Make a Deal show. See Monty Hall show
level of a theoretician versus level of an agent, 191
Littlejohn, 144
Livet, 13
logical positivism, 14
Lord, 50
Lord and Maguire, 91
Löschke, 32
Maguire, 123124, 126128, 132133, 210
Maguire and Woods, 127, 193, 202
Markovits, 7778
Marušić, 202
McBride, 144, 147
McCormick, 193, 199, 215, 217
McHugh and Way, 32, 36, 40, 62, 70, 72, 168, 217
McKeever and Ridge, 144
McKeon, 167
McNaughton and Rawling, 144
meaningful life, 1
Melden, 13
Mele, 79
Meylan, 134
Millgram, 78
moderate pragmatism, 193
monotonicity, 61
Monty Hall show, 2325
Moore-paradoxical beliefs, 71, 90, 116, 156
moral psychology, 16
motiva credibilitatis, 10
Mulligan, 134
Na’aman, 134
Nair, 67, 100, 132
necessary truths, the problem of, 140
neo-Humean, approach in philosophy of action, 16
Non-availability of good reasoning, the problem of, 70
non-cognitivism in meta-ethics, 17
non-observational knowledge of our reasons, 14
norm of belief, 120
normative questions. See ‘Why F?’ questions, normative
normative reasons
as considerations that speak in favour of an action or an attitude, 10
normative testimony, 147
Nutella pizza case, 100
Objectivism about reasons, 51
Ogien, 13
outweighed reasons, the problem of, 53
Oxfam case, 144
P therefore p, 175
Paakkunainen, 7374
Parfit, 2, 17, 31, 33, 76, 163
pars pro toto explanations, 94
parsimony in normative domain, 31
patterns of questions, 169
Pelser, 134
Pickard, 81
Piller, 33
Pollock, 61
pragmatism, 193
prima facie oughts, 91
Prior and Prior, 166
probabilistic conception of evidential support, 139
process reliabilism, 193
promise-accident case, 54
Promotion, 124
Pryor, 192
psychologism in logic, 13
psychology, 13
Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2, 32
radical pragmatism, 193
Rational Internalism, 51
rationalisation, 51
Raz, 40, 44, 90
Reason Basicness, 29
Reasoning view of reasons
Arguments in favor of, 48
first generation of, 40
good dispositions of practical thought version of, 41
the most general form of, 39
norms of practical reasoning version of, 42
objections to, 51, 65, 70
premise of a good, fittingness preserving pattern of reasoning version of, 41
second generation of, 40
as a view concerned with being moved not with acting, 57
reasonology, 13
reasons
accrual of, 67
as considerations that bear on a question, 166
additivity principle for, 6768, 99, 105, 109110, 132
as explanatorily fundamental, 28
attitudinal versus epistemic for emotions, 135
desiderata for a theory of, 162
eliminitivism about, 164
elusive, 73
explanatory, 1112
favouring, 66
guidance by, 75, 102
internal versus external, 198
massively outweighed, 77
motivating, 1011
as motives, 198
normative, introduction of, 10
objective, 19
operative. See motivating reasons
as opposed to causes. See explanation by causes and explanation by reasons
possessed, 20
pragmatic (for belief), 193
as premises in good reasoning. See Reasoning view of reasons
as prime. See reasons-first
pro tanto, 88
pro toto, 87
Rationality and, 188
sans phrase, 125
self-effacing, 78
state-given versus object-given, 33
subjective, 20
subsidiary, 86
as unanalysable, 29
unpossessed subjective, 2023
weight of, 63, 99, 185
reasons for. See motivating reasons
reasons fundamentalism. See reasons-first
reasons why. See explanatory reasons
reasons-first, 2, 2831, 160
Reisner, 193, 199, 202, 206, 210, 215
Response constraint, 73, 7576
responsibility, 81
rightness, 104
Rinard, 193, 202
Ross, 54, 91
Rossi, 73
Rowland, 30
Salmon, 113, 167
satisfactoriness, 45
vos Savant, 23
Scanlon, 2, 17, 29, 32, 56
Scarantino and de Sousa, 134
Schmidt, 144, 149
Schroeder, 2, 19, 2829, 36, 7778, 100
Schroeter and Schroeter, 103, 105
scientific methodology. See explanation by causes and explanation by reasons
self-undermining beliefs, 72
Setiya, 40, 50, 5758, 6566, 69, 78, 144
Shafer-Landau, 78
Shah, 77, 120, 193, 213
Shah and Velleman, 193
Sher, 68
Silverstein, 40, 51, 60, 62
Sinclair, 78
Singer, 94
Skorupski, 2, 17, 36
Smith, 50, 58, 78
Smithies, 19, 27
Snedeger, 186
Sobel, 78
social sciences, 13
Soup case, 172
de Sousa, 132
Srinivasan, 81
Star, 64, 158
Steglich-Petersen and Skipper, 206
Streumer, 81
Stroud, 202
subagential aims, 121
surprise party case, 78
Sylvan, 19
theory of argumentation, 167
Timmerman, 94
Tweety, 61
value-first, 106
Velleman, 40, 46, 120
Way, 36, 40, 48, 55, 59, 62, 158, 193, 217
Way and Whiting, 73, 7576, 7879
Wedgwood, 120, 190191
weighing explanation, 86
mechanical weighing explanation, 88
Whately, 166
Whiting, 2021, 159
Wiland, 13
Williams, 40, 43, 56, 76, 198
Williamson, 26, 81, 139, 155
Wittgenstein, 13
Wodak, 89
Wright, 193
wrong kind of reasons problem, 2, 3237

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  • Index
  • Artūrs Logins, Universität Zürich
  • Book: Normative Reasons
  • Online publication: 21 July 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009076012.010
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  • Index
  • Artūrs Logins, Universität Zürich
  • Book: Normative Reasons
  • Online publication: 21 July 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009076012.010
Available formats
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  • Index
  • Artūrs Logins, Universität Zürich
  • Book: Normative Reasons
  • Online publication: 21 July 2022
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009076012.010
Available formats
×