In this timely edited volume, Professors Kieh and Kalu have compiled an impressive range of chapters discussing the interrelated themes of insurgency, terrorism, and counterterrorism in postcolonial Africa. These themes are discussed in the introduction, conclusion, and seven key chapters. The editors argue that most of the major conflicts in Africa had their root causes in the aftermath of attaining political independence, in the 1960s. African states degenerated into dictatorships, while citizens had no access to basic socioeconomic opportunities. The inaction of African governments, deliberately or not, to address such challenges has been the “breeding ground” for some of the conflicts addressed in this volume (3–4, 27–28). Ted Gurr’s “basic frustration-aggression approach,” to the causes of rebellions, suffices here.
The main themes are defined and contextualized as follows: first, an “insurgency” refers to a political movement aiming to challenge an incumbent government based on shared grievances in society. In Africa, insurgencies range from “secessionists,” as in Nigeria; “liberationists,” as in South Africa; “reformists,” as in Ethiopia; and “warlordists,” as in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Ongoing insurgencies include Al-Shabab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Second, “terrorism,” refers to the threat or deliberate use of violence by both state and nonstate actors, against innocent people. For instance, in apartheid South Africa, the government used the Askaris Squad to assassinate African National Congress (ANC) leaders. Lastly, “counterterrorism” refers to actions aimed at minimizing the threat and consequences of terrorism. Such actions, either defensive or proactive, are taken by governments, military alliances, international organizations (such as Interpol), and private citizens (5–15). One would have expected Kieh and Kalu to conduct a longue durée analysis of terrorism in Africa, rather than only associating its rise with the imposition of European colonial rule (7). African history traces terrorism to the continent’s precolonial inter-ethnic/state wars, including wars fought to capture slaves earmarked for international slave markets.
In Chapter Three, Mohamed Ingiriis examines the rise, demands, and operations of Al-Shabab in post-Cold War Somalia. Somalia’s conflict has been protracted by the historical absence of proper channels of political, economic, and territorial power-sharing beginning with Mohammed Siad Barre’s presidency, from 1969 to 1991. Hence, despite efforts of the Somalian government and other external partners, such as the US and the African Union’s (AU) AMISOM troops, Al-Shabab, which emerged from the “warlordism” of the post-Barre era, has continued to cause harm (63–71). Shifting to West Africa, Sylvester Akhaine examines the rise and impacts of Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria and beyond. Boko Haram rose from grievances about poverty, political and religious marginalization, and corruption in government. Western political and religious intrusion is also resented (96–102). Despite government efforts to eliminate Boko Haram, the terror group continues to be a “nuisance,” owing to foreign backers from Qatar and Saudi Arabia (102).
Another terrorist movement operating in West and Central Africa is Al-Qaeda, which has adapted to the grievances of marginalized communities and extremist groups. Facing international attacks in the post-9/11 era, Al-Qaeda operates under the notion of “the jihadist nebula,” which compels the movement to seek international partners, Africans included. This includes Al-Qaeda’s association with Boko Haram, Ansaru, and Ansaroul Islam, among others (115–28). Similarly, ISIS has also found African allies, having lost territory and influence in Syria and Iraq. ISIS collaborates with Boko Haram, the Islamic State in Somalia, and the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP), among others (135–38, 146–51).
The counterterrorism measures against the terrorist groups have achieved limited success. In West Africa, for instance, ECOWAS’s efforts have been hampered by the fragile security and economic infrastructures of the region. ECOWAS has thus been compelled to bring in Western partners, especially the US and France (168–81). With limited success, the US operates through the Pan-Sahel Initiative, the East African Counter-terrorism Initiative, and the US Africa Command, among other initiatives (191–200). In the end, Kieh and Kalu argue that “the global war on terror” across Africa can succeed with a “democratic reconstitution” of the postcolonial state. This includes the political inclusion of all sectors of society, ending the plunder of public resources, promoting human security and the rule of law, and “equitable” sharing of natural resources and socioeconomic opportunities (210–25).
Kieh and Kalu’s volume is a remarkable contribution to the study of the proliferation and fight against the global spread of terrorism and extremism. This book should be read by stakeholders from state and nonstate agencies, both local and international, responsible for counterterrorism. Academics, whose work focuses on global religious fundamentalism, the postcolonial state in Africa, and the post-Cold War dynamics across the continent will find use for this book. There are, however, several omissions in this volume. First, the editors should have included a chapter on the rise and spread of the “Arab Spring,” which began in Tunisia in 2010. Second, there is a glaring omission of the operations of the Russian-backed Wagner Group and its destabilization efforts in sub-Saharan Africa, including the plunder of natural resources, fueling of terrorism, and the murder of thousands of innocent Africans. These omissions aside, one hopes that reading this volume will help practitioners to fight against terrorism and extremism in Africa and beyond successfully.
