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Representations and decision rules in the theory of self-deception

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2011

Steven Pinker
Steven Pinker
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138. pinker@wjh.harvard.eduhttp://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu
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Abstract

Self-deception is a powerful but overapplied theory. It is adaptive only when a deception-detecting audience is in the loop, not when an inaccurate representation is invoked as an internal motivator. First, an inaccurate representation cannot be equated with self-deception, which entails two representations, one inaccurate and the other accurate. Second, any motivational advantages are best achieved with an adjustment to the decision rule on when to act, not with a systematic error in an internal representation.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 34 , Issue 1 , February 2011 , pp. 35 - 37
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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