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Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and The Third Man Argument
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
The Third Man argument, as it originated in Plato's Parmenides, is unjustly read into Aristotle. The Parmenides argument is briefly examined, followed by an analysis of the relevant Aristotelian texts, with a special emphasis on the commentary of Thomas Aquinas. Three different versions of Aristotle's Third Man argument are identified, of which none contain the essential infinite regress that characterizes the Parmenides argument. Finally, current scholarship on the Third Man argument, especially as it pertains to Aristotle, is reviewed. In this respect, I note that the overwhelming tendency has been to identify Aristotle's Third Man argument with that of the Parmenides, in spite of the fact that Aristotle only once articulates his version of the Third Man argument, and that this articulation is vastly different from its Parmenides counterpart. I conclude that contemporary Third Man scholarship must take this into account.
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References
1 Plato, Parmenides. The text I am using appears in The Dialogues of Plato, volume II, Jowett, B. M.A.,trans. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1964).Google Scholar
2 Aristotle, Metaphysics. The text I am using appears in McKeon, Richard, ed., The Basic Works of Aristotle, Ross, W. D., trans. (New York: Random House, 1941).Google Scholar
3 Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations. An English translation by Pickard-Cambridge, W. A. exists online. See < http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/sophist_refut.html >. Accessed November 20, 2019..+Accessed+November+20,+2019.>Google Scholar
4 Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Rowan, John P., trans. (Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books, 1995).Google Scholar
5 Vlastos, Gregory, “The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides”, The Philosophical Review 63, no. 3 (1954), pp. 319-349.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
6 For example, Vlastos famously argued that the Third Man argument constituted in part Plato's “expression of his acknowledged but unresolved puzzlement”. Ibid., p. 344.
7 With apologies to Constance C. Meinwald, who argues that the Third Man and Plato's position on it can only be properly understood when read against the second part of the Parmenides. Meinwald, Constance C., “Goodbye to the Third Man”, in Kraut, Richard, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Plato (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) pp. 365-396CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see especially p. 369. The scope of this paper simply does not allow me to consider the second part of the Parmenides in any detail. Moreover, Aristotle's mentions of the Third Man argument and Thomas's interpretation of them allow us to bypass the considerations which led Meinwald to her conclusion.
8 Plato, Parmenides, 132a.
9 Ibid., 132a-132b.
10 Meinwald, “Good-bye to the Third Man”, p. 373.
11 Vlastos has made an excellent logical structuring of the argument. See Vlastos, “The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides”.
12 See Meinwald, “Good-bye to the Third Man”, p. 381.
13 For example, see Pelletier, Francis Jeffry and Zalta, Edward N., “How to Say Goodbye to the Third Man”, Nous 34, no. 2 (2000), pp. 165-202CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially pp. 165-166.
14 Meinwald, “Good-bye to the Third Man”, p. 371.
15 Moreover, the amount of literature and attention directed towards the Third Man argument in the Parmenides might give the indication that the argument constitutes the most decisive blow against Plato's theory of Forms, when in fact Plato himself indicates that this is not so – at least to his mind. Plato, Parmenides, 133b. That dubious distinction belongs to another argument entirely, so that the Third Man argument is perhaps over-represented in the literature – again, to Plato's mind at least. On the other hand, there is some discussion as to what exactly Plato meant by writing that the fifth argument of the first part of the Parmenides constituted the greatest difficulty for the theory of Forms; perhaps he only meant that it had the most disastrous consequences? See Meinwald, “Good-bye to the Third Man”, p. 395, endnote 23.
16 Aristotle, Metaphysics I.9, 990b9-17.
17 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book I, Lesson 14, §214.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., §215.
20 Aristotle, Metaphysics I.9, 990a34-990b4.
21 Ibid., 991a2-8.
22 Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book I, Lesson 14, §221.
23 Ibid., §222.
24 Ibid.
25 However, the argument is especially noteworthy for those who are interested in the Third Man as an argument that revolves around predication. See ibid., §223.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., §216.
29 Thomas is reading this Platonic doctrine out of The Republic’s divided line analogy in book VI. See Plato, The Republic, Bloom, Allan, trans. (New York: Basic Books, 1991).Google Scholar See also Cornford, F. M., “Mathematics and Dialectic in the Republic VI.-VII. (I.)”, Mind 41, no. 161 (1932), pp. 37-52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
30 Aristotle, Metaphysics VII.13, 1038b35.
31 Ibid., 1039a1.
32 Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book VII, Lesson 13, §1586.Google Scholar
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., §1587.
35 See Aristotle, Metaphysics I.9, 990b15-17.
36 See ibid., VII.13, 1038b35. Notice also that Aristotle writes that the Third Man argument follows “especially” from denying this proposition.
37 Ibid., XI.1, 1059a2-9.
38 Aquinas, Thomas, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book I, Lesson 14, §216.Google Scholar
39 Ibid., Book XI, Lesson 1, §2160.
40 Kung, Joan, “Aristotle on Thises, Suches and the Third Man Argument”, Phronesis 26, no. 3 (1981), pp. 207-247, 225.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
41 See especially ibid., p. 227.
42 Fine, Gail, “Owen, Aristotle, and the Third Man”, Phronesis 27, no. 1 (1982), p. 14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Later in her paper, Fine argues that “Aristotle sets it [the Third Man argument] out in his Peri Ideōn”. Ibid., endnote 5 (page 28). I have not included the Peri Ideōn in this paper, since its authenticity is still under dispute, and since it survives only in fragments throughout Alexander of Aphrodisias's commentary on the Metaphysics.
43 Barford, Robert, “The Context of the Third Man Argument in Plato's Parmenides”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 16, no. 1 (1978), pp. 1-11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
44 Meinwald, “Good-bye to the Third Man”. In addition, Meinwald claims that “Aristotle popularized the Third Man as a crucial problem for Platonism.” Ibid., p. 373. While this may be true, it is an open question as to whether or not Aristotle popularized the version of the Third Man that Meinwald has in mind. It seems to me that Plato did the popularizing of the Parmenidean style of argument, and that Aristotle was, unfortunately, shoehorned into this type of thinking by subsequent commentators.
45 Dybikowski, James C., “Professor Owen, Aristotle, and the Third Man Argument”, Mind 81, no. 323 (1972), pp. 445-447.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
46 Vlastos, “The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides”, p. 329.
47 Ibid., footnote 15.
48 Ibid., p. 339, footnote 36.