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Patriotism without Patriots? Perm΄-36 and Patriotic Legitimation in Russia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 August 2020

J. Paul Goode
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Abstract

This article examines the takeover of the Perm’-36 Gulag museum as emblematic of the dynamics of patriotic legitimation in Russia. The museum was dedicated to preserving the memory of the victims of Soviet political repression and it grew in popularity into the 2000s, emerging as an opposition platform and target for self-styled patriots who accused it of distorting Soviet history. The regional government soon joined the battle, finally forcing the museum's takeover and transforming it into a site honoring the Gulag rather than its victims. Drawing on interviews conducted with the museum's former director and scientific directors in 2015 and extensive local press materials, this analysis of the struggle over Perm’-36 demonstrates the significance of patriotism in sustaining the regional government's attacks even in the absence of federal patronage. The findings thus challenge prevailing understandings of authoritarian regime politics as driven primarily by patronage and power-maximizing elites.

Keywords

Russiaauthoritarianismlegitimationnationalismpatriotism
Type
Articles
Information
Slavic Review , Volume 79 , Issue 2 , Summer 2020 , pp. 390 - 411
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies

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Footnotes

Funding for this research was provided by a Fulbright Research Fellowship. This paper was previously presented at the 49th Annual ASEEES Convention, Chicago, November 9–12, 2017, and the PONARS Eurasia workshop on “Post-Soviet Domestic Politics in Comparative Perspective,” Kharkiv, Ukraine, June 22–23, 2017. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, the author is grateful to Archie Brown, Mischa Gabowitsch, Marlene Laruelle, Olga Malinova, Olga Onuch, Regina Smyth, Katie Stewart, and Melissa Stockdale, as well as colleagues at University of Bath (especially Peter Allen, Paul Higate, Aurelien Mondon, and David Moon). The author gratefully acknowledges Valeriia Umanets for her research assistance with this project. All errors and omissions are the author's sole responsibility.

References

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2 For recent exceptions that examine legitimation in autocracies, see: Gerschewski, Johannes, “Legitimacy in Autocracies: Oxymoron or Essential Feature?” Perspectives on Politics 16, no. 3 (September 2018): 652–65Google Scholar; Alexander Dukalskis and Johannes Gerschewski, “What Autocracies Say (and What Citizens Hear): Proposing Four Mechanisms of Autocratic Legitimation,” Contemporary Politics 23, no. 3 (September 2017): 251–68; Nelli Babayan, “Bearing Truthiness: Russia’s Cyclical Legitimation of Its Actions,” Europe-Asia Studies 69, no. 7 (August 2017): 1090–1105; Diana T. Kudaibergenova, “Compartmentalized Ideology and Nation-Building in Non-Democratic States,” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 52, no. 3 (September 2019): 247–57; Kelly M. McMann, “Developing State Legitimacy: The Credibility of Messengers and the Utility, Fit, and Success of Ideas,” Comparative Politics 48, no. 4 (July 2016): 538–56; Derek S. Hutcheson and Bo Petersson, “Shortcut to Legitimacy: Popularity in Putin’s Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 7 (September 2016): 1107–26.

3 Alexander Lukin, “Russia’s New Authoritarianism and the Post-Soviet Political Ideal,” Post-Soviet Affairs 25, no. 1 (January-March 2009): 66–92; Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Neil Munro, Popular Support for an Undemocratic Regime: The Changing Views of Russians (Cambridge, Eng., 2011); Graeme Gill, Building an Authoritarian Polity: Russia in Post-Soviet Times (Cambridge, Eng., 2015); Stephen Whitefield, ed., Political Culture and Post-Communism (Basingstoke, 2005); Samuel Greene and Graeme Robertson, Putin v. the People: The Perilous Politics of a Divided Russia (New Haven, 2019); Regina Smyth, Anton Sobolev, and Irina Soboleva, “A Well-Organized Play: Symbolic Politics and the Effect of the Pro-Putin Rallies,” Problems of Post-Communism 60, no. 2 (March-April 2013): 24–39; Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, “Monumental Politics: Regime Type and Public Memory in Post-Communist States,” Post-Soviet Affairs 27, no. 3 (July-September 2011): 269–88; Graeme Gill, Symbolism and Regime Change in Russia (Cambridge, Eng., 2013); Edward Schatz, “The Soft Authoritarian Tool Kit: Agenda-Setting Power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,” Comparative Politics 41, no. 2 (January 2009); Michael Urban, Cultures of Power in Post-Communist Russia: An Analysis of Elite Political Discourse (New York, 2010).

4 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London, 1995).

5 J. Paul Goode, “Love for the Motherland (or Why Cheese Is More Patriotic than Crimea),” Russian Politics 1, no. 4 (2016): 418–49.

6 Steven R. Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability,” Perspectives on Politics 10, no. 4 (December 2012): 869–89.

7 Mark R. Beissinger, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge, Eng., 2002). This was less the case in Belarus and Central Asian states, where independence was claimed later than other Soviet republics and nationalist movements failed to take power following independence.

8 Alena V. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?: Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance (Cambridge, Eng., 2013); Stephen Levitsky and Lucan Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War (Cambridge, Eng., 2010); Richard Sakwa, “The Dual State in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 26, no. 3 (2010): 185–206.

9 This bears a similarity to T.H. Rigby’s characterization of legitimate authority in the Soviet Union as “goal-rational” rather than a Weberian “legal-rational” authority. T. H. Rigby, “A Conceptual Approach to Authority, Power and Policy in the Soviet Union,” in Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR: Essays Dedicated to Leonard Schapiro (London, 1980), 9–31.

10 This paragraph and the next adapt the schema of regime, subordinate, and opposition practices introduced in: J. Paul Goode, “Nationalism in Quiet Times: Ideational Power and Post-Soviet Electoral Authoritarianism,” Problems of Post-Communism 59, no. 3 (May/June 2012): 6–16.

11 Vladimir Putin, “Rossiia na rubezhe tysiacheletii [Russia on the Eve of the Millennium],” Nezavisimaia Gazeta, December 30, 1999, at http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium.html (accessed March 27, 2020).

12 Marlene Laruelle, In the Name of the Nation: Nationalism and Politics in Contemporary Russia (New York, 2009).

13 Gregory Feifer, “Russian Opposition Leader Faces Court Hearings,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 24, 2010, at https://www.rferl.org/a/Russian_Opposition_Leader_Faces_Court_Hearings/2136136.html (accessed May 21, 2020).

14 Anne Le Huérou, “Where Does the Motherland Begin? Private and Public Dimensions of Contemporary Russian Patriotism in Schools and Youth Organisations: A View from the Field,” Europe-Asia Studies 67, no. 1 (January 2015): 28–48; Marlene Laruelle, “Patriotic Youth Clubs in Russia: Professional Niches, Cultural Capital and Narratives of Social Engagement,” Europe-Asia Studies 67, no. 1 (January 2015): 8–27.

15 Helge Blakkisrud, “Blurring the Boundary between Civic and Ethnic: The Kremlin’s New Approach to National Identity under Putin’s Third Term,” in Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, eds., The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000–2015 (Edinburgh, 2016), 249–74.

16 Pål Kolstø, “Marriage of Convenience? Collaboration between Nationalists and Liberals in the Russian Opposition, 2011–12,” The Russian Review 75, no. 4 (October 2016): 645–63; Nicu Popescu, “The Strange Alliance of Democrats and Nationalists,” Journal of Democracy 23, no. 3 (July 2012): 46–54; Natal΄ia Iudina, Vera Al΄perovich, and Aleksandr Verkhovskii, “Mezhdu Manezhnoi i Bolotnoi: Ksenofobiia i radikal΄nyi natsionalizm i protivodeistvie im v 2011 godu v Rossii [Between Manezh and Bolotnaya: Xenophobia, Radical Nationalism, and Efforts to Counteract them in 2011],” SOVA Informatsionno-analiticheskii tsentr, February 24, 2012, at http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2012/02/d23739/ (accessed March 27, 2020).

17 “Putin: Natsional΄naia ideia v Rossii—eto patriotizm,” RIA Novosti, February 3, 2016, at https://ria.ru/society/20160203/1369184806.html; Vladimir Putin, “Vstrecha s aktivom Kluba liderov [Meeting with Members of the Club of Leaders],” Prezident Rossii, February 3, 2016, at http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/51263 (accessed March 27, 2020).

18 Yuri Teper, “Official Russian Identity Discourse in Light of the Annexation of Crimea: National or Imperial?,” Post-Soviet Affairs 32, no. 4 (2016): 378–96; J. Paul Goode, “Everyday Patriotism and Ethnicity in Today’s Russia,” in Pål Kolstø and Helge Blakkisrud, eds., Russia Before and After Crimea: Nationalism and Identity, 2010–2017 (Edinburgh, 2018), 258–81.

19 M. P. Odesskii and D. M. Fel΄dman. “Ideologema ‘Patriot’ v Russkoi, Sovetskoi i Postsovetskoi Kul΄ture. Lozung i Rugatel΄stvo (The Concept of ‘Patriot’ in Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Culture: Slogan and Curse Word),” Obshchestvennye Nauki i Sovremennost΄, no. 1 (2008): 109–23.

20 Serguei Alex Oushakine, “Remembering in Public: On the Affective Management of History,” Ab Imperio, no. 1 (2013): 269–302.

21 Peter Hobson, “How Russian Authorities Hijacked a WWII Remembrance Movement,” The Moscow Times, May 6, 2016, at https://themoscowtimes.com:443/articles/how-russian-authorities-hijacked-a-wwii-remembrance-movement-52776 (accessed March 27, 2020).

22 Local press accounts were accessed via the Integrum full-text database. While seeking a balanced range of sources, the most comprehensive coverage was provided by the business daily Novyi Kompan΄on. The timeline of events was triangulated with other federal and regional news sources, though duplicate stories are not cited here. Other press sources used in compiling this timeline include: Argumenty i Fakty—Prikam΄e, Chusovskoi Rabochii, Ekho Moskvy v Permi, Kommersant—Perm΄, Komsomol΄skaia Pravda—Perm΄, Permskii obozrevatel΄, Rossiiskaia Gazeta—Iuzhnyi ural, and Zvezda. Interviews were conducted by the author in Perm΄ in 2015.

23 Tat΄iana Kursina, former co-director of Perm΄-36, interview, Perm΄, December 3, 2015.

24 Ekho Moskvy v Permi, Perm΄, March 9, 2015, at https://www.echoperm.ru/interview/299/136851/ (accessed May 21, 2020).

25 Author’s field observation, Perm΄, November 7, 2001.

26 Quoted in: Zuzanna Bogumił, Gulag Memories: The Rediscovery and Commemoration of Russia’s Repressive Past (New York, 2018), 155.

27 “Amerikantsy restavriruiut russkuiu tiur΄mu,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, October 11, 2005.

28 “Zarabatyvat΄ na istorii prikam΄ia,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, September 28, 2004; “Gorod-urod,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, October 26, 2004.

29 It was decided informally that “the singers should sing what they think they need to sing, and that would make them civic.” Ibid., September 20, 2005.

30 “Uik-end pesen i vospominanii,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 22, 2008.

31 “Chrezmerno populiarnaia ‘Pilorama,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 28, 2009.

32 “Bez Shevchuka,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 20, 2010.

33 “Plata za prestizh,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, September 14, 2010.

34 Kursina, interview, Perm΄, December 3, 2015.

35 “Perm΄ lishilias΄ statusa ‘demokraticheskoi mekki,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, May 23, 2006.

36 “Poteri i obreteniia novoi Rossii,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 12, 2011. In the end, Naval΄nyi and Gorbachev chose not to attend.

37 Bogumił, Gulag Memories, 155–60.

38 “Miniust potoptal zonu,” Kommersant-Perm΄, Perm΄, August 12, 2011.

39 “Muzei finansovykh repressii,” Kommersant-Perm΄, Perm΄, November 22, 2012.

40 “Khvatit vrat΄,” Argumenty i Fakty—Perm΄, Perm΄, July 25, 2012.

41 The group describes itself as motivated by “the development of the communist ideal in the 21st century and the search for a synthesis of the red project with national traditions,” positions itself as a “left-patriotic force,” and views its historical mission as advancing the “USSR 2.0” project.

42 “Kto my [Who we are],” April 9, 2012, at http://eotperm.ru/?cat=7 (accessed March 30, 2020).

43 “Perm΄-36. Pravda i lozh΄ [Perm΄-36: Truth and lies],” November 21, 2012, at http://eotperm.ru/?p=639 (accessed March 30, 2020).

44 Kursina, interview, Perm΄, December 3, 2015.

45 “Pozitsiia rezhissera ‘Belykh nochei’—konkurentnaia, i my gotovy provodit΄ konkurs idei,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, June 20, 2013.

46 “Nezazhivaiushchaia ‘Pilorama,’” Kommersant-Perm΄, Perm΄, July 9, 2013.

47 “My ponimaem, chto otmena mezhdunarodnaia foruma—eto ogromnyi reputatsionnyi udar po Permskomu kraiu,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 8, 2013.

48 “Proverka na ‘Piloramu,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 15, 2013.

49 “‘Perm΄-36’ stanet Muzeem GULAGa,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, October 14, 2013.

50 “‘Perm΄-36’ poluchila federal΄nyi grant na provedenie v 2014 godu ‘Piloramy,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, December 5, 2013.

51 “My reshili otstavit΄ obidy v storonu i nachat΄ s chistogo lista,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, December 12, 2013.

52 “Viktor Basargin: U menia srok idet,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, January 14, 2014.

53 “My mogli by vstat΄ v pozu. No my vyshli v rezhim dialoga,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, January 16, 2014; “Tat΄iana Kursina vozglavit AU ‘Perm΄-36,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, February 11, 2014.

54 Vladimir Putin, “Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii” (Address by the President of the Russian Federation), Prezident Rossii, March 18, 2014, at http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/20603 (accessed March 30, 2020).

55 Bandera was a controversial leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) that fought against the Soviet Union for Ukrainian independence in the 1930s-1940s, including during Nazi Germany’s occupation of Ukraine. In the wake of Ukraine’s “Revolution of Dignity” in 2013–2014, Russian state media frequently referenced the new regime’s celebration of Bandera (hence the term “Banderites”) as evidence of its allegedly Russophobic and fascist nature.

56 “Ia k muzeiu ‘Perm΄-36’ otnoshus΄ polozhitel΄no,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, March 25, 2014; “Mne lestno doverie, okazannoe chelovekom, sotrudnichavshim s Maiklom Makfolom,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, March 26, 2014.

57 “Kraevye vlasti otkazyvaiutsia ot ‘Piloramy’ vtoroi god podriad,” Kommersant-Perm΄, Perm΄, April 30, 2014; “Tiur΄ma—ikh dom,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, May 21, 2014.

58 “Direktorom gosudarstvennogo muzeia ‘Perm΄-36’ naznachena Natal΄ia Semakova,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, May 23, 2014.

59 “Tat΄iana Margolina: Ministr Gladnev nanes bezobraznyi vred gubernatoru,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, May 26, 2014.

60 “Sponsory iz SShA otkryli v Permi muzei “natsionalistov-muchenikov” Ukrainy (American Sponsors Open a Museum of Ukraine’s “Nationalist Martyrs” in Perm),” NTV.ru, June 3, 2014, at http://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1010037 (accessed March 30, 2020); “‘Piataia kolonna’ proslavliaet banderovtsev na den΄gi SShA” (“Fifth Column” Glorifies Banderites with American Money), NTV.ru, June 7, 2014, at https://www.ntv.ru/novosti/1019296/ (accessed March 30, 2020).

61 “Sotrudniki tsentra ‘E’ proveriaiut deiatel΄nost΄ muzeia ‘Perm΄-36,’” Kommersant-Perm΄, Perm΄, August 26, 2014.

62 “Libo narushena vertical΄ vlasti, libo kto-to lukavit,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, August 29, 2014.

63 “V deistviiakh sotrudnikov ‘Perm΄-36’ ne obnaruzhili sostava prestupleniia,” Kommersant-Perm΄, Perm΄, October 3, 2014. It is perhaps worth noting that the museum was actually cleared on a technicality: the tour guide was ruled to have made extremist statements, but the statements pre-dated the adoption of amendments to the Criminal Code under which the museum could be prosecuted. In other words, the NTV broadcast was treated as legitimate by the authorities and the museum was still attributed with having promoted extremism.

64 Gur΄ianov later denied any involvement by EoT, claiming that the broadcasts were produced by those “who had seen actual preparations for a fascist maidan in Russia, and decided to warn society rather than wait for a coup along the lines of a ‘Kyiv scenario.’” “Obshchestvennaia kollegiia priznala siuzhety NTV o ‘Perm΄-36’ protivorechashchimi zhurnalistskoi etike,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, January 23, 2015.

65 “Libo primem soglashenie, libo budem bodat΄sia,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, June 18, 2014.

66 “Rabochaia vstrecha s Predsedatelem Soveta po pravam cheloveka Mikhailom Fedotovym (Working meeting with Human Rights Council Chairman Mikhail Fedotov),” Prezident Rossii, July 29, 2014, at http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46372 (accessed March 30, 2020).

67 “ANO im nado?” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, June 26, 2014.

68 “Tri raunda v pustotu?” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, March 11, 2015.

69 The museum was not even mentioned in the government concept for memorializing victims of political repression adopted in 2015 (http://www.president-sovet.ru/documents/read/393/#doc-1), nor was it listed on the corresponding government Foundation site (http://memoryfund.ru/) or the related site of the Association of Museums of Memory (memorymuseums.ru).

70 “Eto tol΄ko pervaia iz serii vstrech,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 1, 2014.

71 “Gosuchrezhdenie otsuzhivaet u ANO ‘Perm΄-36’ kraevoe imushchestvo,” Kommersant-Perm΄, Perm΄, July 24, 2014; “Reshenie ne smertel΄noe,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, November 26, 2014.

72 “V administratsii prezidenta eto vyzvalo, miagko govoria, nedoumenie,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 16, 2014.

73 “Viktor Shmyrov: V Kuchino ostanut΄sia golye steny. Muzei budet umirat΄,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 22, 2014.

74 “Prichina uvol΄neniia—‘nesoglasie s politikoi ministra Gladneva,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 1, 2014.

75 “Natal΄ia Semakova initsiirovala proverku inostrannykh ekskursantov v Kuchino,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 22, 2014.

76 “Ot imeni Tat΄iany Kursinoi l΄etsia potok klevety s obvineniiami v unichtozhenii imushchestva,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 23, 2014.

77 “Muzeia v tom vide, kak on byl zaduman, bol΄she ne sushchestvuet,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 25, 2014.

78 “Muzei budet sozdan nezavisimo ot zhelaniia ili nezhelaniia otdel΄nykh lits,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 28, 2014; “Chinovniki pridumyvaiut svoiu versiiu permskogo muzeia politrepressii,” Kommersant-Perm΄, Perm΄, July 29, 2014.

79 “Igor΄ Gladnev: Istoriia dolzhna ob”ediniat΄, a ne razdeliat΄ narod,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, January 22, 2015.

80 “Muzei i festival΄ dolzhny moshchno i s dostoinstvom umeret΄,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 29, 2014.

81 “Neobkhodimo pereiti ot protivostoianiia k sotrudnichestvu,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, September 8, 2014; “Ne lakirovat΄ tot period i ne politizirovat΄ temu repressii,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, October 2, 2014; “Muzei ‘Perm΄-36’ teper΄ ofitsial΄no kuriruet byvshii rossiiskii ombudsmen,” Kommersant-Perm΄, Perm΄, October 4, 2014.

82 “Biuokratii byl dan sovershenno nepravil΄nyi signal,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, October 15, 2014.

83 “Reshenie ne smertel΄noe,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, November 26, 2014.

84 “Tat΄iane Kursinoi ne udalos΄ vosstanovit΄sia na rabote,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, December 15, 2014.

85 “V ‘Perm΄-36’ ishchut priznaki inostrannogo agenta,” Kommersant-Perm΄, Perm΄, March 17, 2015.

86 “My stali uchastnikami ocherednogo spektaklia absurda,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, April 9, 2015.

87 According to Kursina, the basis for claiming the museum undertook political activities was a journal dedicated to Pilorama that was published by the region’s human rights ombudsman. Kursina, interview, Perm΄, December 3, 2015.

88 “ANO ‘Perm΄-36’ soobshchilo o priznanii svoei organizatsii ‘inostrannym agentom,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, April 21, 2015; “ANO ‘Perm΄-36’ vkliucheno v reestr ‘inostrannykh agentov,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, April 30, 2015.

89 “‘Perm΄-36’ budut sudit΄ za neosushchestvlenie deistviia, kotoroe ‘dolzhno bylo byt΄ osushchestvleno,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, July 17, 2015.

90 “‘Perm΄-36’ ne budet platit΄ ‘Memorial΄nomu kompleksu politicheskikh repressii,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, August 24, 2015; “‘Memorial΄nyi kompleks politicheskikh repressii’ obzhaloval reshenie kraevogo arbitrazha po ‘Perm΄-36,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, October 8, 2015; “Mirovoi sud΄ia prekratil administrativnoe delo v otnoshenii ANO ‘Perm΄-36,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, October 16, 2015; “ANO ‘Perm΄-36’ ne budet platit΄ 1,5 mln rublei,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, November 19, 2015.

91 “Sud΄bu muzeia ‘Perm΄-36’ budet reshat΄ Kirill Markevich,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, January 25, 2015.

92 “Kraevoi Minkul΄t gotov idti na mirovuiu s ANO ‘Perm΄-36,’” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, March 12, 2015.

93 “Dokument ne podgotovlen,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, March 20, 2015.

94 Leonid Obukhov, former scientific director for Perm΄-36, interview, Perm΄, November 25, 2015. More generally, this shift in focus is now reflected in the museum’s current exhibits, which showcase prison labor production and achievements and draw no distinctions between categories of prisoners.

95 Mikhail Suslov, current scientific consultant to Perm΄-36, interview, Perm΄, December 9, 2015.

96 M.G. Suslov, “Patriotizm i problemy patrioticheskogo vospitaniia v sovremennykh usloviiakh (Patriotism and the Problem of Patriotic Upbringing in Contemporary Conditions),” in E.P. Skachkova, ed., Znat΄, pomnit΄, ne zabyvat΄: Sbornik statei i materialov po voprosam patrioticheskogo vospitaniia (Perm΄, 2015), 5–28.

97 Suslov, “Patriotizm i problemy,” 19–20.

98 “Igor΄ Gladnev: Sluzhit΄ i verit΄, verit΄ i sluzhit΄,” Novyi Kompan΄on, Perm΄, October 2, 2015.

99 A prime example is Perm΄’s governor during the Perm΄-36 affair, Viktor Basargin, who eventually resigned from office and was demoted to head the federal transportation oversight service, Rostransnadzor.

100 “Aleksandr Telepnev zaimetsia patriotizm,” Kommersant-Perm΄, Perm΄, August 17, 2016.