Element contents
Series: Elements in Epistemology
Stratified Virtue Epistemology
A Defence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 December 2023
Summary
This accessible Element defends version of virtue epistemology shown to have all-things-considered advantages over other views on the market. The view is unorthodox, in that it incorporates Sosa's animal/reflective knowledge distinction, which has thus far had few takers. The author shows why embracing a multi-tiered framework is not a liability within virtue epistemology but instead affords it an edge not attainable otherwise. The particular account of knowledge goes beyond Sosa's own view by introducing and incorporating several theoretical innovations (regarding both basing and risk, as well as the introduction of multiple species of reflective knowledge) which are aimed at revamping how we think about 'high-grade' knowledge, how we attain it, and what it demands of us. The result is a new and improved stratified virtue epistemology that can hold up against scrutiny.
Information
- Type
- Element
- Information
- Series: Elements in EpistemologyOnline ISBN: 9781009067546Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication: 18 January 2024
References
Alvarez, Maria. 2017. ‘Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation.’ In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward, N. Zalta, Winter. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reasons-just-vs-expl/.Google Scholar
Baumann, Peter. 2014. ‘No Luck with Knowledge? On a Dogma of Epistemology’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3): 523–51.Google Scholar
Bird, Alexander, and Tobin, Emma. 2022. ‘Natural Kinds’. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/.Google Scholar
Carter, J. Adam. 2021b. ‘De Minimis Normativism: A New Theory of Full Aptness’. The Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1): 16–36. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa017.Google Scholar
Carter, J. Adam. 2016. ‘Metaepistemology and Relativism’. In Metaepistemology and Relativism, 212–32. Springer.Google Scholar
Carter, J. Adam, and Jarvis, Benjamin. 2012. ‘Against Swamping’. Analysis 72 (4): 690–99. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carter, J. Adam, and McKenna, Robin. 2019. ‘Kornblith versus Sosa on Grades of Knowledge’. Synthese 196 (12): 4989–5007. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1689-8.Google Scholar
Carter, J. Adam, Pritchard, Duncan, and Turri, John. 2018. ‘The Value of Knowledge’. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward, N. Zalta, Winter. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/.Google Scholar
Carter, J. Adam and Cowan, Robert. 2023. ‘Safety and Dream Scepticism in Sosa’s Epistemology’ (ms.).Google Scholar
Carter, J. Adam, and Sosa, Ernest. 2021. ‘Metaepistemology’. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward, N. Zalta, Winter. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/metaepistemology/.Google Scholar
Cassam, Quassim. 2009. ‘What Is Knowledge?’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 64: 101–20.Google Scholar
Colaço, David, Buckwalter, Wesley, Stich, Stephen, and Machery, Edouard. 2014. ‘Epistemic Intuitions in Fake-Barn Thought Experiments’. Episteme 11 (2): 199–212.Google Scholar
Cottingham, John. 2002. ‘Descartes and the Voluntariness of Belief’. The Monist 85 (3): 343–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Drayson, Zoe. 2014. ‘The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction’. Philosophy Compass 9 (5): 338–46. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12124.Google Scholar
Gagne, Robert M., and Smith, Ernest C. Jr. 1962. ‘A Study of the Effects of Verbalization on Problem Solving’. Journal of Experimental Psychology 63 (1): 12–18.Google Scholar
Gerken, Mikkel. 2018. ‘Against Knowledge-First Epistemology’. In Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by Carter, J. Adam, Gordon, Emma and Jarvis, Benjamin W., 46–71. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Goldberg, Sanford. 2023. ‘A Novel Process Reliabilist Response to the Swamping Problem’. Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anac062.Google Scholar
Goldman, Alvin. 1967. ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’. The Journal of Philosophy 64 (12): 357–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Goldman, Alvin. 2009. ‘Williamson on Knowledge and Evidence’. In Williamson on Knowledge, edited by Greenough, Patrick, Pritchard, Duncan, and Williamson, Timothy, 73–91. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Greco, John. 2008. ‘What’s Wrong with Contextualism?’ The Philosophical Quarterly, 58 (232): 416–36.Google Scholar
Greco, John. 2010. Achieving Knowledge: A Virtue-Theoretic Account of Epistemic Normativity. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Greco, John 2020a. ‘Safety in Sosa’. Synthese 197 (12): 5147–57. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1863-z.Google Scholar
Henderson, David K., and Greco, John. 2015. Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University PressOxford .Google Scholar
Hetherington, Stephen. 1998. ‘Actually Knowing’. The Philosophical Quarterly (1950–) 48 (193): 453–69.Google Scholar
Hetherington, Stephen 2001. Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge: On Two Dogmas of Epistemology. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hetherington, Stephen 2011. How to Know: A Practicalist Conception of Knowledge. Wiley-Blackwell.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hetherington, Stephen 2013. ‘Knowledge Can Be Lucky’. Contemporary Debates in Epistemology 2: 164–76.Google Scholar
Hetherington, Stephen 2016. Knowledge and the Gettier Problem. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hetherington, Stephen 2018. ‘The Redundancy Problem: From Knowledge-Infallibilism to Knowledge-Minimalism’, Synthese 195: 4683–702.Google Scholar
Kallestrup, Jesper, and Pritchard, Duncan. 2012. ‘Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (1): 84–103.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kornblith, Hilary. 2004. ‘Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge’. In Ernest Sosa and His Critics, edited by Greco, John, 126–34. Blackwell.Google Scholar
Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2003. The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Lackey, Jennifer. 2007. ‘Why We Don’t Deserve Credit for Everything We Know’. Synthese 158 (3): 345–61.Google Scholar
Lederman, Harvey. 2022. ‘The Introspective Model of Genuine Knowledge in Wang Yangming’. Philosophical Review 131 (2): 169–213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clayton, Littlejohn, and Adam Carter, J.. 2021. This Is Epistemology. John Wiley & Sons.Google Scholar
McGrath, Matthew. 2022. ‘A Limitation on Agency in Judgment’. Synthese 200. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03616-y.Google Scholar
Melchior, Guido. 2019. Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation. Routledge.Google Scholar
Lisa, Miracchi, and Adam Carter, J.. 2022. ‘Refitting the Mirrors: On Structural Analogies in Epistemology and Action Theory’. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03462-y.Google Scholar
Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical Investigations. Belknap Press of Harvard University.Google Scholar
Olsson, Erik J. 2007. ‘Reliabilism, Stability, and the Value of Knowledge’. American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4): 343–55.Google Scholar
Otero, Manuel Pérez. 2020. ‘Williamson on Defining Knowledge’. Episteme, July, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2020.27.Google Scholar
Perrine, Timothy. 2014. ‘Against Kornblith Against Reflective Knowledge’. Logos & Episteme 5 (3): 351–60.Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan. 2023. ‘Moderate Knowledge Externalism’. In Externalism About Knowledge, edited by Oliveira, L. R. G., 131–49. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan 2009. ‘The Value of Knowledge’. The Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (1): 86–103. https://doi.org/10.5840/harvardreview20091616.Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan 2012. ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’. The Journal of Philosophy 109 (3): 247–79.Google Scholar
Pritchard, Duncan 2015. ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem’. Philosophical Studies 172 (1): 93–111.Google Scholar
Rabinowicz, Wlodek, and Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni. 2000. ‘A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and for Its Own Sake’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1): 33–51.Google Scholar
Reed, Baron. 2002. ‘How to Think about Fallibilism’. Philosophical Studies 107 (2): 143–57.Google Scholar
Shope, Robert K. 1983. The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Smithies, Declan. 2011. ‘Attention Is Rational-Access Consciousness’. In Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays, edited by Mole, Christopher, Smithies, Declan, and Wu, Wayne, 247–73. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sosa, Ernest. 1980. ‘The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5: 3–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sosa, Ernest 1991. Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Sosa, Ernest 1997. ‘Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles’. Journal of Philosophy 94 (8): 410–30. https://doi.org/jphil199794827.Google Scholar
Sosa, Ernest 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, vol 1. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sosa, Ernest 2009. Reflective Knowledge: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, vol. 2. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sosa, Ernest 2010a. ‘How Competence Matters in Epistemology‘. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 465–75.Google Scholar
Sosa, Ernest 2021. Epistemic Explanations: A Theory of Telic Normativity, and What It Explains. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Turri, John. 2016. ‘Knowledge Judgments in “Gettier” Cases’. A Companion to Experimental Philosophy, 337–48.Google Scholar
Turri, John, Buckwalter, Wesley, and Blouw, Peter. 2015. ‘Knowledge and Luck’. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 22: 378–90.Google Scholar
Turri, John, Buckwalter, Wesley, and Blouw, Peter 2017. ‘Sustaining Rules: A Model and Application’. In Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind, edited by Carter, J. Adam, Gordon, Emma C., and Jarvis, Benjamin, 259–77. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Williamson, Timothy 2005. ‘Précis of Knowledge and Its Limits 1’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2): 431–35.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, Linda. 2003. ‘The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good‘. Metaphilosophy 34 (1–2): 12–28.Google Scholar
Zagzebski, Linda T. 1996. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Accessibility standard: Unknown
Why this information is here
This section outlines the accessibility features of this content - including support for screen readers, full keyboard navigation and high-contrast display options. This may not be relevant for you.Accessibility Information
Accessibility compliance for the HTML of this element is currently unknown
and may be updated in the future.
- 16
- Cited by