With roots in philosophy, political theory, and social psychology, the idea of legitimacy occupies an important role in scholarship across the social sciences, including psychology (e.g., Reference Lind and TylerLind and Tyler 1988), organizational theory (e.g., Reference Elsbach, Jost and MajorElsbach 2001), political science (e.g., Reference EastonEaston 1979), and criminology and sociolegal studies (e.g., Reference Smith and TylerSmith 2007; Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003; Reference TylerTyler 2006; Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo 2002). Subjective assessments of the legitimacy of authority, whether in the form of individuals or institutions, are thought to influence a wide range of human behaviors, from child obedience and worker productivity, to decisions about whether to obey the law or comply with legal authorities. Legitimacy assessments play an increasingly important role in a diverse scholarly literature on how people think about and respond to authority.
In criminology and sociolegal studies, a rapidly developing body of scholarship focuses on the antecedents and consequences of the perceived legitimacy of law and legal authorities. The most well-known causal model linking perceived legitimacy to its antecedents and consequences is Tyler's process-based model of regulation (e.g., Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003; Reference TylerTyler 2006; Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo 2002). In this model, perceived legitimacy mediates the relationship between people's perceptions of the procedural justice of legal authorities and their decisions about whether to obey the law or comply with the directives of legal authorities. According to this perspective, people assess the procedural justice employed by legal authorities like police officers, prosecutors, judges, and prison guards. These procedural justice judgments have a powerful influence on their more general assessments of the legitimacy of the law and legal institutions, which in turn influence people's willingness to obey the law and comply with the directives of legal authorities. Thus, according to the process-based model, when legal authorities treat people in a procedurally just manner, their behaviors promote the legitimacy of law and legal institutions and cultivate compliance and other beneficial outcomes like cooperation and support (Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003; Reference TankebeTankebe 2009; Reference TylerTyler 2006; Reference Tyler and FaganTyler and Fagan 2008; Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo 2002).
The process-based model of regulation is appealing for many reasons. From a theoretical perspective, it proposes an elegant set of causal relationships between procedural justice, legitimacy, and compliance with the law and legal authorities. Moreover, it serves as a compelling counterweight to deterrence, the most common or instinctual explanation for why people obey the law (Reference TylerTyler 2006). The process-based model is also inherently testable or refutable, thus satisfying a key condition for good scientific theory (Reference BlumerBlumer 1954). The model is also appealing from a philosophical perspective because it suggests that authority figures should treat people fairly, not only because it can satisfy the Kantian imperative to do the right thing, but because it also satisfies utilitarian objectives by generating socially meaningful outcomes.
Studies in this area have grown exponentially in recent years. Many of these studies provide support for the process-based model of regulation (Reference Fagan, Tyler and MeskoFagan and Tyler 2004; Reference Hinds and MurphyHinds and Murphy 2007; Reference Hough, Tankebe and LieblingHough et al. 2013; Reference JacksonJackson et al. 2012; Reference MazerolleMazerolle et al. 2013; Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003; Reference TylerTyler 2006; Reference Tyler and FaganTyler and Fagan 2008; Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo 2002). A review of the research on the legitimacy of legal authorities reveals two important patterns. First, legitimacy has been conceptualized and measured in numerous ways, suggesting that there is not yet a clear consensus among scholars about what exactly constitutes legitimacy. Recently, a robust debate has emerged about the conceptual meaning and dimensional structure of perceived legitimacy (Reference Bottoms and TankebeBottoms and Tankebe 2012; Reference Cherney and MurphyCherney and Murphy 2011; Reference GauGau 2011; Reference Hough, Tankebe and LieblingHough et al. 2013; Reference TankebeTankebe 2013). Second, most of the research on perceived legitimacy and the process-based model of regulation is based on data from a handful of developed nations. The few studies that have tested the model in other sociopolitical contexts have produced mixed results, thus raising questions about the universality of the structure and content of perceived legitimacy, as well as its connections with related concepts.
The present study seeks to address two issues: the lack of conceptual consensus in the field and the limited amount of research in developing nations. We aim to clarify the nature and structure of the perceived legitimacy of law and legal authorities, testing the fit of a dominant conceptual model and contrasting it with alternative models arising from recent conceptual and empirical challenges. The data used for this analysis come from Trinidad and Tobago, a small twin-island developing nation in the eastern Caribbean. This study contributes to a large and growing body of research in criminology and sociolegal studies on the meaning of perceived legitimacy and its relationships with other key concepts. It also contributes to the small but important body of research on procedural justice and legitimacy in developing and postcolonial countries (Reference KochelKochel et al. 2013; Reference Reisig and LloydReisig and Lloyd 2009; Reference TankebeTankebe 2008a, Reference Tankebe2009).
Conceptualizing Legitimacy and Related Concepts
The concept of legitimacy has a lengthy history in social and political philosophy. As Reference Jost and MajorJost and Major (2001: 4) note, “it is now a well-established fact in sociology and political science that leaders and authorities are effective to the extent that they are perceived as having legitimate authority and acting in accordance with prevailing norms of appropriate conduct.” Legitimate authorities are those institutions, regimes, or individuals whose laws, edicts, or directives are perceived as “desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Reference SuchmanSuchman 1995: 574). Modern thinking about legitimacy has been shaped heavily by Weber, whose vital contribution was the notion that legitimate authority generates compliance by inspiring in people “an internal sense of moral obligation” (Reference HerdHerd 1999: 387; Weber Reference Weber1918/1968).
Within criminology and sociolegal studies, arguably the most influential scholarship on procedural justice and legitimacy is the work of Tyler and his colleagues. Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo (2002: 102) define legitimacy as “a quality possessed by an authority, a law, or an institution that leads others to feel obligated to obey its decisions and directives voluntarily.”Footnote 1 Voluntary compliance, emerging out of an internal sense of obligation to obey the law, plays a central role in Tyler's conceptualization of legitimacy. This view of legitimacy serves as a counterpoint to deterrence, which suggests that people comply with the law to avoid punishment.Footnote 2
Tyler's theoretical framework—the process-based model of regulation—links procedural justice to legitimacy, and legitimacy to compliance. Tyler's model has been especially influential in the study of the police, particularly with regard to their relationships and interactions with the public (Reference TylerTyler 2006; Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo 2002).Footnote 3 In the process-based model of policing, procedural justice is typically conceptualized as having two components: quality of treatment (QT; e.g., the extent to which an officer behaves respectfully and politely) and quality of decisionmaking (QD; e.g., the extent to which decisions are based on a fair and neutral process). Tyler posits that procedural justice bolsters the perceived legitimacy of law and legal authorities, which in turn promotes citizen compliance and other beneficial outcomes such as cooperation with, and support for, legal authorities and institutions.
Although Tyler's conceptualization of legitimacy varies somewhat across studies, the central components of legitimacy in most of his work are obligation to obey and institutional trust (e.g., Reference TylerTyler 2006; Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo 2002). Thus, measures of one or both, particularly obligation, feature prominently in most of the empirical research on perceived legitimacy (e.g., Reference KochelKochel 2012; Reference ReisigReisig et al. 2007; Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003; Reference TankebeTankebe 2008a; Reference TylerTyler 2001; Reference Tyler and FaganTyler and Fagan 2008). At times, Tyler also includes cynicism about the law as a component of legitimacy (e.g., Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003; Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo 2002). Drawing on Reference Ewick and SilbeyEwick and Silbey (1998), Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo (2002: 104–05) conceptualize cynicism about the law in terms of whether people believe the law is used by the powerful or the state against them and their interests. Tyler has also included institutional support and affective feelings about authorities, laws, or institutions as additional aspects of legitimacy in some studies (Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003; Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo 2002). Tyler's research on these issues treats trust and obligation as key components of perceived legitimacy, with cynicism about the law, institutional support, and affective feelings included as additional components of legitimacy in some studies. As noted earlier, Tyler's conceptualization of legitimacy has become the dominant or default approach adopted by most researchers. Recently, however, Reference TankebeTankebe (2013) offered an alternative conceptualization of legitimacy, arguing against equating legitimacy with a felt obligation to obey legal authorities.
Drawing on Reference BeethamBeetham (1991) and his own previous work (Reference Bottoms and TankebeBottoms and Tankebe 2012), Reference TankebeTankebe (2013) posits that legitimacy is comprised of four dimensions: distributive fairness, procedural fairness, police lawfulness, and effectiveness. Tankebe's conceptualization of legitimacy differs from Tyler's in important ways, and these differences have significant implications for testing the process-based model of regulation. For example, while Tyler treats procedural justice as an antecedent of legitimacy, Tankebe considers it a component of legitimacy. Similarly, Tyler draws a sharp conceptual distinction between instrumental judgments about the perceived effectiveness of police and normative judgments about the procedural fairness of police (Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003; Reference TylerTyler 2005, Reference Tyler2006), treating both as antecedents of legitimacy (Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003). Reference TankebeTankebe (2013), on the other hand, incorporates perceived police effectiveness into his conceptualization of legitimacy. Moreover, Reference TankebeTankebe (2013) treats obligation to obey, which is a central component of legitimacy in all of Tyler's work, as a consequence of legitimacy. Reference TankebeTankebe's (2013) reconceptualization of perceived legitimacy is well grounded in the conceptual and theoretical literature on legitimacy more broadly and represents a thoughtful challenge to Tyler's conceptualization.Footnote 4
Stepping back from the particulars of this theoretical debate, we find it useful to envision perceived legitimacy as enmeshed in a dense network of related concepts representing different dimensions of how people perceive, judge, and respond to law and legal authorities. Some of the potential dimensions within this network are legitimacy and its components, procedural and distributive justice, perceived effectiveness, legal cynicism, and other related concepts. Reference Cronbach and MeehlCronbach and Meehl (1955: 187) note that “ ‘learning more about’ a theoretical construct is a matter of elaborating the nomological network in which it occurs. …” Achieving a more thorough and nuanced understanding of the nature and dimensional structure of legitimacy means delineating its position within a nomological network of related concepts. Clarifying the relationships between related concepts is an essential part of the conceptualization and operationalization process through which abstract ideas are transformed into concrete measures. The criminological and sociolegal literature on legitimacy and its antecedents and consequences are at a crossroad because the nomological network in which these concepts are enmeshed is not yet well understood. It is often unclear whether and how the concepts within this network are related to one another, particularly given semantic overlap in their labels and in the items frequently used in empirical research to measure key constructs (Reference GauGau 2011; Reference HendersonHenderson et al. 2010; Reference Maguire and JohnsonMaguire and Johnson 2010, Reference Maguire and Johnson2014; Reference MazerolleMazerolle et al. 2013; Reference ReisigReisig et al. 2007; Reference TankebeTankebe 2013).
For example, it is unclear how cynicism about the law, which Tyler uses as a component of legitimacy, is related to the concept of legal cynicism, which was originally developed by Reference Sampson and BartuschSampson and Bartusch (1998), and which has been used by Fagan and others in recent work on legal socialization (Reference Fagan and PiqueroFagan and Piquero 2007; Reference Fagan and TylerFagan and Tyler 2005). Drawing on Reference SroleSrole's (1956) measure of anomie, Reference Sampson and BartuschSampson and Bartusch's (1998: 786) measure of legal cynicism uses indicators that tap into “general beliefs about the legitimacy of law and social norms.” While Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo (2002) treat cynicism about the law as a component of legitimacy, other scholars (Reference Fagan and PiqueroFagan and Piquero 2007; Reference Fagan and TylerFagan and Tyler 2005; Reference PiqueroPiquero et al. 2005) treat both legitimacy and legal cynicism as aspects of a broader concept that they term legal socialization.
A close reading of the specific items used in previous research to measure legal cynicism and cynicism about the law suggests that they are not tapping into the same concept, though they share a similar label. Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo (2002: 104–05) conceptualize cynicism about the law in terms of whether the law serves people's interests. In contrast, Fagan and his colleagues conceive of legal cynicism as being rooted in a sense of normlessness or anomie. Their measure taps into people's views about whether it is acceptable to act outside of norms, rules, and laws (see Reference Fagan and TylerFagan and Tyler 2005: 221; Reference PiqueroPiquero et al. 2005: 272). Recently, Kirk and his colleagues (Reference Kirk and MatsudaKirk and Matsuda 2011; Reference Kirk and PapachristosKirk and Papachristos 2011) have developed an alternative conceptualization of legal cynicism. In contrast to the normative perspective offered by Sampson and Bartusch and used by Fagan and colleagues, Kirk and his colleagues conceive of legal cynicism as a cultural orientation that views the law and legal authorities as illegitimate, unresponsive, and ineffective (Reference Kirk and PapachristosKirk and Papachristos 2011). These examples highlight how the nomological network of constructs related to perceived legitimacy remains unresolved and difficult to delineate.
As demonstrated in this brief review, scholars have not yet settled on a clear and consistent conceptualization of perceived legitimacy. Questions remain about its conceptual meaning, its structure and dimensionality, and its overlap with other related concepts such as procedural justice, distributive justice, perceived effectiveness, legal cynicism, and cynicism about the law (Reference Tyler, Jackson, Tankebe and LieblingTyler and Jackson 2013). Because perceived legitimacy has been conceptualized in different ways in the literature, and may overlap with other related concepts, clarifying its conceptual boundaries and mapping out its relationships with other key concepts is crucial.
Measuring Perceived Legitimacy
Just as scholars have conceptualized the legitimacy of legal authorities in a variety of ways, our review of the literature reveals substantial variations in the way perceived legitimacy has been operationalized and measured. Legitimacy is typically measured using one or more composite indexes. Most studies treat legitimacy as unidimensional, though some have specified two-, three-, or four-dimensional measures. Though the dimensional structure of legitimacy has not yet been resolved, formal tests of the dimensionality of legitimacy are rare. Few studies have seriously addressed measurement issues by assessing construct validity, diagnosing measurement error, or refining indicators. Few authors have examined the convergent and discriminant validity of their perceived legitimacy measures, or tested the empirical relationships between perceived legitimacy and potentially overlapping constructs such as procedural justice, cynicism about the law, or police effectiveness. This concern is especially salient in research on procedural justice and legitimacy because some indicators and constructs that have been used to measure legitimacy overlap conceptually and empirically with procedural justice. This overlap raises questions about the causal relationship between procedural justice and legitimacy, which is a central component of the process-based model of regulation.
Several scholars have argued that inattention to these types of conceptual and methodological issues raises important questions about the validity of the theoretical inferences that can be drawn from this body of research (Reference Eisner and NivetteEisner and Nivette 2013; Reference GauGau 2011; Reference HendersonHenderson et al. 2010; Reference Maguire and JohnsonMaguire and Johnson 2010, Reference Maguire and Johnson2014; Reference MazerolleMazerolle et al. 2013; Reference ReisigReisig et al. 2007). For instance, in their systematic review of research evidence on legitimacy, Reference MazerolleMazerolle et al. (2013: 45) noted that they “encountered substantial heterogeneity among conceptual and operational definitions of key outcomes. Difficulty in defining and measuring latent variables … was reflected in a wide variety of measures for each construct.” Mazerolle and her colleagues also noted that the relative absence of reliability and validity diagnostics in this line of research made it difficult for them to assess the effects of differences in measurement on study outcomes. Similarly, Reference ReisigReisig et al. (2007: 1006) observed that “much of the survey research in this area has inconsistently operationalized key constructs and has done surprisingly little to evaluate the construct validity of existing scales … perfunctory attention to whether measured variables reflect theoretical constructs has resulted in confounding variables and misleading findings.” Reisig and his colleagues concluded that scholars need to pay more attention to construct validation in research on the process-based model. Similar concerns have been raised by several others (Reference Eisner and NivetteEisner and Nivette 2013; Reference GauGau 2011; Reference HendersonHenderson et al. 2010; Reference Maguire and JohnsonMaguire and Johnson 2010, Reference Maguire and Johnson2014).
The Present Study
The conceptual and methodological issues we have just reviewed have important implications for theories that specify relationships between procedural justice, legitimacy, and related concepts. Since concepts are the building blocks of theory, knowledge about their nature and structure and the relationships between them is vital for building, testing, and refining theory. Conversely, conceptual ambiguity inhibits the development of a robust and meaningful body of social theory. Reference BlumerBlumer (1954: 9) notes the importance of exposing concepts to empirical scrutiny so that “proposals about that world can be tested, refined and enriched … ambiguity in concepts blocks or frustrates contact with the empirical world and keeps theory apart in a corresponding unrealistic realm.” Similarly, Reference Willer and WebsterWiller and Webster (1970: 755) note: “since we know that theoretical concepts gain their meaning primarily from their relations to one another … empirical studies can be used as tools for theory construction. Such research would begin with the description of observable relations.” While much of the conceptualization process takes place at the level of abstract thought, connecting abstract concepts with observable or empirical referents can provide useful insights about the validity of theories linking those concepts.
As we noted earlier, the scientific literature provides many clear examples of inconsistency and dissensus in the conceptualization and measurement of the legitimacy of law and legal authorities. One way to evaluate the competing perspectives is to examine the empirical relationships between observable measures of these concepts. In this study, we test a series of measurement models in an effort to provide greater clarity about the nature of perceived legitimacy and its relationships with other key concepts. Our findings reveal useful insights about the nature of the nomological network in which these concepts reside. These insights are directly relevant to theories linking procedural justice, legitimacy, and other key concepts, including those articulated by Tyler and Tankebe.
We examine the conceptualization and measurement of perceived legitimacy using survey data from Trinidad and Tobago, thus building on a small body of scholarship on police legitimacy in the developing world. Research in different sociopolitical settings is important for testing the conceptualization and measurement of legitimacy and other related perceptual constructs (Reference Hough, Tankebe and LieblingHough et al. 2013). As Tyler and his colleagues have argued (Reference Tyler and TylerTyler et al. 2007), and as Tankebe's work (Reference Tankebe2008a, Reference Tankebe2009) suggests, the meaning of perceived legitimacy may not be universal. Moreover, its structural relationships with related concepts may vary across cultures and stages of development (Reference Smith and TylerSmith 2007). We begin by describing the research site, including a brief history and overview of relevant contemporary issues. We then estimate several statistical models that shed light on the structure of perceived legitimacy and its relationships with other key constructs. These analyses reveal new insights about the nature and structure of citizen perceptions of law and legal authorities. Though the research setting is distant from the locations where most of the research in this genre has taken place, the findings are consistent with an emerging body of research that questions the meaning and measurement of perceived legitimacy and other related concepts.
Research Site
Trinidad and Tobago is a two-island Caribbean nation located near the northeast coast of Venezuela. The nation achieved independence from Great Britain in 1962. Its official language is English and its legal system is modeled after English common law. Trinidad and Tobago is one of the wealthiest nations in the Caribbean due to its petroleum and natural gas reserves, but is considered a developing nation.Footnote 5 The country's population of 1.26 million reflects its colonial history and is largely comprised of descendants of African slaves and South Asian indentured servants. According to data from the 2000 census, 40 percent of the population is Indian, 37.5 percent is African, and 20.5 percent is of mixed heritage.
Understanding a nation's evolution is vital for understanding the historical and contemporary context of policing and the law (see Reference TankebeTankebe 2008b). The style of policing that is common in Caribbean nations like Trinidad and Tobago—which “treat[s] the policed like subjects rather than citizens”—is rooted in the region's tumultuous colonial history (Reference HarriottHarriott 2000: 284). Indeed, scholars argue that one cannot separate the development of policing in the Caribbean from the politics of colonialism:
Understanding the enduring consequences of colonialism in the shaping of every aspect of Caribbean society, including the state's coercive apparatus, is arguably the most important factor in explaining police behavior in the region … the passive role of politics in the policing of plantation societies, differentiated along both class and racial lines, is of special significance in explaining not only the tactical decisions made by police in the daily performance of their duties, but also the enduring characteristics of police culture and behaviour that continue to generate recurring crises in police-community relations. (Reference Mars and DeosaranMars 2007: 265)
As shown below, these recurring crises have generated significant legitimacy costs for the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service (TTPS).
Spain colonized the island of Trinidad in the late sixteenth century, enslaved the native Arawak population, and imported African slaves to work in the sugar, cacao, and cotton industries (Reference RichardsonRichardson 1975). Following the Napoleonic Wars and subsequent transfer of the islands from Spain to Britain in 1797, Trinidad and Tobago wrestled with issues associated with slavery, indentured servitude, and law enforcement practices (Reference OttleyOttley 1972). During the nineteenth century, the police were a “paramilitary organization, headed by military officers … who envisioned their organization's role as repression of a rebellious public that threatened the island's elite” (Reference Mastrofski and LumMastrofski and Lum 2008: 486; see also Reference TrotmanTrotman 1986). Following emancipation in 1834, some 20,000 slaves and their children were freed (Reference RichardsonRichardson 1975; Reference WoodWood 1968) and many migrated to the hillsides around the capital city of Port of Spain, including the area now known as Belmont (where our research took place). Without adequate means, many settlers did not pay for the land and instead illegally “squatted” in certain areas, a concern that eventually led the Police Service to establish a formal Squatters' Squad in 1971 (Reference OttleyOttley 1972: 137). Consistent with Tankebe's (Reference Tankebe2008b) account of former slave experiences in Ghana, the settlers (including those in Belmont) received poor treatment by police officers, some of whom may have perceived the settlers as “less than equal” and as lacking common norms and values.
Current Issues
Historical experiences with police mistreatment can have a lingering impact on citizen trust in police and perceptions of police legitimacy, particularly when these issues continue to remain salient. At the time of our research, Trinidad's criminal justice system was experiencing a serious legitimacy crisis related to the government's inability to stop an outbreak of violence. The number of homicides more than quadrupled in less than a decade from 120 in 2000 to 540 in 2008. Most of the increase was due to gang violence in distressed neighborhoods (Reference MaguireMaguire et al. 2008), many of which were located in and around the area where our research took place. At the same time, clearance rates for homicide declined dramatically due in part to police capacity issues (Reference MaguireMaguire et al. 2010). These two trends were a common storyline in the local media and significantly impacted public satisfaction with the police and the criminal justice system. National public opinion surveys conducted yearly between 2002 and 2007 indicated that citizens viewed the police as ineffective and expressed little to no confidence in them (MORI International 2002–2007). Research in other postcolonial nations shows that police effectiveness in controlling crime can exert a strong influence on perceptions of legitimacy (Reference TankebeTankebe 2008a). There are good reasons to expect the same to be true in Trinidad.
In addition, concerns about police corruption and brutality were widespread (U.S. Department of State 2007). For example, 43 percent of respondents in a 2005 national survey characterized the police service as corrupt (MORI International 2002–2007). Incidents of alleged police brutality were commonplace, with victims reporting beatings and other mistreatment at the hands of police (e.g., Reference DeosaranDeosaran 2002). Police use of deadly force was of particular concern (Amnesty International 2006; Reference KowlessarKowlessar 2008; Reference RenneRenne 2008). These concerns were especially acute in the community where our research took place. For example, in 2006, more than 50 percent of residents in the Gonzales neighborhood of Belmont reported that police officers used excessive force against community residents “very often” or “somewhat often” (24.0 percent and 33.2 percent, respectively) (Reference KuhnsKuhns et al. 2011).
These patterns highlight the serious legitimacy challenges facing the TTPS and the nation's government.Footnote 6 Police–citizen relationships evolved somewhat differently in Trinidad and Tobago than in the United States and other developed nations where most of the research in this genre has taken place. These social and historical differences provide an intriguing opportunity to examine the nature of perceived legitimacy and its relationships with other key concepts in a setting where these issues are highly salient. Thus, Trinidad and Tobago represents a useful laboratory for examining the meaning and measurement of legitimacy and related perceptual concepts.
Methods
Data for this study are drawn from wave 3 of the IMPACT study, a multi-wave citizen survey designed to evaluate a pilot community-oriented policing project. The survey data were collected in Belmont, a community located in the Port of Spain metropolitan area. A local research firm conducted face-to-face interviews with 603 randomly selected residents from June 3 to July 11, 2008; the AAPOR Response Rate #1 was 83 percent.Footnote 7 Descriptive statistics for the sample are shown in Appendix S1, which can be found in the online version of this article.
Topics on the IMPACT survey included community cohesion, fear of crime and victimization, perceived crime and neighborhood problems, and attitudes toward the police and the law. The instrument was carefully constructed based on a review of the relevant literature and focus groups in the study communities. Many of the survey items were drawn from previous research, and the questionnaire was reviewed by local professionals to ensure that it reflected Trinidadian language and culture and was appropriate for a community with low literacy.Footnote 8 The instrument was further refined after pretesting with a small sample.
Measurement Strategy
Our general measurement approach was to treat respondents' answers on individual survey items as indicators of latent variables representing legitimacy and related perceptual concepts. We sought to measure seven perceptual dimensions. Following Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo (2002), we included three dimensions of legitimacy: trust in institutions, obligation to obey, and cynicism about the law. Existing research treats these dimensions as “subscales” of legitimacy (e.g., Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003; Reference TankebeTankebe 2008b; Reference TylerTyler 2001; Reference Tyler and FaganTyler and Fagan 2008). In line with Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler (2003), we included two dimensions of procedural justice: QT and QD (see also Reference ReisigReisig et al. 2007; Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003; Reference TankebeTankebe 2008a; Reference TylerTyler 2006; Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo 2002). Finally, we included separate factors measuring legal cynicism (Reference Fagan and PiqueroFagan and Piquero 2007; Reference Fagan and TylerFagan and Tyler 2005; Reference Sampson and BartuschSampson and Bartusch 1998) and perceived police effectiveness (Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003; Reference TankebeTankebe 2013). Unfortunately, we do not have access to a measure of distributive justice. Table 1 lists the items associated with each dimension as they have been used in previous research.
Table 1. Initial Measurement Model with 7 Factors and 34 Items
The indicators were all ordinal variables with four categories. Thirty of the questions had response options ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree), while four questions asked respondents to rate the effectiveness of police using response options ranging from 1 (not at all effective) to 4 (very effective).Footnote 9 Frequencies for the 34 items used to measure these seven dimensions are available in Appendix S2, which can be found in the online version of this article.
Model Estimation and Selection
We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to test the fit of an initial measurement model containing the seven factors and 34 items listed in Table 1. Measurement models allow all latent variables to be freely correlated, but do not impose a causal structure on the relationships between them. Measurement models are often useful for examining the relationships between constructs and their correspondence with observed indicators. As a result, we do not make any inferences about the causal relations between these constructs. Based on the findings from the initial CFA specification, we made small modifications to the model. Because the outcomes (indicators) are categorical, we used a robust (mean and variance adjusted) weighted least squares (WLS) estimator available in Mplus (Reference Muthén and MuthénMuthén and Muthén 2010).Footnote 10 Monte Carlo simulations show that the robust WLS estimator performs well in models with categorical outcomes, including those with skewed distributions and small samples (Reference Flora and CurranFlora and Curran 2004; Reference MuthénMuthén et al. 1997). We specified a multiple group model that allowed factor loadings and other model parameters to vary across the two areas included in this study: Gonzales and Belmont.Footnote 11
Findings
Our initial CFA tested the fit of a seven-factor measurement model derived from Tyler's foundational work. This model reflects the most common specifications used in the literature to measure legitimacy and related concepts. We sought to measure seven perceptual dimensions: three dimensions of legitimacy (institutional trust, obligation to obey the law, and cynicism about the law), two dimensions of procedural justice (QD and QT), perceived police effectiveness, and legal cynicism (e.g., Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003; Reference TylerTyler 2006; Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo 2002). Model fit was assessed using multiple measures.Footnote 12
We encountered problems in attempting to estimate the initial CFA model because the latent variable covariance matrix (ψ) for both groups was not positive definite. This typically results from having either a negative variance or residual variance for a latent variable or a linear dependency between two or more latent variables. We traced the source of the problem to several correlations between latent variables that exceeded 0.9 (see Table 2). For instance, QT and QD, which are aspects of procedural justice, had a correlation of 0.969 in Gonzales and 0.995 in Belmont (see Table 2). Most interesting, however, is that these measures of procedural justice also had high correlations with institutional trust, which is a component of legitimacy in Tyler's work (e.g., Reference TylerTyler 2004, Reference Tyler2006; Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo 2002). In Gonzales, trust had a correlation of 0.992 with QD and 0.939 with QT. In Belmont, trust had a correlation of 0.975 with QD and 0.949 with QT.
Table 2. Initial Factor Correlations
Note: Correlations for Gonzales are shown below the diagonal and correlations for Belmont are shown above the diagonal. Correlations greater than 0.9 are shown in bold.
These high-factor correlations led to model estimation problems and suggest the need to respecify the model. According to Reference BrownBrown (2006: 131), “a factor correlation that exceeds 0.80 or 0.85 is often used as the criterion to define poor discriminant validity.” The results presented so far suggest a discriminant validity problem involving QD, QT, and institutional trust. Although scholars have drawn clear conceptual distinctions between these three phenomena, empirical measures of these concepts overlap considerably, suggesting that residents do not distinguish between them. This finding casts doubt on key aspects of procedural justice theory, particularly the conceptualization of procedural justice and legitimacy. QD and QT are components of procedural justice whereas institutional trust is a component of legitimacy. This finding suggests that procedural justice and institutional trust, which are typically theorized to have a causal relationship, may be measuring the same underlying concept. We will return to this important finding in the Discussion section.
When factors overlap heavily, “a common research strategy is to respecify the model by collapsing the dimensions into a single factor …” (Reference BrownBrown 2006: 131). Therefore, we collapsed the three overlapping dimensions (institutional trust, QT, and QD) into one dimension that we term trust and procedural justice and tested the fit of the resulting model. Since we began with a seven-factor model and collapsed three factors into one, we now have a five-factor model consisting of trust and procedural justice, obligation to obey, cynicism about the law, legal cynicism, and perceived effectiveness. Three of the four fit indexes suggested that the model fit the data well (CFI = 0.982; TLI = 0.982; RMSEA = 0.045), while one (χ2 = 1,814.8, p < 0.000) suggested poor fit.
Next, we made some minor modifications to the model to address localized areas of misfit.Footnote 13 Once again, three of the four fit indexes suggested that the model fit the data well (CFI = 0.986; TLI = 0.986; RMSEA = 0.042), while one (χ2 = 1,504.9, p < 0.000) continued to suggest poor fit. Based on the well-known problems with χ2 as a test of model fit, Reference Bowen and GuoBowen and Guo (2012: 145) note that “it is widely considered acceptable to conclude that a model fits the data well even if the value [of χ2] is statistically significant” if other fit indexes suggest good fit. Thus, we treat this as our final model. Table 3 shows the correlations between factors in this model and Table 4 shows the factor loadings for the 32 remaining items. The five-factor structure showed no sign of discriminant validity problems, as evidenced by the low factor correlations in Table 3. Moreover, every item loaded strongly on its intended factor. Our findings suggest the presence of five distinct perceptual dimensions that appear to be measured well. In the following section, we discuss these findings and their implications for procedural justice theory and the conceptualization of its key elements.
Table 3. Final Factor Correlations
Note: Correlations for Gonzales are shown below the diagonal and correlations for Belmont are shown above the diagonal.
Table 4. CFA Factor Loadings
Discussion
Scholarship on perceptions of procedural justice and the legitimacy of law and legal authorities has grown rapidly in recent years. Research evidence from multiple settings shows that when people perceive the police and other legal authorities as treating them in a procedurally fair manner, they are more likely to view the law and its representatives as legitimate. These legitimacy assessments, in turn, play an important role in shaping people's compliance and cooperation with the law and legal authorities. Thus, the process-based model of regulation specifies a set of causal relationships that are fundamental to the interplay between law and society. If the process-based model is valid, it has powerful implications for the entire criminal justice process, starting from the initial encounter between a police officer and a citizen.
However, some scholars have begun to challenge the conceptualization and measurement of perceived legitimacy of law and legal authorities. This study sought to clarify the nature and structure of perceived legitimacy by examining the empirical relationships between seven key perceptual concepts relevant to Tyler's process-based model of regulation. These included legitimacy (obligation to obey, institutional trust, cynicism about the law), procedural justice (QT and QD), legal cynicism, and police effectiveness. We chose a study site where these issues are highly salient in the daily lives of many citizens. Our research makes several useful contributions to the study of perceived legitimacy. First, our findings reveal significant empirical overlap between the institutional trust component of legitimacy and both components of procedural justice: QD and QT. Second, our results highlight the ambiguous role of cynicism about the law as a component of legitimacy. Third, our findings contribute to recent theoretical debates about the relationship between obligation to obey and legitimacy. Taken together, these findings raise important questions about the conceptual, theoretical, and empirical models of procedural justice and legitimacy that are common in this body of scholarship.
Institutional Trust as a Component of Legitimacy
A key assumption of Tyler's process-based model of regulation is that procedural justice and legitimacy are separate phenomena. Indeed, most of the empirical research on the process-based model treats procedural justice as an antecedent of legitimacy, placing the two constructs on opposite sides of regression equations and estimating the effects of procedural justice on legitimacy. A vital aspect of establishing a causal relationship between two concepts is first confirming that they are separate and unique phenomena. Although some scholars using rigorous methods have uncovered distinct measures of procedural justice and legitimacy (e.g., Reference ReisigReisig et al. 2007), others have found strong overlap between the two constructs (e.g., Reference GauGau 2011; Reference Maguire and JohnsonMaguire and Johnson 2014; Reference PrycePryce 2014). Our findings from Trinidad and Tobago challenge the assumption that legitimacy and procedural justice, as conceptualized by Tyler, are thoroughly distinct concepts. Citizens in our study were unable to differentiate between a key aspect of legitimacy (institutional trust) and both components of procedural justice (QD and QT). This empirical overlap suggests that measures of these three concepts may be tapping into the same underlying perceptual phenomenon.
Our findings are consistent with recent theorizing in political science about the relationship between trust and legitimacy. Reference KainaKaina (2008: 511) argues that trust and legitimacy “are quite different concepts that should not be used synonymously” and that “trust should not be treated as a ‘component’ of (institutional) legitimacy.” Kaina quotes Reference EastonEaston (1979: 258) in noting that legitimacy derives from people's conviction that institutions are “conforming with [their] own moral principles, [their] own sense of what is right and proper.” Political trust, on the other hand, derives from people's evaluations of the extent to which institutions perform “in accordance with normative expectations held by the public” (Reference Miller and ListhaugMiller and Listhaug 1990: 358). Kaina notes that it is possible for people to view an institution as a legitimate source of authority while simultaneously having little trust in the institution. Thus, while there are many good reasons to expect a relationship between trust and legitimacy, Kaina emphasizes that they should be treated as separate concepts. Several other scholars have also emphasized the conceptual distinction between trust and legitimacy (Reference BarbaletBarbalet 2009; Reference Bottoms and TankebeBottoms and Tankebe 2012).
We are unable to state with certainty why perceived QD and QT overlap so heavily with institutional trust. While the literature establishes clearly that these three constructs are distinguishable at a conceptual level, the evidence presented in this study suggests that they are not empirically separable. One reason may be that they all represent normative judgments about whether legal authorities behave in way that is consistent with expected standards of performance or conduct. This is not the first study to find that perceptions of police thought to be conceptually distinct were later found not to be empirically distinguishable (Reference Maguire and JohnsonMaguire and Johnson 2010). One possibility is that when residents make normative judgments about the behavior of institutions relative to community standards, these judgments—whether about QT, QD, trust, or other phenomena—may blend together as part of one perceptual package under certain conditions.
Our finding that trust and procedural justice may be one and the same in the minds of citizens raises significant concerns about the accuracy of conclusions made about the process-based model of regulation in previous research. Put simply, procedural justice cannot be said to “cause” legitimacy if procedural justice is legitimacy.Footnote 14 For this reason, findings from previous studies which purport to show that procedural justice predicts legitimacy (including institutional trust) may be partially tautological. The results from this research suggest that scholars may need to rethink some of the key theoretical linkages in the process-based model of regulation.
Cynicism about the Law as a Component of Legitimacy
Our review of the literature, coupled with the results of our analysis, also raises questions about the role of cynicism about the law as a component of perceived legitimacy. As we noted earlier, the role of cynicism in people's perceptions of the law and legal authorities has been conceptualized inconsistently, resulting in confusion about its meaning and its relationship with legitimacy and other key concepts. We see three conceptual strands in the literature on “cynicism about the law” and “legal cynicism.” First, Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo (2002) conceptualize cynicism about the law in terms of whether people view the law as being used against them or their interests by elites or the state. Tyler and Huo treat cynicism about the law as a component of legitimacy, combining it with obligation to obey, institutional trust, and affect to form a composite measure of perceived legitimacy. In other studies (e.g., Reference Sunshine and TylerSunshine and Tyler 2003), the same items used to measure cynicism about the law in Reference TylerTyler (2001) and Reference Tyler and HuoTyler and Huo (2002) are included as measures of obligation to obey. This specification suggests that cynicism about the law is equivalent to (or a subset of) obligation to obey, which is a primary component of legitimacy in Tyler's model. Thus, although the exact specifications vary, much of the scholarship by Tyler and his colleagues treats cynicism about the law as a component of legitimacy.
Second, Reference Sampson and BartuschSampson and Bartusch (1998) conceptualize “legal cynicism” as being rooted in a sense of normlessness or anomie in which acting outside the law is viewed as acceptable. A small body of scholarship has relied on Sampson and Bartusch's conceptualization of legal cynicism in studies that also focus on legitimacy. For instance, Reference Fagan and TylerFagan and Tyler (2005) treat legal cynicism and legitimacy (along with moral disengagement) as separate aspects of a concept they refer to as legal socialization. Similarly, Reference PiqueroPiquero et al. (2005) measure two dimensions of legal socialization: legitimacy and cynicism about the legal system. Implicit in these specifications is that legal cynicism is not a component of legitimacy. Rather, it sits alongside legitimacy as a separate aspect of legal socialization.
Third, recent scholarship by Kirk and his colleagues (Reference Kirk and MatsudaKirk and Matsuda 2011; Reference Kirk and PapachristosKirk and Papachristos 2011) draws on Reference Sampson and BartuschSampson and Bartusch's (1998) conceptualization in defining legal cynicism as “a cultural frame in which people perceive the law, and the police in particular, as illegitimate, unresponsive, and ill equipped to ensure public safety” (Reference Kirk and MatsudaKirk and Matsuda 2011: 447; emphasis added). While Reference Kirk and MatsudaKirk and Matsuda (2011) describe their conceptualization of legal cynicism as narrower in scope than Reference Sampson and BartuschSampson and Bartusch's (1998), we view it as broader. It explicitly includes legitimacy within its definition as well as the perceived effectiveness of police and the law. Their measure of legal cynicism includes one item that is consistent with Sampson and Bartusch's conceptualization (“laws are made to be broken”) and two items that are consistent with instrumental judgments about the perceived effectiveness of the police (including items focusing on how well the police prevent crime and maintain order).
To summarize, these three strands of scholarship treat cynicism variously as a component of legitimacy, as a component (alongside legitimacy) of legal socialization, and as a broader concept that encompasses legitimacy. While our research design is not sufficient to declare any one of these conceptualizations more appropriate than the others, our empirical findings can help inform the debate. Our findings reveal that in spite of the similarity in their labels, cynicism about the law and legal cynicism are indeed separate constructs at an empirical level. Bivariate correlations between the two constructs differ considerably across communities (r = 0.185 in Gonzales and r = 0.486 in Belmont), but we find no evidence to suggest that the two measures are tapping into the same underlying concept. Similarly, the relationships between obligation to obey and the two cynicism constructs are small to moderate, suggesting that cynicism and obligation are not tapping into the same underlying concepts.Footnote 15 This finding casts doubt on the wisdom of using cynicism indicators to measure obligation to obey, or using them alongside indicators of obligation to obey to measure legitimacy. Both of these approaches, as we pointed out earlier, are common in the procedural justice and legitimacy literature. Our research is unable to draw definitive inferences about the relationships between cynicism and legitimacy. However, the low factor correlations in Table 3 suggest that obligation to obey the law, cynicism about the law, and legal cynicism do not share a common cause. Therefore, it may be inappropriate to treat them as indicators of the same underlying latent variable.
Obligation to Obey as a Component of Legitimacy
Recently, Reference TankebeTankebe (2013) challenged Reference TylerTyler's (2006) conceptualization of legitimacy, which serves as the foundation of most empirical scholarship on this topic over the last two decades. Tankebe made a forceful argument against equating legitimacy with a felt obligation to obey the directives of legal authorities. In Tankebe's model, obligation to obey is not a component of legitimacy; it is a separate, downstream phenomenon that partially mediates the relationship between legitimacy and compliance. Our empirical findings are consistent with Reference TankebeTankebe's (2013) theoretical position that obligation to obey is distinct from the other components of perceived legitimacy.
We agree with Tankebe that citizens may feel obliged to obey legal authorities for reasons unrelated to legitimacy. Indeed, we can imagine many situations where citizens would feel obliged to obey police directives precisely because they believe the police might act in an illegitimate manner. For example, qualitative evidence from our fieldwork suggests that citizens in Trinidad and Tobago—particularly in communities where the police are perceived as corrupt, brutal, and unfair—may acquiesce to the police out of fear, not because they perceive the police as legitimate and worthy of compliance. Thus, citizens may report an obligation to obey the police out of a rational calculation of self-interest, not a moral sense that it is the right thing to do. Reference TankebeTankebe (2009: 716), drawing on Reference CarrabineCarrabine (2004), refers to this phenomenon as “dull compulsion.”Footnote 16 Similarly, Reference KainaKaina (2008: 513) observes that “decision acceptance can also be attributed to other causes such as habits or utilitarian calculations.”
Our results are also consistent with previous research that has found measures of obligation to obey, institutional trust, and cynicism about the law to be empirically distinct. Our findings from Trinidad and Tobago mirror those from Tankebe's (Reference Tankebe2008a, Reference Tankebe2009) findings in Ghana, also a developing nation and former British colony. Like us, Tankebe identified separate factors for trust, obligation, and cynicism about the law.Footnote 17 At a conceptual level, our results (together with Tankebe's) suggest that the psychological processes that generate an internalized sense of obligation to obey the law and legal authorities, a feeling of institutional trust, and cynicism about the law may differ. At a measurement level, the patterns observed here suggest that the common practice of combining obligation, trust, and cynicism into a single composite measure, based on the assumption that they share a common cause, may be inappropriate.
Future Directions
The results from this study, together with various theoretical challenges to the dominant conceptualization of legitimacy, raise important questions about the future of research on perceived legitimacy. If legitimacy is not obligation to obey (as Tankebe argues it is not), and if legitimacy is not trust in institutions (as Kaina argues it is not), and if analyses continue to show that our conceptualizations of legitimacy fail to match empirical reality, then what is legitimacy and how do we measure it? Answering these questions is beyond the scope of this study, but they represent foundational issues for sociolegal scholars to investigate. In sum, our findings support recent calls for scholars to rethink the conceptual structure of perceptions, judgments, and feelings about the law and legal authorities (Reference GauGau 2011; Reference Maguire and JohnsonMaguire and Johnson 2010; Reference Tyler, Jackson, Tankebe and LieblingTyler and Jackson 2013). Recent research from diverse settings, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and now Trinidad, has highlighted concerns about the conceptualization and measurement of perceived legitimacy and related concepts (Reference GauGau 2011; Reference Maguire and JohnsonMaguire and Johnson 2014; Reference TankebeTankebe 2013). If findings from different settings continue to show that key concepts once thought to be separate (like procedural justice and trust) are not empirically distinct, then it may be appropriate to reconsider the psychological processes underlying the process-based model of regulation.
Evidence suggests that it may also be profitable to examine the influence of contextual effects on these perceptions. Reference Maguire and JohnsonMaguire and Johnson (2010: 719) speculate that citizen attitudes may not just vary in magnitude across communities but that “the very structure of the attitudes themselves may differ.” They posit that citizens in stable, low-crime communities “where the majority of police-citizen contacts are fleeting, not very serious, and of low-intensity” may not be able to develop detailed nuanced attitudes toward the police. As they note, detailed impressions of the police may only be formed among people “whose contact with the police was frequent, intense, and/or very recent. These citizens would be expected to have the most detailed, fully formed, and perhaps multidimensional opinions about the police.”
Legitimacy issues are highly salient in the community we studied, thus we anticipated that concerns about procedural fairness and legitimacy would be particularly relevant for our respondents. Little is known about the influence of salience on the structure of citizens' attitudes toward law and legal authorities. Research in social psychology supports the idea that high-salience conditions may make information of this kind more “cognitively accessible,” enabling people to form more nuanced perceptions and judgments (Reference van Prooijen, van den Bos and Wilkevan Prooijen, van den Bos, and Wilke 2002). In addition, psychologists have long noted that moral judgment is a “cognitive-affective process,” thus affect and emotion are also likely to play a role in structuring people's views on law and legal authorities (Reference Barsky, Kaplan and BealBarsky, Kaplan, and Beal 2011; Reference Goodenough and PrehnGoodenough and Prehn 2004; Reference GreeneGreene et al. 2001). Understanding these various psychological processes may help illuminate how residents form procedural justice and legitimacy judgments.
If the salience hypothesis is valid, one implication is that people in high-salience conditions should be able to distinguish between conceptually distinct phenomena like QT, QD, and institutional trust. However, in the high-salience community we studied, high correlations between these constructs suggest that residents did not differentiate between them. One possibility is that the salience hypothesis is not valid. Another is that the conceptualization of procedural justice and legitimacy in the process-based model of policing requires further refinement. Distinguishing between these potential explanations for our findings would require research across low- and high-salience conditions.
Beyond examining the possible impacts of context and salience on the nature and structure of perceived legitimacy, we also encourage scholars to devote more attention to the construct validity of perceived legitimacy. Many concepts in the social sciences are intangible or latent concepts that cannot be measured directly; they can only be approximated using indirect indicators or proxies. This is particularly true for perceptual constructs like values, attitudes, opinions, and orientations. When respondents answer survey questions that are intended to measure latent concepts like procedural justice, institutional trust, or obligation to obey, the hope is that their responses will serve as valid and reliable proxies for these unobserved concepts. Although we can never be certain that our measures reflect the latent concepts we intend to measure, construct validation procedures are available for checking our assumptions. Item-level analyses like those used here are useful for validating constructs. Testing for convergent and discriminant validity is especially important in substantive areas that feature a number of closely related concepts and a nomological network that is not yet well understood. Unfortunately, these methods are not used regularly in research on the process-based model of regulation, thus leading some scholars to question the accuracy of conclusions from past research (Reference GauGau 2011; Reference HendersonHenderson et al. 2010; Reference Maguire and JohnsonMaguire and Johnson 2010, Reference Maguire and Johnson2014; Reference MazerolleMazerolle et al. 2013; Reference ReisigReisig et al. 2007). The result is a science built on a foundation of untested concepts and uncertain measures. Focusing greater attention on construct validation can help sharpen our understanding of the nomological network involving legitimacy and related concepts. This type of scholarship is beneficial for testing and refining concepts and theories.
Limitations
As with all research, this study is not without limitations. The data are based on a cross-sectional survey, thus limiting our ability to examine the temporal stability in the phenomena under study. Moreover, because the data were collected from only two neighborhoods within one community, it was not possible to test the hypothesis that we outlined in the Discussion section: that the salience of procedural justice and legitimacy issues may influence the structures (and not just the magnitudes) of attitudes toward these issues. Studying a wider sample of communities in which these issues have varying levels of salience would help reveal additional insights about procedural justice and legitimacy as experienced by citizens in different contexts. Finally, though distributive justice plays an important role in the network of concepts related to perceived legitimacy, we did not have access to a measure of distributive justice in this study. A recent study using data from London found that distributive and procedural justice were not empirically separable (Reference Maguire and JohnsonMaguire and Johnson 2014). The present study would have been more complete had we been able to test the relationships between distributive justice and the other concepts in the nomological network we examined here. In spite of these limitations, the study makes several useful contributions to the existing research on procedural justice and legitimacy.
Conclusion
This study is instructive for thinking about the future of scholarship on procedural justice and legitimacy. It reinforces the need for more attention to conceptualization and measurement in this body of research. Moreover, it highlights the importance of understanding the nomological network of constructs that influence, constitute, and are influenced by legitimacy. Perceived legitimacy is one of the cornerstones of the law. Developing a more nuanced understanding of its nature and structure, as well as its antecedents and effects, is therefore of utmost importance.
Supporting Information
Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's web-site:
Appendix S1. Sample Characteristics.
Appendix S2. Relative Frequencies for 34 Survey Items.
