This article provides a comparative analysis of the construction of regional identifications among labour circles prior to World War II, and to the formalization of the idea of regionalism within the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTUFootnote 1) after 1949. A comprehensive analysis of the process of labour regionalism as well as of the organizational strategies involved in it will serve three interrelated purposes: to redress the lack of scholarly attention paid to pre-1970s regional labour organizations; to focus on the relationship among labour leaders from different regions; and to analyse the motives of labour leaders in creating regional organizations. These objectives are relevant to the historiography of labour internationalism, in which many authors have tended to portray the organizations created in Europe and the Americas between the 1920s and the 1970s as largely insignificant and/or subordinated to US interests.
Although the dynamics of regionalism have been sufficiently analysed in studies of international relations, most studies deal with political, economic, or security issues and focus on state actors.Footnote 2 Ernst Haas's study of national and supranational political, economic, and social groups in relation to European integration concentrated on their reaction to the unification process and their impact on the workings of the first European institutions, and not on the development of regional ideas within non-governmental organizations.Footnote 3 Recent studies that have included non-state actors in analyses of regionalism focus on issues other than labour. Other authors tend to follow the same functionalist logic as Haas, according to which the emergence of regional labour organizations is the result of the strengthening of regional integration in Europe; or the response of social movements opposed to neoliberal schemes of contemporary regional integration in the Americas.Footnote 4 In this article, I argue that the idea of regionalism was already present among labour circles during the first half of the twentieth century, and that the ICFTU's regional organizations in Europe and the Americas – the European Regional Organization (ERO, founded in 1950 and dissolved in 1969) and the Inter-American Regional Workers’ Organization (ORIT, founded in 1951Footnote 5) – should be seen as the first attempts to institutionalize and strengthen it in the postwar period.
This article also shifts the focus of attention from the communist vs non-communist rivalry within the international trade-union movement to the ambiguous relationship – at once consensual and conflicting – among non-communist union leaders. Early in the twentieth century, regionalist ideas started to develop among national labour leaders from Europe and the Americas who stressed the “old and new world contrasts”.Footnote 6 While European labour leaders such as Edo Fimmen depicted the United States as “the Land of the Almighty Dollar”, the President of the American Federation of Labor, Samuel Gompers, described Europe as a region in which “the ever-present possibilities of war”, the “scores of languages”, and the maintenance of a caste system retarded human progress and were “a hindrance to economic and general intellectual development”.Footnote 7 I argue that the negative and simplistic images of “the other” and the different trade-union “expression of continental aspirations and problems”Footnote 8 led to tensions at the international level of organized labour and to the strengthening of regionalism.
Furthermore, this article explores the dynamics of labour regionalism and the degree of labour leaders’ support for the institutionalization of the regional idea. Labour regionalism is seen as a process that involved not only the largest trade unions but also medium and small workers’ organizations. As the ICFTU took shape, most of them started to see the benefits of a decentralized free trade-union movement. Close scrutiny of the relationship between labour leaders is meant to support the main argument of the article: labour regionalism is the result of a long history of disagreements and competition among the leaders of non-communist labour organizations from different continents, as well as of the identification of a (real or imagined) common history, culture, and interests that brought trade unionists of a given region into area-oriented units.
Focus on labour leaders’ discourse and concrete action for the creation of regional structures follows the idea that “region-building” was a top-down process in which rank-and-file members were only marginally, if at all, involved. As Ernst Haas noted in his study of European integration and the role played by non-state actors, the emphasis on elites “derives its justification from the bureaucratised nature of European organisations of long standing, in which basic decisions are made by the leadership, sometimes over the opposition and usually over the indifference of the general memberships”.Footnote 9 The impact of regional arrangements on regular workers from both regions cannot be analysed on the basis of the material used for this article (ICFTU documentation and secondary literature) and requires further research in national and local archives.
The article unfolds into three sections. The first provides an overview of regionalism in a theoretical and historical perspective and examines the first de facto examples of labour regionalism prior to the ICFTU foundation. In the second section, the motives of ICFTU members in establishing a regional machinery, as well as the nature and functioning of the regional organizations in Europe and the Americas, are further analysed. The third part explores the interplay between labour leaders from and within both regions, their motives in strengthening regional labour organizations, and their relationship to the ICFTU.
REGIONALISM AND ORGANIZED LABOUR (1920s–1940s)
“Regions” and “regionalism” are, as Andrew Hurrell compellingly argues, ambiguous terms.Footnote 10 Geographical proximity and mutual interdependence have received particular attention,Footnote 11 but have not appeared satisfactory in defining either a region or regionalism. Geographical relationships and regional interdependence are, after all, determined by the way actors perceive and define them. As with the idea of the “nation” and notions of “nationalism”, regions and regionalism are socially constructed.
Regionalism has also been interpreted in terms of the degree of historical, socio-economic, political, and organizational cohesiveness, and this has prevented conceptual clarity. For this reason, Hurrell proposes to avoid working with a single, overarching concept, and “to break up the notion of ‘regionalism’ into five different categories”.Footnote 12 First, regionalization, which “refers to the growth of societal integration within a region and to the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction”; second, regional awareness and identity, which emphasize discourses of regionalism; third, regional interstate cooperation, which involves the negotiation and eventual institutionalization of interstate agreements or construction of “regimes” (that is, regional cooperation based on looser structures); fourth, state-promoted regional integration, which refers to regional economic integration led by governments; and, fifth, regional cohesion, which “refers to the possibility that, at some point, a combination of these first four processes might lead to the emergence of a cohesive and consolidated regional unit”.
Gordon Mace and Louis Bélanger agree with Hurrell's observations on the ambiguity of the terms “region” and “regionalism”, but also point to some recurrent themes that emerge from his categories. First, regionalism is a process that cannot be explained by the mere existence of formal institutions at the regional level. Second, regionalism is a multi-dimensional phenomenon that includes geographical, political, social, cultural, and historic dimensions, and that cannot be described in purely economic terms. Third, regions and regionalism are not “natural”; they are social constructs and products of human agency, devoid of automaticity or deterministic forces.Footnote 13
Although the first more or less successful integrationist projects took place in various regions of the world only after 1945, a sense of regional awareness and a few de facto regional groupings existed in Europe and the Americas as far back as the early nineteenth century. William Wallace argues that the idea of Europe as a “region” in the context of the Europe-centred world-order prior to World War I would have seemed anathema to European statesmen. He places the development of the consciousness of the distinctiveness of European regional interests in the course of the 1970s and 1980s, as the European détente reopened the question of Europe, but traces its roots to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when Europe was defined in opposition to the non-European world.Footnote 14 Even though not defined in terms of “regionalism” or “regional identity”, the idea of Europe implied a “shared perception of belonging to a particular community”,Footnote 15 “enlightened” and distinct from other parts of the world.Footnote 16
The universalism propagated by international labour organizations during the first half of the twentieth century was more an ideal than a reality. They were effectively regional in scope and implicitly stressed the “sense of exceptionality”Footnote 17 that drove Europeans (or their descendants in other parts of the world) to take the lead in international cooperative initiatives. As recognized by David Saposs, adviser in the postwar US Labor Division in Europe, the “sentiment favoring the existence of regional labor organizations was already felt after WWI”.Footnote 18 During the 1920s, the first (tacitly) exclusionary labour organizations were created in Europe and the Americas.
Although the International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) or the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs) undertook efforts to organize outside Europe, they functioned primarily in and for Europe. For European labour leaders, ideological and organizational cohesion was more important than size, so they basically pushed the only non-European trade union present at the IFTU founding congress, the American Federation of Labor (AFL), away from the organization. Mutual distrust between the US and European labour leaders, which resulted from divergent accents on political and socio-economic issues and disagreement regarding the application of international trade unionism, rendered trade-union cooperation across the Atlantic difficult. As Geert Van Goethem points out, the IFTU leaders strove to preserve the unity within the federation, at the cost of political and geographical limitation. Non-European members within the IFTU were merely nominal.Footnote 19
Within the IFTU and the ITSs, there were a few leaders harshly critical not only of the IFTU's bureaucratic style but also of the ideological split of European trade unions. One of the most outspoken was Edo Fimmen, general secretary of the IFTU until 1923 and of the International Transport Workers' Federation from 1919 until his death in 1942. As early as 1924, Fimmen had envisaged an international structure composed of regional organizations representing, on equal footing, workers from industrialized and non-industrialized countries.Footnote 20 In his publication Labour's Alternative: The United States of Europe, Fimmen thought that “as far as the immediate future is concerned, the linking-up of the European trade unions that look towards Amsterdam with those that look towards Moscow for inspiration, is of far more importance than the adhesion of the extra-European organizations”.Footnote 21 He and later supporters of regionalism did not attempt to undermine universalist ideals or global institutions and seem to have viewed “regional arrangements [as] a natural outgrowth of international co-operation and desirable stepping-stones toward world organization”.Footnote 22 Fimmen's proposals seemed impractical at the time, but many of them would materialize in the immediate postwar period.Footnote 23
The Eurocentrism of many of these international initiatives, along with strong interest in the neighbouring countries, led to early attempts to strengthen the idea of regionalism in the Americas. As in Europe, regional awareness in the American continent rested on internal factors and on external considerations (regionalism defined against some external “other”Footnote 24). Historically, regionalism in the Americas has taken two different forms: hemispheric, inter- or pan-American regionalism, and sub-regional integration covering Latin American republics only. Both tendencies go back to the early nineteenth century and both stress a common (colonial) past, shared economic and cultural interests, similar political ideals, notions of a “special relationship”, and fear of an external threat.Footnote 25 For pan-Americanists, the threatening “other” was Europe, whereas for the supporters of Latin American unity the strongest fear was US predominance in the region.Footnote 26
Regionalist ideas also circulated among labour circles.Footnote 27 While the IFTU and the ITSs were “purely European in scope”,Footnote 28 the American Federation of Labor chose to concentrate on its own backyard for the promotion of hemispheric solidarity and peace through trade-union cooperation and avoidance of class struggle. In 1918, the AFL spearheaded the creation of the Pan-American Federation of Labor (PAFL), which served “to keep the IFTU out of the Western hemisphere by proclaiming a sort of ‘Monroe Doctrine of Labor’ ”.Footnote 29 The PAFL never succeeded in becoming a true hemispheric organization. The bulk of its members were small unions; the AFL and the Mexican Labour Confederation (CROM) were the only national trade unions represented in the PAFL. The federation was also home to hefty clashes between US labour leaders and Latin American delegates who opposed US foreign policy in the continent. However, the PAFL formed a precedent for the postwar international labour organizations, even though it had become a phantom organization by 1927.Footnote 30
The foundation of the leftist Latin American Trade Union Confederation in 1929 and of its reformist-populist successor, the Latin American Confederation of Workers (CTAL) in 1938, were also an expression of the Latin American preference for labour regionalism, as a stepping stone towards a world labour confederation.Footnote 31 CTAL became a strong supporter of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTUFootnote 32) but focused primarily on Latin American industrial development, independence from the US, and maintenance of Latin American labour unity. By the end of the 1940s, CTAL had lost much of its popularity, but the idea of creating a Latin American labour organization that would reflect the cultural heritage of the republics south of the United States did not completely die out and would re-emerge in the early 1960s.
However, inter-American cooperation started to sound more attractive to labour leaders, and as various CTAL affiliates grew disappointed with the confederation, they responded positively to the efforts of non-communist unions to create a new hemispheric organization. But these labour leaders did not wish to follow the isolationism of the PAFL. Motivated in great part by Cold War tensions, they wanted to contribute to the formation of a new but decentralized international labour organization that would rival the WFTU and CTAL on the one hand, and that would respond to the interests of non-communist labour leaders on the other.
In 1948, the AFL was one of the main forces behind the establishment of the Inter-American Confederation of Workers (CIT). Supported by conservative, centrist, and some non-communist leftist Latin American trade unions, the AFL succeeded in spreading its policy of regionalism. Through CIT, the US and Latin American unions were furthering the spirit of pan-Americanism and strengthening the PAFL model of a moderate hemispheric labour movement. Even though Pan-Americanism implied a legitimization of US leadership in the continent, it was attractive to Latin Americans because it was seen as instrumental to their interests. While the universalism propagated by international organizations with headquarters in Europe departed from a series of principles and norms inspired by European experiences, Pan-Americanism responded (or was at least intended to respond) to the concrete needs of trade unions from North and Latin America.Footnote 33
These initiatives reflected the enthusiasm of an increasing number of labour leaders from the Americas who wished to formalize their ties at the regional level. Although Latin Americans and Europeans often coincided on their general socio-economic policy and on their criticism of US foreign policy, sentiments of distrust infected the Latin American-European relationship before and after the ICFTU's foundation. If Europeans tended to underestimate the Latin American capacity to act independently of the United States, Latin Americans were apt to believe that Europeans did not fully understand the complexity of the region, nor their motives for working closely with US labour leaders. For instance, Europeans interpreted the foundation of CIT in 1948 as a purely AFL initiative, in which Latin American input was negligible.Footnote 34
True, the AFL did take the lead in creating the inter-American organization, but, as Pedro Reiser argues in his study of the origins of the free labour movement in the Americas, US leaders would not have been able to achieve this goal without the support of non-communist Latin American unionists. Moreover, the CIT founding congress was home to disagreement between US and Latin American trade unionists about socio-economic issues such as the nationalization of key industries, agrarian reform, and aggressive anti-communism.Footnote 35 Latin American non-communist labour leaders did not conceal their opposition to US interventionism and were not willing to become “AFL agents” in the region. As Jon Kofas maintains, “a more accurate description would be partners acting principally for their own reasons against the Lombardist [CTAL] camp”, and in favour of a decentralized international structure.Footnote 36
INSTITUTIONALIZING REGIONALISM: ERO AND ORIT
When non-communist labour leaders from various parts of the world met in Europe in 1949 to discuss the best means of achieving democratic trade-union cooperation around the world, they all concurred that “centralized power contradicted the basic principles of their movement”.Footnote 37 They wished to work together for the foundation and maintenance of a stable international labour agency, but not to create a symbiotic relationship and thereby lose their own power over their separate regional organizations to a central authority. Akin to the development in the international political arena, where universalism started to make room for regionalism within a global system,Footnote 38 free trade-union leaders opted for a less centralized organizational structure.
On the one hand, the use of the word “confederation” underscored the distinctive character of the ICFTU vis-à-vis its main rival, the WFTU. “Confederation”, as opposed to “federation”, emphasized the loose and decentralized character of the new association, which ought to guarantee the sovereignty of the affiliated trade unions. On the other, the ICFTU's preference for the principle of devolution reflected the tension between labour leaders from different parts of the world, who strongly disagreed on the policy towards communism and the function of free trade unions. The “incessant power struggle between the Americans and the Europeans for control”Footnote 39 of the international labour movement persisted during the 1950s and 1960s.
Moreover, feelings of distrust were fairly generalized and did not involve only the largest trade unions. Belgian trade unionists, for example, refused to participate “in an international movement dominated by America”.Footnote 40 The numerical majority of European unions, the appointment of European labour representatives to ICFTU leading posts, and the proximity of the ICFTU Brussels secretariat to European unions, were perceived by many non-European affiliates as European dominance of the international confederation.Footnote 41 Their sentiments were strengthened by AFL leaders such as George Meany, who stated that “we begin with the premise that the ICFTU is run by the British”.Footnote 42
Large labour organizations agreed on the principle of regionalism, but European and US trade-union representatives disagreed on certain practical arrangements. US leaders wanted an immediate application of regionalism. They also insisted on the need to guarantee the autonomy of the regional organizations. Their intention was to transform the inter-American labour organization (CIT) into the ICFTU representative in the Americas and, above all, to keep the new organization “as close as possible to the United States”.Footnote 43 The British, on the other hand, called for a more careful undertaking: gradual establishment of regional structures and maintenance of a certain degree of control from the central body. Initially, the compromise reached seems to have favoured the British proposal. The adoption of regional structures would start with trade-union missions to various parts of the world to explore the possibility of cooperation before proceeding to create permanent regional bodies. Once established, the regional machinery was to have an experimental character and a high degree of autonomy, though it had to be accountable to the international headquarters in Brussels and, at the same time, guarantee the sovereignty of the affiliated organizations.Footnote 44
The confederation's “decentralized centralization”Footnote 45 was based on three principles, which at first seem contradictory: first, national centres affiliated to the ICFTU and its regional structures would remain sovereign bodies; second, ICFTU regional organizations would have a relatively high degree of autonomy; and third, the ICFTU's authority would prevail at all times. The question was how to achieve the latter when the two lower levels (regional and national) were granted so much autonomy. The key answer to this question was “self-imposed discipline”Footnote 46 to guarantee the maintenance of international cooperation.
In the months following the foundation of the ICFTU, debates concentrated on the question of the scope of the regional machinery. Did advanced areas need regional organizations? European and US leaders acknowledged the acute need for international trade-union activities in regions such as Asia, Africa, and the Middle and Near East. They used precisely this argument to push ahead the idea of establishing regional organizations on both continents: by creating regional structures in Europe and the Americas, the ICFTU would be able to concentrate its efforts in underdeveloped areas. Moreover, they emphasized that the world consisted of areas with profound differences in terms of socio-economic structure and stages of development, political culture, and trade-union traditions. One could not expect to find a common solution for all. Hence the application of regionalism in all parts of the world would not only facilitate ICFTU involvement in global affairs, it would also make it more efficient and democratic.Footnote 47
Behind these noble arguments lay the latent mistrust between ICFTU affiliates. As in the Americas, European trade unions had associated in a regional organization shortly before the ICFTU was founded. The European Recovery Programme – Trade Union Advisory Committee was formed in March 1948 by a conference of all trade-union centres that participated in the Marshall Plan. The organization was composed of trade unions from seventeen European countries and from the US.Footnote 48 However, neither the European nor the US unions proposed transforming the Trade Union Committee into the ICFTU regional organization in Europe. The Europeans opposed this because it meant including US trade unions in a structure that was supposed to be solely European. For their part, US labour leaders grew disappointed with the work of the Trade Union Committee and hoped to enhance their influence by means of a new European organization.Footnote 49
The request for a regional organization came from the Belgian affiliate. The Belgians and other trade unionists reasoned that Europe's “different nature” called for the establishment of a regional organization. Moreover, Europe was seen as best qualified to set an example for other areas of the world.Footnote 50 Other European trade-union centres agreed to the Belgian proposal, although not all of them were entirely convinced of its suitability. The Scandinavian trade unions questioned the need for an elaborate regional machinery for Europe. They preferred to retain the existent forms of loose sub-regional trade-union cooperation, and to create a special secretary at the ICFTU headquarters to handle European affairs.Footnote 51 The British also seemed a bit hesitant about establishing a European organization. They feared that such a structure would become too independent and jeopardize the maintenance of contacts with other parts of the world. The emphasis on the experimental character of regionalism and the assurances of some form of ICFTU control over the regional structures persuaded the wavering trade unionists to create a regional organization for Europe. ICFTU general secretary Jacobus Oldenbroek convened a meeting of European labour leaders in Brussels, from 1–4 November 1950, where the immediate establishment of the European Regional Organization was unanimously adopted.Footnote 52
In the Americas too, there was general agreement among non-communist labour leaders on the “mutual interest to remain united”.Footnote 53 They feared the advancement of communism and sought therefore to precipitate a split within the ranks of the leftist CTAL; they opposed centralism and European dominance of the international labour movement; and they sought to defend and to integrate organized labour in national and regional programmes for socio-economic development. Furthermore, Latin Americans felt great deference towards US democratic institutions and standard of living, and wanted to build a “modern” trade-union movement based on the principles of collective bargaining.Footnote 54 Latin Americans appreciated the AFL concession to respect their ties with political parties. Its representative in Latin America, Serafino Romualdi, knew that without political support his efforts to promote free trade unionism in Latin America would be futile.Footnote 55 Also of crucial importance to Latin Americans was the financial and technical aid offered by the US government and unions. All these considerations were far more important than any possible criticism Latin American leaders had of their northern neighbours.Footnote 56
Thus, when Romualdi suggested transforming the inter-American workers’ confederation into the ICFTU regional organization in the Americas, most Latin American unionists willingly agreed to the proposal. Oldenbroek convened a regional trade-union conference in Mexico City, from 8–12 January 1951, where the Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores (ORIT) was born. Present at this conference were not only the CIT pillars (the Chilean, Cuban, Peruvian, and US unions), but also other important trade unions, such as the Confederation of Industrial Organizations, the Canadian Congress of Labour, and the Mexican Workers’ Confederation (CTM). The latter, which had been a member of the leftist CTAL before being purged of its radical elements in 1947–1948, was a politically important ally of the free trade-union movement.Footnote 57
During preparatory talks on the organization's constitution, a debate arose over the relationship between ORIT and the ICFTU. Some advocated the establishment of an independent regional organization, but others preferred it to be a more direct branch of the ICFTU.Footnote 58 Most US and Latin American unionists opted for an autonomous organization, while European ICFTU representatives wanted to create a closer link between ORIT and the central secretariat.Footnote 59 The Mexicans perceived the ICFTU as “imperious” and insisted that a genuine regional organization could not be expected to follow orders from an executive board in Brussels.Footnote 60 A compromise was finally reached. ORIT would have its own, financially independent, executive committee, but it had to coordinate its activities with the ICFTU. ORIT's regional congress would appoint the regional secretary. The latter's salary would be paid by ORIT and not by the ICFTU. These arrangements favoured those who wanted to create an organization sufficiently independent from the Brussels office.Footnote 61
Figure 1 ORIT promotes itself centrally within the international labour movement (1951), ICFTU archive, file 4999. Collection IISH
Yet the heterogeneous character of North and Latin American unions led to a founding congress which was far more acrimonious than ERO's had been. Latin Americans complained about the list of invitees, which excluded important trade unions such as the Mexican CROM and the Argentinian General Workers’ Confederation. Disappointed Latin American unionists questioned the degree of autonomy that powerful trade unions were willing to grant to other national centres.Footnote 62 Furthermore, Mexican labour leaders from the CTM felt betrayed because the conference participants had chosen Havana, Cuba, instead of Mexico City, as ORIT's headquarters and elected the Cuban Francisco Aguirre as the organization's general secretary.Footnote 63
Hence, the Mexicans left the congress and refused to join ORIT. Therefore, ORIT's founding congress was perceived as a partial victory.Footnote 64 European and US unionists feared that the Mexicans would enhance their contacts with Peronist labour leaders, who were making plans to found a new Latin American labour organization.Footnote 65 After the congress, great efforts were made by the ICFTU, ORIT, and US leaders to convince the CTM to join the inter-American free trade-union movement.Footnote 66 The charm offensive culminated with an invitation for the Mexicans to attend ORIT's second congress in Rio de Janeiro, in December 1952. During this congress, it was decided to move the headquarters from Havana to Mexico City. This decision was a way to placate the Mexicans, but it was also the result of political factors. Apart from dissatisfaction with ORIT general secretary Francisco Aguirre, many delegates thought it inappropriate to maintain the regional secretariat's headquarters in a country ruled by a military dictator, Fulgencio Batista, who had seized power unconstitutionally earlier that year. In May 1953, the CTM announced its support and willingness to join the free trade-union movement.Footnote 67
DEFENDING LABOUR REGIONALISM IN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS
ERO and ORIT adopted divergent strategies to coincide with the political and socio-economic contexts of the areas they represented. The advanced legal and political system of high-income countries guaranteed the existence of relatively free labour organizations with sufficient human and financial resources to solve domestic issues. Therefore, ERO concentrated on issues that went beyond the realm of industrial relations or even the nation-state. ERO leaders chose a “top-top strategy”, which consisted mainly of gaining access to policy-making bodies at the national and supranational levels.Footnote 68 The objective of this strategy was threefold: firstly, to collect information on European socio-economic issues and to distribute it to ERO affiliates; secondly, to establish a close relationship with European intergovernmental organizations and to become involved in the decision-making and implementation of supranational projects; and thirdly, to guarantee the support of workers for European integration by “creating a powerful European public opinion”.Footnote 69
Although individual affiliates did not allow ERO to intervene in domestic affairs, there were a few cases in which the assistance of the regional organization was requested. Organizational activities and financial aid needed to be directed to national centres that encountered particular difficulties in the development of their trade-union movement – that is, trade unions from France, Italy, and Spain. French and Italian free trade unionists had to cope with strong communist labour movements, while the Spanish affiliate struggled against the Franco regime. For their part, ORIT leaders opted for a “top-down strategy” meant to support any local initiative that could be beneficial to the development of the free trade-union movement. Labour representation in intergovernmental organizations was, for the time being, of secondary importance to ORIT.
The different strategies of ERO and ORIT were reflected in their daily activities. ERO's focus on European reconstruction and integration led to the creation of special committees that dealt with economic and social affairs.Footnote 70 Across the Atlantic there were other priorities. Propaganda and trade-union education were among the highest concerns of ORIT, in particular of its US affiliates. Workers’ education was perceived as an important instrument “to teach democratic ideology” to Latin American workers.Footnote 71 To Latin American labour leaders the priorities were ORIT/US financial and technical support, strengthening of existing free trade unions, and defence of reform programmes such as those proposed by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America.Footnote 72
Many Latin Americans sought primarily to integrate in the inter-American trade-union movement to combat leftist and Catholic workers’ organizations (for example in Chile and Ecuador), to support the free trade unionists’ struggle against dictatorial regimes (in Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela and elsewhere), and, in general, to contribute to the modernization of the labour movement.Footnote 73 A thorough analysis of the correspondence between Latin American and US labour leaders evidences a “complex history of conflicts, alliances and negotiations”.Footnote 74 Latin American and US unionists were often receptive to each other's ideas and strategies. And when disagreement arose, the financial and diplomatic power of the US unions was not always sufficient to persuade Latin Americans to alter their points of view.
By the mid-1950s, many ICFTU and ORIT leaders realized that their organizing activities were not bearing fruit. The ICFTU's and ORIT's secretariats often blamed each other for this malfunctioning. For instance, the failure to capture Argentine unions following Perón's fall in 1955 was interpreted as ORIT's lack of efficiency by the ICFTU headquarters, whereas the AFL-CIO and ORIT thought that the ICFTU's idea to immediately send a free trade-union mission to the country lacked tact and would be perceived as a “public show of paternalism”.Footnote 75 To solve these problems and to extend the ICFTU's organizing activities in the world, the confederation appointed a director of organization in 1956, the Canadian Charles Millard.Footnote 76
Millard wanted to develop an effective organizing programme, which would be coordinated by him and an ORIT representative. Millard's proposed five-year plan for trade-union development aimed at the establishment of an information centre and an assessor's office, and at the creation of training schools in Paraguay and Peru. Full-time organizers would be appointed in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.Footnote 77 The ORIT secretariat welcomed Millard's programme, not only because it would give a much-needed boost to the Latin American free labour movement, but also because it meant a 20 per cent increase in its subvention. Yet ORIT was disturbed by the proposed establishment of an information centre, an advisory office, and training schools that would concentrate on a limited number of countries.Footnote 78
ORIT leaders such as Luis Alberto Monge – general secretary between 1952 and 1958 – opposed a scheme that would focus on South America because “this might cause the inter-American machinery to break down”.Footnote 79 Indeed, both Oldenbroek and Millard wished to curtail the “AFL-CIO domination of ORIT”Footnote 80 by means of a restructuring of the regional organization and strengthened cooperation with International Trade Secretariats, which were headed mainly by Europeans.Footnote 81 Monge emphasized that inter-American cooperation was based on mutual accord. He admitted that many Latin Americans often disagreed with the US leaders, but insisted that the will for collaboration was stronger than the disagreements.Footnote 82 He stressed that US material aid was welcome and vital for the development of the Latin American trade-union movement and that ORIT could not ignore the points of view held by the AFL-CIO, but he also insisted that “between this and believing that we in the ORIT are their spokesmen there is quite a difference”.Footnote 83
Leaders from both the ICFTU and the ITSs were strongly distrustful of the free trade-union movement in the Americas. Scepticism of the capacity of Latin Americans to take decisions independently of the US unions and suspicion of the AFL/AFL-CIO's intentions affected their view of ORIT.Footnote 84 Attacks on individual leaders were not uncommon either.Footnote 85 To be sure, the US unions were not altogether satisfied with ORIT's achievements, nor with many of its members who embraced some of the reformist principles that had been promoted by the leftist CTAL during the 1930s and 1940s. They were, however, in no position to abandon the inter-American organization and were confronted with the choice of supporting it or losing it to more radical elements within the hemispheric trade-union movement.Footnote 86 Hence, the frequent insinuations that the AFL-CIO imposed its will on the regional organization and the perceived ICFTU and ITS hostility towards ORIT leaders were interpreted as an insult and symbolic of European paternalism. This posture not only offended the Latin American affiliates but possibly strengthened their ties to the US unions.
If inter-American labour organizations (CIT and ORIT) were initially created under US pressure to combat communist and other anti-US unions by means of a moderate labour movement, Latin American non-communist leaders soon acknowledged the opportunities hemispheric labour cooperation had to offer: economic resources and international support. Backed by its North American affiliates, ORIT protested against ICFTU “interference” in the region, which Monge insisted on calling “trade union colonialism”.Footnote 87 They stressed ORIT's “maturity” and “different nature” to press for more autonomy within the international trade-union structure.Footnote 88 In spite of the recent (or incomplete) development of most Latin American unions into a modern labour movement, ORIT leaders reiterated that “in the Western Hemisphere union organization has been active for a long, long time”, and that “in fact, there was an inter-American organization many years before the ICFTU developed”.Footnote 89 The latter statement referred to CIT, founded just one year before the ICFTU. Hence as with nationalism, there was “a good deal of historical rediscovery, myth-making, and invented traditions”Footnote 90 within ORIT's discourse in defence of labour regionalism.
Figure 2 ORIT defends itself as a mature and independent organization (1954). Collection IISH
During the 1960s and early 1970s, ORIT entered a critical period. The regional organization was threatened by, on the one hand, external forces which, strengthened by the 1959 events in Cuba, called for the creation of a new Latin American labour confederation; and on the other by internal conflicts involving Latin American, US, and European free trade-union leaders. Whereas ORIT general secretary Arturo Jáuregui was regarded as too “pro-Yankee” by the ICFTU, ITSs, and some Latin American leaders, he was heavily criticized by the new AFL-CIO leadership for being too political.Footnote 91 In turn, Jáuregui complained of “US interference” in the Latin American labour movement. Following the Chilean military coup in 1973, ORIT was heavily criticized by the ICFTU leadership for having reacted too mildly to the overthrow of Salvador Allende's government, whereas the regional organization (headed by the Paraguayan Julio Etcheverry since 1974) protested against the ICFTU's favourable treatment of Chilean communist trade unionists.Footnote 92
This crisis strengthened elements within the Latin American free labour movement that called for a more vigorous regional organization. Supported by European leaders, ORIT increased its activities in defence of human and trade-union rights in various Latin American countries, often in cooperation with non-ORIT unions.Footnote 93 However, the “ideological turn”,Footnote 94 as ORIT called it, did not undermine the inter-American character of the organization. On the contrary, as the official history of ORIT insisted, the organization's reorientation reinforced “the tradition of a political process that permits advances, reform and modernization, without loss of organic unity”.Footnote 95 Hence, labour regionalism continued to be perceived as a viable tool for effective trade-union action in the continent. The latter was also true for European labour leaders.
As stated above, some European labour leaders were not convinced of the necessity of creating a regional structure in Europe. In the early 1950s, the hesitant position of some trade unionists towards the creation of ERO was reflected during the debates on labour representation in intergovernmental bodies and supranational structures. One of the main issues was who should represent labour at the Coal and Steel Community: ERO, the national trade-union confederations of the six ECSC countries (often referred to as “the Six”), or the miners’ and metalworkers’ unions?Footnote 96 Supporters of a strongly integrated Europe favoured the international trade-union organizations. Together with ICFTU and ERO leaders, they argued that the pooling of coal and steel production needed to be seen as an instrument for peace and as the first concrete step towards the unification of Europe, meant to serve the interests of all democratic workers. Hence they believed it suitable to have ERO “represent the common good” at the ECSC.Footnote 97
US labour leaders, along with many Austrians, British, and Scandinavians (all from non-ECSC countries), also favoured the international confederation and its regional organization as labour's representatives at the ECSC. The official argument was that European integration concerned war and peace, and thus it needed to be discussed within ERO. But another, more strategic reason lay behind their support of ERO as representative of organized labour at the supranational level: the avoidance of isolation. A sub-regional scheme in which only the national trade-union confederations and miners’ and steelworkers’ unions of participating countries would be represented internationally meant that non-ECSC unions could be excluded.Footnote 98
Yet the miners’ and metalworkers’ delegates succeeded in securing their participation in the Schuman Plan. Their expertise in all aspects of coal and steel production and the direct relevance of the Plan to miners and metalworkers made it a logical choice to have them represent organized labour. Albeit reluctantly, the ICFTU and ERO accepted this logic and agreed to the creation of the so-called Committee of 21, composed of delegates of the national confederations of the six participating countries, of the national miners’ and metalworkers’ unions, and of their respective International Trade Secretariats.Footnote 99
During the second half of the 1950s, ERO was further weakened with the establishment of a new functional trade-union organization. After the Messina Conference of 1955, which would lead to the creation of the European Economic Community in 1958, the Committee of 21 maintained that it was up to the national sectoral unions to pursue negotiations with the governments and preparatory committees and sub-committees at the national level, and with the Common Market and Euratom authorities at the European level. Its argument was that the use of atomic power would mainly affect miners and metalworkers of the six ECSC countries.Footnote 100 ERO secretary Walter Schevenels argued that as the furthering of the integration process would affect the entire working class in Europe, ERO should be responsible for these matters.
Various unions from non-participating countries supported Schevenels and attempted to strengthen his position with the argument that the rivalry between two European trade-union organizations would harm the prestige and efficiency of the labour movement. British representatives concluded that ERO was the most suitable structure to pursue general policy and tackle all issues concerning Europe.Footnote 101 Thus, precisely those unionists who questioned the viability and desirability of European unification became the strongest defenders of ERO as the representative of a unified labour movement in Europe.Footnote 102 Admittedly, their support stemmed from strategic reasoning (avoidance of isolation), but, then again, we should bear in mind that trade-union activity has seldom been altruistic and has often been guided by national considerations.
Leaders from other trade-union confederations also favoured the view that Common Market and Euratom issues could not be solved by taking only certain industries into account as these issues were of great importance to workers in all trades. Their motives were, however, different than those of Schevenels. Not ERO, but the national confederations of the Six were to take the lead in the matter of trade-union representation with the Common Market and Euratom.Footnote 103 In January 1958, trade-union delegates of six national labour confederations met in Düsseldorf to arrange the establishment of a new labour organization, the European Trade Union Secretariat (ETUS).
Schevenels opposed the creation of a separate organization, not only because it meant an undermining of ERO's capacity to represent labour at the European level, but also because ERO was not represented in important technical committees of the ECSC, Euratom, and the Common Market. ERO was allowed to send a delegate to the ETUS meetings, but it could no longer aspire to play a decisive role in the three communities. Nonetheless, there was a function that for the time being ERO alone could provide, namely to act as a permanent link between the “unions of the Six” and the remaining western European labour organizations. As the German Ludwig Rosenberg noted, ERO would then be responsible for the problems of “Greater Europe”.Footnote 104 This role gained in importance when the British came up with an alternative form of European cooperation: the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), established in 1959 by seven non-Common Market countries (henceforth called “the Seven”).Footnote 105
Refusing to become irrelevant to European national centres, Schevenels took the opportunity to define ERO's task as coordinator of trade-union action in order to prevent the splitting of Europe into two blocs. During the first half of the 1960s, Schevenels concentrated his efforts on maintaining contacts with the EEC and EFTA unions, a task meant to resolve existing differences and restore European unity. Other labour leaders also viewed ERO as an indispensable link between the unions of “the Six” and “the Seven”.Footnote 106 All of them were aware of its deficiencies, but the majority still thought that ERO should “stay as a symbol of the unity of the European trade union movement”.Footnote 107 Moreover, the “all-in-one” approach was supported not only by the British and ERO leaders but also by other union representatives, who had become disappointed in the ICFTU on the one hand and increasingly preoccupied with regional issues on the other.Footnote 108 They realized that the mushrooming of trade-union organizations and committees during the 1950s and 1960s had weakened the European trade-union movement and provided sufficient ammunition to governments wishing to deny labour the right to participate in policy-making at the European level.Footnote 109
Figure 3 Report of the Committee of Four for the reorganization of the European Free Trade Union Structures, 1966, ICFTU archive, file 1306. Collection IISH
These internal and external difficulties called for a careful inspection of ERO's function. The barrage of internal criticisms against ERO led to renewed discussions on the need for its reorganization or even on its possible dissolution. The latter option was strongly defended by the representatives of the Scandinavian unions, who saw no benefit in maintaining the European organization.Footnote 110 In view of the refusal of most members to dissolve ERO, the Scandinavian leaders made a new suggestion, namely the establishment of a committee to review the scope, activities, and possible restructuring of the European organization. A so-called Committee of Four was created in 1966 and was composed of two members from ETUS and two trade-union representatives from EFTA countries. It proposed the maintenance of ERO as an umbrella organization for the trade unions of the two blocs. However, the members of ETUS rejected this suggestion on the grounds that the problems confronting both economic regions in Europe were too different to allow one organization to deal with them. Furthermore, amalgamation with ERO meant integration into the ICFTU structure, whereas ETUS preferred autonomy and strengthening of the European trade-union arrangements.Footnote 111
Efforts to reorganize supranational structures reflected the wish of many labour leaders to have a regional organization that would undertake the wider aspects of trade-union work at the European level. Because of their functional nature and limited staff, ETUS and the Trade Union Committee for the EFTA countries (founded in 1968) could not assume this task.Footnote 112 But the creation of new sub-regional labour structures accelerated the dissolution of ERO, in December 1969.Footnote 113 Yet the development of the European integration process and the unity of the employers’ sector at the European level made the harmonization of trade-union activity imperative.Footnote 114
During the early 1970s, free trade unionists focused firstly on the restructuring and geographical scope of their labour structures, and secondly on the link with the ICFTU and the eventual ideological broadening of the European trade-union movement. There were divergent opinions on the necessity of creating an organization that would constitute a broad forum or that would function within the narrow framework of European institutions. Workers’ organizations from the EFTA area, as well as Belgian and Italian unions, called for a broad organization that, like ERO, would include all trade unions from western Europe. Also, after the British entry into the EEC in 1973, the TUC called for a large European labour organization that would deal with general trade-union questions. For their part, the German unions strongly supported a functional, EEC-oriented organization, which meant excluding non-EEC countries. By November 1972, a decision was taken favouring the partisans of the “large solution”. In February 1973, the European Trade Union Confederation was born, including trade unions from EEC and EFTA member states.Footnote 115 A year later, Christian and communist-led unions were allowed to join the European confederation, proving, as John Windmuller put it, that “the principle of regional attachment prevailed over the principle of ideology”.Footnote 116
This wide form of labour regionalism in Europe implied detachment from the ICFTU. Europeans responded to the opposition of ICFTU leaders and non-European affiliates to the creation of an independent regional organization by emphasizing the “special circumstances” of Europe.Footnote 117 Already in 1951, the ICFTU had acknowledged that “diversity is implicit in the concept of regionalism”, and anticipated that its concrete application as an organic part of international organization could pose some problems. Therefore, the confederation insisted on the necessity of mutual trust and confidence for a successful reconciliation between regionalism and universalism.Footnote 118 Non-European unions feared for the future existence of the ICFTU as the powerful European bloc would cut its formal link with the international organization. Valid as they were, these fears and accusations of “parochial regionalism” did not deter the Europeans from creating an autonomous regional organization, which will celebrate its fortieth anniversary in 2013.
CONCLUSION
One of the purposes of the present study was to contribute to our knowledge of international trade-union organizations by focusing on an issue that has so far received little scholarly attention: the construction of labour regionalism. True, “the regional level has received some attention in recent years, mainly because of the impact of regional economic and political institutions like NAFTA”,Footnote 119 but the early construction of labour regionalism has been either ignored or simplified in the scholarly literature. The strengthening of labour regionalism can be placed in the 1920s, when the first (tacitly) exclusionary federations were created in Europe and the Americas. The postwar period saw the institutionalization of regional ideas among labour circles, through the establishment of the ICFTU's regional machinery. However, the importance of this development has often been neglected.
The history of ERO has been interpreted as an insignificant prelude to the “actual” process of European labour regionalism, starting at the end of the 1960s and culminating in 1973 with the foundation of the European Trade Union Confederation. Not ERO but smaller functional trade-union bodies created for limited tasks have been the focus of most analyses dealing with organized labour at the European level. In this study I have argued that ERO provided a suitable forum where issues of general interest to all European trade unionists could be discussed. Although it failed to respond to the concrete interests of its members, ERO proved useful as a clearing house and symbol of the unity of labour at European level.
Whereas ERO has been overshadowed by other European labour groupings, ORIT has received more attention from scholars. It has, however, often been portrayed as an entity that served US interests only. The political, financial, and numerical power of the US unions has been interpreted as a dominant factor that contributed to the subordination of the Latin American members within ORIT to the wishes of the US. Departing from a Cold War logic, in which world powers played a leading role in virtually all societal developments, the agency of Latin American free trade unions appears negligible. Without wishing to imply that US influence within ORIT was minor, I have tried to demonstrate that the relationship between Latin American, AFL/AFL-CIO, and ICFTU/ORIT leaders was far more complex than is often believed. Preference for regionalism responded to both US and Latin American interests.
This brings me to the second purpose of this article, which aimed at an alternative analysis of international free trade-union organizations. While many studies dealing with the history of the international labour movement during the second half of the twentieth century place the communist vs non-communist rivalry at the centre of the narrative, I have focused on the relationship between ICFTU non-communist members. Undoubtedly, the fight against communism played an important role in the creation of free trade-union organizations, but it was not, in my view, the main cause of the ICFTU's decentralized structure. Disagreement on policy and mutual suspicion of their intentions strengthened the construction of regional identities and stimulated labour cooperation at the regional level. Competition and mistrust between and within national unions also existed, but in the international arena many leaders tended to defend their arguments in terms of regional rather than national interest. The differentiation between “Europe” and “the Americas” was emphasized as early as the first half of the twentieth century. After World War II, free trade-union leaders exploited regionalism as an instrument to protect or promote regional interests, as well as a co-binding mechanism that allowed for permanent and mutual control.
A final point I wished to stress in this study was that all members of the ICFTU, and not only powerful unions, had an interest in the creation and maintenance of regional structures. The political, financial, and organizational strength of big unions such as the AFL/AFL-CIO and the TUC made their participation within the ICFTU and its regional organizations imperative. Small unions, however, were not passive actors; on the contrary, their interest in supranational labour organizations responded not only to the fear of being isolated, but also to their hope of being able to mould these organizations. Paradoxical as it might seem, the main advantage of small trade unions was their relative impotence in world politics. Labour leaders from big unions, with their close ties with governments and intelligence agencies, were always suspect. This situation provided sufficient clout to leaders of small trade unions to criticize, propose new actions, and demand assistance from the international and regional organizations.
Labour regionalism was appealing to most ICFTU members from Europe and the Americas because it seemed a more realistic response to the problems that had plagued trade unions since their inception. Area-oriented labour organizations became ever more appealing in the postwar period, as regional intergovernmental institutions or agreements were established in different parts of the world. They represented a “challenge to the competence and vitality of the ICFTU”,Footnote 120 but not necessarily a threat. For all their disagreements, free trade unionists were as one in wishing to preserve a decentralized structure, in which different levels – local, national, regional, and global – of labour organization would complement and strengthen each other. Paraphrasing Eric Hobsbawm, labour regionalism is not the absence of concern with national or international structures, but the overcoming of their limits.Footnote 121
