Christian Interest Groups: Considerations From Existing Literature

Interest groups have long been studied by political scientists as central to democratic politics and policymaking. According to one standard definition, interest groups are organizations that aim to influence public policy but do not formally seek public office (Beyers, Eising, and Maloney Reference Beyers, Eising and Maloney2008). This paper looks at such organizations in the UK that have a Christian character—a potentially wide category that includes church denominations, charities and other bodies. While there has been comparatively little research that explicitly examines religious interest groups, some analyses have been conducted—most notably in the US (Hertzke Reference Hertzke1988; Hofrenning Reference Hofrenning1995; Knutson Reference Knutson2011, Reference Knutson2013), but also a small amount concerning the UK (e.g., Kettell Reference Kettell2016a; Steven Reference Steven2011). Indeed, one recent review of the political science subfield of politics and religion suggested that “the influence of religious groups in policy-making processes” is an understudied topic worthy of greater investigation (Kettell Reference Kettell2016b, 218).

A first step in any such enterprise is to document the extent of this activity. A number of studies have identified the most important religious interest groups in the US, especially those active in Washington DC (Hertzke Reference Hertzke1988; Hofrenning Reference Hofrenning1995; Knutson Reference Knutson2011; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2012). In the UK, while scholars have analyzed key individual organizations or policy episodes (e.g., Steven Reference Steven2011), and their grassroots supporters (Hatcher Reference Hatcher2017), the most comprehensive effort to map the sector and its priorities focused on a specific subset: socially conservative “Christian Right” campaign groups (Kettell Reference Kettell2016a). Thus far, however, there has been no comparable academic analysis of the UK Christian interest group sector as a whole. Better understanding of the shape of this sector is of particular interest in view of the UK's changing socio-religious landscape. One possibility is that the decline of UK Christianity may have dampened the overall scale of Christian lobbying activity—as perhaps implied by one study that uncovered a decline in the number of UK associations with a religious character, in sharp contrast to the US (Jordan et al. Reference Jordan, FR, JD, Bevan, Greenan, Darren and Jordan2012), an outcome that could have enduring consequences for future policy debates in which religious voices have traditionally featured. Alternatively, if the volume of Christian organizations is increasing, perhaps partly due to greater diversity of Christian traditions (Brierley Reference Brierley2014; Wharton and de Las Casas Reference Wharton and de Las Casas2016), this could increase the numbers operating as interest groups.

Even less is known about the characteristics of Christian interest groups active in the UK. Studies of similar groups elsewhere have sought to categorize them—typically beginning with “denominations” but also often incorporating membership groups, professional organizations, coalitions, and those representing religious institutions (Weber and Jones Reference Weber and Jones1994; Zwier Reference Zwier and Stevenson1994; Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life 2012)—but no similar exercise has been performed in the UK. Another common distinction for mainstream interest groups is between “sectional” and “cause” groups, based on whether they represent the interests of members or promote particular causes (Hopkins, Klüver, and Pickup Reference Hopkins, Klüver and Pickup2019). While religious groups might be expected to fall into the latter category, they do also have sectional interests that might inform their policy work (Warner Reference Warner2000; Gill Reference Gill2001). Finally, and as already mentioned, some prior attention has been paid to socially conservative Christian campaign groups (Kettell Reference Kettell2016a, Reference Kettell2017). Yet, although such organizations may be especially visible, it is not known to what extent they are representative of Christian interest groups more broadly in the UK.

Closely connected to the type of organization is their issue agendas—that is, the policy issues on which they attempt influence. Much of the existing research into UK Christian interest groups has focused on traditional “moral” issues such as embryology and same-sex marriage (Kettell Reference Kettell2010, Reference Kettell2019)—yet among the grassroots, even the UK's evangelical constituency has much wider concerns (Hatcher Reference Hatcher2017). While there has been some consideration of more mainstream issues (Kettell Reference Kettell2013a), the extent to which these are prioritized by the sector as a whole is less clear. Academic studies of US religious interest groups have indicated a surprisingly broad range of policy interests. Knutson (Reference Knutson2013, 62) observed two sets of religious coalitions within most states, indicating different types of issue agenda: “a traditional values coalition and a social justice coalition”. The Pew Forum's (2012) survey uncovered engagement with around 300 distinct policy issues, ranging from traditional morality to more mainstream concerns. Once again, it appears plausible that the broader socio-religious context may play a role, for instance with declining Christian religiosity provoking some to emphasize traditional values.

Within the wider interest group literature, significant focus has been on groups' lobbying strategies. Particular attention has been paid to whether they employ “insider” or “outsider” tactics—the former being those aimed directly at policymakers (e.g., government or parliament) and the latter indirectly (e.g., via media or grassroots supporters) (Kollman Reference Kollman1998; Baumgartner et al. Reference FR, JM, Hojnacki, DC and BL2009; Binderkrantz and Krøyer Reference Binderkrantz and Krøyer2012). These strategies were traditionally assumed to be connected to groups' statuses in relation to policymakers, with those excluded from insider access falling back to outsider approaches, although the reality is not as simple as this suggests (Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin Reference Maloney, Jordan and McLaughlin1994; Page Reference Page1999; Binderkrantz Reference Binderkrantz2005). Even so, the distinction between insider and outsider strategies is interesting when applied to religious interest groups. In the context of wider socio-religious change, in which Christianity is losing its status yet also retains at least some of its cultural and institutional connections, one question is whether Christian interest groups are forced into outsider “protest” strategies, or whether they are able to make use of insider connections. Indeed, the popular debate around religion in UK society has seen rival claims that Christianity faces “marginalization” from the public sphere (Kettell Reference Kettell2009, 424) and that religion possesses “legal and political privileges” (Kettell Reference Kettell2015, 376). Moreover, it has been suggested that religious lobbyists may be particularly drawn toward outsider strategies for ideational reasons: some of the US research has found that many groups adopt a “prophetic” style that eschews insider compromise and negotiation, in part informed by religious commitments (Hofrenning Reference Hofrenning1995). The notion of religious interest groups as outsiders by natural inclination is similar to Grant's ([1978] Reference Grant and Rhodes2000) early category of “ideological outsider” interest groups.

A further dimension of interest group strategies is how they frame their arguments. This may be connected to the insider/outsider distinction, since organizations excluded from policy forums may seek to present their demands in ways that appeal to popular audiences (Baumgartner and Jones Reference Baumgartner and Jones1993). US religious interest groups have been found to present their policy demands in relatively secular terms in order to appeal to non-religious audiences (e.g., Hertzke Reference Hertzke1988, 88), although more explicitly theological language may be used when communicating with supporters (Kettell Reference Kettell2013b; Kraus Reference Kraus2009). Yet there may also be specific factors associated with the UK's complex socio-religious context. Declining comprehension of Christian concepts is likely to make explicitly religious language less effective: Kettell (Reference Kettell2017) found that secularization had presented such challenges to conservative Christian groups, leading them to instead frame their arguments around the secular theme of religious liberty. Even so, as highlighted above, the embeddedness of Christian ideas and themes within UK culture may serve to offset some of the challenges. Interestingly, some US and comparative studies have found that religious interest groups may frame issues in “moral” terms (Knutson Reference Knutson2013, 96; Grzymała-Busse Reference Grzymała-Busse2015, 10), potentially a looser frame than an explicitly theological one. Once again, the dilemmas of framing issues to different audiences are not unique to religious organizations—for example reflecting the tension between the “logic of influence” and the “logic of membership” among other interest groups (Binderkrantz Reference Binderkrantz2020, 574).

Ultimately, interest groups seek to influence policy outcomes; indeed, it is for this reason that religious lobbying is often controversial. Yet assessing the influence of interest groups can be exceptionally challenging—in the words of one leading scholar, representing “the Holy Grail of interest group studies” (Leech Reference Leech, Maisel and Berry2010, 534). Among studies of US religious interest groups, the overall conclusion is that there has been no “rigorous assessment of effectiveness” (Guth Reference Guth, Burdett, Francia and Strolovich2012, 244). If the churches are declining in UK society, we might naturally expect them to be less capable of achieving successes. Kettell (Reference Kettell2016a, 1) observes that UK conservative Christian lobby groups are “typically considered to exert little practical influence”. Even in the case of the Church of England, despite its established status and presumed greater access, influence has been questioned—partly because establishment may temper its behavior (Minkenberg Reference Minkenberg2003, 210), but also because it does not enjoy strong social authority (Grzymała-Busse Reference Grzymała-Busse2015, 333). In addition to direct policy change, other forms of “interim interest group success” should also be taken into account, for instance in shaping the policy debate or on setting the policy agenda (Leech Reference Leech, Maisel and Berry2010, 536). Nor does interest group policy influence solely comprise change. Some groups have an interest in maintaining the status quo (Baumgartner et al. Reference FR, JM, Hojnacki, DC and BL2009), engaging in “counteractive lobbying” (Austen-Smith and Wright Reference Austen-Smith and Wright1994) to “avoi[d] an even worse outcome” (Dür Reference Dür2008, 561)—a situation that may apply especially well to religious organizations whose influence on social norms is in decline. Analyzing the nature of Christian interest group influence in the UK may thus have wider implications for understanding the dynamics of religiously based policy influence elsewhere.

Data and Methods

The aim of this research was to provide the most comprehensive analysis to date of the engagement, strategies and possible impacts of the UK Christian interest group “sector” as a whole. The study sought to gauge the extent to which the most important Christian organizations behave as interest groups on UK-level public policy,Footnote ² as well as to begin to understand their activities and impacts. The findings of this research are important in their own right, but also facilitate more in-depth future study. Two main research methods were employed. The first was a survey, which provided a source of both qualitative and basic quantitative data about the most important organizations within the sector.Footnote ³ The second was a series of interviews with Christian group representatives, which allowed for more nuanced explorations. In total, representatives of over 60 Christian organizations participated in the research.

The survey was sent to over 111 UK Christian organizations, with a response rate of 54% (60 organizations)—well above the typical rate for such exercises (Marchetti Reference Marchetti2015).Footnote ⁴ A common sampling method for interest group surveys is to begin with pre-existing published lists of organizations (Jordan et al. Reference Jordan, FR, JD, Bevan, Greenan, Darren and Jordan2012). This was not available for Christian groups as a whole in the UK, but there are good data sources listing denominational bodies.Footnote ⁵ Drawing on a variety of such sources, 74 of the most important denominations were identified, ranging from large and high-profile institutions to smaller and less well-known ones.Footnote ⁶ All respondents were invited to identify additional organizations that either represented the views of their congregants or members, or which formally represented the respondent's organization itself. This resulted in a further 37 “other Christian” organizations that were also sent a version of the survey.Footnote ⁷ Respondents were asked whether they ever sought to “inform, influence or engage with [UK-level] government policy”. This description was designed to cohere with standard definitions of interest groups (Beyers, Eising, and Maloney Reference Beyers, Eising and Maloney2008), whilst also being sensitive to findings that some religious groups may be uncomfortable with explicit language of lobbying (Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2012). The survey enabled an assessment of the extent of interest group activity by Christian groups overall, as well as providing answers to a range of questions about their issue agendas, strategies, and possible impacts.

Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with representatives of Christian organizations, most of which also responded to the survey. Around 20 interviews were carried out with representatives of 15 Christian organizations—of which seven were from denominational bodies and eight from other Christian groups. These made it possible to obtain greater detail than was available through surveys, including by asking interviewees to elaborate on survey responses. In addition to informing interpretation of the survey data, comments from some interviewees are cited below.

The remainder of the paper discusses the findings in greater detail. Because the next section documents the overall shape of the Christian interest group sector, this discusses denominational bodies and other Christian groups separately. Thereafter, the main quantitative results are presented for all respondents combined. While some distinctions are drawn in the text, the overall conclusions are largely similar across both categories of Christian group.

The UK Christian Interest Group Sector

An initial topic highlighted above concerns the overall extent to which Christian organizations act as interest groups in the UK. Of the 60 organizations that responded to the survey, 48 (80%) stated that their organization did seek to inform, influence or engage with UK-level policy, suggesting that interest group behavior among Christian organizations is likely to be fairly extensive.

Other Christian Groups

Alongside denominational bodies, 37 “other Christian” organizations were identified, mainly through survey responses, and are listed in Table 1. Of the 23 that themselves responded, 21 (91%) confirmed that they were active on UK-level public policy, while desk research indicated that the remaining two had done so in the recent past—again suggesting relatively widespread interest group activity.

Table 1.

Other Christian groups identified by survey respondents

^a CLAS was specifically stated in the survey question as an example of a group that might formally represent the group responding.

Note: Groups in italics are those identified by Kettell (Reference Kettell2016a) as belonging to the UK “Christian Right”. Number in parentheses is the number of unique surveys that mentioned the group as representing the organization or the views of its members.

One way of capturing the diversity of these organizations is to categorize them. The categories employed in existing studies to US groups (e.g., Zwier Reference Zwier and Stevenson1994; Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life 2012) were not easily applicable to the above organizations, so an alternative scheme was devised, based on desk research into their core functions—but these are comparable in their range to the existing typologies. Ten were classified as “denominational umbrella” bodies, which exist to represent denominations—notably the Churches' Legislation Advisory Service, which provides advice on issues of shared institutional concern.Footnote ⁹ However, the largest number were classified as “service providers,” for example those working on international development or domestic social issues. The next category was for “campaign groups,” defined as organizations whose primary purpose is to campaign on policy issues rather than to provide services—although in practice the boundary between this and the previous category is sometimes hard to determine. Two further groups have been classified as “professional” organizations. The remaining two groups were labeled as “other,” both of which are evangelical organizations that, in many respects, are similar to the denominational umbrella groups.

As with denominational bodies, then, the evidence suggests that interest group activity by other Christian groups is likely to be fairly extensive, in spite of wider declining religious commitments. Once again, there is much variation in the resources spent on policy work. Some of the largest organizations—for example some of the international development NGOs—reported significant levels of personnel. One large service provider reported around 15 staff, while another stated that it had 12. At the other end of the spectrum, some groups had relatively low levels of resource. One stated that it had 0.2 persons on policy work (full time equivalent), while others that reported being active on policy stated that they nonetheless had no personnel responsible for this.

Another issue highlighted above concerns the extent to which socially conservative campaign groups are representative of the wider Christian sector. In terms of the absolute number, only a minority of those above fall into this category. To better gauge their importance, Table 1 specifies the number of times each group was mentioned in a survey response. While there are slight methodological problems with reading too much into the findings—not least because the views of the respondents may not be representative of Christian congregants—it does provide an indication of the relative importance of different groups. Of the eight socially conservative organizations identified by Kettell (Reference Kettell2016a) (in italics), half were among the most commonly cited groups, with between eight and 20 respondents mentioning them—and the most commonly mentioned organization, the Evangelical Alliance, was named by a third of all respondents. Two of the remaining groups, by contrast, were mentioned by only one survey respondent (in both cases by one of the other groups identified by Kettell), while the two others received no mentions. More mainstream groups—in particular the international development organization Christian Aid—received a high number of mentions. According to this measure, then, conservative Christian campaign groups cannot be considered fringe bodies within the broader UK Christian interest group sector, as some are among the most prominent overall. Yet this is not universally true, and neither do these groups appear to necessarily be representative of the sector as a whole.

Issue Agendas

The second way of understanding the nature of the UK Christian interest group sector is to consider their issue agendas. The survey included two questions on this. First, respondents were invited to specify up to five “most important topics” on which they sought to inform, influence or engage with government policy, which were then placed into categories by the researcher. Second, they were asked for examples of specific legislation or policy developments with which they had engaged in recent years, and the answers were coded into the same categories. Both sets of results are listed in Table 2.

Table 2.

Policy issues identified by Christian interest groups

N = 48 (all policy-active groups).

Questions: “What are the most important topics on which your [church] organization actively seeks to inform, influence or engage with government policy? (Please specify up to five topics.)”; “Have you engaged with any specific pieces of proposed legislation (e.g., bills considered by parliament), or any other specific government policy developments, in recent years? Please give details.”

Note: Figures refer to the number of groups that specified this issue for each of the two questions. Where the same group gave multiple responses in the same category on the same question, it was counted only once.

An initial finding is that UK Christian interest groups engage with a very wide range of policy issues, covering the responsibilities of almost every central government department. This is partly because some “other Christian” groups have policy specialisms, which when aggregated produces diversity across the sample as a whole. In addition, many of the groups, including denominational bodies, have wide-ranging policy concerns. Of the 24 policy categories in the table, denominations specified 22 as among their priority policy issues, and stated that they had been active on 19 in recent years (the equivalent figures for “other Christian” groups are 21 and 15). An interviewee from one group described its policy work as covering “every issue under the sun, everything from slavery issues, to consumerism, to welfare, to radio and broadcasting licensing, I mean, you name it.” Variations on this statement could easily apply to many of the groups studied.

The socially conservative “moral” issues with which Christian interest groups are frequently associated are well-represented in the table. Among the most commonly cited priorities were “life issues” (e.g., abortion, assisted dying and bio-ethics) and marriage and sexuality (e.g., same-sex marriage, and the teaching of LGBT issues). Other topics listed may indirectly relate to such concerns, for example religious freedom (often centering on a freedom to act on socially conservative values) and commerce (all of which mentioned Sunday trading, perhaps linked to traditional morality). It can be assumed that these groups typically advocated a more traditionalist position, although this was not exclusively the case, and one group active on same-sex marriage specified that it lobbied in a liberal direction. Among the socially conservative campaign groups identified previously, these issues were particularly well-represented—marriage and sexuality was the top priority issue, with education, life issues and religious freedom also featuring highly.

Most of the issues in the table are, however, more mainstream policy concerns—and, like the equivalent Pew Forum (2012) study in the US, these span both domestic and international policy issues. Indeed, the most commonly cited priority issue was immigration, while the top issue on which groups had engaged in recent years was welfare (i.e., social security). An issue very closely connected to the latter was poverty, defined to incorporate a range of domestic issues such as food poverty, debt, and socio-economic equality. Other mainstream topics included the environment, peace and conflict, housing, health, and education. In many cases, Christian interest groups had policy concerns that reflected the broader demographics of their supporters or members. So, for example, some groups based in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland raised “constitutional” issues, which related primarily to matters such as Brexit or devolution that particularly affected those territories. Likewise, two denominational bodies that were branches of churches based principally outside the UK identified foreign policy concerns relating to the areas of the world in which their parent churches operated. This indicates that these Christian groups do not seek to influence policy solely as an expression of abstract religious values, or even in reaction to their declining religious fortunes, but in a way that is also partly rooted in their broader communities.

The list of policy issues in Table 2 also highlights the distinction between Christian organizations as either “sectional” or “cause” interest groups. Many of the issues listed are most plausibly in the latter category. Christian groups have little obvious institutional self-interest in policy on issues such as immigration, welfare, the environment, international conflict or penal affairs—and, even though a case could be made that defense of traditional social values protects the churches' institutional authority, it seems fairer to classify these too principally as “cause” concerns. In other cases, there are more obvious “sectional” interests—most obviously the category labeled “institutional interest” (comprising responses such as charity law, buildings, burial and cremation). Other issues combine both categories—notably education policy, on which some Christian groups have clear sectional interests around the teaching of religious education and the delivery of education services, in addition to value-based concerns. In particular, around a third of maintained mainstream schools in England have either a Church of England or Roman Catholic character (2019 figures, from Long and Danechi Reference Long and Danechi2019), leading both churches to substantial involvement with this issue.

In interviews, groups typically justified “cause” interests by reference to theological and religious values, but not “sectional” ones. So, for example, interviewees referred to their work on the former as reflecting the fact that “we, like all Christians, are called to promote the Kingdom of God on earth” and that “we are compelled to put our faith into action.” One large denomination distinguished between, on the one hand, issues on which “there's a gospel imperative to say something” or “an issue of moral principle” and, on the other, matters on which “there is a direct institutional interest of the Church in play.” These findings suggest that it is a mistake to view religious interest groups solely as cause groups motivated by religious convictions.

Lobbying Strategies

Both the survey and the interviews were also used to probe the extent to which UK Christian interest groups employed different lobbying strategies. This section begins with insider and outsider strategies, before considering their framing strategies. In both cases, the findings are discussed in relation to wider religious trends.

Insider and Outsider Strategies

To understand whether Christian interest groups employ predominantly insider or outsider strategies, the survey asked respondents about their use of ten common interest group tactics. Eight of these were designed to correspond to the categories of strategy outlined by Binderkrantz and Krøyer (Reference Binderkrantz and Krøyer2012): government and parliament (insider), and media and grassroots (outsider). To these were added two additional outsider strategies frequently associated with (especially conservative) religious interest groups in the US: litigation through the courts, and electoral mobilization (Guth Reference Guth, Burdett, Francia and Strolovich2012). The results are presented in Table 3, listed in order of their importance.

Table 3.

Christian groups' use of policy tactics

N = 48 (all policy-active groups).

Question: “Which of the following activities has your organization used when seeking to influence government policy?”.

Notes: “Weighted total” calculated from scores of: major use (2), minor use (1), not used (0).

As can be seen, the findings indicate no obvious preference for insider or outsider strategies, instead suggesting a range of tactics. While the most important tactic was encouraging supporters to write to their elected representatives (an outsider tactic), the next three responses are all insider tactics: contacting parliamentarians directly, responding to a government consultation, and direct contact with government representatives. Yet the remaining insider tactic—direct participation in parliamentary proceedings—appears further down the list. Meanwhile, the two tactics drawn from the US, which may be regarded as especially disruptive forms of outsider strategy, reported very low levels of usage among respondents. To assess the potential advantages of the Church of England's formal legal status, respondents were also asked about the importance of various parliamentary contacts, including the Church's formal representatives in the House of Lords (the Lords Spiritual, i.e., bishops) and the elected House of Commons. Both of these featured relatively low down the list, with just 12 of 48 for the former, and 3 of 48 for the latter (in each case, two-thirds were from “other Christian” groups).

Another way of examining insider and outsider strategy selection is to consider groups' perceptions of how open policymaking is to their involvement—indicative of their wider status and access. The survey therefore asked respondents whether they agreed with a series of statements, the results of which are presented in Table 4. The first three (1–3) assessed whether groups considered that government, parliamentarians and the media were open to policy engagement by Christian groups. As can be seen, attitudes in relation to government and parliament were largely positive, reaching almost four-fifths for the latter. Interestingly, it was the mainstream media (an outsider venue) that was regarded as least open. The second set of statements (4–6) probed assessments of change over time, on which there was little obvious evidence of any shift. These findings do not appear to suggest that Christian interest groups are forced into outsider strategies due to lack of access.

Table 4.

Openness of key policy actors to engagement by Christian pressure groups, and place of Christianity in public sphere

N = 48 (all policy-active groups).

Question: “To what extent do you agree with the following statements?”

Notes: “Total groups” excludes those that selected “no view/unsure” or did not complete the question. “Average” calculated by scoring responses on a 5-point scale (strongly disagree = 1, strongly agree = 5) and dividing by the total number of groups selecting one of these options.

A remaining statement tested perceptions of a more general sense of outsider exclusion from the public sphere. According to Kettell (Reference Kettell2009, 424), central to the “public discourse” of Christianity in the UK is a shared belief among Christian figures that “religion in general (and Christianity in particular) faces marginalization and exclusion from the public sphere by an intolerant form of secularism.” A version of this statement was included in the survey (statement 7). The results generally support Kettell's analysis, with almost two-thirds of respondents indicating agreement—but this was not universal, and almost a fifth strongly disagreed. In interviews, some added further nuance. One large denominational representative commented that “we need to keep a sense of perspective about secularism and hostility. It's clearly there, it gets reflected in the media, but I don't get any sense that we're being pushed out of the public square.” An interviewee from a campaign group stated: “nobody's ever said “you've got no right to say that because you're [a Christian group].” They're quite happy for us to play a role.” A large NGO that responded to the survey likewise commented that “most of government is ‘agnostic’ about Christianity,” with the religious identity neither guaranteeing nor preventing access to its representatives.

These findings on strategy most likely vary between Christian organizations. An interviewee from the established Church of England described it as “less campaigny” than some other groups, as “We try and influence from within, if you like—we're part of the establishment—rather than without.” Conversely, an interviewee from Quakers in Britain situated them at the “protesting” end of the spectrum, commenting that this means they can “get into places that the Church of England can't.” This suggests that the preference for “prophetic” stances, identified in some of the literature, probably varies between groups. Similarly, it seems likely that status and access varied by group. One small denomination that responded to the survey noted that “[t]here is a tendency […] for Government consultations only to involve the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church”, leaving other groups “frequently entirely neglected”. An interviewee even from one relatively prominent denomination commented that it was not “in the same position as the Church of England as having an automatic foot in the door,” thus requiring it to “fight to be heard.”

Group Influence

The final area of focus concerns the influence exerted by UK Christian interest groups. Although assessing this comprehensively is beyond the scope of this paper, groups' self-reported influence does provide a preliminary indication. The survey therefore asked respondents to detail examples of “success” (however defined) when engaging with government policy. This question was deliberately worded broadly, to allow groups to indicate forms of influence that went beyond direct policy change. The responses were manually coded into five categories of influence listed in Table 5.

Table 5.

Christian interest group self-reported influence

N = 48 (all policy-active groups).

Question: “Have there been any cases in recent years when you have achieved a ‘success’ (however defined) when engaging with government policy? Please give details.”

Note: Responses were free-text, and could be coded against multiple categories of influence.

Around a third of the policy-active groups reported no influence on UK-level public policy (rising to two-fifths of denominational bodies). Others highlighted “interim” forms of success—for example on the debate, on a government review, or by gaining access. One group referred to specific activity around “high stakes betting machines and gambling related harm,” which were stated to have been ultimately taken up in a government review on the matter. A large denomination noted that “[s]uccess can be defined in a variety of ways,” including simply “raising an issue.” A small denomination that had unsuccessfully lobbied against same-sex marriage observed (presumably in relation to this legislation) that “[a]nother point of view was certainly publicly expressed and acknowledged.” Another group commented that it did “not necessarily see our engagement in terms of “succeed or fail” […] but in terms of having a good relationship where we can take part as much as we can and where we can make the case for the common good.” In interview, one representative explained: “sometimes there aren't things where you can say we've definitely made a difference in the legislation, but have we made a difference in the way people think about things?” Commenting on same-sex marriage legalization, another interviewee added: “I don't want to say too much that it was a whole great big failure. Because what I want to say is, it is just important to stand.”

Nonetheless, as shown in the table, almost half did report some influence on UK-level policy itself. These responses were manually coded into the 24 policy topics featured in Table 2, and the results indicate potential influence across a very wide range of issues, with at least one example given from 19 of the 24 policy topics.Footnote ¹⁰ The top category was “marriage and sexuality,” with four respondents indicating influence, three of which were in support of legalization of same-sex marriage—itself challenging simplistic caricatures of the sector. Other policy topics with at least two respondents included housing, welfare, commerce (Sunday trading), the environment, immigration, international development, religious freedom, and life issues. It can therefore once again be seen that the range of policy issues on which Christian interest groups report some policy influence is more varied than might be expected.

In terms of examples of policy change, one denomination heavily involved in issues around social security referred to “[p]ressure for mitigations in [the] Universal Credit system,” although presumably this was not solely down to this group. Another highlighted changes around charity law, for example “[g]etting charity exemption from the Community Infrastructure Levy.” Three large Christian-based NGOs working on international development issues referred to their contribution to the government's commitment to spending 0.7% of gross national income on aid. One of these groups acknowledged that “[w]e have usually not been the sole group lobbying for this” and similar issues, but had nonetheless “been a large and significant contributor to these coalitions.” Other examples cited by Christian groups included influencing the Foreign Office to “consider the views of faith-based leaders when they develop their Middle East strategy.”

In some cases, influence on policy did not take the form of change but of maintaining the status quo. This may be especially relevant on traditional moral questions, on which the authority of the churches is gradually ebbing away and yet where they retain some significant social strengths. Survey respondents, for example, cited “[d]efeat of plans to restrict freedom of churches to employ Christians” through the Equality Bill in 2010, and an apparent government u-turn on “plans to register and regulate all ‘out of school settings'” following a sustained campaign by the organization. One denominational body referred to the maintenance of Sunday trading restrictions—though noted that “obviously this was due to combined pressure from many different churches, trade unions, etc.”. Indeed, it may be that maintenance of the status quo is one significant—albeit less easy to detect—form of Christian interest group influence, both in the UK and in other similar contexts elsewhere.