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Repugnance, externalities and subjectivism: a comment on Krawiec

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2023

Marie Daou  and
Alain Marciano Open the ORCID record for Alain Marciano [Opens in a new window]
Marie Daou
Affiliation:
University of Montpueller, Faculty of Economics (MRE), Montpellier, France
Alain Marciano*
Affiliation:
University of Montpueller, Faculty of Economics (MRE), Montpellier, France THEMA CY Cergy Paris Université UMR CNRS 8184, Cergy, France Karl Mittermaier Centre for Philosophy of Economics, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: alain.marciano@umontpellier.fr
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Abstract

In her ‘Markets, repugnance, and externalities’ (2022), Kimberly Krawiec notes that the so-called corruption theorists fail to provide evidence that the adoption of repugnant behaviours or commodification destroy social values. She adds that, the values repugnant behaviours are supposed to destroy may even be reinforced after a market has been created. The explanation she explores is that the creation of a market never goes without debates that allow the society to ponder the values it stands for. We suggest an alternative view on the lack of evidence Krawiec identifies. Our starting point is Krawiec's interpretation of repugnance in terms of externalities. We claim that an analysis of repugnance based on externalities requires a characterization of what an externality is, which is rarely done. We show that economists use two opposed definitions of externalities, an objective and a subjective one, and then show what it implies for an analysis of repugnance and justify why the corruption thesis is not always verified empirically.

Keywords

Buchanancorruption theoryexternalitiesobjectivismrepugnancesubjectivism

Information

Type
Comment
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 19 , Issue 6 , December 2023 , pp. 956 - 960
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Millennium Economics Ltd.

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