Research seeking a scientific foundation for the theory of art appreciation has raised controversies at the intersection of the social and cognitive sciences. Though equally relevant to a scientific inquiry into art appreciation, psychological and historical approaches to art developed independently and lack a common core of theoretical principles. Historicists argue that psychological and brain sciences ignore the fact that artworks are artifacts produced and appreciated in the context of unique historical situations and artistic intentions. After revealing flaws in the psychological approach, we introduce a psycho-historical framework for the science of art appreciation. This framework demonstrates that a science of art appreciation must investigate how appreciators process causal and historical information to classify and explain their psychological responses to art. Expanding on research about the cognition of artifacts, we identify three modes of appreciation: basic exposure to an artwork, the artistic design stance, and artistic understanding. The artistic design stance, a requisite for artistic understanding, is an attitude whereby appreciators develop their sensitivity to art-historical contexts by means of inquiries into the making, authorship, and functions of artworks. We defend and illustrate the psycho-historical framework with an analysis of existing studies on art appreciation in empirical aesthetics. Finally, we argue that the fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure can be amended to meet the requirements of the framework. We conclude that scientists can tackle fundamental questions about the nature and appreciation of art within the psycho-historical framework.

This paper examines why fundamental freedoms are so unevenly distributed across the earth. Climato-economic theorizing proposes that humans adapt needs, stresses, and choices of goals, means, and outcomes to the livability of their habitat. The evolutionary process at work is one of collectively meeting climatic demands of cold winters or hot summers by using monetary resources. Freedom is expected to be lowest in poor populations threatened by demanding thermal climates, intermediate in populations comforted by undemanding temperate climates irrespective of income per head, and highest in rich populations challenged by demanding thermal climates. This core hypothesis is supported with new survey data across 85 countries and 15 Chinese provinces and with a reinterpretative review of results of prior studies comprising 174 countries and the 50 states in the United States. Empirical support covers freedom from want, freedom from fear, freedom of expression and participation, freedom from discrimination, and freedom to develop and realize one's human potential. Applying the theory to projections of temperature and income for 104 countries by 2112 forecasts that (a) poor populations in Asia, perhaps except Afghans and Pakistanis, will move up the international ladder of freedom, (b) poor populations in Africa will lose, rather than gain, relative levels of freedom unless climate protection and poverty reduction prevent this from happening, and (c) several rich populations will be challenged to defend current levels of freedom against worsening climato-economic livability.

Currently, production and comprehension are regarded as quite distinct in accounts of language processing. In rejecting this dichotomy, we instead assert that producing and understanding are interwoven, and that this interweaving is what enables people to predict themselves and each other. We start by noting that production and comprehension are forms of action and action perception. We then consider the evidence for interweaving in action, action perception, and joint action, and explain such evidence in terms of prediction. Specifically, we assume that actors construct forward models of their actions before they execute those actions, and that perceivers of others' actions covertly imitate those actions, then construct forward models of those actions. We use these accounts of action, action perception, and joint action to develop accounts of production, comprehension, and interactive language. Importantly, they incorporate well-defined levels of linguistic representation (such as semantics, syntax, and phonology). We show (a) how speakers and comprehenders use covert imitation and forward modeling to make predictions at these levels of representation, (b) how they interweave production and comprehension processes, and (c) how they use these predictions to monitor the upcoming utterances. We show how these accounts explain a range of behavioral and neuroscientific data on language processing and discuss some of the implications of our proposal.

Minimizing the costs that others impose upon oneself and upon those in whom one has a fitness stake, such as kin and allies, is a key adaptive problem for many organisms. Our ancestors regularly faced such adaptive problems (including homicide, bodily harm, theft, mate poaching, cuckoldry, reputational damage, sexual aggression, and the infliction of these costs on one's offspring, mates, coalition partners, or friends). One solution to this problem is to impose retaliatory costs on an aggressor so that the aggressor and other observers will lower their estimates of the net benefits to be gained from exploiting the retaliator in the future. We posit that humans have an evolved cognitive system that implements this strategy – deterrence – which we conceptualize as a revenge system. The revenge system produces a second adaptive problem: losing downstream gains from the individual on whom retaliatory costs have been imposed. We posit, consequently, a subsidiary computational system designed to restore particular relationships after cost-imposing interactions by inhibiting revenge and motivating behaviors that signal benevolence for the harmdoer. The operation of these systems depends on estimating the risk of future exploitation by the harmdoer and the expected future value of the relationship with the harmdoer. We review empirical evidence regarding the operation of these systems, discuss the causes of cultural and individual differences in their outputs, and sketch their computational architecture.

Brains, it has recently been argued, are essentially prediction machines. They are bundles of cells that support perception and action by constantly attempting to match incoming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or predictions. This is achieved using a hierarchical generative model that aims to minimize prediction error within a bidirectional cascade of cortical processing. Such accounts offer a unifying model of perception and action, illuminate the functional role of attention, and may neatly capture the special contribution of cortical processing to adaptive success. This target article critically examines this “hierarchical prediction machine” approach, concluding that it offers the best clue yet to the shape of a unified science of mind and action. Sections 1 and 2 lay out the key elements and implications of the approach. Section 3 explores a variety of pitfalls and challenges, spanning the evidential, the methodological, and the more properly conceptual. The paper ends (sections 4 and 5) by asking how such approaches might impact our more general vision of mind, experience, and agency.

This article argues that rapid eye movement (REM) dreaming is elaborative encoding for episodic memories. Elaborative encoding in REM can, at least partially, be understood through ancient art of memory (AAOM) principles: visualization, bizarre association, organization, narration, embodiment, and location. These principles render recent memories more distinctive through novel and meaningful association with emotionally salient, remote memories. The AAOM optimizes memory performance, suggesting that its principles may predict aspects of how episodic memory is configured in the brain. Integration and segregation are fundamental organizing principles in the cerebral cortex. Episodic memory networks interconnect profusely within the cortex, creating omnidirectional “landmark” junctions. Memories may be integrated at junctions but segregated along connecting network paths that meet at junctions. Episodic junctions may be instantiated during non–rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep after hippocampal associational function during REM dreams. Hippocampal association involves relating, binding, and integrating episodic memories into a mnemonic compositional whole. This often bizarre, composite image has not been present to the senses; it is not “real” because it hyperassociates several memories. During REM sleep, on the phenomenological level, this composite image is experienced as a dream scene. A dream scene may be instantiated as omnidirectional neocortical junction and retained by the hippocampus as an index. On episodic memory retrieval, an external stimulus (or an internal representation) is matched by the hippocampus against its indices. One or more indices then reference the relevant neocortical junctions from which episodic memories can be retrieved. Episodic junctions reach a processing (rather than conscious) level during normal wake to enable retrieval. If this hypothesis is correct, the stuff of dreams is the stuff of memory.

Humans have the cognitive abilities to implement the revenge and forgiveness systems hypothesized by McCullough et al., but the evidence suggests that simpler processes may underlie most revenge cases in humans and other animals. The mediating role of emotions can be at the basis of the flexibility needed in the hypothesized systems and the associated assessment of social relationships.

Although the analogy between dreams and ancient mnemotechniques is tempting because they share several phenomenological characteristics, this analogy is superficial at a closer look. Unlike mneomotechnically encoded material, rapid eye movement (REM) dreams are inherently difficult to remember, do not usually allow conscious subsequent retrieval of all interconnected elements, and have been found to support subsequent episodic memory in only rare cases.

Clark appears to be moving toward epistemic internalism, which he once rightly rejected. This results from a double over-interpretation of predictive coding's significance. First, Clark argues that predictive coding offers a Grand Unified Theory (GUT) of brain function. Second, he over-reads its epistemic import, perhaps even conflating causal and epistemic mediators. We argue instead for a plurality of neurofunctional principles.

Bullot & Reber (B&R) should be commended for highlighting tensions between scientific aesthetics and art history. The question of how each tradition can learn from the other is timely. While I am sympathetic to their views, their diagnosis of the problem appears exaggerated and their solution partial. They underestimate the reach of scientific aesthetics while failing to identify its inherent restrictions.

Knowledge of the complexity of human communication comes from three main sources – (i) studies of the linguistics and neuropsychology of dysfunction after brain injury; (ii) studies of the development of social communication in infancy, and its dysfunction in developmental psychopathologies; and (iii) the evolutionary history of human communicative interaction. Together, these suggest the need for a broad, integrated theory of communication of which language forms a small but critical component.

The relationship of climate and monetary resources to various freedoms can be enriched if the conceptual links – “psychobehavioral adaptations” – are conceptualized more broadly as reflections of a richer cultural context that involves multiple physical and psychological resources, as proposed by social resource theory and a number of models of the emergence of social meaning.

We address how trait self-control and trait concern for others relate to the concepts of monitored and intrinsic Welfare Tradeoff Ratios (WTRs), respectively, and how recent work on personality, revenge, and forgiveness are informed by the adaptationist perspective proposed in the target article. We also discuss how the proposed adaptationist perspective provides clues to some previously puzzling findings on revenge.

A climate that is too cold to grow crops for part of the year demands foresight and self-control skills. To the extent that a culture has developed intertemporal bargaining, its members will have more autonomy, but pay the cost of being more compulsive, than members of societies that have not. Monetary resources will be a consequence but will also be fed back as a cause.

Pickering & Garrod (P&G) put forward the interesting idea that language production relies on forward modeling operating at multiple processing levels. The evidence currently available to substantiate this idea mostly concerns sensorimotor processes and not more abstract linguistic levels (e.g., syntax, semantics, phonology). The predictions that follow from the claim seem too general, in their current form, to guide specific empirical tests.

The target article addresses historical and present-day mnemotechnics as a practice. It also deserves scrutiny as culture writ small. For would-be Hermetic adepts of the Renaissance and Baroque, the ancient art of memory (AAOM) provided both an iconography and a projective-test vision of possibilities. In contemporary fiction, Memory Palaces become a metaphor for the workings of mind, of culture, and of information technology.

Artists' intentions are among the primary data retrieved by art appreciators. However, artistic creation is not always deliberate; artists sometimes fail in their intentions; artists' achievements depend on artworld roles, not only intentions; factors external to the artist contribute to artwork meaning; artworks stand apart from their creators; and interpretation need not be exclusively concerned with recovering intended meaning.

Clark advertises the predictive coding (PC) framework as applying to a wide range of phenomena, including attention. We argue that for many attentional phenomena, the predictive coding picture either makes false predictions, or else it offers no distinctive explanation of those phenomena, thereby reducing its explanatory power.

Although Van de Vliert presented an entertaining story containing several original observations, an implicit assumption that climate affects human society identically through the history is not realistic. If almost everything is explained by cold winters or hot summers, then nothing is explained. Ignoring rival explanations does not make the proposed theory more convincing.

The project of coordinating perception, comprehension, and motor control is an exciting one, but I found it hard to follow some of Pickering & Garrod's (P&G's) arguments as presented. Consequently, my comment is not so much a disagreement with P&G but a query about the logic of forward models: It is not clear how they are supposed to work, nor why they are needed in this (or many other) contexts, and toward that end I present an alternative idea.