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Natural Final Causality and Providence in Aquinas

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Corey L. Barnes
Corey L. Barnes*
Affiliation:
Oberlin College, Department of Religion, Rice Hall 316, 10 N Professor St, Oberlin, Ohio, United States, 44074
*
corey.barnes@oberlin.edu
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Abstract

Thomas Aquinas articulated an understanding of nature that sought to maintain together the integrity of created causality and God's providential ordering of the cosmos. Developing and combining Aristotelian and Neoplatonic approaches to nature and to final causality, Thomas formulated a horizontal or linear final causality wrapped within a larger vertical or circular final causality. This formulation balanced two seemingly opposed principles. First, that natures operate through intrinsic principles toward determinate ends. Second, that non-cognitive agents must be directed toward an end extrinsically. Aquinas balanced these two principles by situating the first within the second such that God creates and directs natures toward determinate ends through divinely bestowed principles intrinsic to those natures. In this way, Aquinas's understanding of providence underlies his approach to nature.

Keywords

Aquinasprovidencenaturefinal causalityteleology

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Type
Original Article
Information
New Blackfriars , Volume 95 , Issue 1057 , May 2014 , pp. 349 - 361
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 The Author. New Blackfriars © 2012 The Dominican Council. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 2014

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References

1 Torrell dates Thomas's commentary on the Physics to the second Parisian regency (1268–1269), a year earlier than supported by Weisheipl. See Torrell, Jean-Pierre, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Vol. 1: The Person and His Works, trans. Royal, R. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of American Press, 1996), pp. 231–233Google Scholar and Weisheipl, James, Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Work (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 375–376Google Scholar.

2 Honnefelder, Ludger, “The Concept of Nature in Medieval Metaphysics,” in Nature in Medieval Thought: Some Approaches East and West, ed. Koyama, C. (Leiden-Boston-Köln: E.J. Brill, 2000), pp. 75–93, at p. 75CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Gelber offers a clear and useful introduction to scholastic views on providence and their relation to Aristotle's Physics in Gelber, Hester Goodenough, “Providence,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy, Volume II, ed. Pasnau, R. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 761–772Google Scholar. Aertsen examines nature and providence in Aquinas in Aertsen, Jan, Nature and Creature: Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1988), pp. 350–360CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 This terminology loosely follows Rosemann, who employs the terminological pairs of horizontal-vertical and linear-circular in analyzing scholastic uses of Platonic, Aristotelian, and Neoplatonic understandings of causality. See Rosemann, Philipp, Omne Agens Agit Sibi Simile: A “Repetition” of Scholastic Metaphysics (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1996), pp. 63–101Google Scholar. Rosemann finds in Aristotle a similar combination of distinct levels of finality in which the internal finalities of individuals lead to the universal finality of “unity and sameness” (Rosemann, Omne Agens, p. 43).

5 Thomas Aquinas, In Physic. II, l.14, n.8, p. 96 (In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Expositio, Opera omnia, t.2 [Rome: Ex Typografia Polyglotta, 1884]Google Scholar): “natura nihil est aliud quam ratio cuiusdam artis, scilicet divinae, indita rebus, qua ipsae res moventur ad finem determinatum.”

6 Aquinas certainly does not neglect the particular difficulties of holding together providence and human free will but rather devotes much attention to the task in systematic works (e.g., Summa contra Gentiles and Summa theologiae) and in biblical commentaries (Literal Exposition on Job).

7 For general introductions to final causality in nature, see Hessing, Richard, “Introduction,” in Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), pp. 1–51Google Scholar and McEvoy, James, “The Teleological Perspective upon Nature,” in Finalité et Intentionnalité: Doctrine Thomiste et Perspectives Modernes, ed. Follon, J. and McEvoy, J. (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions de l‘Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1992), pp. 1–8Google Scholar.

8 John Carriero formulates a subtle reading of final causality in early-modern thought in conversation with Aristotelian and Scholastic understandings of final causality in “Spinoza on Final Causality,” in Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, vol. 2, ed. Garber, D. and Nadler, S. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 105–147CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Johnson, Monte R., Aristotle on Teleology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 15–28CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially p. 23. Johnson labels this the theological perspective on final causality. He also notes the danger of misreading natural final causality in Aristotle according to a “heuristic perspective” that views final causes as aids to understanding that are metaphysically reducible to material or efficient causes (Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, p. 15).

10 Maier, Anneliese, “Philosophy of Nature at the End of the Middle Ages,” Philosophy Today 5 (1961), pp. 92–107CrossRefGoogle Scholar; “Das Problem der Finalkausalität um 1320,” in Metaphisische Hintergrunde der Spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome, 1955), pp. 273–299Google Scholar.

11 Lang argues that Aquinas's commentary on the Physics enacts a procedural reversal of Aristotelian teleology, thereby transforming physics from a science of nature as principle of motion into a science of motion terminating in God as the first source. See Helen Lang, “Aristotle's Physics: Teleological Method and Its Medieval Half-life,” in Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy: Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy (S.I.E.P.M.), vol. 3, ed. R. Työrinoja, A. Inkeri Lehtinen, and D. Føllesdal (Helsinki: Annals of the Finnish Society for Missiology and Ecumenics, 1990), pp. 103–110.

12 Final causality does provide the fifth way from ST I, q.2, a.3 but this ‘proof’ represents a miniscule portion of Thomas's larger discussions of final causality. See Jacques Follon, “Le finalisme chez Aristote et S. Thomas,” in Finalité et intentionnalité, pp. 11–39. On debates about reading Aquinas's five ways as proofs, see D. Turner, Faith, Reason and the Existence of God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). A more obvious or at least more extensive example of using final causality for proving God's existence can be found in John Duns Scotus's De primo principio. Using final causality within a proof for God's existence need in no way limit or prevent using final causality in other contexts and for other purposes.

13 Aquinas argues that “many definitions are assigned to any one thing according to diverse causes, but the complete definition encompasses all the causes (aliquando unius rei assignatur plures definitiones secundum diversas causas; sed perfecta definitio omnes causas complectitur)” (In Physic. II, l.5, n.7, p. 70).

14 As Johnson rightly notes, Aristotle's term aition is perhaps better translated as ‘explanation’ than as ‘cause’ (Johnson, Aristotle on Teleology, pp. 40–41).

15 In Physic. I, l.1, n.5, p. 5: “Nam mathematica non demonstrat nisi per causam formalem; metaphysica demonstrat per causam formalem et finalem praecipue, et etiam agentem; naturalis autem per omnes causas.”

16 In Physic. II, l.5, n.6, p. 70: “aliquid dicitur causa ut finis; et hoc est cuius causa aliquid fit, sicut sanitas dicitur ambulationis.” In Meta. V, l.2, n.771, p. 212 (In Duodecim Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, ed. Cathala, M.-R. and Spiazzi, R.M. [Taurini and Romae: Marietti, 1964])Google Scholar: “Nam haec quaestio quare, vel propter quid, quaerit de causa: cum enim quaeritur quare, vel propter quid ambulat, convenienter respondentes dicimus, ut sanetur.”

17 In Summa contra Gentiles III, c.2, Thomas argues that an agent's end can either be something produced by an action or the action itself.

18 See In Physic. II, l.8, n.208.

19 In Physic. II, l.10, n.5, p. 84: “Et dicit quod propter hoc quod fortuna non est nisi in his quae voluntarie agunt, inde est quod neque inanimatum neque puer neque bestia, cum non agant voluntarie quasi liberum arbitrium habentes (quod hic dicit propositum), non agunt a fortuna.”

20 In Physic. II, l.10, n.9, p. 85: “casus accidat in his quae sunt propter aliquid.”

21 In Physic. II, l.10, n.10, p. 85: “Cum enim aliquid fit extra naturam in operationibus naturae, puta cum nascitur sextus digitus, tunc non dicimus quod fiat a fortuna, sed magis ab eo quod et per se frustra, idest a casu. Et sic possumus accipere aliam differentiam inter casum et fortunam, quod eorum quae sunt a casu, causa est intrinseca, sicut eorum quae sunt a natura; eorum vero quae sunt a fortuna, causa est extrinseca, sicut et eorum quae sunt a proposito.”

22 In Physic. II, l.5, n.6, p. 70: “Et ulterius addit quod omnia quae sunt intermedia inter primum movens et ultimum finem, omnia sunt quodammodo fines.”

23 In Physic. II, l.5, n.6, p. 70: “Et hoc inducit ne aliquis credat quod solum id quod est ultimum sit causa sicut cuius gratia, propter hoc quod hoc nomen finis ultimum quoddam esse videtur. Est igitur omnis finis ultimum non simpliciter, sed respectu alicuius.”

24 In Physic. II, l.14, n.8, p. 96: “manifestum est quod ars agit propter aliquid; et tamen manifestum est quod ars non deliberat. Nec artifex deliberat inquantum habet artem, sed inquantum deficit a certitudine artis: unde artes certissimae non deliberant, sicut scriptor non deliberat quomodo debeat formare litteras. Et illi etiam artifices qui deliberant, postquam invenerunt certum principium artis, in exequendo non deliberant: unde citharaedus, si in tangendo quamlibet chordam deliberaret, imperitissimus videretur. Ex quo patet quod non deliberare contingit alicui agenti, non quia agit propter finem, sed quia habet determinata media per quae agit. Unde et natura, quia habet determinata media per quae agit, propter hoc non deliberat. In nullo enim alio natura ab arte videtur differre, nisi quia natura est principium intrinsecum, et ars est principium extrinsecum.”

25 Specifying ends as final causes raises this question of temporal sequence, whereas regarding ends as explanations of occurrences raises fewer problems of temporal sequence and ‘reverse’ causation.

26 In Physic. II, l.5, n.7, p. 70: “Nihil enim prohibet aliquid esse prius et posterius altero secundum diversas rationes: finis enim est prius secundum raionem, sed posterius in esse; agens autem e converso. Et similiter forma est prior quam materia secundum rationem complementi, materia autem est prius quam forma generatione et tempore in omni eo quod movetur de potentia in actum.”

27 In Meta. V, l.2, n.775, p. 213: “Est igitur efficiens causa finis, finis autem causa efficientis. Efficiens est causa finis quantum ad esse quidem, quia movendo perducit efficiens ad hoc, quod sit finis. Finis autem est causa efficientis non quantum ad esse, sed quantum ad rationem causalitas.”

28 Victor Salas stresses this twofold aspect in “The Twofold Character of Thomas Aquinas's Analogy of Being,” International Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2009), pp. 295–315CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

29 See In Physic. II, l.5, n.11; In Meta. V, l.3, n.782; ST I, q.5, a.2, ad 1.

30 In Physic. II, l.4, n.8, p. 66: “Ex quo possumus accipere quod sic se habet materia ad formam, sicut forma ad usum. Sed usus est cuius causa fit artificiatum: ergo et forma est cuius causa est materia in artificialibus. Et sicut in his quae sunt secundum artem, nos facimus materiam propter opus artis, quod est ipsum artificiatum; ita in naturalibus materia inest a natura non a nobis facta, nihilominus eundem habens ordinem ad formam, scilicet quod est propter formam.”

31 In Physic. II, l.11, n.2, p. 88: “Dicit ergo primo quod multoties contingit quod tres causae concurrunt in unam, ita quod causa formalis et finalis sint una secundum numerum. Et hoc intelligendum est de causa finali rei generatae. Finis enim generationis hominis est forma humana; non tamen finis hominis est forma eius, sed per formam suam convenit sibi operari ad finem.”

32 ST I, q.6, a.3, p. 35a (Summa theologiae [Ottawa: Comissio Piana, 1953): “Ipse etiam ad nihil aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus finis omnium rerum.” See also De veritate q.5, a.2.

33 ST I, q.5, a.4, p. 30a: “Dicendum quod cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem finis; manifestum est quod bonum rationem finis importat. Sed tamen ratio boni praesupponit rationem causae efficientis et rationem causae formalis. Videmus enim quod id quod est primum in causando, ultimum est in causato … . In causando autem primum invenitur bonum et finis, qui movet efficientem; secundo, actio efficientis, movens ad formam; tertio advenit forma. Unde e converso esse oportet in causato, quod primum sit ipsa forma, per quam est ens; secundo consideratur in ea virtus effectiva, secundum quod est perfectum in esse … ; tertio consequitur ratio boni, per quam in ente perfectio fundatur.”

34 In De div. nom. c.4, l.3, pp. 103–104 (In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio [Taurini and Romae: 1950]): “Causam autem huius ordinis assignat dicens, quod divina bonitas omnia convertit ad seipsam: hoc enim ipsum quod res ordinantur in Deum, ab ipso habent. Sunt enim res quasi dispersae et segregatae, secundum quod ad diversos fines proprios ordinantur, sed inquantum communicant in ordine ad ultimum finem, sic congregantur. Divina igitur bonitas, inquantum omnia ad seipsam convertit, est principaliter congregative omnium dispersorum, sicut quaedam deitas principaliter vivifica. Deinde, cum dicit: et omnia et cetera, assignat rationem ordinis: intantum enim omnia convertuntur in ipsum, inqauntum omnia desiderant ipsum triplici ratione, scilicet: ut principium activum; et ut continentiam, idest conservantiam rerum; et ut finem, ista est triplex ratio desiderii. Desideramus enim Deum ut principium quia ex eo provenit nobis bonum; ut continentiam quia ex eo conservatur nobis bonum; ut finem quem adipisci intendimus.”

35 In Physic. II, l.12, n.1, p. 90: “Dicit ergo primo, quod dicendum primo quod natura est de numero illarum causarum quae propter aliquid agunt. Et hac valet ad quaestionem de providentia. Ea enim quae non cognoscunt finem, non tendunt in finem nisi ut directa ab aliquo cognoscente, sicut sagitta a sagittante: unde si natura operetur propter finem, necesse est quod ab aliquo intelligente ordinetur; quod est providentiae opus.” See also In Meta. V, l.16, n.1000 and De veritate q.5, a.2 for similar arguments.

36 Aertsen, Nature and Creature, p. 347.

37 See ST I, q.22, a.4, ad 1.