Book contents
- Climate Justice and Historical Emissions
- Climate Justice and Historical Emissions
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- 1 Climate Ethics, Affirmative Action, and Unjust Enrichment
- 2 Historical Responsibility and Climate Change
- 3 Historical Emissions
- 4 How Legal Systems Deal with Issues of Responsibility for Past Harmful Behavior
- 5 Asking Beneficiaries to Pay for Past Pollution
- 6 Benefiting from Unjust Acts and Benefiting from Injustice
- 7 A Luck-Based Moral Defense of Grandfathering
- 8 In Defense of Emissions Egalitarianism?
- 9 In the Name of Political Possibility
- 10 Right to Development and Historical Emissions
- Index
- References
7 - A Luck-Based Moral Defense of Grandfathering
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 February 2017
Book contents
- Climate Justice and Historical Emissions
- Climate Justice and Historical Emissions
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Contributors
- Introduction
- 1 Climate Ethics, Affirmative Action, and Unjust Enrichment
- 2 Historical Responsibility and Climate Change
- 3 Historical Emissions
- 4 How Legal Systems Deal with Issues of Responsibility for Past Harmful Behavior
- 5 Asking Beneficiaries to Pay for Past Pollution
- 6 Benefiting from Unjust Acts and Benefiting from Injustice
- 7 A Luck-Based Moral Defense of Grandfathering
- 8 In Defense of Emissions Egalitarianism?
- 9 In the Name of Political Possibility
- 10 Right to Development and Historical Emissions
- Index
- References
Summary
Emissions grandfathering apportions emission rights according to historically established emission levels. Only very recently have Bovens (2011) and Knight (2013, 2014) produced the first sustained philosophical defenses of grandfathering. The paper will argue that Bovens’ Lockean justification of emissions grandfathering fails but take up his idea of temporary grandfathering, which will be developed in new directions on the basis of luck-related justice. In contrast to Knight’s (2014) luck egalitarian approach, I will suggest temporary remedies only against brute bad luck that comes in the form of external shocks. It is a shock to find oneself without one’s fault, as the citizens of industrialized countries did in 1990, in conditions that require a massive lifestyle change. However, rather than compensation it is time for adaptation to a new situation that should in principle be granted to relatively affluent people who are seriously affected by external shocks. This legitimates successive proportional emission cuts in industrialized countries relative to a reference year such as 1990.
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- Information
- Climate Justice and Historical Emissions , pp. 141 - 164Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2017
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