Book contents
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language
- Cambridge Handbooks in Language and Linguistics
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Philosophy of Language: Definitions, Disciplines, and Approaches
- Part I The Past, Present, and Future of Philosophy of Language
- Part II Some Foundational Issues
- Part III From Truth to Vagueness
- Part IV Issues in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Part V Philosophical Implications and Linguistic Theories
- Part VI Some Extensions
- 31 The Philosophy of Argument
- 32 Negation and Denial
- 33 Deception: Lying and Beyond
- 34 Types and Definitions of Irony
- 35 Philosophy of Language and Metaphor
- 36 Analytic Philosophy of Literature
- 37 The Many Facets of Linguistic Relativity
- References
- Index
32 - Negation and Denial
from Part VI - Some Extensions
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 November 2021
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language
- Cambridge Handbooks in Language and Linguistics
- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Contributors
- Preface
- 1 Philosophy of Language: Definitions, Disciplines, and Approaches
- Part I The Past, Present, and Future of Philosophy of Language
- Part II Some Foundational Issues
- Part III From Truth to Vagueness
- Part IV Issues in Semantics and Pragmatics
- Part V Philosophical Implications and Linguistic Theories
- Part VI Some Extensions
- 31 The Philosophy of Argument
- 32 Negation and Denial
- 33 Deception: Lying and Beyond
- 34 Types and Definitions of Irony
- 35 Philosophy of Language and Metaphor
- 36 Analytic Philosophy of Literature
- 37 The Many Facets of Linguistic Relativity
- References
- Index
Summary
How do negation and denial relate? Is one of them prior to or more basic than the other? Can we, for instance, explain denial in terms of negation; or negation in terms of denial? There is at least a prima facie connection between them, since one way in which we can deny something is to say that it is not the case. We can also use cognate terms such as no, to express a flat rejection, or various prefixes and suffixes for predicates, such as when we say that something is inflexible, unknown, imperfect, nonstandard, or flawless. Negation can be understood in a broad sense linguistically to include these cognates, whereas in formal logic it is understood in a strict and univocal way, where if it is true that P, then it is false that not-P and if it is true that not-P, then it is false that P. Here negation is used as a function from truth-values to truth-values, whereas denial seems to fall into the category of speech act. Even if negation and denial belong to different categories, however, it is plausible that some relation holds between them.
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- The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language , pp. 590 - 605Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2021