Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-pfhbr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-10T12:12:00.931Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

56 - Compliance in Occupational Safety and Health

from Part IX - Analysis of Particular Fields

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2021

Benjamin van Rooij
Affiliation:
School of Law, University of Amsterdam
D. Daniel Sokol
Affiliation:
University of Florida
Get access

Summary

Abstract: Quite apart from government regulations and enforcement, employers usually have many incentives to keep workers safe and these have led to major reductions in deaths and injuries. But safety can be costly and disagreements about the worth of some safety measures are inevitable. Leaders of small firms will often have limited information about the risks they face and survey data show that they are less likely to recognize the benefits of safety investments. Preventing long-term exposures that can cause chronic diseases is especially costly and less likely to offer benefits to employers. Governments differ in their approaches to workplace safety. Some, like the United States, essentially train inspectors to identify, cite and punish failures to comply with a detailed list of requirements. Others rely less on punishment and more on training inspectors to offer advice to firms about how to improve. The latter focus less on compliance with detailed standards and more on systematic procedures to give more weight to safety. Evidence from manufacturing that inspections with penalties are followed by reductions in injuries indicates that inspections can affect outcomes beyond compliance. These studies rarely find that the size of the penalty has an effect, although it seems likely that unusually large penalties would draw management’s attention. Important reasons to comply with standards also include beliefs about the legitimacy of regulatory authorities and the fairness of the enforcement process as well as professional norms and empathy.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Ayres, Ian, and Braithwaite, John. 1992. Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Bardach, Eugene B., and Kagan, Robert A.. 1982. Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness, Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.Google Scholar
Bartels, Ann P., and Thomas, Lacy Glenn. 1985. “Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA’s Impact.” Journal of Law and Economics 28:125.Google Scholar
Becker, Gary S. 1968. “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76:169217.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Blanc, Florentin. 2016. “From Chasing Violations to Managing Risks: Origins, Challenges and Evolutions in Regulatory Inspections.” PhD dissertation, University of Leiden.Google Scholar
Blanc, Florentin. 2018. “Tools for Effective Regulation: Is ‘More’ Always ‘Better’?European Journal of Risk Regulation 9:465–82.Google Scholar
Borck, Jonathan C., and Coglianese, Cary. 2011. “Beyond Compliance: Explaining Business Participation in Voluntary Environmental Programs.” Penn Law School Public Law and Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 12–06.Google Scholar
Bradbury, J. C. 2006. “Regulatory Federalism and Workplace Safety: Evidence from OSHA Enforcement, 1981–1995”. Journal of Regulatory Economics 29:211–24.Google Scholar
Braithwaite, J., and Makkai, T.. 1991. “Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence.” Law and Society Review 25:739.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Castleman, Barry I., and Ziem, G. E.. 1988. “Corporate Influence on Threshold Limit Values.” American Journal of Industrial Medicine 13:531–59.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Cheit, Ross. 1990. Setting Safety Standards. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 2006. “Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation and Safety Annual Report.” Harrisburg, PA: Department of Labor and Industry.Google Scholar
Cyert, Richard, and March, James G.. 1963. A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
European Agency for Safety Health at Work. 2010. European Survey of Enterprises on New Emerging Risks: Managing Safety Health at Work. Bilbao, Spain: European Agency for Safety Health at Work. European Risk Observatory Report TE-RO-10–002-EN-C, 2010. As of December 30, 2011. http://osha.europa.eu/en/publications/reports/esener1_osh_management.Google Scholar
Gray, Wayne B., and Jones, Carole A.. 1991a. “Are OSHA Health Inspections Effective? A Longitudinal Study in the Manufacturing Sector.” Review of Economics and Statistics 73:504–8.Google Scholar
Gray, Wayne B., and Jones, Carole A.. 1991b. “Longitudinal Patterns of Compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration Health and Safety Regulations in the Manufacturing Sector.” Journal of Human Resources 26:623–53.Google Scholar
Gray, Wayne B., and Scholz, John. 1993. “Does Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement.” Law & Society Review 27:177213.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gunningham, Neil, Kagan, Robert A. and Thornton, Dorothy. 2003. Shades of Green: Business, Regulation, and Environment. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Haviland, Amelia, Burns, Rachel, Gray, Wayne B., Ruder, Teague and Mendeloff, John. 2010. “What Kinds of Injuries Do OSHA Inspections Prevent?Journal of Safety Research 41:339–45.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Hawkins, Keith. 2002. Law as Last Resort: Prosecution Decision-Making in a Regulatory Agency. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hopkins, Anthony. 1994. “Compliance with What?British Journal of Criminology 34:431443.Google Scholar
Huber, Gregory. 2007. The Craft of Bureaucratic Neutrality: Interests and Influence in Governmental Regulation of Occupational Safety. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Hutter, Bridget M. 1988. The Reasonable Arm of the Law? The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Johnson, Matthew S. 2020. “Regulation by Shaming: Deterrence Effects of Publicizing Violations of Workplace Safety and Health Laws.” American Economic Review 110(6):18661904.Google Scholar
Jung, Juergen, and Makowsky, Michael D.. 2014. “The Determinants of Federal and State Enforcement of Workplace Safety Regulations: OSHA Inspections 1990–2010.” Journal of Regulatory Economics 45:133.Google Scholar
Kagan, Robert A. 1994. “Regulatory Enforcement.” In Handbook of Regulation and Administrative Law, Rosenbloom, D. H. and Schwartz, R. D., eds. New York: Marcel Dekker.Google Scholar
Kagan, Robert A., Gunningham, Neil and Thornton, Dorothy. 2011. “Fear, Duty, and Regulatory Compliance: Lessons from Three Research Projects.” In Explaining Compliance: Business Responses to Regulation, Parker, Christina and Neilsen, Vibeke, eds. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
Kelman, Steven. 1981. Regulating America, Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Safety and Health Policy. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Ko, Kilkon, Mendeloff, John and Gray, Wayne. 2010. “The Role of Inspection Sequence in Compliance with the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Standards: Interpretations and Implications.” Regulation and Governance 4:4870.Google Scholar
Lofgren, Don J. 1989. Dangerous Premises: An Insider’s View of OSHA Enforcement. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
McClure, Kim V. 2019. “Understanding Regulatory Workplace Safety Inspections in British Columbia: Theory and Evidence.” PhD dissertation, University of British Columbia.Google Scholar
Mendeloff, John. 1979. Regulating Safety: A Political and Economic Analysis of OSHA. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Mendeloff, John. 1984. “The Role of OSHA Violations in Serious Workplace Accidents.” Journal of Occupational Medicine May: 353–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mendeloff, John. 1988. The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Mendeloff, John. 1995. “An Evaluation of OSHA’s ‘Top 200’ Program in Maine.” A Report to the OSHA Office of Policy.Google Scholar
Mendeloff, John, and Burns, Rachel. 2013. “States with Low Non-fatal Injury Rates Have High Fatality Rates and Vice-Versa.” American Journal of Industrial Medicine 56:509–19.Google Scholar
Mendeloff, John, and Gray, Wayne B.. 2001. “An Evaluation of OSHA’s Consultation Program.” Report to the OSHA Office of Policy.Google Scholar
Mendeloff, John, and Gray, Wayne B.. 2005. “Inside the Black Box: What Kinds of Injuries Do OSHA Inspections Prevent?Law and Policy 27:219–37.Google Scholar
Mendeloff, John, and Staetsky, Laura. 2014. “Occupational Fatality Risks in the United States and the United Kingdom.” American Journal of Industrial Medicine 57:414.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Mendeloff, John, Haviland, Amelia, Gray, Wayne B., Main, Regan and Xia, Jing. 2012. “An Evaluation of the California Injury and Illness Prevention Program.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, TR-1190, 2012.Google Scholar
Mendeloff, John, Dworsky, Michael, Gray, Wayne B. and Castillo, Jose. 2014. “Options for Improving Complaint Inspections and Follow-Up Inspections in the Cal-OSHA Program.” RAND Corporation, PR-1261, November 2014.Google Scholar
Mendeloff, John, Gray, Wayne B., Armour, Philip and Neuhauser, Frank. 2020. “The Re-Occurrence of Violations in Occupational Safety and Health Administration Inspections.” Forthcoming in Regulation and Governance.Google Scholar
Nichols, Theo. 1997. The Sociology of Industrial Injury: Employment and Work Relations in Context. London: Mansell.Google Scholar
Occupational Safety and Health Administration Field Operations Manual. 2011.Google Scholar
Oleinick, A., Gluck, J. V. and Guire, K. E.. 1995. “Establishment Size and Risk of Occupational Injury.” American Journal of Industrial Medicine 28:121.Google Scholar
Parker, Christina and Neilsen, Vibeke. 2011. eds. Explaining Compliance: Business Responses to Regulation. Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
Paternoster, Raymond, and Simpson, Sally S.. 1993. “A Rational Choice Theory of Corporate Crime.” In Routine Activity and Rational Choice: Advances in Criminological Theory Vol. 5, Clarke, Ronald V. and Felson, Marcus, eds. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.Google Scholar
Reason, James. 1997. Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.Google Scholar
Schell-Busey, Natalie. 2017. “Do Extralegal Variables Impact the Post-Inspection Process of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration?Crime, Law and Social Change 68:187216.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scholz, John T., and Wei, Feng Heng. 1986. “Regulatory Enforcement in a Federalist System.” American Political Science Review 80:1249–70.Google Scholar
Scholz, John T., and Gray, Wayne B.. 1990. “OSHA Enforcement and Workplace Injuries: A Behavioral Approach to Risk Assessment.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 3:283305.Google Scholar
Scholz, John T., Twombly, Jim and Headrick, Barbara. 1991. “Street-Level Political Controls over Federal Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review 85:829–50.Google Scholar
Shapiro, Sidney, and Rabinowitz, Randi. 1997. “Punishment versus Cooperation in Regulatory Enforcement: A Case Study of OSHA.” Administrative Law Review 49:713–62.Google Scholar
Shapiro, Sidney, and Rabinowitz, Randi. 2000. “Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA.” Administrative Law Review 52:97155.Google Scholar
Simpson, Sally S., and Rorie, Melissa. 2011. “Motivating Compliance: Economic and Material Motives for Compliance.” in Parker, Christina and Vibeke, Neilsen. eds. Explaining Compliance: Business Responses to Regulation. Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar
Sims, Robert H. 1988. “Hazard Abatement as a Function of Firm Size.” PhD Dissertation, RAND Graduate School.Google Scholar
Siskind, Frederick B. 2002. “Twentieth Century OSHA Enforcement Data: A Review and Explanation of the Major Trends.” Washington, DC: US Department of Labor, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy, Evaluation, and Research.Google Scholar
Viscusi, W. Kip. 1983. Risk by Choice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Viscusi, W Kip. 1986. “The Impact of Occupational Safety and Health Regulation, 1973–83.” RAND Journal of Economics 17:567–80.Google Scholar
Walters, David, Johnstone, Richard, Frick, Kaj, Quinlan, Michael, Baril-Gingras, Genevieve and Thebaud-Mony, Annie. 2011. Regulating Workplace Risks: A Comparative Study of Inspection Regimes in Times of Change. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Weil, David. 1996. “If OSHA Is So Bad, Why Is Compliance So Good?RAND Journal of Economics 27:618–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wood, Dan B., and Waterman, Richard W.. 1994. Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×