This chapter contains discussion of two distinct skeptical ways around the Darwinian problem of evil. One way is neo-Cartesian theory, according to which we are in no epistemic position to know that animals suffer in a subjective manner comparable to the conscious suffering of human beings. The other isSkeptical Theism, according to which we are in no epistemic position to say with confidence that some apparently gratuitous evils really are gratuitous, i.e., not grounded in morally sufficient reasons that God has for allowing them. The author explains why he does not accept either of these skeptical means of escape from the Darwinian Problem. The prima facie appearance of animal suffering is too strong to be overridden by the reasons and evidence that advocates of the neo-Cartesian view give for such skepticism. Further, the author contends that the absence of God-justifying explanation, which advocates of Skeptical Theism see as expected on theism, is in fact incompatible with the parental goodness of God.