Esse quam videri.1 This maxim, though coined by Cicero, captures the heart of all Socrates’ teaching, especially on the subject of justice. Yet Glaucon and Adeimantus challenge their teacher’s conviction by posing a daunting test: Prove that the truly just person can remain happy even when she is perceived to be unjust. This test case goes beyond the simple question of whether the good person can be happy in the midst of unjust suffering. It asks the deeper question, Is one’s happiness so firmly grounded in the knowledge and love of one’s virtue that one can be at peace within oneself even when one is wrongly accused of being or doing the very thing one hates? Can one bear being thought contemptible? Can the just person, who prides herself in her justice, rise above the humiliation of libelous accusations of injustice? Aristotle’s notion of μεγαλοψυχία complicates the question by focusing on honor. Whence comes the virtuous person’s sense of self-worth? Is it from self-knowledge or society’s approbation? Ultimately, it is not enough to be just; rather one must be indifferent to public shame and dishonor.