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Erik Stei

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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2023

Erik Stei

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Erik Stei: Affiliation:
Universiteit Utrecht, The Netherlands

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Information: Logical Pluralism and Logical Consequence , pp. 208 - 217

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108859585 [Opens in a new window]

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Print publication year: 2023

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