Book contents
- High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil
- High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 High Court–Elected Branch Interactions in Latin America
- 2 Setting the Scene:
- 3 Politicization and the Political Court in Argentina
- 4 Professionalization and the Statesman Court in Brazil
- 5 The Political Court, and High Court Submission and Interbranch Confrontation in Argentina
- 6 The Statesman Court and Interbranch Accommodation in Brazil
- 7 Conclusions and Implications
- Appendices
- Appendix 1.1. Case-Selection Methodology, Argentina and Brazil
- Appendix 5.1. Eighteen Crucial Economic Policy Cases Decided by the Argentine CSJN (1984–2003) (in chronological order by year of ruling)
- Appendix 5.2. Intensity of Argentine CSJN Rulings Endorsing the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases (strongest to weakest)
- Appendix 5.3. Intensity of Argentine CSJN Rulings Challenging the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases (weakest to strongest)
- Appendix 5.4. Considerations Imputed to be Important to Argentine CSJN Rulings on Eighteen Crucial Economic Policy Cases and Approach to Decision Making (ordered by ruling assertiveness – from strongest to weakest endorsement; from weakest to strongest challenge)
- Appendix 5.5. Elected Branches’ Compliance with and Retaliation against CSJN Rulings Challenging the Exercise of Government Power (in order of degree of compliance)
- Appendix 6.1. Twenty-Six Crucial Economic Policy Cases Decided by the Brazilian STF (1985–2004) (in chronological order by year of ruling)
- Appendix 6.2. Intensity of Brazilian STF Rulings Endorsing the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases (strongest to weakest)
- Appendix 6.3. Intensity of Brazilian STF Rulings Challenging the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases (weakest to strongest)
- Appendix 6.4. Considerations Imputed to be Important to Brazilian STF Rulings on Twenty Crucial Economic Policy Cases/Case Pairs and Approach to Decision Making (ordered by ruling assertiveness – from strongest to weakest endorsement; from weakest to strongest challenge)
- Appendix 6.5. Elected Branches’ Compliance with and Retaliation against STF Rulings Challenging the Exercise of Government Power (in order of degree of compliance)
- Notes Concerning Citations to Interviews and Newspaper Articles
- References
- Index
Appendix 5.2. - Intensity of Argentine CSJN Rulings Endorsing the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases (strongest to weakest)
from Appendices
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 October 2012
- High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil
- High Courts and Economic Governance in Argentina and Brazil
- Copyright page
- Contents
- Figures and Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1 High Court–Elected Branch Interactions in Latin America
- 2 Setting the Scene:
- 3 Politicization and the Political Court in Argentina
- 4 Professionalization and the Statesman Court in Brazil
- 5 The Political Court, and High Court Submission and Interbranch Confrontation in Argentina
- 6 The Statesman Court and Interbranch Accommodation in Brazil
- 7 Conclusions and Implications
- Appendices
- Appendix 1.1. Case-Selection Methodology, Argentina and Brazil
- Appendix 5.1. Eighteen Crucial Economic Policy Cases Decided by the Argentine CSJN (1984–2003) (in chronological order by year of ruling)
- Appendix 5.2. Intensity of Argentine CSJN Rulings Endorsing the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases (strongest to weakest)
- Appendix 5.3. Intensity of Argentine CSJN Rulings Challenging the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases (weakest to strongest)
- Appendix 5.4. Considerations Imputed to be Important to Argentine CSJN Rulings on Eighteen Crucial Economic Policy Cases and Approach to Decision Making (ordered by ruling assertiveness – from strongest to weakest endorsement; from weakest to strongest challenge)
- Appendix 5.5. Elected Branches’ Compliance with and Retaliation against CSJN Rulings Challenging the Exercise of Government Power (in order of degree of compliance)
- Appendix 6.1. Twenty-Six Crucial Economic Policy Cases Decided by the Brazilian STF (1985–2004) (in chronological order by year of ruling)
- Appendix 6.2. Intensity of Brazilian STF Rulings Endorsing the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases (strongest to weakest)
- Appendix 6.3. Intensity of Brazilian STF Rulings Challenging the Exercise of Government Power on Crucial Economic Policy Cases (weakest to strongest)
- Appendix 6.4. Considerations Imputed to be Important to Brazilian STF Rulings on Twenty Crucial Economic Policy Cases/Case Pairs and Approach to Decision Making (ordered by ruling assertiveness – from strongest to weakest endorsement; from weakest to strongest challenge)
- Appendix 6.5. Elected Branches’ Compliance with and Retaliation against STF Rulings Challenging the Exercise of Government Power (in order of degree of compliance)
- Notes Concerning Citations to Interviews and Newspaper Articles
- References
- Index
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- Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2012