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Part V - Evolutionary Game Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 October 2017

Edited by
Stephen M. Maurer
Stephen M. Maurer
Affiliation:
University of California, Berkeley
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Summary

Received March 9, 1997; revised March 14, 1999

A long-standing conjecture is that winner-take-all games such as patent races lead to the survival of risk-takers and the extinction of risk-averters. In many species a winner-take-all game determines the males’ right to reproduce, and the same argument suggests that males will evolve to be risk-takers. Psychological and sociological evidence buttresses the argument that males are more risk-taking than females. Using an evolutionary model of preference-formation, we investigate to what extent evolution leads to risk-taking in winner-take-all environments.

Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8.

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On the Shoulders of Giants
Colleagues Remember Suzanne Scotchmer's Contributions to Economics
 , pp. 264 - 306
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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