This is the last in a series of chapters dealing with opportunism problems. As in chapters 16 and 17, this chapter uses a repeated game framework where agents cannot make binding commitments about input supply or side payments. Agents have heterogeneous productivities in the event that they hold control rights in firms. Because these productivities are private information, adverse selection can arise between controllers and non-controllers. Equilibria are required to be stationary, with all agents having correct beliefs and input markets clearing. A range of possible equilibria are explored, including cases where all firm controllers are honest, and cases where a subset of the controllers are dishonest and cheat the non-controlling agents. Under some circumstances it is possible to have an equilibrium where all firms are capital-managed or where all firms are labor-managed. The symmetry of the model is broken when the capital suppliers have liquidity advantages and can offer to pay wages prior to production. This expands the set of parameter values for which there is an equilibrium with only capitalist firms.