This chapter builds on chapters 2-4 to construct a general equilibrium framework for comparing labor management with other economic systems under competitive conditions. There are two types of goods, 'ordinary' goods and 'share' goods. Ordinary goods are traded on conventional markets and are bought and sold without any transfer of control rights. Share goods are acquired or sold by firms using shares that carry residual claims on firm income as well as control rights. The analysis shows that control rights can be assigned to capital suppliers, labor suppliers, or output consumers in ways that guarantee unanimity with respect to the firm's production plan. Any allocation that can be supported by an equilibrium of a Walrasian economy with given preferences, technology, and resource endowments can be supported by an equilibrium in a parallel share goods economy. The Pareto efficiency of a Walrasian economy therefore carries over to a share goods economy where firms are controlled by labor suppliers. One implication is that any theory purporting to explain the asymmetries between capital-managed and labor-managed firms must identify some market imperfections.