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The traditional teleological argument for the existence of God, commonly known as ‘the design argument’, aims to ground belief in God’s existence in empirical evidence drawn from the world around us. The most telling items of evidence to which this argument appeals are biological organs that serve specific functions superbly well. The eye, to cite a frequently used example, serves the purpose of seeing so impressively, it seems impossible that it could have arisen by chance. Rather, it must have been brought into existence for that purpose by an intentional designer, which is to say, God.

David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, it is widely accepted, constitute an exhaustive and devastating critique of this argument. The characters engaged in dialogue debate a very modest version of the conclusion that the design argument might be held to sustain, namely, ‘That the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man’. Yet ultimately, even this very limited claim is found to be wanting. The design argument, which had widespread appeal in Hume’s own day, is wholly lacking in cogency, it seems.

In the Dialogues, the character who articulates and defends the design argument is Cleanthes. The character who undermines it is Philo. Somewhat strangely, however, in the opening paragraphs of the final part of the work Philo, the sceptic, suddenly seems to endorse the very conclusion he has been attacking. He remarks to Cleanthes:

Is this really a volte-face? Is Philo in the end unpersuaded by the arguments he himself has made? The quoted passage has often been interpreted in this way, but there is at least one interpretation that makes the reversal a little less dramatic. Possibly, Philo is here giving voice to a lingering psychological doubt. The key lies in the word ‘inexplicable’ and in the phrase ‘at all times’.