For most of the history of conflicts between states and sub-state armed groups in the twentieth century, the initial response to the violent campaigns of such groups has been through counter-terrorism tactics, namely the use of force against terrorism. Investigations into the causes of these conflicts and of the goals of these groups by decision makers have resulted in the application of non-violent, political resolution efforts between the main armed protagonists. As ethno-nationalist groups have predominantly political aims, and tend to organise violent attacks as a tactic, it is important to assess peace efforts towards ending these conflicts. While states respond to the violence conducted by sub-state armed groups through counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategies as a first resort, their failure is most likely to result in the application of political attempts at conflict resolution. This book argues that an armed struggle between the security forces of states and sub-state armed groups is not an effective method of bringing ethno-nationalist conflicts to an end. It also argues that such conflicts are too complex to be resolved through official negotiations that only involve the main armed protagonists. Ethno-nationalist groups’ ethnic iden tity, desire for self-determination and territorial concerns are related to a specific context, which reveals a dilemma related to the choice of whether a state pursues armed struggle or a non-military solution. Th ere has been a marked increase in eff orts to fi nd non-violent resolutions to these intra-state conflicts, particularly in the post-Cold War era, in arenas such as the Cyprus, Israeli–Palestinian and South African conflicts. However, the existing literature has paid relatively little attention to political attempts towards ending violence in ethno-nationalist conflicts. In addition, the existing conflict resolution literature primarily focuses on negotiations and largely overlooks the importance of other peace initiatives for making peace. This book aims to fill this gap in two ways: firstly, it suggests a more comprehensive framework for resolving ethno-nationalist conflicts, which begins at the pre-negotiation stage through backchannel communications and the initiatives of peace organisations.