This book started from the observation of contradictory, flip-flopping, muddling-though behaviour in international politics, and from the assessment that the existing theoretical repertoire in International Relations (IR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) does not really help us to make sense of these phenomena, which we nevertheless frequently observe. To address this gap, I proposed a conceptualization of reluctance that tries to move away from the often polemic and politically charged use of this notion. Building on different stages of concept reconstruction and concept building, in Chapter 2 I proposed an understanding of reluctance that focuses on two constitutive dimensions: hesitation and recalcitrance. Since both dimensions can be operationalized and observed empirically, my conceptualization of reluctance can be used for the classification of foreign policy, and can be usefully applied in empirical analyses.

Chapter 3 was devoted to developing a theory of reluctance in order to explain why this phenomenon originates and why it can be observed in different intensities across various cases. Building on a range of theoretical approaches from IR and FPA more broadly, I argued that a reluctant foreign policy will emerge if governments are faced with difficulties in devising clear preferences and, at the same time, a number of different and competing expectations by external actors. Such difficulties in preference formation can, in turn, emerge for a number of reasons.

For one, governments might be politically weak, which makes it difficult for them to devise a clear foreign policy course and to implement it. Second, states might have capacity problems of various kinds. They might have a weak bureaucratic apparatus and insufficient resources to implement a coherent foreign policy; or the state apparatus might be well equipped, but fundamentally divided. Forms of bureaucratic infighting such as struggles among different ministries can lead to problems in devising a clear foreign policy course and ultimately to flip-flopping or contradictory policies and statements on the part of various actors. A third possible driver of reluctance has to do with the individuals involved in decision making, and especially with their cognitive abilities. These can be seriously hampered in grave crisis situations that require swift decision making, and this can lead to a range of psychological mechanisms that ultimately result in ambiguous and hesitant policies.