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4 - Was Wittgenstein a Liberal Philosopher?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 August 2020

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Summary

Introduction

There is a substantial literature on the question of whether Wittgenstein was a conservative philosopher but much less has been written on the question of whether Wittgenstein was a liberal philosopher despite the fact that, as Robert Greenleaf Brice has recently argued, there are hints of liberalism in Wittgenstein's writings. Brice ultimately argues that the case for Wittgenstein being a liberal is no stronger than the case for him being a conservative. In both cases the evidence is a long way from conclusive. However, other philosophers have been less circumspect. In his essay ‘Wittgenstein and the Conversation of Justice’, Richard Eldridge argues that ‘a kind of substantive or weak perfectionist liberalism’ follows from ‘the condition of the human person that is enacted in Philosophical Investigations’. Richard Rorty puts a pragmatist spin on Wittgenstein's work and suggests that liberalism is a mode of thought with greater utility than others – one which allows us to cope better. And Alice Crary, while critical of Rorty, suggests that the lessons learned from her own interpretation of Wittgenstein are ‘reflected in forms of social life that embody the ideals of liberal democracy’.

In this chapter I will agree with Brice that there is neither a particularly strong case in favour of Wittgenstein being a liberal and nor is there a particularly strong case to be made in favour of liberalism using Wittgenstein’s philosophical writings. In the course of coming to those conclusions I will first examine the variety of positions going by the name of liberalism. I will then go on to look at the case that Brice pieces together in support of the claim that Wittgenstein was a liberal in Exploring Certainty. Following that, I will go on to argue that Eldridge, Rorty, and Crary fail to demonstrate that there are liberal tendencies in Wittgensteinian philosophy. While agreeing with much of what Crary says in her arguments against Rorty I will argue that no broad ideological conclusions follow from Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks.

Liberalism

The most obvious thing to say about liberalism is that liberals seek after liberty or freedom. However, there are different accounts of what liberty and freedom amount to and of what it is that should be free.

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Wittgenstein and the Social Sciences
Action, Ideology and Justice
, pp. 87 - 112
Publisher: Anthem Press
Print publication year: 2020

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