In 1122, William VI, count of Auvergne, seized the town of Clermont, along with its cathedral. The contemporary French chronicler Suger of St. Denis offers this cryptic statement on how it was accomplished: ‘[Aimeri, bishop of Clermont], appealing to the lord king, laid before him a tearful complaint on behalf of the Church, that the count of Auvergne had occupied the city and had fortified the Church of the Blessed Mary through the deception of his dean, together with many tyrannical acts’. No other information is provided. Who was this dean? Why did he help William? What was the nature of the fraus he committed and how did it help William fortify the cathedral? It is not always possible to tell how and why a stronghold fell, especially when chroniclers use vague terms such as ‘fraud’ or ‘treachery’. Some cases, however, are more explicit and commanders are depicted actively soliciting traitors in the enemy garrison. This was a sound strategy, as it allowed the attackers to take a stronghold quickly, without risking a full-frontal assault. Frontinus dedicated a section of his Strategemata to various examples of how to entice members of a garrison to commit treachery (‘De eliciendis ad proditionem’):

When discussing siege warfare, medieval chroniclers would sometimes present bribery as the logical alternative to violent assault. This is a variation of the common topos of presenting force and trickery as two potential methods of achieving victory (see Chapter 8). For example, Roger of Wendover described Louis VIII of France's advance to La Rochelle (ruled at that time by Henry III of England) in 1224 as follows: ‘In that same year Louis, king of the French, led a grand army to La Rochelle, to conquer the town either by arms or by money’.