INTRODUCTION

Ernest (better known as Ernie) Bevin (1881–1951) remains the first and only postwar British foreign minister with substantial claims to the title of statesman. His achievements are widely recognized and stand in contrast with both the decidedly greyer, smoother personalities of the majority of his successors and the ice-cold reality of the ever diminishing assets at their command.

Bevin's lengthy years in office mark an attempt to protect and promote the concept of Britain as a great power with substantial global political, strategic and economic interests. Central to Bevin's stance was the determination that Britain should be seen as a victor nation that could stand up to and deal from a position of strength, though rarely full equality, with the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet even as the Labour government gained power at what proved to be an unexpectedly swift end to the war in the Asia-Pacific, American commentators were confidently predicting that it was ‘clear, first of all, that there are now only two nations – America and Russia – of really predominant power. They alone possess the resources to wage war on a global scale… most of the lesser nations are now being drawn by a sort of Law of Political Gravity into the orbits of one or the other of the two Super-Powers.’ The overwhelming importance of preparing appropriate policy in the deteriorating atmosphere of what was already being defined as ‘an armed truce’ and would soon be dubbed the Cold War inevitably left the foreign secretary with relatively little time to supervise the secondary field of Japanese business.

THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN – BRITISH POLICY AND THE AUSTRALIAN DIMENSION

British occupation policy was handled by Bevin's Foreign Office officials. When challenges from the Board of Trade, the Treasury and the Dominions Office (later renamed the Commonwealth Relations Office) emerged these were met and generally rebuffed as likely to jeopardize the overall thrust of British policy.