195. So, we are all unerring with regard to our own pathē, but we all make mistakes with regard to the external object. And those are apprehensible, but this is inapprehensible because the soul is too weak to distinguish it on account of the places, the distances, the motions, the changes, and numerous other causes. Hence, they say that no criterion is common (koinon) to mankind but that common names (onomata koina) are assigned (tithesthai) to the objects.

196. All people call something (ti) white or sweet in common (koinōs), but they do not have something common (koinon ti) that is white or sweet. Each person is aware of his own private (idion) pathos, but whether this pathos occurs in him and in his neighbour from a white object (apo leukou) neither he himself can tell, since he is not submitting to the pathos of his neighbour, nor can the neighbour tell, since he is not submitting to the pathos of the other person.

197. And since no pathos is common (koinon) to us all, it is hasty to declare that what appears to me of a certain kind appears of this same kind to my neighbour as well. […]